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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the Italian Black Bands, one of the most famous units of mercenary 
infantry of the sixteenth century, and of their relationships with their employer, the 
Florentine republic, from the death of their founder and first commander Giovanni 
de'Medici (1498-1526) to their disbandment after the surrender of the army of the 
League of Cognac, of which they were part, at Aversa, near Naples, on 30 August 1528. 
In order to establish an adequate framework, the figure and the myth of Giovanni 
de'Medici - in memory of whom his men wore permanently the black bands of 
mourning - are examined at the beginning of the dissertation, and his role and place in 
the tactical and administrative developments that characterised the end of the Italian 
Wars reassessed. Particular attention has been paid to the analysis of the peculiarities of 
the Italian infantry at the end of the Italian Wars, such as its reliance on arquebuses 
rather than pikes and its specialization in assault and skirmish instead of shock tactics, 
and to the problems that these peculiarities created for states like Florence, which 
sought, unsuccessfully, to invert the pike-to-shot ratio and to transform the Black Bands 
from an expeditionary force into a defensive militia. Eventually, the last part of this 
thesis has been dedicated to the siege laid by the army of the League to Naples in 1528, 
one of the most important and less studied sieges of the sixteenth century, whose 
dramatic outcome shattered the residual hopes of the pro-French party after the battle of 
Pavia (1525) and made possible the establishment of Imperial hegemony in the greater 
part of the Italian peninsula. 
With this dissertation I have tried to outline the changes that the organization and 
command of large bodies of mercenary infantry brought about not only in Florentine 
military and foreign policy, but, more generally, in Italian n-fflitary entrepreneurship, 
and to explain how these latter changes contributed to the general European trend that 
brought about the birth of the Tercios and other regimental structures. 
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Introduction 
'Amatemi quando saro' morto. ' 
Dying words of Giovanni de'Medici to the marquis of Mantua 
During the so-called Italian Wars, that is between the end of the fifteenth century and 
the treaty of Cfiteau-Cambresis (1559), Renaissance Italy underwent a series of radical 
changes. The social, economic, political and artistic dimensions of these transformations 
and their consequences across the centuries have been thoroughly investigated by Italian 
historiography, and are being constantly updated by new contributions. However, 
during the last decades the military dimension has been only hinted at. War has not been 
ignored outright, of course, but the different and multiform manifestations of the Italian 
military world have been examined as a system in its own right only rarely and, in the 
main, by foreign scholars. 
The comprehensible, if excessively protracted, aversion from the subject of 
warfare shown by Italian historians since the end of the Second World War, and the 
widespread cultural reaction caused by the disastrous effects of Fascist military rhetoric, 
are only aspects of the problem; they do explain the 'fall from grace' of military 
history, but not the length of its exile. At least as far as the early modem period is 
concerned, the protraction of such a lack of interest is due to the shortage of some 
essential historiographical instruments. Even historians who only have to concern 
themselves with minor military matters are all too often confronted by a great divide 
between the issues raised by more modem historiographical trends and the inadequate, 
' For a short overview on this subject, see P. del Negro, Ta storia militare dell'Italia modema nello 
specchio della storiografia del Novecento', Cheiron, 1995, pp. 11-33, and the introduction to the book of 
Gregory Hanlon, The twilight of a military tradition; Italian aristocrats and European conflicts, 1560- 
1800 (London, 1998). 
old-fashioned nineteenth and early twentieth-century printed sources they are forced to 
rely on. Such a gap is too wide to be filled case by case. 
The intellectual shortcomings, and, in some extreme cases, dishonesties of 
Risorgimento and nationalist military writers have been acknowledged, but, on the 
whole, they have not been replaced by anything else. The birth and the perpetuation 
until our own times of a historical 'invention' of the nineteenth century such as 
'Giovanni dalle Bande Nere', is just a macroscopic example of the dangerous 
pervasiveness of those past errors. Even though they were rightly dismissed by 'proper' 
historians as relatively unimportant, Giovanni and his men have been constantly utilized 
as a sort of benchmark of Italian military achievements during the sixteenth century, and 
for almost two centuries the unchecked use of this benchmark has been a source of false 
or inadequate infonnation. 
This does not mean, of course, that all the achievements of Italian historiography 
in this field are inherently flawed. However, one of the remedies this situation does call 
for is a progressive and, above all, constant reappraisal of the traditional literary sources 
of early modem Italian military history. This can be achieved only through archival 
work carried out by historians interested mainly in military matters, who deem them to 
be worthy of study in their own right, where others would see in them merely a useful, 
but marginal, means to another end, something that must be seen through. To 
paraphrase the French writer Daniel Pennac, if we could see through everything, we 
would end up by seeing nothing at all. 
Moreover, the problem is not limited to the older, traditional sources. Even though 
it was published after the war, the otherwise excellent and still fonnidable book of Piero 
Pieri on the Italian Wars, R Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, 2 shows all the 
2 Piero Pieri, 11 Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin, 1952). Albeit it is not, strictly speaking, a 
product of Italian historiography, the still redoubtable book of Frederick Lewis Taylor, The art of war in 
Italy, 1494-1529 (Wesport, 1973; first ed. 192 1) deserves to be mentioned here: methodologically - if not 
2 
limitations of a cultural framework permeated with Crocean idealism and with 
teleology. What Pieri saw was an irreversible crisis, and not a phase of Italian history: 
since Italian pikemen could not resist foreign pikemen in the open field, the whole 
Italian military system was to be seen as inherently flawed. The tendency to confuse the 
concept of a military tradition with that of a nation was still strong. The new paths 
indicated by the works of Hale and Mallett 3 have been left largely unexplored, and, in 
more recent years, the appeal of Gregory Hanlon4 for an investigation of the 'twilight' 
of the Italian military tradition following the ambitious guidelines of his pre-enqu&e 
has received a rather cold welcome. 
At the beginning, the choice of the Black Bands as the topic of my dissertation 
was due mainly to the fact that, in comparison with the vast literature on the figure of 
Giovanni de'Medici, very little had been written on his unit. However, during the first 
year of my Ph. D. I had to live in Britain most of the time to follow the doctoral courses, 
and this heavily influenced my approach to my topic of research. In practice, I had to 
make some painful - but eventually rewarding - choices with regard to the Italian 
sources I could work on, and, at the same time, I had to make use of an overabundant 
supply of works on early modem military history in English, French and Spanish which 
was not directly related to my research. My initially frantic hunt for 'something useful' 
ended up by giving me a quite unique perspective and a new approach to the analysis of 
tactical and administrative developments at the end of the Italian Wars, and to question 
how closely Italy was integrated into the European picture. 
The distinction between Giovanni and his soldiers was, in fact, somewhat 
artificial, since they were both expressions of the same trends in the evolution of the 
in its scholarship - superior to Pieri's, Taylor's work nevertheless shows different, albeit far less evident, 
weaknesses. 
Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters (London, 1974), Mallet and Hale, The military 
Organization of a Renaissance State; Venice 1400-1617 (Cambridge, 1984). 
4 Hanlon, The Twilight of a military tradition, pp. 356-358. 
3 
Italian military entrepreneurs 5. This study begins with a consideration of the cultural 
framework surrounding the figure of Giovanni de'Medici. However, this dissertation is, 
principally, an initial attempt to identify the Italian features of a process that led to the 
birth, throughout Europe, of the first regimental structures, and to assess the degree of 
correlation between these structures and early modem Italian states. 
From this point of view, the difficult relationship between Florence and the Black 
Bands is an ideal subject of investigation. Florence was a lesser power close to the area 
of operations, and therefore it was a perfect test case, for the republic considered 
carefully even 'trivial' matters concerning its soldiers and their requests. One could 
rightly object that the Black Bands are an inadequate sample, since they were not an 
army, and could never have become one. However, this does not pretend to be a study 
of 'war' and the Renaissance state, but rather of the 'instruments' of war. 
The system of military entrepreneurship in Italy in the era of the regiments and of 
the Tercios has rarely been studied beyond its interactions with some Italian states, like 
Venice. The emphasis put on the 'side' of the state, whose role is too often seen as 
dominant, has produced a rather misleading picture of the role and of the range of 
activities of the Italian military entrepreneurs after their 'conversion' - during the last 
phase of the Italian Wars - from cavalry to infantry commanders and recruiters. The 
implications of such an important change have never been fully investigated. The 
enlistment and the administration of bodies of tactical infantry were very complex 
processes which presupposed the existence of a series of structures and infrastructures 
that had to exist apart from the state. However, the Italian commanders have been 
5 This is a definition that I took from the work of Fritz Redlich, The German military enterpriser and his 
workforce 2 vol. (Wiesbaden, 1964), and that I prefer to the traditional, and more etymologically correct 
word condottieri which has become, in practice, the synonym of a figure with political as well as military 
ambitions. 
4 
studied, on the whole, from a different angle: as aristocrats involved in the wars of 
6 
supremacy between Valois and Habsburg 
Finally, I am aware of the doubts that my decision to focus this research on such a 
short period of time, and on a subject so restricted as the Black Bands, could raise. 
However, I was persuaded to do so not simply by the exceptional abundance of the 
archival sources on this topic, but also by their quality, especially in the case of the 
letters of the Florentine ambassadors and commissioners in the camp of the League. 
Moreover, having been practically ignored by Risorgimento and nationalist historians 
obsessed with the more 'patriotic' siege of Florence (1530), the case of the siege of 
Naples was a perfect example of the need to reappraise some of the literary sources on 
Italian military history. 
Nevertheless, I have to concede how many times I have felt thrilled on 
recognizing in the official papers I was reading the very phrases subsequently utilized 
by Francesco Guicciardini and Benedetto Varchi in their historical works, as well as the 
emotion I have experienced on seeing come back to life, after a long and undeserved 
oblivion, and thanks to the descriptive powers of commissario Lorenzo Martelli, the 
soldiers of the Black Bands in all their grandeur and all their baseness. As the forgotten 
motto engraved on their armour boastfully stated, 'In dispecto tuo, Christo. ' 
6 Geoffirey Parker's The army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659); the logistics of Spanish 
victory and defeat in the Low Countries' wars (Cambridge, 1972) is the only book that has given a 
different account of the support given to Spain's policy by Italian troops, ba it has only scratched the 
surface. and the history of the Italian Tercios has yet to be written. I would like very much to be the one 
who does it. 
5 
Chapter I 
Between Narrative and Document 
1. The Invention of History: Giovanni of the Black Bands 
'- Oh, che tu sia benedetto, bianco cavaliere! Ma dicci chi sei, e perche tieni chiusa 
la celata dell'elmo. - 
- Il mio nome e al termine del mio viaggio. -' 
Italo Calvino, Il Cavaliere Inesistente 
The title of this first section could easily be misunderstood, but in the present case the 
word 'invention' must not be understood in its wider meaning that - both in English and 
Italian - is more closely associated with the concept of fiction rather than with the sense 
that the word originally had in Latin. In Latin invenire means 'to find', and indeed the 
inventio, the process of finding, is common to the historian and the novelist, since the 
historian 'invents' reality because he must both find the facts and select which of them to 
use I. In the case of the Black Bands - and even more in the case of their founder 
Giovanni de'Medici - the criteria of that 'choice' through the centuries have a history of 
its own, and any attempt to simply ignore or deconstruct the legend by applying a rigid 
distinction between historiographical and literary invention would blur rather than clear 
our horizon. The departure point for our research, and indeed, its historical co-ordinates 
were defined by the name 'Giovami of the Black Bands', which is in fact the result of an 
invention. The epithet 'of the Black Bands' is largely a posthumous creation. 
On the 'invention of history' from a literary point of view, see the introduction of Emmanuella Scarano 
to her book Sette Assedi di Firenze (Pisa, 1982), pp. 7-26. 
6 
According to Pietro Aretin02 , not considered a monument of truthfulness, 
Giovanni de'Medici held up a light in his hand to help the surgeon who was sawing off 
his leg - injured by a musket shot - without anaesthesia. To begin the analysis of the 
focus of my research, the famous 'Medici Warrior' must undergo another amputation, 
. 
r_ 
-- tar more complex than painful: we must separate his name from that of his mercenary 
company, the so-called Black Bands. This is rather difficult because Giovanni and the 
Black Bands have ahnost always been considered together as an indivisible whole, and 
- not a mo 
Giovanni of the Black Bands, the hero, was a predestined saviour who 
systematically failed in his missions: he did not save the King of France from capture at 
Pavi2, Rome from being sacked and Italy from the 'final ruin -)6 . This tragic figure 
embodied - at different times and with different names -the valore italico at the 
disastrous end of the Italian Wars; martial prowess, courage and intelligence wasted in a 
losing battle against destiny and, obviously, treachery. However, it ought to be noted 
that the 'invention' of the name 'Giovanni of the Black Bands', now an integral part of 
Italian folklore 7, is a typical example of the way in which nineteenth-century Italian 
2 Giuseppe de Sanctis' negative judgement on Pietro Aretino in his Storia della Letteratura italiana, 
(pp. 387-399) is still a good starting point, and the bibliography on the topic is huge. For a good recent 
biography: Paul Larivaille, Pietro Aretino (Roma, 1997). For a general overview: Pietro Aretino, nel 
cinquecentenario della nascita (Atti del Convegno di Roma- Viterbo-Arezzo-Toronto-Los Angeles), 2 
vol. (Roma, 1995) 
3 Pietro Aretino, Lettere (Verona, 1960), p. 9. 
4 So successful has this operation been that even today the few Italians who still remember the name of 
Giovanni dalle Bande Nere often do not know that he was actually a Medici. 
5 Giovanni de'Medici was seriously wounded on 20 of February during a skirmish and had to leave the 
French army a few days before the decisive battle of Pavia (24 February). According to the first 
biographer of Giovanni, his nephew Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, Francis 1, imprisoned in Pizzighettone, 
ascribed his defeat mainly to the wound of 'Signor Giovanni' and to the counterfeit payrolls of the 
mercenary troops, which made him presume he had more soldiers than he actually had. 'Pour achever le 
malheur, Dieu envoya la blessure au seigneur Jean, le quel ti la veriti entendoit plus 6faire la guerre, 
que tous ceux qui ýstoient aupres du roy', Blaise de Monluc, from his Commentaires quoted in Vite 
d'uomini d'armi e d'affari del secolo XVI (Firenze, 1866), p. 186. 
6 The campaign of 1526-27 is well described in Piero Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana 
(Torino, 1952) p-568 ff. 
7 'Messer Giovanni dalle Bande Nere 
dal lungo cavalcar noiato e stanco 
7 
culture re-utilized earlier sources in dealing with contemporary issues'. It was the period 
of the Risorgimento and tragic national heroes needed to be created. Whether or not his 
Bands were really Black during his lifetime, 'Giovanni of the Black Bands' is a title given 
only posthumously, a projection of effects onto cause. For his contemporaries Giovanni 
was a Medici; his surname was so important that he neither needed nor admitted 
additions. His men were 'the soldiers of Signor Giovanni de'Medici', and were openly 
called 'Black Bands' only after the death of their master. If anything, his personal name 
was applied to his troops, who on one occasion were called the gioanini, the 'Little 
Johns'9. In order to define the object of this research, nonetheless, we must first examine 
Giovanni's myth, considering both its origins and the changes it underwent over time. 
Three 'traditions' can be clearly identified: the late Renaissance historiographical'o 
and biographical" tradition, the nineteenth-century one - with its patriotic aims 
12 and its 
scese di cavallo e si mise a sedere' 
These cheap and anonymous verses, disrespectful of metrical rules, were composed by the Florentines of 
old, who were disrespectful of everything but beauty, to celebrate the rather tardy and quite ugly statue of 
the long-dead condottiere, which still stands out among the bancarelle, the shops and the noisy barbari 
(that is the tourists, who mercifully ignore it) that crowd Piazza San Lorenzo, in front of the church that 
contains the Cappelle Medicee. The hyperactive, sober and illiterate Giovanni de'Medici is represented 
seated, with a broken lance in his hand and wearing Roman armour on a base covered with cheap 
decorative motifs. On the relationship between the Florentines and the statue of Giovanni dalle Bande 
Nere see Curzio Malaparte, Maledetti toscani (Milano, 1994) pp. 106-110: 'Fra tutte le statue di 
Firenze, la statua di Giovanni dalle Bande Nere 6 quella che pifi si meriterebbe un par di ceffoni nel 
muso, 
8 Giorgio Petrocchi, Il Romanzo storico dell'Ouocento italiano (Torino, 1967); Folco Portinari, Le 
parabole del reale (Torino, 1976); Emanuella Scarano, 11 romanzo della storia (Pisa, 1986). 
9 Marin Sanuto, Diarii. XXXVII, p. 458. 
'0 Francesco Guicciardini, Benedetto Varchi, Bernardo Segni, lacopo Nardi, Filippo Nerli and Paolo 
Giovio are the most prominent representatives of the great age of sixteenth-century Renaissance 
historiography. 
11 The first 'authorised' biography of Giovanni de'Medici was written by his nephew Giovangirolamo 
de'Rossi and dedicated to the Duke of Tuscany Cosimo 1, son of Giovanni, while his former secretary 
Giovambattista Tedaldi wrote and sent a short biographical outline to the historian Benedetto Varchi. 
The life of Giovanni de'Medici published by Scipione Ammirato in the third volume of his Opuscoli, 
Ritratti d'uomini illustri di casa Medici (Firenze, 1642) was basically a reworking of Rossi's 
manuscript. 
12 Together with the revival of the sixteenth century historiography and the reissuing of the works of 
Benedetto Varchi and lacopo Nardi, the manuscript of Giovangirolamo de'Rossi was published several 
times: Pompeo Litta, Vita di Giovanni deMedici celebre capitano delle Bande Nere (Milano, 1833), 
Sebastiano Ciampi, Notizie dei secoli XV e XVI sull'Italia, la Polonia e la Russia, raccolte e pubblicate 
da Sebastiano Ciampi (Firenze, 1833); Vite di uomini d'armi e d'affari del secolo XVI (Firenze, 1866). 
The biography by Costantino Mini, Storia delle Bande Nere e dei celebri capitani che vi militarono, 
corredata di documenti (Firenze, 185 1) which exhibits mystical tendencies, is a 19th century product. 
8 
love for historical novels 13 - and finally its fascist appendage (when, needless to say. the 
14 
colour black was all the rage), with its own 'invention' of an Italian military tradition . 
It must be admitted that Giovanni himself laid the foundations of his legend with 
the strange and deep link he established with Pietro Aretino (see Plate 1). Theirs was a 
mutually profitable relationship: Giovanni offered protection to this salacious literary 
blackmailer when nothing short of a small army could save him from his powerful 
enemies, and Aretino granted his revered 'Mars de'Medici"' a sort of literary 
immortality, even though he refused to measure himself with the epic genre and, after 
Giovanni's death, declined to write an 'official' biography 16 of the condottiere. The 
power and fame that Aretino enjoyed during his lifetime aflowed him to be caffed the 
'scourge of Princes' by the important friends of an important man like Giovanni 
de'Medici17 , but his colourful reputation created problems for Giovanni's admirers in 
later centuries. For the Romantics the presence of the most vain and trivial representative 
of the Italian Renaissance by the side of one of its rare military heroes was plainly 
embarrassing, and was even more so for his fascist eulogizers. The invention of Giovanni 
13 Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi, Lassedio di Firenze (Parigi, 1836); Massimo d'Azeglio, Niccol6 
de'Lapi, ovvero i Palleschi ei Piagnoni (Milano, 1841). At a more general level: P. 1hring, 'La figura 
del condottiero nel romanzo storico risorgimentale', Studi Italiani, vii 1992, pp. 83-101. 
14 Gregory Hanlon, The Twilight of a Military Tradition (London, 1998), pp. 1-9. The unhealthy 
passion for the colour black produced dire consequences with the publication of a series of new 
biographies: Alessandro Antonio Monti, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Roma-Milano, 1928); Ettore 
Allodoli, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Firenze, 1929); Bravetta, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Torino, 
1932); Carlotta Fratini, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Milano, 1936). The biography of Monti was 
included in the series 'I prefascisti' (the Pre-Fascists). The final chapter of the book is even entitled 'll 
precursore', 'The Forerunner', pp. 137-143. In 1936 the German movie director Luis Trenker directed 
two versions (one for Italy and one for Germany) of the film 'Condottieri' in which Giovanni appeared 
clearly as a pre-fascist. On I April 1942, the "Giussan o-C lass" cruiser "Giovanni dale Bande Nere" was 
sunk by British submarine "Urge". By 1956, when Sergio Grieco directed the actor Vittorio Gassman as 
'Giovanni dalle Bande Nere', the famous condottiere had become a man looking for a balance between 
love (for women) and the sword. 
'5Pietro Aretino, Lettere, p. 570, letter to Girolama Fontanella, 6 July 1539; see also Luisa Mulas, 
'L'Aretino ei Medici' in Pietro Aretino nel Cinquecentenario, pp. 535-572; and Giuseppe Galasso, 
, Pietro Aretino nel suo contesto storico: il papato, la Francia, l'Impero', ibid., pp. 297-33 1. 
" Probably afraid of being ridiculed and conscious of his own limitations, the master of ridicule didn't 
reply to the letter of Maria Salviati, Giovanni's widow, who asked Pietro to celebrate with a biography 
'li xiiii anni che sua signoria ha combattuto'. 
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of the Black Bands produced other inventions; for some it seemed best to reduce the 
importance of Pietro Aretino, others thought that he had been ennobled through his 
contact with the pure heroism of 'Giovanni d'Italia"' 
The way in which Giovanni's family name has been passed down through the 
centuries is even more teHing. As the son of Giovanni de'Medici Popolani'9 he was a 
member of the branch of the family that opposed Cosimo il Vecchio's rise to power and 
made an important contribution to the expulsion of the Medici in 1494. Even though 
Giovanni grew up under the watchful eye of the Salviati family (influential partisans of 
the Medicean party in Florence), the legitimate son of a popolano would have been 
always in a secondary position in respect to any descendant, even illegitimate, of Lorenzo 
the Magnifico and his brother Giuliano. Giovanni de'Medici's first true biographies were 
published after his son Cosimo had come to power as Duke of Florence and second 
Pater Patriae - after Cosirno il Vecchio - of the Florentine state. In the early modem 
tradition the troubled origins of Giovanni, his constant fight against the main branch of 
the family to obtain even the smallest space, his final defeat and heroic death while 
fighting to protect pope Clement VII (the most ungrateful relative of all) were exalted 
and exaggerated in order to give to his successful son the aura of the self-made man, 
legitimised by the final victory against all odds as well as by his blood. Even the 
circumstances of Giovanni's birth - he was born two days before the death of Charles 
VIII, 'la, ruina d'Italia, 20', and the same night on which Savonarola. was arrested 21 - were 
17 Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, Vita di Giovanni deMedici detto delle Bande Nere (Roma, 1996) p. 104. It 
ought to be noticed that the title is taken from Litta's edition and not from the manuscript. 
18 Carlotta Fratini, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere. More recent biographies tend to emphasize the role and 
relevance of Pietro Aretino in Giovanni's life; see Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune (London, 1966) 
pp. 245-287; Cesare Marchi, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Milano, 1982). 
'9 Giovanni's branch of the family took the name of Popolani (of the people, 'del popolo ) in 1494 to 
symbolise their reconciliation with the popular regime after the expulsion of Piero de'Medici, son of 
Lorenzo. 
20 Ammirato, Ritratti, p. 176. 
2 'Rossi, Vita, p. 35. 
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made to be symbolic. However, the point of view of the nineteenth century was radically 
different: the Medici were tyrants who destroyed Florentine freedoM22 , and Duke 
Cosirno was the first and worst of them all. Even though their evaluations were more 
varied, twentieth-century writers were more interested in finding a line of continuity in 
the life of Giovanni de'Medici and in his deeds that could distinguish him from the other 
Medici. For the writers of the early modem period Giovanni 'the Brave 
23-) 
was simply 
one individual, albeit an important one, in a longer series of Medici family members, 
glorifying and glorified by both his ancestors and descendants, while in Italian folklore of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century he had become an outsider who won his true 
narne through his victories and his death: Giovanni of the Black Bands. 
It is possible that Giovanni's men put black bands of mourning on their armour and 
flags for the first time in 1521 after the death of pope Leo X (al secolo Giovanni 
de'Medici), patron of their niaster, but this gesture, temporary in any case, was 
emphasised at a later stage in order to make it a turning point in the life of the famous 
condottiere and to distinguish him at the beginning of his all too short career at least with 
a colour, given his 'wavering 24 ' loyalty. For sixteenth-century historians and biographers, 
from Francesco Guicciardini to Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, one of the main characteristics 
of Giovanni de'Medici's life was its sad incompleteness: he died at twenty-eight, a very 
promising future leader of armies, killed when both his age and his experience were 
about to reach maturity. The musket (or falconet) shot fired by the comered 
Landsknechts killed just the newly appointed and not totally accepted captain general of 
"Guerrazzi's historical novel Vassedio di Firenze, is typical in this sense. Only Giovanni of the Black 
Bands, brought to life by the flashbacks of one of his soldiers, is glorified in the sixth chapter, pp. 148- 
153. The mind of 'Lupo bombardiere', however, seems to recall the events of Giovanni's apotheosis and 
death as if they were quite distant in the past, when he (Lupo) was still a young lighthorseman and not a 
skilled artilleryman (a very strange career), though only three years had passed. Giovanni had to appear 
as a figure of the past, almost fi7om another world. 
23 'Giovanni il Valoroso'; Ammirato, Ritratti di uomini illustri, p. 176. 
24 That is, by the nineteenth century's standards. 
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the League's infantry, not of its whole army. On the other hand the Giovanni of the 
Black Bands celebrated by the writers of the nineteenth century and afterwards was 
taken out of context to transfon-n him into a fully-fledged heroic figure that had already 
reached the apex of his career. 
In this effort the high point was reached by the French writer and art critic Pierre 
Gauthiez, who published in 1901 the best docwnented, and possibly the best known, 
biography2' of Giovanni de'Medici. Even though it was never translated, the book 
received a warm welcome from the Italian critics and public. Gauthiez, with the 
'benevolent contempt' towards the Italians typical of many fin-de-siecle French writers 
felt even more strongly the need to separate the hero - 'le dernier des grands tueurs 
d'hommes a I'arme blanche -, 
26 
, and not a commander of arquebusiers - not simply from 
other Italians but also from his family name, a synonym for dirty money and 
opportunism. After the death of Leo X Giovanni acquires his new name in a sort of 
investiture which makes him become entirely 'Jean des bandes noires', that is, Giovanni 
of the Black BandS27 . Furthermore,, Gauthiez 
based his affirmations mainly on Martin du 
Bellay's Mimoires, according to which when Giovanni de'Medici entered French service 
shortly before Bicocca (1522) his flags were already black2' 
In the following years, due to growing Italian nationalism and especially during the 
Fascist regime, the reaction against Gauthiez's book was strong, but the new biographers 
25 Pierre Gauthiez, Jean des Bandes Noires (Paris, 1901). It ought to be noticed that this book was 
written by Gauthiez after a biography of Pietro Aretino. He followed the general opinion and considered 
Aretino the summa of all the Italian vices and errors. "'Je fus son (Giovanni's) pdre, son fr6re, son ami, 
son esclave"... il ne fut que son valet, et son buffon': such was the relation between Giovanni and Pietro 
Aretino according to Gauthiez. 
26 'The last of the great slayers (the condottieri) with hand-to-hand weapons'; Gauthiez, Jean, p. 1. 
2'lt happens in the culminating point of the book, at the end of chapter three; 'Et d6s lors, Jean de 
Medicis.... devient pour le reste de sa vie, et dans la memoire a venir, Jean des bandes noires. Comme 
tous les hdros, son nom, son wai nom, Cest lui qu'il s'est cree', Gauthiez, Jean, p. 165. 
21Martin du Bellay, Mjmoires de Martin et Guillaume A Bellay (Paris, 1908), vol. 1, book II, p. 216: 
vint au service du Roy le seigneur Jean de Medicis, parent du feu pape Leon, qui amena trois mille 
hommes de pied et deux cens chevaux, desquels les enseignes estoient noires, parce qu'ils portoient le 
dueil dudit feu pape Leon, du vivant duquel il avoit tousjours est6 au service de la ligue contre le Roy... '. 
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of Giovanný albeit hostile to Gauthiez, did not differ much from his method and 
conclusions. In 1928 Ettore Allodoli concluded by considering a rather curious mistake 
made by 'some historians, both ancient and modem ones' who maintained that the bands 
darkened their flags and became widely known for this feature only after the death of 
GI. -29 iovanni , thereby making of 'Giovanni of the Black Bands' an entirely posthumous 
32 title. We might mention that Bernardo, Segni'O, Filippo Nerli", Benedetto Varchi , 
Francesco Guicciardini33 , Giovangirolamo de'RoSSý4, Marco Guazzo3' and the French 
Blaise de MontlUC36 were among the 'some historians' who held the view Allodoli was 
criticising. 
The positive judgement on the military effectiveness and skill of the men who 
decided to continue to follow the discipline and memory of the 'signor Giovanni' was 
unanimous,, as well as the criticism of their rapacity and insolence 37 . The agony of the 
anti-Imperialist League which the Bands served was long and the Sack of Rome was an 
epoch-shaping event: the two years during which the Bands survived before being 
destroyed at the siege of Naples (1528) were enough to invent a track and to allow a 
legend to be invented. The general collapse of morale that preceded the storming of 
Rome's walls needed some sort of relief, if not healing: the historian Paolo Giovio in a 
29Ettore Allodoli, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, p. 86; '... Curioso e in, proposito, Perrore di quegli storici 
(antichi e moderni, fra cui il Segni) che dicono le milizie di Giovanni essere state dette bande nere per la 
morte del loro capitano illustre, nel 1528 cioe: cosi che "Giovanni dalle bande nere" verrebbe ad essere 
un titolo puramente postumo' . 30 Bernardo Segni, Istorie Fiorentine dall'anno 1527 al 1555 scritte da Bernardo Segni (Firenze 1857), 
p. 20. 
3' Filippo Nerli, Commentari deifatti civili occorsi dentro la citt6 di Firenze (Trieste, 1859), vol. 11, p. 
23. Filippo Nerli was Giovanni's brother-in-law. 
32 Benedetto Varchi, Storia Fiorentina 3 vols. (Firenze, 1838-1841), book 2, p. 112, vol. 1. 
33 Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d7talia (Torino, 1971), book XVIII, chap. 1, p. 1817. Messer Francesco 
was Lieutenant General of the papal forces when Giovanni died. 
3'Rossi, Vita, p. 92-94. Rossi was Giovanni's half-nephew. 
3'Marco Guazzo, Historie di messer Marco Guazzo (Venezia, 1564), pp. 49-50. 
36 Blaise de Montluc, Commentarii tradotti dalfrancese (Firenze, 1636), p. 28. The young captain Blaise 
de Montluc fought side by side in the same trenches with the Black Bands during the siege of Naples. 
17 Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, book IV, XVI, pp. 243-244: 'la migliore e piii reputata fanteria e la pia 
ternuta che andasse in quei tempi attorrio, si come ancora la piO insolente, la p41 fastidiosa e ]a piu' 
rapace. 
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letter shortly preceding the disaster celebrated the victorious defence of Frosinone, which 
was considered as an omen of future victories. Giovio writes that the 'signor Joannin's 
devils' sang joyously during the siege and the Homeric slaughter of the humiliated 
Spaniards that followed their irresistible sortie. He compared also their commander Luca 
Antonio Cuppano, former lieutenant and 'Right Eye' of Giovanni de'Me ici 38 , to 
Patroclus'9 with a gilded arquebus. Several accounts of the Sack of Rome describe some 
companies of the Black Bands as the first line of defence on the walls of the Holy City; at 
the end of a ftirious melee, after having successfully repelled a first attack, Luca Antonio 
Cuppano's arquebusiers were overwhehned - thanks to a treacherous mist that covered 
the approach of the Imperialists - and massacred while their comnmder was badly 
wounded and captured4o. However, according to other accounts, the Imperialists' victory 
was possible only after former members of the Black Bands, who joined the Spaniards a 
few days after having been discharged by the 'avaricious' Clement VII, confronted and 
defeated the loyalists of Cuppano 41 . The cold comfort of having been the 
final cause of 
their own ruin is a rhetorical and psychological expedient commonly utilised by the losers 
in the aftermath of any major defeat; in this case it gives the measure of the importance, 
symbolic at least, attached to the Bands, since this kind of 'treason' is traditionally 
always perpetrated at the higher levels by the most trusted person(s). 
The historians of the sixteenth century, concerned more with the actual 
effectiveness of Giovanni de'Medici's men on the battlefield and their adequacy 
compared with other examples of the 'modem mffitia' like the Landsknechts, had no 
problem in describing the Bands as formed largely of good arquebusiers proficient in 
38Pietro Aretino, Lettere, il primo e il secondo libro (1960), p. 282,9 November 1537. The 'left eye' 
was, of course, Aretino himself 
" Marin Sanuto, Diarii, XLIV, p. 99. The letter was written by the historian 17 February 1527. On 
Giovio, Clement VII and the sack of Rome: T. C. Price Zimmermann, Paolo Giovio (Princeton, 1995), 
pp. 60-86. 
'oMarin Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, pp. 144,167. 
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skirmishes and siegeworks 42 with a minority of fight cavalrymen. For the official 
biographers the situation was different: in the two versions 43 (denominated 'A' and 'R') 
of the fife written by Giovangirolamo de'Rossi -a nephew of Giovanni whose work for 
long influenced or conditioned writing on the topic - the space dedicated to the troops 
and to the more 'technical' side of warfare decreases to the benefit of its more 
adventurous and heroic aspects. In the final version Giovanni de'Medici is still 
considered the father of the light cavalry, but 'his' other military innovations like the 
mounted arquebusiers and the reform of the lancie spezzate 44 are ignored, while the 
rivalry with Clement VII and Giovanni's many romantic affairs are emphasised. The 
arquebusiers are always in the background, since the 'Gran Diavolo 45 was a prominent 
figure of the 'militia of the modem times', but Giovanni had once again become a 
mounted hero whose discipline, strong will and physical prowess (twice in his life he ran 
an opponent through with his lance! ) were wasted against the 'maladetto, aborninoso 
ordigno 46 '; that is, firearms and artillery. This was a part of the effort of ennobling the 
skirmishes - the kind of fighting in which Giovanni excelled - to the level of heroic 
struggles, since during the military career of Giovanni de'Medici only a few pitched 
battles were fought, and both at the Bicocca (1521) and Pavia (1525) he managed to be 
on the losing side. 
41 Marin Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, pp. 187,202. 
42(. 
... gente buona e spedita per servirsene all'espugnazione 
delle terre, ed alle scaramucce, ed imboscate; 
nelle quali imprese le genti toscane, ed infra I'altre le nostre erano attissime tanto pia, quanto le avevano 
capitani eccellenti, e molti soldati segnalati, e divenuti esperti nel mestiere delle arml sotto la disciplina 
di Giovanni de'Medici' Bernardo Segni, Istorie Fiorentine, p. 32. 
43 'A' - edited recently in 1996 by Vanni Bramanti - is usually considered the final version, presented to 
the Duke Cosimo I with the biography of Giovanni as the first of a series of seventeen 'Vite'. However, 
the more frequently used version is certainly 'R', used for the nineteenth-century editions. On this topic, 
see the introduction of Vanni Bramanti's edtion of Giovangirolamo de'Rossi's Vita di Giovanni 
de'Medici, 
44 Vite, p. 80 for the 'lancie spezzate', p. 93 for the mounted arquebusiers. 
45 'The Great Devil', the last of the many nicknames of Giovanni, allegedly given to him by the 
landsknechts that he was trying to stop before they could cross the Po in the days before the fatal wound 
of Governolo. 
46 0! curs'd device! base implement of death... ' Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, bk. 1, canto 9. 
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More technical information on the Bands was offered by the sources questioned on 
this topic by the historian Benedetto Varchi; from the accounts given by Giovanni's 
secretary Giovambattista Tedaldi and by an anonymous former captain (possibly 
Cuppano 'the Right Eye' himselt) a less 'centralised' picture of the mercenary company's 
structure emerges. The leader appears surrounded by a staff of legal and diplomatic 
advisors, in addition to a well-paid network of spies, informers and SCoUtS47. 
Another point common to aH the traditions of the myth is that the semi-permanent 
court that accompanied Giovanni de'Medici in his wars was also a 'school', in the 
tradition of the more long-lived mercenary companies of the fifteenth century 4'. For the 
early modem historians and biographers, those lucky enough to have been officers and 
4 apprentices of signor Giovanni', the lesser demons at the court of the Gran Diavolo, 
fonned a distinctive elite of soldiers. Pietro Aretino, with his typical insolence, was able 
to say in 1535 that not only the noble pupils of Giovanni, but also his accountants and 
laekeys had beeome famous and appreeiated eaptains, 49 . This 
historieal invention gave 
rise to the myth of the Italianita - if not the Toscanitti - of the Bands and the more 
mtenmttent sueeess of Franeesco Ferrueei'O and Piero Strozzi", two heroie figures who 
actually never met Giovanni de'Medici but owed much to his tactical innovations and to 
his 'apprentices'. 
47 Sebastiano Ciampi, Notizie, pp. 86-101,101-108; Vite, pp. 156-182,201-209. 
480n the 'schools' and the mercenary companies of the fifteenth century: Michael Mallett, Mercenaries 
and their Masters (London, 1974) and Mario Del Treppo, 'Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali 
di una compagnia di ventura italiana', in Rivista Storica Italiana, 85 (1973), pp. 253-275. 
49pietro Aretino to Bino Signorelli, 28 September 1535, Lettere, p. 57. On the 'students' of Giovanni 
de'Medici's school: Ercole Ricotti, Le compagnie di ventura in Italia (Torino, 1845), pp. 207-304. 
'0 Two useful collections of documents are: Wite di italiani illustri: vita di Francesco Ferrucci, Raccolta 
di opere e documenti riguardanti la Storia d'Italia, lettere di Francesco Ferrucci al Magistrato dei Dieci 
della Guerra ea Ceccotto Tosinghi', Archivio Storico Italiano, Tomo IV, parte 11 Firenze, Viesseux 
1853; Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze del 1529-1530 (Firenze, 1889). He is also the 
positive hero of Guerrazzi's Assedio di Firenze. Guerrazzi also wrote his biography: Vita di Francesco 
Ferruccio (Firenze, 1889). 
5'Bernardo Segni (son of Bemardo), Vita di Piero Stro-7,7i, published in Vite d'uomini d'arme e d'affari, 
p. 212 ff.; Brantome, Vie du Marechal Strosse, largely used by Ercole Ricotti in his Storia delle 
compagnie di ventura, pp. 289-301. 
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The Italian character of the Black Bands was obviously highly emphasised in the 
nineteenth century, during the Risorgimento, and the fact that some of the last remnants 
of the unit contributed significantly to the defence of the Florentine Republic (1527-30) - 
considered the last stand of Italian freedom 52 against Habsburg hegemony - added myth 
to myth. After Giovanni of the Black Bands, regarded as the last spark of an already 
weakened spirit, Italian military historiography turns 'a blind eye"' to the following 
period of Spanish supremacy, when the role of the Italian troops was considered too 
auxiliary to be worth studying. Notwithstanding the archival and documentary effort 
provoked by the popularity of the topic 54 , no serious attempt to analyse the structure of 
the Black Bands was made; attention was dedicated to their best-known members, but 
not to the whole structure. Strict discipline and boldness became Giovanni de'Medici's 
most significant features. There was even an attempt to establish a sort of idealistic fink 
between the famous condottiere and Niccolo' Machiavelli, on the ground that the Black 
Bands were modelled strictly on the precepts contained in Machiavelli's Art of War"; 
and the black clad 'Medici Warrior' excited the fantasy of Italian and even English 
historical novelistS56 . Even the notorious anthropological school of Lombroso had to say 
something about Giovanni's cranial measurements and his (bloody) childhood games, 
which were seen as evidence of the pathological deviance of the condottiere 57 
52 Francesco Guerrazzi, Lassedio di Firenze; Cecil Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London, 1925); 
Bartolomeo Valori, La Difesa della Repubblica Fiorentina (Firenze, 1929) 
S3 Hanlon, The Twilight, p. 5; P. Del Negro, 'La storia militare dell'Italia moderna nello specchio della 
storiografia del Novecento', Cheiron, 1995, pp. 11-33. 
54 Transcriptions of letters of Giovanni and his familiars were published in different moments in the 
Archivio Storico Italiano, Tomi VIII, 1859 (pp. 3-40) and IX (pp. 3-29); Tomo VII, pp. 3-48; years 1902 
(pp. 71-107) and 1903 (pp. 97-126). 
"Costantino Mini, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, pp. 253-255. 
56 Guerrazzi, Lassedio di Firenze; D'Azeglio, Niccol6 de'Lapi; Christopher Hare, The Romance of a 
Medici Warrior (London, 1911) 
57 Carlo Portigliotti, 'La pazzia morale di Giovanni dalle Bande Nere', Archivio di psichiatria e scienze 
penali, XXII, 1902, pp. 353-371. Gaetano Pieraccini, La stirpe dei Medici di Cafaggiolo (Firenze, 
1947). 
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In more recent years Giovanni's biographerS18 have been unable to escape falling 
into hagiography, and have done little more than perpetuate the existing legend, although 
emphasising different aspects of his life and relying increasingly on Pietro Aretino, no 
longer considered an embarrassing figure. 
A real effort at redefining of Giovanni de'Medici's figure within the broader 
picture of the Italian Wars and reassessing his tactical innovations - rather than his 
personality - was started by Frederick Taylor 
59 
, even though his impartial work was 
mainly based on Giovangirolamo de'Rossi's biography. Better documented and more 
detailed was the image outlined by the historian Piero PierPO who relegated the 
condottiere to a secondary position because of his lack of strategic perspective. 
However, Pieri's broad picture of the Italian 'military crisis' was still distorted by the 
long-lived Italian problem of not distinguishing between the concepts of military tradition 
and national spirit, too often considered to be synonyms. 
The search for heroic characters of the past during the Risorgimento, the love for 
biographical encyclopaedias that had a revival during the fascism, and above all the 
specific attention dedicated to the army of the Piedmontese state - as the future 
unificating element of the country - were basically attempts to fragment, in order to 
digest more easily, what was judged as a very depressing overall picture of the Italian 
61 
military world , guilty of the capital sin of 
being merely an auxiliary element of the 
58 Such as Cesare Marchi and Joseph Jay Deiss. 
59Frederick Lewis Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 (London, 192 1- reprint West Point, 1973), 
pp. 12,53- 55,60,62,69,76,136,179. 
60piero Pieri, 11 Rinascimento, pp. 514 n., 525,540,548,552 e n., 557,561 n., 574 e n., 575 e n., 576 n., 
607,608,609 n. 
6 'On the topic see Piero Del Negro, La storia militare dell'Italia modema nello specchio della 
storiografia del Novecento, Cheiron, 1995, pp. 11-33; Hanlon, The Twilight, pp. 1-8, while on the 
, piedmontese exception' see pp. 275-301. 
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armies of the European great powers during the sixteenth and seventeenth century (and 
beyond). As in fact it wa. §6'. 
Auxiliary troops have always been a vital element of any great power's military 
structure; they represent often its everyday expression, pay the same price in battle, but 
share none of its privileges. They have no grandeur to mask their actions. When we talk 
about the Italian Wars and the sixteenth century, the figures of the German Landsknecht, 
the French aventurier, the proud Swiss pikeman and the stoic Spanish soldier have all an 
important role in the various national historiographical traditions; not so the Italian 
mercenary foot soldier. The greatly exaggerated charge that the Italian mercenaries 
ruined their own country and wasted their energies by fighting - although often skilfully - 
on both the French and the Imperialist side deprived them of a true definition, of features 
of their own. 
This prejudice also prevented any analysis of the Black Bands as an independent 
topic and reduced them once more to an appendage of Giovanni. They were indeed an 
appendage; but the analysis of this appendage could give us the key to open more 
important doors than the one that guards the fascinating legend of the Great Devil. 
"About the 'Habsburg system': Hanlon, The Twilight. On the status and importance of the Italian troops 
in the Army of Flanders: Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 29-32,43,275,277. 
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2. The Pike and the Arquebus: Giovanni de'Medici against NiccolO' MachiaveUi 
'Ma e ben vero che le piche de ýpazi rompeno spesso el disegno de le penne de li savii... ' 
Paolo Giovio to Domenichi, 14 February 1527 
Even though we do not share the early modem passion for finding edifying symbologies 
and lines of continuity in every event, the two 'officially' attested encounters of NiccoI6 
Machiavelli and Giovanni de'Medici are meaningful indeed. When, during a delicate 
diplomatic mission to Forh in 1499, the Florentine secretary met the virile Caterina, 
Sforza 63 in order to establish a defensive alliance against Cesare Borgia's growing 
military and political influence, the little child Giovanni was barely one year old and lay 
badly ill in a nearby room. His mother's state and his own life were both apparently 
doomed. The years of Giovanni's troubled childhood were the years of Machiavelli's 
hard work in the service of the first Florentine republic, whose end (1512) coincided with 
the beginning of the discontinuous and troubled rise of Giovanni de'Medici's star under 
cardinal Giovanni's watchful eye, and with the eclipse of the Florentine secretary's 
political influence 64 . When, according to the tale of the 
Dominican monk Matteo 
BandeH065, the two met again in 1526 under the besieged walls of Milan the world itself 
was different. On that occasion the young and successful Giovanni allegedly entrusted to 
the unfortunate and elderly Machiavelli, who at the moment was slowly and painfully 
trying to regain the favour of the Medici, three thousand of his highly trained men to put 
irito practice what, in messer Niccolo"s military papers, appeared to be not only easy but 
63 P. D. Pasolini, Caterina Sforza (Roma, 1893) 
6'On Machiavelli and his vita contemplativa, see Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini 
(Princeton, 1965) pp. 153-200. 
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also profitable. In the course of two long and exhausting hours under the July sun, 
Machiavelli showed his monumental inability to apply his own drill methods even to 
already experienced soldiers, and Giovanni disentangled the resulting muddle with a few 
peremptory orders. Whether this anecdote is true or not, and besides the understandable 
inadequacy of any theoretician - no matter how brilliant - when confronted with the hard 
laws of practicality, the segretario and the condottiere had two opposite visions of how 
to make and win a war; theirs was a dialogue between the pike and the arquebus. 
Although the famous 'bloodless battles' of the earlier condottieri were mainly a 
humanist rhetorical (and highly successful) topoS66, the unreliability of mercenaries when 
confronted with the needs of a state-formulated policy - even a discontinuous one as in 
the case of Florence - was evident67. Machiavelli's answer to the repeated and crippling 
humiliations suffered by a series of Florentine mercenary armies under the walls of the 
rebeffious PisP was the creation (1507) of the famous Ordinanza, a militia formed by 
Florentine subjects whose main weapon was the pike; the drill method of the new units 
was the same as that of the successful Swiss squares of pikemený9, and the action of the 
4 new army' was meant to be a frontal and destructive one", opposed to the exaggerated 
tacticism of the condottieri. More than a weapon, the pike represented the state's 
ambition and its need to have a self-sufficient army in order to pursue its own strategic 
agenda, an army composed of the most hard-working, politically reliable, sober and 
pious inhabitants of both contado and city that could counter with these virtU' the furore 
65 Matteo Bandello, Tutte le opere (Milano, 1934), vol. 1, novella XL. For an evaluation of the episode: 
Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters, pp. 258-259. 
66 Mallett, Mercenaries, pp. 1-5 
67 On the case of Florence: C. C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence (Toronto, 196 1). On 
Venice: Michael Mallett and John Rigby Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State; 
Venice c. 1400 to 1617 (Cambridge, 1984). 
68 Bayley, War and Society, pp. 241-315; Pieri, Il Rinascimento, pp. 431-443. 
6' Douglas Miller, The Swiss at War (Oxford, 198 1). 
70 NiccoI6 Machiavelli, 'Prowisione prima per le fanterie', in Tutte le opere storiche, politiche e 
letterarie (Milano, 1998), pp. 41042 1; Pieri, 11 Rinascimento e la crisi militare, pp. 525-535. 
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oltramontano of the Swiss infantry on whom they were modelled. In the Art of War 
(1520), written during Machiavelli's forced retirement from the political scene, he argued 
that pikes should be outnumbered by shielded swordsmen", but the basic concept 
remained of favouring the destructive action of the arme bianche in a hand-to-hand 
melee rather than the tactical advantages granted by gunpowder weapons 72 . 
To the famous and bold Bartolomeo d'Alviano, a representative of the generation 
of condottieri that witnessed the 'golden age' described by Guicciardini at the beginning 
of his Storia dItalia 7' and the escalation in the wars for supremacy between France and 
Spain in the peninsula, the battle of Marignano (1515) appeared like a battle of giants. 
Giovanni de'Medici was used to fighting among giants without being one; his tactic was 
based on that concept. He and his captains were the foreseeable product of twenty years 
of pitched battles and campaigning on Italian territory: a generation of 'young soldiers' 
whose military date of birth had come after Charles VIII's famous descent into Italy in 
1494 and the introduction of so many new elements into Italian warfare. Giovanni was 
just bom when MachiaveUi and Guicciardini began to analyse the reasons and propose 
solutions for the general Italian crisis; the twelve companies 74 of infantry that after the 
death of their commander (1526) decided to remain loyal to signor Giovanni's discipline, 
and, by putting the sombre stripes of mourning on their corselets, flags and drums, 
claimed the name of Black Bands were, in their own way, a creation based on the 
observation of reality no less than the Principe and the Ricordi were 75 . 
Some changes induced by long decades of almost constant warfare in the peninsula 
were not limited to the higher levels of society nor were they strictly military in nature. 
" Machiavelli had been deeply impressed by the ability of Consalvo de Cordoba's shielded footsoldier to 
'infiltrate' the wall of pikes during the clash of two squares. 
72 Nicco, 16 Machiavelli, 'Dell'Arte della guerra', Tutte le opere, pp. 295-6. 
73 Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, Chapter 1, pp. 5-6. 
74 Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, pp. 66,278. 
75See the introduction of Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, pp. I -10. 
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They affected large areas like the Florentine state and implied a widespread change of 
attitude towards the 'mestiere delle armi' and the possibility of living at least a part of 
one's life al soldo, that is as a mercenary soldier. One of Giovanni's panegyrists' 
recurrent themes was to assign to him the credit for the newbom military reputation of 
the Tuscan footsoldiers, especiafly the arquebusiers, which formed the backbone of his 
famous bands and were afterwards considered among the best Italian trooPS76 available. 
Obviously these assessments have to be calibrated, but they do not to have to be 
discarded; Giovanni's preference for having a high number of Tuscan soldiers and 
captains in the Black Bands was probably more the effect than the cause of their new 
4 reputation'. 
Machiavelli's projects for the creation of a militia formed by the most loyal and 
hard-working men of the Florentine contado, destined to replace the expensive and 
untrustworthy mercenary troops, proved to be a striking failure at Prato" (1512) but the 
idea was constantly re-launched by the tenacious former segretario of the Ten and was 
taken up again - although discontinuously and without the energy that characterised its 
18 
creation - even during the period of the Medici regime . Indeed 
it produced some long 
term effects on the social fabric of the contado, but different and quite contrary to those 
desired by ser NiccolO'. The Tuscan agricultural world had a pervasive and efficient 
system of social control, a system which extended from the wealthy Florentine owner of 
the land through the village priest, the fattore (bailiff) down to the head of each peasant 
family. The rural masses, formed largely of m6tayers (sharecroppers, mezzadri) and 
landless labourers, were far too different from the Swiss social and military model which 
76 Vile, p. 152 '... imper6 la nazione toscana ha molto da lodarsene... che i toscani siano reputati oggi tra 
i primi d'Italia, il che .... non era per lo addietro. '; in the same book the anonymous source of Benedetto 
Varchi wrote '... tanti fiorentini, poich6 egli li conobbe della virt6 e della militia, che prima no li 
voleva ...... 77 Bayley, War and Society, pp. 268-284. 
78 Bayley, War and Society, pp 284-292. 
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inspired Machiavelli and that was based on a sort of huge seasonal migration towards the 
European battlegrounds. However, such a massive and prolonged contact with the 
soldierly world and the professional connestabili that guided the various battaglioni of 
the Florentine ordinanza gave to many Tuscan rural workers - who more than 'rebellious 
to (fatherly) authority -)79 were cadets pushed out of the mezzadria in a period of 
demographic increase and/or economic crisis - access to an expertise that at the time was 
highly in demand and that they decided to invest elsewhere as mercenary footsoldiers'o. 
As was to be expected, Pisa and its contado became, after the end of the war and the loss 
of its freedom, one of the most frequented Italian recruiting grounds 81 . Surely 
Machiavelli would not have been pleased at such 'side effects', but while civic humanism 
was living within the Orti Oricellari its final intense season, under the rule of Lorenzo the 
Medici duke of Urbino, Florentine society was experiencing the growing duality between 
the two models of the cortigiano and the cittadino 82 which would end with the victory of 
the former over the latter. At a different level many Florentine subjects found that it was 
far easier to become 'soldiers' than 'militiamen', thus contributing to the creation of a 
sort of 'breeding ground' on whose resources Giovanni de'Medici in his brilliant but very 
short career used to draw but which he could never have hoped to create ex novo. 
79 This was the traditional accusation those who too eagerly joined the militia were charged with. 
However, the 'fatherly' authority was simply the last link of the chain, and a mean streak of rebellion 
has always been one of the components of the Tuscan rural world. 
8OThe system of the 'mezzadria', strongly (in some cases ruthlessly) supported by the church, maintained 
for centuries its control on every aspect of the Tuscan peasants' lives until it was literally broken up by 
the process of industrial isation in the early 1960's. 
8' The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, bishop of Saintes, 16 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 44, f 172 r.: '... le genti non potriano essere migliori perch6 sono fatte in Val di Nievole, 
in quel di Pisa et nel Lunigiana, onde escono le migliori fanterie di tutta Italia. '. On the fame of the 
Pisan soldiers and the transformations induced by the war on the Pisan society see also Michele Luzzati, 
Una guerra di popolo (Pisa, 1986). 
82 A duality, whose utilisation as a system to consolidate the power of the Medici is efficaciously outlined 
in Federico Chabod's introduction to the fundamental book of Rudolf von Albertini, Firenze dalla 
Repubblica al Principato (Torino, 1970), first. ed. Das florentinische Staatsbe"j3tstein in Ubergang 
von der Republic.: = Prinzipat (Berri, 1955). 
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Lodovico Alamanni 83 ,a pro-Medici partisan, wrote that the young 
Florentines - the 
real hope of the Medici regime - had to be persuaded to wear the courtesan's cloak 
instead of the 'civilian' hood. Only two years before (Alamanni wrote his Discorso in 
ý0 
84 1516) the young Giovanni de'Medici started to, this very thing : as soon he was out of 
the sight and reach of his tutors and future parents-in-law lacopo and Lucrezia Salviati 
he changed his clothes and went out to guzzle with the soldiers and other rebellious 
young Florentines. 
Besides the image that his earliest biographer, Giovangirolarno de'Rossi, gave of 
Giovanni de'Mediei as a horse-riding heroic leader in the style of Ariosto, the highest 
achievement of his military science was the successful utilization of a unit of fight infantry 
composed mainly of arquebusiers that excelled in skirmishes, ambushes and sieges. He 
was also a celebrated commander of light cavalry, and indeed he combined fight 
horsemen skilfuRy with his light infantry. However, Giovanni's utilisation of the 
unchivalrous arquebus was not, as Taylor says in his otherwise brilliant analysis of the 
condottiere 85 ,a deliberate choice nor an innovative one; in fact it was imposed by his 
personal role and - as we shall see in greater detail later on - dictated by the more general 
trend f6flowed by both the Italian mercenary world and society. Unlike his distant 
relative Lorenzo de'Medici,, the duke of Urbino, who simply played the part of the 
military leader as one of the traits required for a would-be prince, Giovanni de'Medici 
was a straightforward professional soldier whose utilization and deployment had to be 
easy and profitable. 
83 Lodovico Alamanni, writer of the 'Discorso di Lodovico Alamanni sopra i1jermare lo stato di Firenze 
nefla devotione deMedici', published in Von Albertini, Firenze... appendix 4, pp. 377-384 
84 Vita di Giovanni p. 202: '... cominci6 a volere liberamente praticare a suo modo co'soldati e giovani 
dell'etA sua pifj arditi della cittA, n6 a tenerlo a freno avea forza alcuna n6 ritegno dell'abito civile, quale 
i suoi suoceri gli feciono portare, perchd il cappuccio lo dava a uno compagno, e da lui pigliava la 
berretta; il mantello a uso di cappa si accomodava e con quello coi compagni si ritrovava... '. 
85 On Giovanni's contribution to the development of the light cavalry and his tactics according to Taylor, 
see Taylor, The Art of War, pp. 68-80. 
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Even though it did not help to bring Renaissance Italy out of its 'crisis', the 
development of specialised units of light infantry and cavalry was the response of the 
various Italian states and elites not only to the needs created by their role in the wars of 
supremacy between France and Empire, but above aH to the necessities of their domestic 
politics. 
The implications of this situation were profound: Giovanni joined what we could 
define as the 'Spanish' tactical school, that had to learn how to obtain from the combined 
action of light cavalry and light infantry, increasingly equipped with gunpowder 
weapons, what their (initially) inferior heavy horsemen and pikemen could not achieve 
when put to the test against the French gendarmerie and the Swiss squares. Eventuafly 
this additional effort of coordination gave to the Habsburg forces the edge over their less 
flexible oPponents. 
The two divergent tactical formulations - the 'defensive' Spanish and the 
'offensive' French - were bom during the Wars of Italy and were modelled on different 
strategic 86 needs and resources. The greater availability of men allowed the Habsburg 
multi-lingual. empire to maintain towards its enemies a political and military 'defensive' 
posture so well developed that it amounted in practice to an offensive one; to this France 
could oppose only the fact that its forces could be assembled more rapidl y 87. 
Already at an earlier stage of their confrontation the superior ability of the Spanish 
system to find more general solutions overcame the ability of the French one to 
implement more particular ones". Accompanied by the superiority of some of their 
86 On the Spanish strategic doctrine: Simon Adams, 'Tactics or Politics? "The Military Revolution" and 
the Habsburg Hegemony', 1525-1648, in Clifford J. Rogers (ed. ), The Military Revolution Debate 
(Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1995), pp. 253-272. More generally: Geoffrey Parker, The Army of 
Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge, 1972). On the French side: John A. Lynn, 'Tactical 
Evolution in the French Army, 1550-1660', French Historical Studies 14 (1985). 
87 Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V (London, 1985) 
88 Jaime Vicens Vives, 'Estructura administrativa estatal en los siglos XVI y XV11', in Rapports, IV 
Hisjoire Hoderne (ComW international des sciencies historiques. XI Congris International des 
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tactical and technical choices, the unwieldy but more constant pressure of the imperial 
armies prevailed over the potentially more intense but also more localized and short-lived 
efforts of the League of Cognac. The Wars did not simply change fighting techniques, 
they also changed Italian society, and even in this case the 'Spanish tactics' with their 
superior capacity for establishing long-lasting relationships with Italian military, political, 
economic and cultural elites - an indispensable element of the victory - proved more 
effective than 'French' ones. However, whatever political and psychological factors 
determined the French reaction, Francis I could at least count on the energies of a major 
power. A smaller state like Florence simply could not sustain large-scale attrition 
war e 
89 
. 
It is true indeed that Machiavelli failed to understand the importance of gunpowder 
weapons, but his main political and military concern" was to avoid the return to the 
delaying tactics of the despised condottieri that these weapons seemed to announce. 
Florence's main weak point was its highly mobile and highly vulnerable wealth, dispersed 
on the banchi all across Europe and endangered even by other people's wars; a short 
resolute campaign was the best option in the real world as it was in the ideal one - the 
literary world of his Art of War - in which his fellow citizens abandoned their lucrative 
activities to adopt more 'Roman' military attitudes. Machiavelli's prospective was the 
result of his fascinating, but weighty, heritage; his only care was Florence, and however 
brilliant his project was, the Florentines lacked the means to support a strong strategic 
sciencies historiques. Rapports, Goteborg-Stockolm -Uppsala 1960, trad. it. 'La struttura amministrativa 
statale nei secoli XVI e XVIF, ed. E. Rotelli-P. Schiera, Lo stato moderno, I. - Dal Medioevo all'et6 
moderna (Bologna 1971), p. 233. For the life and the works of Jaime Vicens Vives: Stanley G. Payne, 
'Jaime Vicens Vives and the writing of Spanish History', The Journal of Modern History, June 1962, 
N'2. S 
89Adams, 'Tacti4or Politics? ' p. 265. 
9' On the difficulty of distinguishng between political and military thought in Machiavelli, see the 
introduction to the English translation of his Arte della Guerra (Indianapolis, 1965) pp. ix-lxxx; Felix 
Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: the Renaissance of the Art of War' in Peter Paret (ed. ) Makers of Modern 
Strategy. 
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initiative. The concept of the militia as a school of citizenship' had been timidly outlined 
by Domenico Cecchi9' and, in times of dire need (the siege of 1529-30), more directly by 
Machiavelli's successor Donato Giannott? 2 , 
but the concept of a citizenship enlarged 
even to the more loyal elements of the contado would have been in contrast with the 
very foundations of the Florentine soul. For these reasons in the early 1930s Antonio 
Gramsc ?3 provocatively considered the Imperial army that crushed the last Republic as a 
positive step in the direction of the modem state. The final result was the creation of the 
Duchy (later Great Duchy) of Florence and its partial inclusion in the military 'Spanish 
system -)94 . 
However, Gramsci was left alone in his 'idealization' of the Neapolitan 
mercenary captain Fabrizio Maramaldo9' as the harbinger of a culture that was 
intrinsically more modem and promising than the fading communal tradition or, one 
might add, the Italian Renaissance. 
More than the different tactical presuppositions on which the use of the pike or the 
arquebus was based, more than their different ages and more even than their different 
professions, what really divided NiccoI6 Machiavelli and Giovanni de'Medici were their 
horizons. The segretario was the highest expression of a Florentine class of citizens who, 
without having a famous name or a great wealth, considered the onori and utili as an 
essential part of their existence and themselves a basic element of the city's political life. 
The fall of Soderini in 1512 and the constitution of the Rome-Florence axis under two 
9'Bayley, War and Society, p. 239. 
92 Ibid., pp. 312-315. On the figure of Donato Giannotti, last secretary of the Dieci of the last Florentine 
Republic: Giorgio Cadoni, L'utopia repubblicana di Donato Giannotti (Firenze, 1978), Giuseppe 
Bisaccia, La Repubblica fiorentina di Donato Giannotti (Firenze, 1978), Donato Giannotti, Opere 
politiche (Milano, 1974). 
93 Antonio Gramsci. 11 Risorgimento (Torino, 1954), p. 10. On Gramsci and Machiavelli: Benedetto 
Fontana, Hegemony and Power (Minneapolis, 1993). 
94 On the 'Spanish system' from the military point of view: Gregory Hanlon, The Twilight, pp. 47-91; 
Parker, The Army of Flanders, passim. 
9'Maramaldo was a soldier who followed the Imperialist cause faithfully during his whole military life 
and who killed (although many would instead say 'murdered', since Ferrucci at the moment was his 
prisoner and was already mortally wounded) Francesco Ferrucci, last defender of the Florentine freedom, 
with his own hands. 
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almost consecutive Medici popes projected the Florentine moneyed and political class 
onto the international scene, quickening the already pronounced decline of Machiavelli's 
world 96 . Giovanni, born the barely 
legitimate son of Caterina Sforza and Giovanni 
de'Medici Popolani, cadet (see Table I) of two cadet families, brought up by the rich and 
powerful Salviati family, lived his short life as a part of this ephemeral political creation; 
even his marriage with Maria Salviati, daughter of Jacopo Salviati and Lucrezia 
de'Medici (the Magnifico's daughter) was meant to heal the breach between the two 
main branches of the family (see Table 1). 
Giovanni de'Medici was a practical soldier and not the Alberigo da Barbiano of a 
new 'Italia liberata da'barbari 97 . He was welcome among the aristocratic comn-ianders of 
the French and Imperialists armies alike not only because he was a valiant soldier, but 
because he was 'one of them', while his 'student' Francesco Ferrucci, the last champion 
of the Florentine republic and its traditional freedom, was not, since 'di mercatante s'era 
fatto soldato'98 . 
Despite any posthumous attempt to link in some way his figure to one of the 
highest representatives of civic humanism, Giovanni de'Medici - who understood very 
little of letters and even less of Latin - found young Pietro Aretino's (1494-1556) jests 
and enthusiasm in debauchery more to his liking. Tom in a hospital with the soul of a 
96 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 105-152; Rudolf Von Albertini, Firenze dalla 
Repubblica al Principato (Torino, 1970). 
97 On the myth of Alberigo da Barbiano and the revival of the valore italico in the fourtheent century: 
Mallett, Mercenaries, chapt. 2. On the origins of the last phase of Giovanni's myth - Giovanni d7talia - 
there is the famous letter (1526) by Machiavelli to Francesco Guicciardini in which he reveals his idea 
that the Signor Giovanni 'audace, impetuoso, di gran concetti, pigliatore di gran partiti... farebbe girare 
il cervello agli Spagnuoli... potrebbe far mutare opinione al re di Francia e volgersi a lasciare Paccordo 
(with Charles V) e pigliare la guerra; e se questo rimedio non c'ý, avendo a far guerra, non so quale sia. ' 
Vite, pp. 186-7. 
18 Jacopo Nardi, Istorie della citt6 di Firenze (Firenze, 1888), IX, pp. 203-20. Nardi was the more 
'republican' of his generation's Florentine historians. In his writings the final confrontation between the 
Florentine commander Francesco Ferrucci (the positive hero) and the Neapolitan condottiere Fabrizio 
Maramaldo (the archetypal villain) epitomises the end of a world. 
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king 09 
, Aretino had the same level of understanding of the 
human soul, the same spirit of 
observation as Machiavelli and Guicciardini, but - to quote De Sanctis - while they just 
thought that the lever of the world was the appetite, Pietro was that appetite'00. Messer 
NiccolO' wanted to be the servant of the state, Guicciardini of his particulare, Aretino of 
his pleasure. A poor 'classic' literate and an unscrupulous innovator, he made his acute 
critical consciousness and his hatred of pedantry into a flag against the literati. 
CounseHor and procurer of Sua Alterezza Giovanni de'Medici, they were both reafly 
bom in the bel mondo of Renaissance Rome, between popes and courtesans. 
In this case the 'divine' Pietro Aretino represented one of the highest points - at 
least the most ostentatious, in the field of the vernacular - of this ephemeral world. 
Unlike Machiavelli who simply knew the names of the mercenaries' vices and flaws, 
Aretino had a first-hand experience of the brutal and pleasure-loving life of the soldiers; 
he knew how to talk to thern, and even after the death of Giovanni de'Medici he kept in 
touch with many of his captains to whose minds he was able to recall the 'good old 
times' they had together. 
The sack of Rome was much less of a tragedy for Aretino than for the men of 
letters, the Petrarchists that he criticized harshly as 'pedants', because of the vacuity of 
their ideas, of their ostentatious use of Latin and of their debates - besides the fact that 
Aretino, had to leave the Renaissance Rome of Clement VII pursued by the hatred of the 
intelligentsia and having narrowly survived an assassination attempt 101 . His prodigious 
literary talent, which was made ad hoc for the people of his period, was more 
99 Only those who did not have a home - the destitute, the illegitimate and the sons of the whores - were 
born in 'spedali'. Aretino's mother, Tita, although a part-time model, was not a prostitute. On the 
circumstances of Aretino's birth see Larivaille, Pietro Aretino, pp. 19-23. Paul Larivaillle's book is the 
most complete and recent reconstruction of Aretino's career and literary works. 
"' Francesco de Sanctis, Storia della Letteratura Italiana (Milano, 1876), vol. 2, p. 99. The section 
dedicated to Pietro Aretino is heavily conditioned by Risorgimento ideology. 
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understandable to someone who, like the professional soldiers, had a very limited 
personal horizon' 02. 'Sive bonum sive malum, fama est': either good or bad, fame is 
fame; so stated the impresa'O' that the Imperialist colonnello Luigi Gonzaga, cal-led also 
Rodomonte for his amazing physical strength, wanted to see embroidered on the flags of 
his company 104 , one of the more (in)famous Italian units that helped to crush the 
desperate defence of the makeshift papal army and to sack the Holy CitYI05 
Aretino was considered for a long period by Italian literary critics as a striking 
example of the degeneration to which the Renaissance literary world was victim after a 
(golden age' that had found its completion in the fortunate production of the first twenty 
years of the sixteenth century. That was the age for example of Ariosto, Bembo and 
Castiglione, as well as Machiavelli himself The figurative arts after Michelangelo and 
Raffaeflo were included in this judgement, making of Manierismo an implicitly pejorative 
expression. Only in relatively recent times has Mannerism, either figurative or literary, 
been considered as the multi-faceted product of a culture in crisis, and not a mere 
06 degeneration' 
. 
'O'For Aretino's political leanings: Galasso, 'Pietro Aretino nel suo contesto storico: il papato, la 
Francia, I'Impero'; on Aretino's periods of stay among Giovanni's troops see Larivaille, Pietro Aretino, 
pp. 56-57,81-86. 
102 Aretino maintained with many former captains of Giovanni de'Medici (especially with Lucantonio 
Cuppano, Giovanni da Turino and Pier Maria de'Rossi) a long correspondance in every letter of which 
he remembered all the benefits received by the liberal condottiere and the happy days of their youth. He 
tried to take advantage of it with Giovanni's son Cosimo 1, duke of Florence, with uneven success; 
Aretino, Lettere. On the monumental ego of Pietro Aretino and on how he understood his relationship 
with the Gran Diavolo: Joanna Woods-Marsden, 'Toward a history of art patronage in the Renaissance: 
the case of Pietro Aretino', Journal ofMedieval and Renaissance Studies, 1994,24 (2), pp. 275-299. 
103 Paolo Giovio, Dialogo dell'imprese militari e amorose, edited by Maria Luisa Doglio (Roma, 1978), 
pp. 37-8. An 'impresa', a sort of motto whose meaning had to be only partially open to the rest of the 
world, represented an original mixture of personal and political belief, and were variable as the fortune 
of the bearers or their psychology. 
'04The 'impresa' was, however, considered quite inelegant, and was therefore changed into the more 
poetical 'Alterutra clarescere fama' ('The most obscure deeds make fame shine') by the historian Paolo 
Giovio himself, one of the papal courtiers who narrowly escaped in Castel Sant'Angelo the 'Imperialist 
ftiry' and the greedy hands of Luigi Gonzaga. 
105 Luigi Gonzaga, son of Ludovico, was the Imperial commander who captured Lucantonio Cuppano; 
Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, p. 144. 
"On the relationship between Renaissance and Mannerism literature, see the intruduction of Paul 
Larivaille to his book on Pietro Aretino, pp. 9-18. More generally: A. Blunt, Le teorie artistiche in Italia 
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Between the patently auxiliary role of the Italian powers at the resumption of the 
hostilities between France and Empire - this time at a European level - and disasters such 
as Pavia, the sack of Rome and the fall of Florence, the 1520s represented a watershed in 
Italian culture; it was in this period that a reality started to emerge that could hardly be 
considered compatible with the ideals of the early Italian Renaissance. The need for an 
adaptation in the face of the growing sense of uncertainty was not limited to artists, and 
the real community of tastes between the cadet Giovanni de'Medici, condottiere of 
soldiers, and the fonner lackey Pietro Aretino 'condottiere of literature' - as he was 
called by his friend the painter Titian - was something more than the result of an 
opportunistic choice. Paul Larivaille's 107 attempt to link Aretino's professional and 
personal ethics to the influence of Machiavelli's moral thought through the figure 
Giovanni is very suggestive, if not entirely relevant. However, the connection underlined 
by Larivaifle does exist: after aH, Giovanni's attitude towards his imminent death and his 
serenity derived from having honestly fulfilled - as Machiavelli's ideal prince was 
required to do - all the duties of his cruel and inhuman craft'O', otherwise considered 
inherently sinftil according to a purely Christian ethic. Even if Aretino did not read the 
Principe, he understood completely the necessity to he to the entire world to be true to 
his role and his ambitions. 
dal Rinascimento al Manierismo (Torino, 1965); Georg Weise, 'Manierismo e letteratura', Rivista di 
Letterature Moderne e comparate, XIII, 1960, pp. 5-52; Arnold Hauser, Storia dell'arte H. - 
Rinascimento, Manierismo, Barocco (Torino, 1957). 
107 Paul Larivaille, Pietro Aretino, pp. 84-86. 
. '"For the touching narration of Giovanni de'Medicý'prodigious' agony, see Pietro Aretino's letter to 
Francesco degli Albizzi, Lettere, pp. 7-12. 'Venne poi a la confessione cristianamente, e vedendo 11 frate 
gli disse: Padre, per esser io professor d'armi son visso secondo il costume de i soldati... non feci mai 
cose indegne di me. ' This phrase was almost a repetition of the one he had frequently pronounced 
before, while delirious because of the infected wound: 'Che sarA?... lo non feci mai tristitia niuna'. Even 
according to bishop of Pavia Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, Giovanni refused to discuss his sins in detail, 
committing his soul confidently to the mercy of God. 
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The impending danger of a long-lasting Habsburg predominance in the peninsula, 
an 'atroce et vituperosa servitu' "09, produced, as a reaction, a wave of real patriotic 
sentiment I 10. It was however, as Chabod correctly states, an elitist and weak 'national' 
feeling, which was incapable of seriously affecting high politics and which was destined 
to pass through the next three centuries as a sort of subterranean river, emerging only 
sporadically. Nevertheless it existed, even though the innovative picture of Italy as a 
whole' " had frequently to be reinforced by the idea of Italy as 'utmost foundation of the 
Catholic faith' 12 ' against the Empire, whose aggression was made more sinister by the 
presence in its armies of the Lutheran heresy. The link was not fortuitous: faith was stifl a 
far stronger bonding agent than national feeling, and it was the Medicean alliance of 
Florentine money and Roman papal authority that granted to Italy for a decade, more or 
less, an appearance of stability. 
The papal courtier and historian Paolo Giovio, - an active Imperial supporter who 
had to see first his native city Como and then Rome sacked by Imperial armies - 
experienced that moment of general collapse as a deep discontinuity that made itself felt 
suddenly at all the levels of his world"'. After his forced departure from the service of 
OL 
Clement VII, prisoner in Castel Sant'Angelo, Giovio bec me a weleome refugee on the 
island of Ischia within the walls of Vittoria Colonna's castle, and spent the period 
corresponding to the campaign in Naples of 1528 trying to elaborate an answer to his 
'09 Scritti inediti di Francesco Guicciardini sopra la politica di Clemente VII dopo la battaglia di Pavia 
(Firenze, 1940), p. 105. 
"o Federico Chabod 'Y-a-t'il un Etat de la Renaissance? ', Scritti sul Rinascimento, (Torino, 1967) pp. 
593-623. On the history and structure of the imperial bureaucracy see also Chabod's Carlo Ve il suo 
Impero (Torino, 1985) 
"'Among many examples: the Eight to Alessandro de'Pazzi, Florentine ambassador to Venice, 7 
February 1527, ASF, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, 10, f, 176 r.: '... non di meno essendo 
Italia tucto un corpo, ne seguita che debilitandosi Ii membri o qualunche di epsa, el corpo viene ad 
patire... ' 
112 Ibid. f 176 v. '... confidando nella clementia di Dio che non sia per abandonare n6 ]a sua Sancta 
Chiesa n6 la povera Italia, secondo noi maximo fondamento della fede; et pensando pure che la prospera 
fortuna mostransi fin qui a Cesare habbi ad voltarsi... ' 
"'Zimmermann, Paolo Giovio, p. 89. 
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personal grief, which was also the grief of his learned interlocutors, the representatives of 
the Italian humanist tradition. In Giovio's case the staunch defense of Latin against the 
vernacular language was one of the bases of his Italian patriotism: the wars had vastly 
contributed to the dissipation of precious cultural energies, slowing down any further 
development of the once-promising Italian society' 
14 
. 
114 Ibid. pp. 98-99 
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3. The Origins of the Black Bands 
'I soldati del famoso padre di voi, oppressi dalla fatica continua, da la 
penuria delle cose, da la tarditti de le paghe, dai moti de le sue jurie e da la 
frequenza del combattere, lo maledivano, lo biastemavano, lo dispregiavano, 
lo rifiutavano e lo rinegavano; intanto, datoli a Varme, scordatisi di ogni 
fastidio, facevano a gara in accrescergli gloria col proprio sangue ' 
Pietro Aretino to Duke of Florence Cosimo de'Medici 
Despite all the attempts made by his biographers, and also by some historians, to 
transform him into a sort of 'force of Nature 
015 
, whose only natural outcome was war, 
Giovami de'Medici was not bom with a sword in his hand, nor was he somebody who 
can be viewed outside of his social and historical context. Obviously the course of his life 
and his choices were deeply influenced by his impressive and almost innate faculties and 
defects, but his personal background was not radically different from that of his fellow 
M 
military entrepreneurs, from whý he stood out more for his surname than for his different 
status, which became higher only posthumously. The choice of becoming a military 
enterpriser was always the result of a compromise between ambition and need mediated 
by circumstances. In the case of Giovanni the choice was almost compulsory, since not 
even the heavy risks that he took as a military professional enabled him to make his own 
way among his Riario half-brothers and Medici relatives who thronged the papal court 
16 begging for ecclesiastical benefits and civil appointments' . 
A similar principle should be applied to the focus of our research. A means and not 
an end, Giovanni's workforce - only a part of which was to become the Black Bands - 
115 'Egli & morto uno sforzo di Natura'. So sang Pietro Aretino in the funeral poem in Giovanni's 
honour; Pietro Aretino, Lettere, p. 13. 
116 His few successes in this field are due to the frenetic and sometimes humiliating Roman activity of 
Giovanni's docile and unhappy wife, Maria Salviati de'Medici, granddaughter of Lorenzo the 
Magnifico, daughter of the influential Jacopo, the chief of the powerful Florentine Salviati family, and 
sister of a cardinal. 
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was only one (although very important) of the aspects of a larger network of interests 
that was not merely military in nature, the result of a slow, difficult and discontinuous 
process of aggregation centred on the figure of Giovanni de'Medici. Therefore it would 
be a mistake to limit the area of research by trying to define the Bands too precisely, 
reducing it to a unit that in its heyday had - with its 3000-3500 soldiers - the size of a 
Landsknecht regiment. Although in one sense very convenient, the term 'regiment' 
would be misleading. 
The future 'Great Devil' had his period of military apprenticeship during the 
nepotistic, wars of Urbino' 17 (1516-1517), fought by the pope against the duke Francesco 
Maria della Rovere to give to Lorenzo de'Medici the seignory of that city. During the 
confficts Giovanni followed Lorenzo as a simple gentiluomo of his retinue"'. Given the 
scarce consideration in which the Medici duke of Urbino was held as an unsuccessful 
soldier and statesman who prevailed over his enemies only thanks to the influence of the 
pope and Florentine money, this period of Giovanni's life was considered by his early 
biographers as unimportant or used as an ideal background for the comparison between 
the promising young condottiere and his unwarlike relative Lorenzo. 
More recent and thorough studies"9 on Florentine history have outlined the 
importance of the intricate network of personal and political allegiances that supported 
the Medici regime and surrounded the figure of Lorenzo duke of Urbino. In this detailed 
picture Giovanni is ignored or considered as definitely marginal, and rightly so; at the 
117 Pieri, Il Rinascimento, p. 525; Ricotti, Storia delle Compagnie, pp. 254-258. 
118 Benedetto Varchi's anonimous source - unlike other biographers - saw nothing wrong in the fact that 
his master had been a simple 'gentiluomo' and a member of a retinue; 'Venne poi la grandezza, delli 
signori illustrissimi luliano et Lorenzo, i quali esso Signore (Giovanni) molto osservava. Con messer 
luliano si messe a servire per uno de'suoi gentiluornini... e poi col signor Lorenzo similmente nella 
guerra d'Urbino... ' Vite, p. 203 
119Von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato.; Devonshire-Jones, Francesco Vettori: 
Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant (London, 1972); J. N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine 
Republic (Oxford, 1983); Humfrey Butters, Governors and Government in early sixteenth Century 
Florence; 1502-1519 (Oxford, 1985). 
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very best he was one of those that the touchy cittadini of Florence contemptuously 
dubbed 'spadacini'. They had already enough problems in dealing with the aristocratic 
attitudes of Lorenzo, and at least he was a descendent of the Magnifico. Many of the 
names of the more prominent Florentine adherents - that is those from the main branches 
of their families - of the circles and compagnie that developed around the new duke of 
Urbino and other important members of the Medici family, are well known, but they 
were just the tip of the iceberg. A large number of young men from less influential, 
poorer or collateral Florentine families (together with some from the cities and towns of 
the Florentine dominions) were welcomed at the court of Lorenzo as pages or galuppi. 
Living between Florence, Urbino and Rome some of them - probably the more 
violent ones and those who had less to offer Lorenzo and his party - joined Giovanni's 
personal circle or considered service in the fledgling casa of the young Medici 'del 
popolo' as an acceptable and satisfactory alternative after the death of the duke of 
Urbino. This was true in the case of the violent Giano (Giuliano) di Niccolo' Strozzi"O. 
one of the captains of the Black Bands immediately after the death of Giovanni, who had 
been a 'gentiluomo' in Lorenzo's retinue, but it was also true of Bernardo di Giovanni 
Strozzi 121 (1502-1533), nicknamed Cattivanza, of Ivo Bfliotti, cafled the Straccaguerra 
and of the unlucky Pandolfo Puccini, to name just the most fainous ones. This sublevel 
made up of the younger and more volatile elements in Florentine society, whose minds 
120 ASF, Carte Strozziane, Terza Serie, 36, Vite di uomini illustri della casa degli Strozzi, ff. 241-242, 
written by Lorenzo di Filippo di Matteo di Simone Strozzi; 'Era ne' tempi suoi de'piii gagliardi et 
de'meglio disposti giovani della cittA nostra, non trovando chi negli esercitii del corpo lo pareggiassi. Fu 
gentil'huomo del domino Lorenzo de'Medici, il quale tenne di lui pi6 conto che d'alcun altro che 
havessi apresso di se, e parendo al signor Giovanni de'Medici - capitano di quella eccellenza che fti noto 
a tutto il mondo - che egli meritasse nella militia ogni grado, lo honoi-6 di bandiera de'suoi huomini 
d'arme... ' . See also 
Litta, Famiglie, dispensa. 68, tav. L. 
12 'on Bernardo di Giovanni Strozzi see ASF, Carte Strozziane, Terza Serie, 36, Vite di uomini illustri, f 
248: 'Bernardo di Giovanni chiamato Cattivanza, molto giovannetto comband da fante a pi6 a corpo a 
corpo talmente che il signor Giovanni amatore di tutti gli huomini coraggiosi e valenti lo accolse nel 
numero dei suoi favoriti... ' 
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were 'naturally drawn to thoughts of pay 022 , together with their counterparts from the 
Papal States, probably offered Giovanni the first draft of the roll from which he would 
soon choose his captains, his homini da bene, his lancie spezzate. 
Owing to the composition of the first nucleus of professional soldiers (both 
counsellors and bodyguards) that surrounded Giovanni during his violent quarrels with 
123 the warlike Roman aristocracy , the bulk of his first companies of footsoldiers was 
made up of Corsicans, 124 ,a natione that although destined to become a minority, 
remained a fixed element in the life of the Black Bands. Equally constant, probably, was 
their role as Giovanni's 'personal guard', bound to their master and his family, in 
comparison with other Italian troops, by a less fortuitous and temporary link. 
The presence of such a large number of Corsicans in Giovanni's retinue was not 
surprising, since the relationship between the reliable footsoldiers from poor, oppressed 
and disease-ridden Corsiea - in this period under the administration of the Genoese 
Banco di San Giorgio - and Florence (and especially the Medici family) went a long way 
back in tiMel25. It presents also some interesting similarities with the connection existing 
between Venice and its Albanian stradiots. The successful deployment of the Corsican 
soldiers was not the result of one of Giovanni's famous 'innovations' 126 , but the fact that 
they were so closely associated with the name of the condottiere is significant in itself 
Such a profitable relationship was inherited by Florence through the acquisition of Pisa 
122 Ibid. '... Gualterotto di Niccolaio Strozzi. (one of the defenders of Arezzo in 1529)... volontariamente 
drizz6 I'animo al soldo di cui era tanto vago'. 
12' The brawl (fought with pikes, halberds and swords) between a mob of Roman bravi headed by 
Camillo Orsini and Giovanni with his Corsican bodyguards on the bridge of Castel Santangelo was 
notorious. 
124 Vite 
, P. 
91 'Tutto il carico tocc6 alle sue genti, che per la maggior parte erano c6rsi'. 
12' Giovanni Livi, 'Delle relazioni dei c6rsi colla Repubblica Fiorentina', Archivio Storico Italiano, ser. 
IV. Tome XIII, 1894, pp. 415-436. Of course the significant presence of the Corsicans ('ces hommes au 
sombre courage') delighted the French writer Pierre Gauthiez. One of the most famous tragic champions 
of Corsica's centuries-long struggle for freedom, Sampiero da Bastelica, had been in his youth a soldier 
of Giovanni de'Medici. 
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(1406), once master of Corsica, and subsequently cultivated by Lorenzo the Magnifico 
and the Medici. However, by 1520 the highly regarded Corsican footsoldiers were 
fighting on the side of every power involved in the conflict. 
The death of Lorenzo de'Medici (4 May 1519) made Giovanni - the only warlike 
relative left to the pope -a valuable commodity; many of the 'legendary' deeds ascribed 
to him, especially those related to his bloodthirsty nature, took place in this period, 
during which he ruthlessly enforced papal authority on the rebellious aristocracy of the 
Marches 127 . In 1521 Giovanni joined the papal and Imperial forces in the successful 
campaign that ended with the capture of Parma, Piacenza - the two cities which Leo X 
wanted to regain for the Papal State - and Milan, and the complete retreat of the French 
army. During the struggle for Piacenza the young condottiere experienced, on the 
Imperial side, large-scale warfare for the first time and this probably induced a first 
qualitative leap in his excessively juvenile and 'personal' style of leadership. One of 
Giovanni's features that most excited the fantasy and the approval of Romantics and 
Fascists alike was his habit of personafly executing the undisciplined and the coward 
without a trial 128 ; however, his secretary Giovarnbattista Tedaldi wrote that it was during 
his twenty-third year of life that Giovanni learned to curb his juvenile impetuosity and 
included in his casa an auditore -a judge-advocate"9. This fact represents the basic 
difference between an informal 'princely' retinue and the institutionafised societas of 
soldiers on which full-fledged military entrepreneurship was based. By this period the 
126 According to the anonymous source of Varchi it was Giovanni who revealed to the world the valour 
of the Tuscan, Roman and Corsican troops. Vite, p. 205. It is interesting, however, to see how the 
presence of the Corsicans was so easily associated with the figure of Giovanni de'Medici. 
127 Rossi, Vita, p. 43. 
128 Ibid, p. 106: 'Ebbe in uso ne' suoi primi anni d'ammazzare i soldati di sua mano quando erravano, 
ma ravvistosi poi che non dava loro tanto timore quanto faceva col castigarli per via della giustizia, 
mut6 pensiero'. 
12'Discorso di Giovambattista Tedaldi, in Vite, pp. 86-101. 'Col XXIII anno fin! quella caldezza et 
vivacita che per dire il vero sino allora non piccola in lui era stata... da quel tempo in qua tenne 
continuamente un Auditore il pi6 eccellente e famoso potessi avere... ' 
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administrative structure of Giovanni's company had already been established with two 
principal components, the chancellery and the treasury, run respectively by 
Giovarnbattista, Tedaldi"O and Francesco degli Albizzi"'; other figures of the casa were 
Francesco Suasio, the administrator of Giovanni's household 
132 
, Bartolomeo Raimondi 
133 
134 
and Gabriele Cesano . 
According to Varchi's anonymous and practical witness, Giovanni started to 'serve 
the Spaniards' in 1521 'con conditione onorata' under the command of the captain Paolo 
Luzzasco. The true meaning of the words 'conditione onorata' is quite uncertain, since 
Luzzasco is generaUy remembered as one of the best lieutenants of Giovanni, and not 
vice versa. Whatever the conditions in which the lieutenancy arose or developed 
afterwards, Giovanni's social standing was not so high that he could always be 
considered as an undisputed leader by everybody but his biographers. Luzzasco himself 
came to be regarded as one of the best soldiers of his time, and at the beginning of 
Giovanni's career the lieutenants must have had a greater space and autonomy than 
afterwards. Even Giovangirolamo de'Rossi had to admit that the break with the pro- 
Spanish Luzzasco in 1522 - when the young Medici shifted his loyalty from the Empire 
"0 Under duke Cosimo I de'Medici, Giovanni's son, Giovambattista Tedaldi became ducal governor of 
Pisa, Arezzo and Pistoia. 
13 ' Francesco degli Albizzi (1486-1556) had been in the service of Giovanni since 1519. He discreetly 
opposed the French condotta in 1522. After the death of his master he became captain of the fortress of 
San Lorenzo in 1526, podestA of Borgo San Lorenzo in 1532 and captain of the Pistoiese Mountain in 
1540. In 1555 he was one of the Otto di Guardia. 
132 Suasio's duties ranged fi-om the care of the condottiere's estates in the Mugello and Rome, the 
purchase of good horses, the welfare of Giovanni's wife and of his beloved hunting dogs. 
133 '11 Signore volse sempre avere appresso di sd qualche uomo qualificato e di esperienza di lettere... 
come fu messer Gabriello Cesano e messer Bartolmmeo Raimondi, uomini grandi e di rara eccellenza', 
Vite, p. 180. 
134 Gabriele Cesano (1490-1568); according to Benvenuto Cellini he was 'Tanto brutto e tanto 
dispiacevole', while for Pietro Aretino he was '... una persona honestissima, di cor sincero, di animo 
libero, di mente giusta, di prudentia utile, di dottrina chiara, di fede stabile e d'ingegno facile'. Cesano 
was a Pisan lawyer and man of letters, in the service of Giovanni de'Medici since 1522. After his death 
the pro-French Cesano served the cardinal Ippolito de'Medici who died presumably poisoned in 1535, 
then the cardinal Ippolito d'Este. Confessor of queen of France Caterina de'Medici, he became 
eventually bishop of Saluzzo. He was also a friend of Pietro Aretino whose gigantic conceit must have 
been gratified indeed on the day Cesano exclaimed publicly 'Voi sete il migliore uomo del mondo' (p. 
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to France - was a turning point in the life of Giovanni, who had to show that he had 
'made' his former associate 
135 
. 
The death of Leo X (I December 1521) has often been considered the official 
birthday of the Black Bands - whether or not his soldiers wore the black bands of 
mourning on their corselets - since for the first time Giovanni was left on his own, while 
the French condotta' 36 and his clumsy 'volte-face' just before the battle of Bicocca won 
him the reputation of a condottiere who changed his allegiance with excessive ease. In 
fact, Giovanni de'Medici was an excellent tactician, a formidable soldier-maker and a 
worshipped leader, but his ability as a military enterpriser doing business on his own 
account and risk' 37 , at a time when the margins of autonomy were narrowing, was less 
evident. However, the old Italian saying '0 Franza o Spagna purchd se magna' was 
strictly true only for the rank and file soldiers; at this juncture for those who, like 
138 Giovanni and Aretino , were looking for a political upheaval that would open new 
spaces in their respective fields of interests, the best choice was Tranza' and not 
'Spagna'. 
748). He was an Accademico Intronato. His only surviving literary work is a book on the 'Ethica 
secondo la dottrina dAristotile; C. Tolomei (ed. ), Il Cesano de la lingua toscana (Firenze, 1974). 
135 'Credevansi per alcuni... che esso signore (Giovanni) non fosse per fare piii cosa notabile nel 
mestiero dell'arme per ]a perdita di un tanto uomo. ' Rossi, Vita, p. 106. Every biography of Giovanni 
de'Medici contains the famous episode in which the bold condottiere, seeing his lieutenant and ffiend 
Paolo Luzzasco surrounded by the Venetian troops that were holding him prisoner, turned his horse and 
charged almost alone against the enemy, brandishing his mace and shouting like a madman and 
eventually fi7eeing Luzzasco. Rossi, Vita, p. 48 and Vite, p. 204 
136 According to Rossi, the condotta amounted to eight thousand scudi di provvisione, four thousand foot 
and four hundred horsemen. However, according to the anonymous source (presumably a soldier and a 
direct witness) of Benedetto Varchi - and also according to Sanuto - Francis I paid Giovanni for three 
hundred light cavalrymen and two thousand foot, more or less the same troops with which he had left 
Tuscany. 
137 Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force (Wiesbaden, 1964), vol. 1, p. 
37. To quote Redlich, the enterpriser doing business on his own account and risk raised '... the troops 
with the military enterpriser's own funds and on his own credit without being charged to do so by a war 
lord'. This kind of figure, like the old-fashioned condottieri, was however already disappearing both in 
Germany and Italy. 
13 ' Giuseppe Galasso, 'Pietro Aretino nel suo contesto storico: il papato, la Francia, l'Impero', in Pietro 
, 4retino nel Cinquecento, pp. 297-33 1. 
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Despite any attempt to transform Giovanni of the Black Bands into a sort of 'lone 
wolf, a creature devoted to war and ignorant of the compromises and intrigues of 
politics, he was an integral, if unsuccessful, part of the patronage systems that 
characterised Italian society, realities experienced on a daily basis by rulers and subjects 
that were only partially (and often superficially) influenced by the more evident struggle 
between France and the Empire. Giovanni had not only life-long enmities, but also 
influential and binding amicizie, such as those with the duke of Urbino, Francesco della 
Rovere, and with Malatesta Bagfioni, and a family relationship with the powerful Vitelli 
family"9. The fwnous circle of captains, lancie spezzate and homini da bene (the so- 
called 'school' of Giovanni de'Medici) was only the inner layer of a complex and open 
structure which represented a normal rather than an exceptional feature of late 
Renaissance Italian military entrepreneurship. Each contractor, each capo di 
colonnello 140 like Guido Rangoni or the count of Caiazzo had his own circle, whose 
representatives at the time were not considered inferior to Giovanni's. 
One of the reasons for the negative judgement expressed by both Ricotti and 
Oman 141 on the Italian mercenary companies of the sixteenth century - with the 
significant exception of the Black Bands - was their short-lived character, especially in 
comparison with their predecessors, like the bracceschi and sforzeschi of the fifteenth 
century who, as in the case of Micheletto degli Attendoli, remained together for decades. 
A large body of infantry could not be the result of a more or less casual association of 
minor companies; Giovanni was not a 'prirnus inter pares' among his captains, and the 
organizational chart of his bands resembled more a pyramid than a tree, like the company 
"9 Rossi, Vita, p. 100. Giovangirolamo de'Rossi wrote that Giovanni needed powerful ffiends for an 
eventual takeover of power in Florence. In fact, Giovanni needed ffiends as anybody else in his position 
and, as in the case of Malatesta, his amicitia with the duke of Urbino resembled more a 'fi7iendly' 
tutorship than anything else. 
140()n the birth of the colonna and colonnello - that indicated both the commander and his troops - see 
Mallett, Mercenaries, pp. 150-15 1. 
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of Micheletto's 142 men-at-arms. Things had changed even among the ranks of the 
cavalrymen, whose link with the leader remained personal rather than that of a unit as in 
the case of the infantry, but whose individual bargah-iing power weakened as that of their 
commanders grew; the compagnaggio 143 and the social mobility allowed by large bodies 
of heavy cavalry decreased in step with the decline in their numbers and tactical 
importance. As a reaction against the unchivalrous arquebus the men-at-arms did not 
simply encase themselves in heavier armour, they also made their 'social order' less 
penetrable, giving up many personal prerogatives to the group and therefore to the 
commanders. In the fifteenth century the lancie spezzate (broken lances) were remnants 
of disbanded mercenary units directly employed by a state or another master without 
being part of any other sub-unit of the army 144; in Giovanni's period the future captains, 
either of infantry or cavalry, often started their careers not as compagni but directly as 
lancie spezzate of a warlord, learning their craft and receiving the soldo directly from the 
hands of their master. This process was also greatly accelerated, as we shall see, by the 
success of different sorts of mounted troops. 
Besides being one of the unavoidable aspects of their auxiliary role, the constant 
breaking-up and re-forming of the Italian infantry companies did not occur in a purely ad 
hoc fashion, but was the product of a weU-structured system of permanent groups of 
military enterprisers. 
14 'Charles Oman, A History of the art of war in the sixteenth century (London, 1937). 
142 Del Treppo, 'Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura italiana', pp. 
253-275,260-264. 
143 The compagnaggio was one of the consequences of the theoretical equality of all the men-at-arms, in 
a period in which, for instance, Micheletto's company ( with his 561 lance in total) was made up of 87 
sub-companies with their own condottieri. A homo d'arme was ftilly entitled to create more of his kind, 
that is compagni who - whatever their origins before the 'adoubement' - had all the rights and 
prerogatives of the other men-at-arms associated in the compagnia. This was also the way other 
companies were born, when one of the 'gia compagni' decided to become himself a full-fledged 
condottiere, albeit with only five or six lance under his direct command. Del Treppo, 'Gli aspetti 
organizzativi' pp. 270-272. 
144 See Mallett, Mercenaries, pp. 112-114. 
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The death of Giovanni (30 November 1526) made his troops the most chaotic 
element in an already confused picture. The sudden disappearance of the Gran Diavolo 
and the crossing of the river Po by the Imperialists caused the collapse of the morale and 
the tactical initiative of the League's army. The mayhem of which the papal forces were 
victim is well outlined in the passionate Oratio Defensoria 
145 
written by Francesco 
Guicciardini to clear himself from the avalanche of accusations that fell upon him after 
the sack of Rome. Freed from the only man who had been able to enforce on them at 
least his personal authority, if not the discipline dreamed of by Machiavelli, during the 
following weeks and months the infantry companies that had served Giovanni went out 
of control. Without abandoning the League's anny, they refused inspections, elected 
their own commanders and eventuaRy 'feciono certa unione insieme' 146 , that is 
established that 'coalition of the captains' which was to become the uneasy interlocutor 
of the Florentine Republic during the following year. The Black Bands were bom. 
According to Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, on his deathbed Giovanni named as his 
successor Pier Maria de'RoSSi147 , son of 
his half-sister Bianca Riario and of the late 
count of San Secondo Troilo de'Rossi (who died in 1521). Giovanni had acted as a sort 
of 'protector' of the rights and lands of Bianca against the pretensions of the other 
branches of the Parmesan family sponsored by Clement VII, and it was probably he who 
favoured the marriage of one of Bianca's daughters, Angela, to the powerful condottiere 
Vitello Vitelli. Pier Maria, Bianca's eldest son, had been one of Giovanni's lieutenants 
and followers but, notwithstanding Giovangirolarno's biased account, Pier Maria appears 
145Francesco Guicciardini, Opere (Torino, 1970), pp. 590-604. 
146 ibid. p. 599: 'Le Bande Nere, che feciono male assai, erano avvezze sotto el signor Giovanni che dava 
loro molta licenza e morto lui augumentorno, perch6 stettono molti mesi o senza capi o con capi a loro 
modo... anzi volendo dare loro un capo, non lo vollono accettare e feciono certa unione insieme, che per 
essere nella necessitd ci bisogn6 avere pazienza. Non 6 el phi altiero n6 el manco ragionevole animale 
che el soldato quando conosce il tempo suo. ' 
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to have been simply one of the competitors in the contest that raged for months inside 
the Black Bands and above them. 
AQ 
Aner a meeting in Bologna with all the captains of the Bands, Francesco 
Guicciardini persuaded them to follow the bishop of Casale 148 to Tuscany along with the 
other papal forces - that is, the two colonnelli of infantry led by count Guido Rangoni 
and the count of Caiazzo Roberto Sanseverino 149 , and the Mantuan heavy cavalry - to 
protect Florence against the advance of the Imperial army. At the same time the 
detachment (1500 hand-picked soldiers) sent by Giovanni shortly before his death under 
the command of Lucantonio Cuppano and the treasurer Francesco degh Albizzi was 
fighting in the territory of the Papal State against the forces of the viceroy of Naples. By 
this time the Black Bands were already an unit composed solely of infantry, since after 
the death of the Gran Diavolo his cavalry company was claimed by the marquis of 
Saluzzo for his brother 150 
, and many of his 
lancie spezzate had joined the Mantuan 
cavalry company of Paolo Luzzasco. Owing to the chaotic general context and to the 
almost complete lack of control by any institution, the period of relative 'freedom' that 
went from January to April 1527 - possibly the most interesting part of the life of the 
Black Bands - is also the most difficult one to investigate. 
By the beginning of May 1527 Giovanni's 'orphans' were in Tuscany, leaving 
behind them the usual trail of destruction"'; here, on the eve of the sack of Rome, they 
underwent a sort of initial re-organization. The twelve companies were divided into three 
147 Rossi, Vita, p. 94. After having been brought up at the French court, on the death of his father in 
1521 Pier Maria went back to Italy and was named 'senatore' of the Milanese state by Francis 1; see 
Litta, dispensa 34, tav. IV. 
148Bemardino Castellari della Barba, bishop of Casale. 
149 'Uomo sanza ragione, sanza vergogna e sanza religione' according to Francesco Guicciardini, still 
frightened by the memory of the assassination attempt against his person made by the violent 
condottiere, Roberto di Giovanfrancesco Sanseverino was one of Giovanni's friends. 
150 Sanuto, Diarii, XLIII, p. 674,24 December: 'La compagnia da cavallo del signor Joanin domandata 
per il marchese di Saluzo, 6 stA promessa al fratello Francesco ... 5. 
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colonnelli for the first time, an initiative that did not entail the disbandment of the unit; 
seven companies were given to Pier Maria de'Rossi, three to Azzo da Correggio count 
of CasalpO' (nicknamed the Contazzo), while the two remahiing ones, made up of 
Corsicans, refused to follow a commander who was not already experienced and 
renowned 152 . Paolo Luzzasco was considered the best candidate. However, given the 
situation of financial weakness and constant political uncertainty in which Guicciardini 
and the partisans of the Medici were finding themselves, it is hard to say to what extent 
these provisions were really applied. On 6 May Rome fell into Imperial hands, the pope 
himself was besieged in Castel Santangelo and the League's army, that was not far from 
the Holy City, had neither the resources nor the determination to do something; eleven 
days later the cardinal of Cortona, Alessandro and Ippolito de'Medici had to leave 
Florence where, in a few weeks, the magistracies that symbolised the republic were to be 
reconstituted"'. 
On 23 May Lucantonio Cuppano, freed by Luigi Gonzaga, joined his feHows 
captains' 54 , but the situation of the League's army was deteriorating daily, and not simply 
from the tactical point of view, since the choice between the Florentine republic and the 
Medici was not confined to Florentine citizens alone. For instance, the condotta of the 
capitano generale of the papal forces, the marquis of Mantua, had been signed and paid 
jointly by Florence and the pope"'. On I June Pier Maria de'Rossi and Alessandro Vitelli 
151 Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, p. 75: 'Quelli fo del signor Zanin di Medici, che si chiama la banda negra, sono 
da 2500 et p41 tosto manco, et sono pezo che turchi. Hanno sachizato in Valdamo tre castelli di 
fiorentini, et forzato femene, et fatto altre cose crudelissime... ' 
152 Benedetto Agnello to the marquis of Mantua, 3 May 1527. ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Roma, 874, f 96 r/v: Terchd ditti c6rsi sono molto superbi n6 hanno voluto andare sotto 
l'obedientia d'alcuno dicendo che se hanno da haver capitano voleno una persona signalata, et che 
habbia reso bon conto di s6 per altro tempo... ' 
153 Von Albertini, Firenze dalla Repubblica al principato, pp. 104-11. 
154 Benedetto Agnello to the marquis of Mantua, 23 may 1527. ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, busta 874,: 'Luca Antonio allievo del quondam signor Joanni de'Medici ý 
ventuo in campo qui, liberato dal signor Aloysi Gonzaga, del qual dice il maggior bene del mondo 
laudandolo di animositA et di liberalitA sopra ogni altro... ' 
155 ASF, Otto di Pratica, Ricordanze, 3, f 102 r. 
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deserted and went to Rome with a mixed troopý of two hundred infantrymen and 
cavalrymen 156 ; Guido Rangoni, formally in charge of the Black Bands, went back to his 
hometown Modena; and the count of Caiazzo allegedly tried to kill the papal lieutenant 
Francesco Guicciardini. 
FinanciaRy exhausted by having sustained the cost of the pope's war and 
determined to look after its own interests, but not to abandon the League, Florence 
decided to cut its losses and to pay only four thousand foot. In order to relieve the 
discredited and dispirited Guicciardini, Raffaele Girolami was sent by the newly-elected 
Dieci di Balia to the camp as a new commissario generale. 
156 Sanuto, Diarii, XLV, p. 278, Carlo Nuvoloni to the marquis of Mantua; Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, 
book XVIII, chapt. IX, p. 1865. Alessandro Vitelli was considered by Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, one of 
Giovanni's pupils; after the death of Vitello Vitelli he married Bianca de'Rossi. Pier Maria served the 
Imperialists for a long period, distinguishing himself during the siege of Florence, the campaign of 1532 
in Germany and the expedition against Tunis. In 1542 he returned to French service and became a 
knight of St. Michel and general of the Italian foot, fighting in Flanders, relieving besieged Lanrecy and 
fighting against the English at Boulogne. He died in Italy in 1547. 
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PLATE I 
Gian Paolo Pace. Portrait of Giovanni dalle 
Bande Nere. Museo degli Uffizi, Florence 
'Giovanni is constructed as gazing intensely at, and listening raptly to, the utterance of 
his secretary and counsellor, who, placed on his heraldic dexter, appears to speak as he 
moves toward his lord. The pose given Aretino... must therefore be understood as 
purposeful, rather than arbitrary, with the satirist taking the active role in this pictorial 
encounter'. 
Joanna Woods-Marsden, 'Toward a history of art patronage in the 
Renaissance: the case of Pietro Aretino', Journal ofMedieval and 
Renaissance Studies, 24,1994, pp. 275-299. 
According to some historians, these two paintings, both gifts of Pietro Aretino to duke 
Cosimo I de'Medici,, were intended to be paired portraits, destined to 'inspire' the 
munificence of the fortunate son of 'sua alterezza' Giovanni . Whether this is true or 
not, Aretino decidedly was impudent enough to consider Giovanni himself, and not only 
his portrait, as a pendant. 
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Titian. Portrait of Pietro Aretino. 
1545. Palazzo Pitti, Galleria 
Palatina, Florence, 
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Chapter 11 
From 'Renaissance' to 'Mannerism': the Last Phase of the Italian 
Wars. 
1. Infantry: the 'scaramucciatore archibugiero'. 
'0 miseri noi che con verghogna andami 
a nostre stanze cosi vituperosi 
lassando dece milli de nostri alamani 
ch'en sepeliti per li campi e fossi 
de portare arme piu' non ne parlami... ' 
Excerpt from the Tamento, de Svizari' coming back from the battle of Bicocca. 
VA, iile Machiavelli was organising the militia of the Florentine contado or writing his 
treatise on the art of war the Italian scene was still open to experimentation; pikemen's 
squares I and artillery still represented factors that biased the tactical situation in favour 
of an offensive deployment, although their margin of action - respectively in the open 
field and in siegecraft - was steadily decreasing. In the infantry's case this was due to the 
slow process that set against each other the 'school' of the Swiss footsoldiers, which 
favoured aggressive tactics involving rapid and mainly frontal action, and the 'Imperial' 
one, which was more defensive and sacrificed speed to the benefits of an increased 
firepower. The Germans, who were the first to benefit from direct contact 2 with the 
Helvetic cantons and from the migration of the first wave of successful Swiss military 
entrepreneurs, had to endure many defeats before winning the bloody feud that opposed 
' On the general evolution of the square and its structure: Hall, Weapons and Warfare. pp 32 ff. , 164-190, Frederick Taylor, The Art of War, pp. 29-61, Eltis, The Military Revolution, pp. 44-60. The bibliography 
on the topic is, however, huge. 
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them to their Swiss teachers. These facts have been already studied and well outlined by 
historians like Taylor and Pieri, and there is very little that I could add to this picture. 
However, the period that stretched from the reopening of hostilities in 1520 to the 
end of the siege of Florence (1530) represents also a critical moment of transition, at the 
end of which, after the hard lessons of Bicocca (1522) and Pavia (1525), the balance 
between the offensive and defensive modes was far more stable. In fact it could be said 
that if a 'manneristý' style of warfare in the sixteenth century ever existed, as Parker 
4 
says, contrasting it to the 'baroque' style of the seventeenth century , 
it has its origins in 
this last phase of the Italian Wars. As in the case of literary and figurative mannerism,, 
we have to be careful of the danger represented by the application of a teleological 
perspective to the changes in progress in the military world. The idea of an 
'unstoppable' movement - towards the pike and the musket, for instance - led historians 
such as Pieri to consider everything else as a sort of rearguard battle, the resistance of a 
dying world. Changes never actually follow a linear progression. 
Although Pavia caused more spectacular political effects, Bicocca produced a real 
shock for those who, up to that fateful day, were considered the best heavy infantry, that 
is the Swiss, and showed how vulnerable even the more aggressive formation of 
pikemen could become when faced by effective field fortifications and fire discipline. 
The success of the Swiss and of large bodies of heavy infantry during the first phase of 
the Italian wars persuaded Machiavelli that this was the right social and tactical model 
to adopt when organizing the militia and writing his Art of War. It is interesting to see 
2The first Landsknechts were from the regions near the Swiss border like the Vorarlberg and the Rhine 
basin. For the orgins of the Landsknechts, Redlich, The German Military enterpriser, pp. 14-18 and 
Baumann, I lanzichenecchi, pp. 2345. 
3 By Mannerism here I mean the late Renaissance's artistic tendency based on the imitation of a highly 
successful model (for instance in painting the canone was Michelangelo Buonarroti) and the search for an 
original style -a maniera - consisting in subtle variations and complications rather than on innovations. In 
the 'military art' the canone was in this phase being defined by the Imperial - Spanish 'school'. On 
mannerism see also Peter Burke, The European Renaissance (Oxford, 1998) pp. 10 1- 102. 
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how two of messer Niccolo"s disciples, the Spaniard Diego de Salazar 5 and the French 
Raymond Beccarie de Pavie, baron de Fourquevaux (1509-1574)6, constructed their 
works from very different perspectives during the ensuing years. 
The Tratado de re militari of Diego de Salazar, published in 1537, retains a strict 
formal and stylistic adhesion to the Machiavellian original, as well as the dialogic 
structure, though the place of Fabrizio Colonna is taken by the Gran Capit6n Consalvo 
Fernandez de Cordova and the setting is Spanish 7. Many of the elements of the Art of 
War, such as the imaginary battle fought and won by the new army in the third book, are 
introduced again with only a few variations, and the book by itself possesses very little 
'literary' value. In Salazar's book Consalvo de Cordova is not faithful to the tactical 
beliefs that had made him so famous and had influenced the Italian and Spanish military 
world. Like Fabrizio Colonna in the hands of Machiavelli, he becomes an authoritative 
spokesman8. If anything, with the counterparts of the veliti extraordinarii organized into 
the square and the resulting increase in the percentage of pikemen, the action of the six 
thousand men of Salazar's legion is even more 'frontal' and destructive than that of 
4 Parker, The Army offlanders, P. 18. 
5 Diego de Salazar, Tratado de Re Militari, hecho a manera de dialogo, que passo entre los illustrissimos 
Sehores don Conqalo Fernandez de Cordova llamado Gran Capitan, Duque de Sessa, eýf y Don Pedro 
Manrique de Lara, Duque de Najera: en el qual se contienen muchos Exemplos de grandes Principes, y 
sehores: y excellentes avisos, figuras de guerra muy provechoso para Cavalleros, Capitanes, y Soldados 
(Zaragoza, 1537). 
6 Raymond Beccarie de Pavie, Baron de Fourquevaux, Instructions sur lesfaict de la guerre (Paris, 1548). 
The book was erroneously attribued to Guillaume du Bellay. On the figure of the Baron de Fourquevaux: 
Abel Lefranc, 'L'armde frangaise a la Renaissance. Un reformateur militaire au XVI siecle. Raymond de 
Fourquevaux', Revue du Seizieme Siecle, Tome 111,1915, p. 46. Please note that from now on in the notes 
I will refer to the Italian translation of the book made by Mambrino Roseo da Fabriano, published with the 
title Tre Libri della Disciplina Militare (Venezia, 1550). For a thorough analysis, from the literary point 
of view, of the similarities between the Arte della Guerra and the Instructions see the section on the 'Armi 
proprie' in Procacci, Machiavelli nella cultura europea, pp. 183-212. 
7 On the life and wars of the Gran Capitan Consalvo de Cordova: H. Perez del Pulgar, Cronica llamada la 
dos conquistas del Reyno de Napoles... (Zaragoza, 1559), and Paolo Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano e 
del Marchese di Pescara (Bari, 193 1). 
81 do not quite agree with the point of view of prof. Raffale Puddu, who finds at least some points in 
common between Salazar and Consalvo de Cordova. Raffaele Puddu, 11 soldato gentiluomo (Bologna, 
1982), pp. 16-18. See also the section dedicated to the land force in Fracisco-Felipe Olesa Muflido, La 
organizacion naval de los estados Mediterraneos y en especial de Espaha durante los siglos XVI y XVII, 
2 voll. (Madrid, 1969), pp. 803-84-33. 
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Machiavelli's, where they were supposed to flank the main body 9- However, between 
the two theoretical armies there are some important differences: (see Table 11) the 
number of the pikemen is increased from two to three thousand, while the shield bearers 
of messer NiccolO' are reduced to two thousand. Moreover, the big 'Roman' shields of 
the 'scudati' are replaced by the smaller and more modem rodelaslo (bucklers) like the 
ones that, during the battle of Ravenna, had allowed the Spanish swordsmen to open a 
breach in the wall of pikes of the Gennan Black Legion" -a fact that left a vivid 
impression on contemporaries and had inspired Machiavelli. The remaining one 
thousand footsoldiers were equipped with arquebuses. 
However, besides the variations and the years between the work of the Florentine 
secretary and that of Diego de Salazar, we can still consider the latter as a 'Renaissance' 
plagiarism. On the other hand, the Instructions sur les faicts de la guerre belong not 
only to a different period, but also to a different generation. Monsieur de Fourquevaux 
did not cast his work in dialogue fonn, although he followed the logical guidelines of 
Machiavelli 12 
, 
from a French point of view, and expressed his patriotic disapproval of 
the failure of the reform of the French Provincial Legions 13 , launched after 1534. He 
criticised the inadequacies of the arriere-ban - as Machiavelli had criticised the scarce 
military virtues of Florence's citizens - and proposed reforms of it to address the 
widespread bewilderment caused by the still painful memories of the French mistakes 
9 Salazar, Tratado de re militari, f 15 v. 
'00n the weapons of Salazar's Legion, see Tratado, f. 12 v. The rodeleros were equipped with sword, 
buckler and 'dardos', that is some kind of missile weapon like the javelin. 
"Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book 10, chap. XIII. 
12 Even Fourquevaux utilizes the idea of the imaginary battle: Tre libri, chap. XII, pp. 67 v. - 70 v. 13 The composition of a Legion was explained in the Familiare institution pour les ligionnaires en suivant 
les ordinnances faites sur ce par le roi composi nouvellement (Lyon, 1536). On the French army in 
sixteenth century see Philippe Contamine (ed. ) Histoire Militaire de la France, vol. I Dis origins a 1715 
(Paris, 1992), pp. 233-256, and also John Lynn, 'Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660', 
French Historical Studies 14 (1985), pp. 176-191 and Knecht, The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France, 
pp. 174-175. 
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and defeats in the Italian Wars. In fact, the French, just like the Italians, failed to create a 
heavy infantry 14. 
Even though the organization and deployment of a modem 'legion' of six 
thousand men. is once again the nucleus of the work, its framework is rather different. 
Monsieur de Fourquevaux based his highly partial criticism of the excessive use of 
mercenaries in the French armies on the contention that the conditions that required the 
employment of specialised troops like the Landsknechts no longer obtained. The parts of 
the battle array that had once been considered most formidable were no longer the 
'battle' (as it was referred to the traditional tripartite subdivision of an anny) or the 
guard of the artillery, but the vanguard and rearguard, regularly engaged in gruelling 
assaults and skirmishes. These were all duties that the Landsknechts and the Swiss 
refused to perform, and since battles were so rare, they simply collected their wages, 
leaving all the dangerous tasks to the French soldiers' 5. Notwithstanding his evident 
reservations about the effectiveness of the arquebusiers 16 . Fourquevaux acknowledged 
the role of skirmishers and, unlike Machiavelli and Salazar, included in his book a plan 
for the reform of mounted troops 
17 
. 
The formal model of the Instructions was the Art of War, but, in practice, the spirit 
of the book is closer to that of the Prowisione prima per lefanterie'8 (1506), that is less 
a rhetorical exercise and more a serious proposal for military reform. Even though their 
battle array was a variation of the one proposed by Machiavelli'9, Fouquevaux's 
'legionnaires' (see Table 11) were equipped in a quite conunon and 'modem' way: 
14 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, book 1, p. 20. According to the writer, the first to imitate successftilly the Swiss 
were the Gen-nans, then the Spaniards '... gli italiani vi si son dati appresso, et noi (the French) 
ultimamente, ma cosi di lontano che quanto all'ordine non potremmo mai esser uguali a loro... ' 
'5 Fouquevaux, Tre libri, book 1, pp. 7 v. -9r. 16 He stressed the accuracy and dependability of bows and crossbows; Fourquevaux, Tre libri... P. 19 V. 
17 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, book 1, pp. 41 v. - 49 v. 
18 Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, 'Provvisione prima per le fanterie', pp. 410-42 1. 
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seventy-one percent of them were pikemen, ten percent halberdiers and nineteen percent 
arquebusiers. The pikemen respected the usual division between ordinarii and 
estraordinarii, these latter destined to the defence of the skinnishing arquebusiers 
without observing the classical Swiss gevierte Ordnung and fighting in a loose and ever- 
changing formation. This kind of disposition was at the time a common tactic, called by 
the Landsknechts verlorene Haufe, that is 'forlom hope', while Fourquevaux called 
these skinnishers 'enfants perdus' - 'fanti perduti' in Italian2o. Finally, it ought to be 
noticed that, even inside this theoretical square, the more conventional halberdiers had 
taken the place of the shielded swordsmen. Fourquevaux was able to retain 
Machiavelli's view that the Roman order of battle was superior to the Macedonian 
phalanx by arguing that when the melee was close the pikemen should drop their pikes 
and engage the enemy with swords and with the bucklers that they were meant to carry 
on t eir ac s 
21 
While even the treatises were shifting from an ideal infantry of shield bearers and 
pikemen towards one made up of pikemen and shooters, another fundamental change 
had already taken place. Machiavelli, Salazar and Fourquevaux had recommended the 
creation of a 'legion' of six thousand men as a direct expression of the state, as its 
Roman model, according to their idealized vision of the classical world, had been. 
However, one of the main results of the 1520-1530 campaigns was the birth and the 
success of a type of unit which was not only far less numerous, three-four thousand 
men, but enjoyed also a high level of independence. The future lay with the regiment, 
not with the legion. The regiments' smaller format was at the same time made possible 
19 To compare the two figures, see Machiavelli, Art of War (Minneapolis, 1965), sheet 4 and 
Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 60. 
20 D. Miller and G. A. Embleton, The Landsknechts (London, 1997), p. 8. The name 'forlorn hope' 
indicated both the danger implicit in being in the first line and the lure they represented for the enemy. 
Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 54 r. 
21 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 54 v. 
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and required by the growing tactical and technical effectiveness of small firearms. a fact 
that enabled the number of troops to be significantly reduced without a corresponding 
loss in firepower, while their autonomy derived from the fact that they were 
expeditionary forces designed to act far from their homeland. This autonomy was not a 
new development, but the principle was sanctioned and rationalised in order to match 
the new strategic and political needs of the European powers at the end of the Italian 
wars. It could be said that the new tactical bodies were more similar to the Roman 
legions of the Imperial period, while Machiavelli and the humanists had taken as their 
model the legion of republican Rome. 
With the re-organisation of the Habsburg forces in Italy that followed the 
conference of Bologna (1532) and the subsequent birth of the first three Tercios viejos 
of Spanish infantry, the Empire embraced this institution 22 . Such a choice probably was 
due more to the acceptance of the system of military entrepreneurship as it had been 
developing and to the geographical distribution of the Habsburg domains rather than to 
a decision freely arrived at, but it was a successful one. Unlike the Spanish Tercios and 
the Landsknecht regiments, the French provincial legions raised by Francis 1 (1534) 
failed to attract the 'right kind' of officers, that is those rich enough to sustain the tasks 
of a military entrepreneur 23 . As 
it was understood by the king of France and by Florence, 
a hybrid between the Swiss model and older types of territorial defence, the 'militia 
de'tempi moderni' conserved all of the risks of the model, but none of its attractions. 
More often than not, a reform is simply the acceptance and formalization of a 
process of merging of single companies and of whole colonnelli into bigger and 
22 See Joaquin de Sotto y Montes, 'Los grandes Tercios Viejos de la in fanteria espaflola', Revista de 
Historia Militar, 11,1962, Julio AN de la Cuesta, De Pavia a Rocroi: los Tercios de infanteria 
espahola en los siglos XVI ,v 
AVII (Madrid, 1999), Olesa Muffido, La organizacion naval, pp. 812-819. 
2' On the failure of the French Legions see Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 9 r., and Franqois de la Noue, 
Discours politiques et militaires A Seigneur de ja Noue (Basel, 1597), pp. 272-284 ; Knecht, The Rise 
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permanent tactical and administrative bodies, a process which was already under way in 
1528 and that involved Spanish, German, French and Italian infantry. The men of the 
Tercio of Naples, for instance, listed Pavia (1525) among their victories, even though 
the battle preceded the official date of birth of their unit. Italian troops were a part of 
this general trend: as we shall see in the next chapter, the Black Bands acted in defence 
of their interests and on the battlefield like a sort of protoregimental ensemble. The 
memory of their dead master was perhaps enough to give their force its individual 
character, a sense of unit awareness, that even now is usually associated with a 
collective structure such as a regiment24 , but, notwithstanding the arguments of 
Giovanni's eulogists, it was not enough to justify its existence. 
Francesco Maria della Rovere,, duke of Urbino and Capitano Generale of the 
League of Cognac, and Giovanni de'Medici, at the time of his death capitano generale 
of the League's infantry, have been considered two antithetical types of soldiers, even 
by modem historiography: cautious to the point of idleness the first, rash and 
hyperactive the latter. However, such a comparison needs to be put in a quite different 
perspective. Giovanni and Francesco Maria formulated the strategy of the campaign of 
1526-27 in Northern Italy together, and between the two there was not any irremediable 
contrast, nor were they incompatible personalities. Their common failures - Giovanni's 
heroic death cannot cancel his responsibilities - was due more to the lack of 
coordination between political and strategic choices 25 than to wrong tactical 
assumptions. For the Great Devil and for the duke of Urbino the fact that Italian troops 
and Fall, pp. 174-175. At the end of the sixteenth century monsieur de la Noue proposed the constitution 
of regiments of two thousand men instead of the Legions of six thousand men of Francis 1. 
24 For a few examples: Parker, The Army of Flanders, p. 178. For a panegyric of the 'personal' traits of 
the Tercios, see the still useful - albeit outdated and partial - article of Sotto y Montes 'Los grandes 
Tercios VieJos'. 
25 For a general overview of the campaign that led to the sack of Rome, see Pieri, Il Rinascimento, pp. 
566-584. 
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could not successfully 'cross pikes' with Gennan or Swiss oltramontani was taken for 
granted; the two condottieri had, however, completely different backgrounds. 
Francesco Maria della Rovere, nephew of pope Julius 11, belonged to the 
generation of soldiers that had fought in the Italian Wars since the beginning of their 
career; however, while he was fully aware of all the tactical and technical innovations 
that had been introduced in Italy and knew very well how to use them to achieve 
victory, young Giovanni de'Medici and his men were the result of those changes. The 
duke of Urbino was definitely a Renaissance figure: he believed that on the battlefield 
there were no fast rules (see Plate 2), and that each circumstance required a separate 
analysis and different provisions. He criticised the French for their tactical rigidity, 
considered adaptability the greatest asset of all and praised the imitation of nature's 
wide variety of shapes 26 ; constancy had to be used only as a lure for the enemy, because 
6 questa regola e verissima, che buona regola e non usare sempre la stessa regola' 27 
However, the basic ingredients of the duke's 'piecemeal tactic' were quite 
constant and tested; as far as infantry was concerned, he considered Italians and 
Spaniards equally good foot soldiers, but added that they could not do anything decisive 
without the help of Landsknechts or Swiss troops. The German soldiers were the best 
choice, since they not only retained their aggressiveness longer than their Swiss 
counterparts, but, during the last years - as della Rovere remarked to the Venetian 
Senate in 1532 - they had learned the only thing they lacked, that is how to skin-nish in 
the 'Spanish way 28 . Francesco 
della Rovere's vision of the situation was not unusual: at 
this stage Swiss and Landsknechts were the still masters in the use of the pike, while 
26 Francesco Maria della Rovere, Discorsi militari dell'eccelientissimo signore Francesco Maria della 
Rovere duca d'Urbino (Ferrara, 1583); the first part of this varied collection of military discorsi, 
published posthumously, can be found in Sanuto, Diarii, LVI, pp. 171-175. 
27 Della Rovere, Discorsi militari, p. 32 r. 
28 Sanuto, Diarii, LVI, pp. 171-172, Della Rovere, Discorsi Militari, pp. 14. On the 'Spanish way' to 
skirmishing and its cultural consequences, see Puddu, II soldato gentiluomo, pp. 13-35. 
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Italian and Spanish troops - notwithstanding the good performance of the latter at 
Ravenna - shared a different tactical niche. In November 1527 the Spaniards who 
occupied Rome refused to leave the city without the Germans, whom they viewed as 
their 'bastions 29 . while the Ten's envoy to the camp of the League defined the Italian 
30 troops there as skirmishers 'par excellence', accustomed to fighting in open order . 
Subsequent Italian military writers considered the Italian Wars a period in which - in 
contrast to the Netherlands, for instance - the pike did not dominate the scene at all 
levels, and arme corte like halberds, partisans, sword and buckler still played a 
significant role in the hands of skinnishing troops 31 . 
In a bizarre parallelism it ought to be noticed that, organised in their squares, the 
Swiss and the Landsknechts were highly visible and easier to analyse, while the troops 
frequently defined as light infantry or skirmishers seem to be as elusive from a 
historiographical point of view as they had to be on the battlefield. The fact that their 
duties were ancillary ones led Pieri and more recent historians, whose studies and 
technical evaluations of weapons and tactics tend to focus on a few major battles, to 
dismiss these troops as a rather rudimentary phenomenon with a scarcely articulated 
organization. There is a tendency to forget that, albeit central, the square of pikemen 
was only one of the elements that composed the battle array. Skirmishing was not an 
occasional way of fighting, it was a system, a tactic of attrition which was largely 
practised - even though with different degrees of ability. Above all it was a system in 
which technical skills, stamina, ability to act independently and personal aggressiveness 
were more important than being able to maintain the formation. The duke of Alba 
29 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 12 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125. f 335 r. 
30 Palla Rucellai to the Eight, 12 May 1527, ASF, Otto di Pratica, Responsive, 50, f. 31 r. '... rivedute 
tutte le fanterie et trovatole circa 16 milia fanti buona gente che circa la terza. parte erano Svizzeri et 
Lanzichenech, da stare fort] alla campagna et il resto Italiani da. scaramucciare et combattere sbandati per 
excellentia. - .' 31 Lelio Brancaccio, I carichi militari (Antwerp, 16 10), p. 42. 
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thought that 'any troops could fight a battle but it required trained veterans to win a 
skirmish -)32 . The army of the League had enough Swiss and Landsknecht units 
specialized in shock tactics, but lacked good assault troops 33 like the 'essercitatissime 
compagnie' of arquebusiers of the Black Bands 34. Since the 1527-28 campaign included 
an endless series of skinnishes, one blockade but no pitched battles, we have to give a 
closer look to skirmish warfare, whose central element was the 'archibuggiero 
scaramucciatore'. 
When adequately coordinated, the skinnishing shooters had already shown how 
deadly their action could be. At Romagnano (1524), the arquebusiers of Fernando de 
35 Avalos transformed two counterattacks of the retreating French anny into a disaster . 
At the climax of the battle of Pavia (1525), the 'sparsi' arquebusiers of the marquis of 
Pescara opened fire on the thick ranks of the French heavy cavalry from the cover of the 
wood of Mirabello. When charged by the outraged gendarmes 'serrati insieme', the 
Spaniards followed Avalos' 'nuovi precetti' and eluded their attack by feigning a retreat, 
and spreading 'sanza ordine' all around the enemy while at the same subjecting the 
32 Quotation from Parker, The Army of Flanders, p. 13. Parker correctly states that the War of Flanders 
forced the Spanish troops to engage in a real guerrilla war which called '... for troops with an unusual 
degree of endurance and experience... discipline and unit organization hardly mattered; the critical 
qualities were independent excellence and complete familiarity with the weapons'. 33 , 
... assai fanteria da combattere ferma, manca per6 loro gente dextra et ardita allo assalto come dicono 
essere quelle di Vostre Signorie'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, f. 424 r. 
34 Paolo Giovio, La seconda parte dell'Historie del suo tempo di monsignor Paolo Giovio vescovo di 
Nocera, tradotte per M. Lodovico Domenichi (Firenze, 1563), book 25, p. 67 
35 Romagnano was not a real battle, but is frequently mentioned as one because one of the victims of the 
steady fire of the Imperialist arquebusiers and musketeers was - quite appropriately - the famous 
monsieur de Bayart, 'le chevalier sans tache et reproche' who embodied all the knightly virtues. On 29 
April, monsieur de Bonnivet guided the French heavy cavalry and four hundred Swiss in an attempt to 
recover the army's ordnance, captured by the hnperialists. The gendarmes were forced to retreat after 
sustaining heavy losses, and the Swiss were annihilated by the elusive Spanish shooters. Bonnivet himself 
was badly wounded. Bayart tried to prevent the Spaniards from harassing the French rearguard and led 
another counterattack, during which the famous knight was killed by a musket shot. On Romagnano, see 
Pieri, Il Rinascimento, pp. 549-550. 
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bewildered men-at-arms to a constant barrage of fire, at the end of which they were able 
to oveirwhelm them 
36 
. 
A 'typical' arquebusier was equipped with his main offensive weapon, that is the 
'archibuso' - which was at most two and a half feet long - and he usually had a knife on 
his right side and a sword on his left. The only 'anne defensiva'an arquebusier normally 
carried was a bulletproof sallet or a morione 37 . Following the old saying that 'lancia 
lunga et spada corta. fa buon fante -, 38 , many Italian writers of military treatises 
encouraged the choice of a short thrusting sword, only slightly longer than the 
katzbalger ('mangler') of the Landsknechts, whose broad, double-edged blade was 
lighter, easier to draw and less cumbersome than the longer models usually carried by 
the footsoldiers, and could cut the shafts of the polearms 39 . The sword was mainly a 
weapon of self-defence, but was also a symbol of the status of the soldier: it was the 
only arma that a soldato privato could carry while moving around inside his camp, and, 
in the case of an honourable surrender,, sometimes it was the only weapon that the rank- 
and-file were allowed to keep. Moreover, the arquebusiers, especially during an assault, 
did not vanish with the smoke of their shots: during the violent melees and in the 
trenches outside Naples there was little space left for the pike, 'regina dell'artne', and in 
36 Ma gli spagnuoli naturalmente destri e coperti d'armi leggiere, si ritirarono tosto adietro, et 
aggirandosi intmo schernirono la furia de'cavalli, et accresciuti di numero, si come quegli ch'erano 
ammaestrati per lunga esprienza e per li nuovi precetti del marchese, senza ordina s'allargarono per tutto 
il campo. Era quel modo di combattere per s6 nuovo e non pift usato, ma sopra tutto mirabile, et crudele, 
perciocchd preoccupando con gran vantaggio gli archibugieri, Phonorata virtit della cavalleria si perdeva 
affatto... et cavalieri senza poter vendicarsi erano per tutto abbattuti da fantaccini ignobili et privati... '. 
Paolo Giovio, Delle Istorie del suo tempo di monsignor Paolo Giovio vescovo di Nocera, tradotte da M 
Lodovico Domenichi. Prima parte. (Venice, 158 1), book 22, p. 506 v. 
37 Domenico Mora, Il Soldato di messer Domenico Mora, bolognese, Gentilhomo Grisone et cavalliere 
accademico stordito (Venice, 1570), p. 72. Domenico Mora fought for Venice against the Turks, and 
became first military commander and then governor of the island of Zante. After leaving Venetian service, 
he went to France during the Civil Wars. He took part in the successful siege of Avignon. 
38 Aurelio Cicuta, Disciplina militare del signor cavalliere Aurelio Cicuta, divisa in tre libri (Venice, 
1572), p. 211. During his youth, Aurelio Cicuta had been an 'allievo' of the marquis of Pescara, the hero 
of Pavia. 
39 For instance, Aurelio Cicuta, Disciplina militare, p. 211. Cicuta criticised the swords of the Spaniards 
and of the French firantoppini, that is the _franc-taupins, as 
the irregular Picard troops were called. The 
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close combat the soldiers used everything they had. In case of need, an arquebus could 
become an excellent club. Quickness, lightness and agility were to be the main 
characteristics of the arquebusier, who could be expected to fight in three principal 
roles: as skirmisher, as a part of the groups of shooters 'sbandati', or wings, that 
preceded and followed the square and, eventually, at the sides of the square itself as 
4 maniche' ('sleeves' - see Plate 3 and Table VII), which were also called 'guamitioni'. 
In the first case, the 'archibugiero scaramucciatore' was meant to be constantly in 
movement, walking crouched, hopping here and there like a 'saltarino', kneeling down 
to recharge his weapon, always ready to discharge it at the enemy's chest. During a 
skirmish there was seldom the occasion or the need to take careful aim before shooting, 
mainly because the enemy was so close, and there was little need of long-range weapons 
like the musket. Italian military writers of the second half of the sixteenth century were 
somewhat conservative in regard to the great diffusion of the musket, that was 
considered too heavy to be used in close combat; a good skirmisher had to be ready to 
fight for hours, maintaining the same rate of fire, from dawn to dusk, if necessary 40 . 
Captain Francesco Ferretti (1523-1600), a veteran of Mtihlberg and of the French 
Civil Wars, believed that there were three circumstances in which skirmishing was 
41 
appropriate : to sound out your own fighting spirit and the enemy's intentions, to 
occupy and hold a pass, to stop the enemy from harassing your marching troops. The 
mechanism was the same in the three cases; what changed were the priorities, the times 
and the modes of the engagement. The officer in charge of the action was to select a 
percentage of arquebusiers adequate to the needs of the occasion from the various 
ftantoppina was a kind of sword that at half or three-quarters of its length became a long, pointed stiletto 
and was used mainly in close combat. 
40 On skirmishes: Cicuta, Disciplina militare, pp. 177,209-211 and Domenico Mora, Il Soldato, pp. 72- 
75. 
41 Francesco Ferretti, Delia osservanza militare del capitan Francesco Ferretti dAncona, cavallier 
dell'ordine di Santo Stefano, libri due (Venezia, 1577), pp. 65-70. 
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companies, and to give them accurate instructions on the purpose of the coming fight. In 
theory, the scheme was rather simple: the captain had to take possession of a tenable 
position and then to divide his men into five or six groups of at least fifty men each that, 
by attacking in waves, would first provoke the enemy and then put them under pressure, 
so 'enlarging' the skirmish. During their action, the arquebusiers were flanked by groups 
of 'corsaletti' - armoured footsoldiers - armed with short polearms. At the beginning of 
the seventeenth century Lelio Brancaccio (15 60-163 7), a veteran of the Netherlands who 
had been in command of one of these groups of annoured storm troops, considered 
these halberdiers an obsolete legacy of the past wars, when Italiaif and Spaniards still A 
had not learned how to wield the pike with sufficient ski1142. 
The body of covering troops lined up behind them and the timely advance of other 
groups allowed the different teams of arquebusiers, to retreat and to regroup after 
discharging their weapons and after the enemy counterattack. There, they would become 
a part of the 'grossa spalla', waiting for their turn to attack again. To further clarify this 
tactical scheme, Francesco Ferretti compared it explicitly to the caracole, which was the 
typical mode of attack of the reiters, the German mounted pistoleers who had come to 
43 
prominence during the early days of his military career . 
Possibly, the most dangerous duty required from arquebusiers and musketeers was 
when they were organised into the 'ali' (wings), also called 'coma', of a square (see 
Plate 2) during the preliminaries to a pitched battle. A characteristic of the 
'scaramucciatore archibugiero', and one of his main advantages, was his adaptability to 
the different kinds of terrain and his use of natural or man-made shelters and obstacles. 
The wings were 'sbandate' and loose formations in which the skirmishers had to rely on 
the accuracy and on the long range of their weapons and - given their low rate of fire 
42 Lelio Brancaccio, I carichi militari, p. 42. 
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and the open ground on which they usually fought - were more vulnerable to direct 
attacks from both cavalry and infantry. However, the wings followed, on a bigger scale, 
the same fighting mode of the groups of arquebusiers of the aforesaid skirmishes. Once 
the 'ali' had come into contact with the enemy, a different kind of caracole began: 
according to need, shooters from the square's sleeves methodically exchanged their 
places with their weary colleagues 'sbandati', stirring up the fight. Moreover, since it 
had to mount an 'elastic' resistance, a wing in trouble could, and frequently did, re-enter 
the square. Captain Ferretti considered these formations typical of Italian and Spanish 
units, two '. nationi' that excelled as shooters 44 - If successful, this tactic of attrition could 
even force an intact square of pikemen, whose arquebusiers had been overwhelmed or 
had suffered heavy losses, to retreat. 
Organized into sleeves (see Table VIII), the shooters had no freedom of movement 
at all: they were the 'garrisons' ('guarnitioni') of the square and had to remain at its 
sides, maintaining the ordinanza, ready to take shelter under the pikes of their 
companions, who were usually picche secche, that is unarmoured pikemen. Unlike their 
colleagues on the wings, the arquebusiers in the sleeves followed a very strict fire 
discipline: they had to keep at bay enemies that, like the cavalry, were quick enough to 
outmanoeuvre the square before it could show them its 'armoured' front or rear. As a 
consequence, when the side was under attack they only opened fire at very short range, 
file after file kneeling down immediately to reload and to clear the line of fire, or rank 
after rank, following the technique of the caracole, when the square was attacked 
frontalIY45. 
43 Ferretti, Della osservanza militare, p. 66. 
44 Ferretti, Della osservanza militare, p. 100 
45 1 mperiale Cinuzzi, La vera militar disciplina (1604), pp. 48-52. 
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When Giovambattista Gotti da Messina (? -1559), former sergeant-major of 
Giovanni de'Medici and of the Black Bands, wrote his Libro di ricordi intorno all'arte 
militare between 1553 and 1559 46, this kind of battle array had already become 
common enough to be considered orthodox and proposable to somebody who, like 
Giovambattista's master Guidubaldo, della Rovere, duke of Urbino, had as his long-term 
ally and employer a rather conservative power like the Venetian Republic 47 . For the 
fortnation of the battaglia, Giovambattista thought that thirty per cent of the soldiers 
composing it should be arquebusiers, fifty-five per cent pikemen, and fifteen per cent 
halberdiers, while in '1548 Venice had prescribed that sixty per cent should be pikemen 
and ten per cent halberdiers 48 . During the second half of the sixteenth century the 
majority of the writers of military treatises (see Table 111) recommended a ratio of pike 
to shot of at least two to one, and many Italian and European powers tried constantly to 
raise the percentage of pikemen to that level. 
However, as early as 1570 the Bolognese knight Domenico Mora (see Table 111) in 
his book II soldato had concluded that the tactical needs of a military unit and the 
interests of the state were, at least partially, divergent. Mora argued that 'nowadays' it 
was very difficult to fight a pitched battle: the soldiers of both sides could walk but 
could not fly, while 'pel contrario, la vista loro trapassa ogni velocita'; it was almost 
impossible to engage the enemy in close combat without conceding him time to prepare 
and so enjoy a considerable tactical advantage. As a consequence war had become a 
series of skirmishes and ambushes, and for every pikeman who fell, twenty arquebusiers 
46 Biblioteca centrale, UniversitA degli Studi di Urbino, Giovambattista Gotti da Messina, Libro di ricordi 
intorno all'arte militare dati da un suo sergente a Guidubaldo II della Rovere, coll. Urbino 101. The 
manuscript book of Giovambattista da Messina is still unpublished. To see the results of a preliminary 
survey on his work, see Infantry and Numbers: Giovambattista da Messina's Military Science, 
Computing essay by Maurizio Arfaioli, University of Warwick, academic year 1998-1999. 
47 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization, pp. 319-320 
48 On the evolution of the Venetian infantry, lbid, pp 350-366. 
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49 rom the offensive to the defensive mode had lost their lives . In order to shift swiftlY 
E 
and vice versa, a military unit that acted according to purely tactical circumstances 
needed to be composed mostly of shooters, who should constitute at least two thirds of 
the whole, since they were far more versatile than pikemen. Only when a prince or a 
republic enlisted an army for the defence of their dominions, was the proportion of pike 
and shot to be inverted in favour of the pikemen; when the survival of the state was at 
stake, there was no time for long and exhausting 'traccheggiamenti' but only for a stiff 
resistance 
50 
. 
As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, the differences between the 
needs of a body of infantry specialized in assault tactics like the Black Bands and the 
priorities of a state practically under siege like Florence, could produce a very tense 
situation. Giovarnbattista Gotti wrote his Libro di ricordi having in mind the 
requirements of his master Guidobaldo, della Rovere, but he had become famous as 
sergeant-major of Giovanni de'Medici, overseeing the training and to deployment of a 
very different kind of infantry. With a percentage of arquebusiers that varied from sixty 
to almost eighty per cent (see Table IV), the Black Bands clearly exhibited all the 
characteristics of an expeditionary force, and resisted all Florence's attempts to invert 
the pike/shot ratio. Such a high proportion of shooters was not unusual: in the 
immediate aftermath of the League's defeat at Naples the last effort of the allies to keep 
the Imperial army in southern Italy consisted in reuniting all the residual units in order 
to 'fare una testa' in Apulia, that is to assemble a force whose objective was to harass 
the enemy army, and not to confront it directly, gaining time while more decisive 
49 See Mora, Il Soldato, chapter X1, p. 88: '... che i soldati non volano, ma che vanno, et che pel contrario 
la vista loro trapassa ogni velocita, non si lasclano i capitani condurre, a simili fattioni pericolose senza 
qualche vantaggio et tempo di pigliare, forme resistibili... ' 
50 , 
, .. a volte 
li principi fanno gli eserciti, sforzati da alcune potentie nemiche, principalmente per resistere 
a loro, et difendere il suo; onde hanno pifi bisogno di stare sopra la lor guardia, che di assalire et offendere 
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countermeasures were organized elsewhere 51 . The companies that formed this makeshift 
army were mainly Italian, and a precious detailed description of their structure has been 
left by the reports 52 (Sheet V) of the Florentine paymaster Giuliano Ciati (Florence paid 
one third of the expenses). The six colonnelli show no regular pattern in the percentages 
of pike and shot but do show a really marked prevalence of the latter (Chart VI) and, 
inside this category, the prevalence of the more modem arquebuses over the schioppetti, 
an older and lighter weapon in which the lighted match was applied to the primer by 
hand rather than by a trigger, as in the case of the arquebus. The rest of the soldiers were 
equipped with pikes and 'arme corte'. In 1527, young Blaise de Montluc, one of the 
Gascon captains under the command of Pedro Navarro during the siege of Naples, had 
enlisted about seven or eight hundred men, of whom four or five hundred were 
arquebusiers, a remarkable number since, according to him, in France at the time there 
were still not many of them 53 . Only years later did Fourquevaux 
lament the fact that 
6 nowadays everybody wants to be an arquebusier' 54 . but the conversion of the Gascons 
from the crossbow to the arquebus was, in all probability, merely hastened by the French 
defeats in Italy. 
In 1532 the duke of Urbino considered the percentage of shooters deployed by the 
Italian armies of the day too high, and therefore dangerous: he argued that the pike, and 
I nemici... in questo caso potri fare che i capitani ordinino le sue compagnie di un terzo d'archibugieri, et 
di due terzi di picche... ', Ibid., p. 93. 
5' The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, Bishop of Saintes and Florentine ambassador in France, 6 October 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 45, f. 102 r. The Florentines, who agreed on the plan, were 
asked to contribute two thousand foot and one hundred horsemen to the force. However, after the loss of 
the Black Bands, they refused to send more troops to the Kingdom of Naples. The events of the League's 
forces in Apulia are well outlined - from the Venetian point of view - in Vito Vitale, Uimpresa di Puglia 
degli anni 1528-1529', Nuovo Archivio Veneto, Tome XIII part 11 (1906) pp. 5-68 
52 Nota of the troops paid in Barletta, Giuliano Ciati to the Ten, December 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 127, f, 266 r. - 267 v. 53 Blaise de Montluc, Commentaires et Lettres , (Paris, 1864), 1 vol., p. 77: 'Et 
luy mennay sept d huit 
cents hommes, dont il y en avoict quatre ou cinq cens harquebuziers, combien qu'en ce temps-IA Wen y 
avoict encore gui&res en France... '. At the muster in Alessandria these men were equally divided between 
Montluc and monsieur d'Aussun, and according to Venetian sources at the beginning of the operations in 
Lombardy 'Munleu's' and 'Ansuno's' companies were respectively composed of three and four hundred 
foot; Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI, p. 428. 
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not the arquebus, opened the road to ViCtory55 . However, the proportions of shot and 
pike he criticised were typical of the new 'mannerist' tactics used during this phase of 
the conflict, while Francesco Maria della Rovere had learned his craft during the period 
of the great battles, like Fomovo, Agnadello and Ravenna, that at the beginning had 
been fought by the Italian powers as protagonists and not mere auxiliaries. The criteria 
according to which victory itself was judged had changed. 
By the first half of the sixteenth century, Italian soldiers were widely considered as 
good skirmishers and as specialists in the use of the arquebus. In 1532 thousands of 
Italian arquebusiers were deployed outside Vienna against the Turks as a part of the 
famous 'Hungarian Ordinance' 56 ; and in the Netherlands, where they fought from 1576 
onwards, the Italian troops were judged to be second only to the SpaniardS57. On the 
other hand, their reputation as pikemen remained always quite low, and it was this 
disparity of performance combined with patriotic dreams of an Italian 'renaissance' 
which would begin on the battlefield, that probably encouraged Giulio Cesare 
Brancaccio (1515-1584) to expound in a rather eurious book his rather unorthodox 
project of an army made up entirely of arquebusiers and cavalry. Addressing the 
(prencipi d'Italia', Brancaccio went so far as to describe the pike as an useless and 
obsolete weapon, and the squares as cumbersome and rather illogical formations, which 
would be easily defeated by his ideal infantry, which was to be entirely composed of 
arquebusiers trained with a 'secret' method which, if correctly taught and applied, 
would start a chain reaction comparable to the one triggered by the Swiss pikemen, but 
54 & Tutta volta ciascun al tempo nostro vuol esser archibusiero', Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 19 r. 
55 Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI, p. 174, from the speech delivered by Francesco Maria della Rovere in Venice in 
1532. See also the Discorsi Militari dell'eccelientissimo signore Francesco Maria della Rovere duca 
d'Urbino, pp. 14; '... le vittorie tutte se aquistano p41 con le piche che con il archibusi, imperochd quelle 
rompeno li ordini, da che nasce la vitoria... ' 
56 Paolo Giovio, La seconda parte dell'Historie, pp. 361-374; on the Hungarian Ordinance, see 
Embleton, The Landsknechts, p. 12. 
57 Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 29-30. 
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initiated, on this occasion, by Italians 58 . Unfortunately for us, the writer did not explain 
the so-called 'secret' method that was to give the arquebusiers victory over the 
traditional pike and shot fonnations in an open field, since he kept it for the ears of the 
Italian princes and leading commanders of his days. 
"'Giulio Cesare Brancaccio, Il Brancatio della vera disciplina et arte militare, sopra 1. Commentari di 
Giulio Cesare, da lui ridotti in Compendio per la comodit6 de'soldati (Venice, 1582). 
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2. Cavalry. 
4 e'vagliono hoggipiu' 100 cavalli leggieri che 100 homini d'armi, et meno spesa. ' 
The Florentine Commissario Lorenzo Martelli to the Dieci. I November 1527. 
It was a most pleasant sight, wrote Giovangirolamo de'Rossi, to see on a day of truce 
the Imperial army defending Milan (in 1526) and the League's forces that were 
besieging the city mixed together 'con tanto amore quanto se fossero stati uniti insieme' 
while the 'staff officers' from both sides met to parley. For the Imperial party there were 
Antonio de Leyva, the duke of Bourbon, Fernando de Alargon, Alfonso de Avalos and 
Luigi 'the young' Gonzaga (alias Rodomonte), while the 'collegati'were represented by 
the papal lieutenant Francesco Guiceiardini, the duke of Urbino, Vitello Vitelli, the 
count Guido Rangoni and Giovaimi de'Medici. On this occasion a Spaniard challenged 
any representative from the League's army to a duel with lances 'a cavallo alla leggera', 
that is a duel between light horsemen. The challenge was accepted on behalf of 
Giovanni de'Medici by the standard bearer of his company of light cavalry, Pierantonio, 
della Gisa from Verona, but the Spaniard - who was one-eyed - against the terms of the 
duel (and of 'buona guerra') killed the horse of his Italian opponent in the first clash. 
The question whether or not the Spaniard could be considered a 'homo da bene' was 
about to be pennanently settled between the angry Giovanni de'Medici and the truculent 
Rodomonte Gonzaga when the others, including Guicciardini and Alfonso de Avalos, 
decided to stop theM59. 
59 Rossi, Vita, pp. 82-83 3- 
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Challenges, between foot soldiers or mounted troops, were quite a common sight 
(especially during a truce or a siege), and a duel with lances is an indication of the level 
of autonomy attained by the light cavalry; as is the fact that the challenge was between a 
Spaniard and an Italian - two nationalities for long considered masters of the speciality. 
In fact the objective of Giovangirolamo de'Rossi was to identify the figure of Giovanni 
de'Medici as the 'father' of the Italian light cavalry, on the ground that he equipped all 
his men with Turkish horses and Burgundian sallets, rendering immediately obsolete the 
traditional men-at-arms, and was the first to mount his arquebusiers on untrained horses 
to speed up their deployment. However, once more a distinction is to be made between 
literary and historical originality. By 1526 there was already a well-establi shed 
distinction between the stradiots, with their capelletti and their shields, and those 
60 
equipped with helms and armour (and without shields) 'alla Italiana' . 
The Burgundian 'lance' was composed of two mounted men: one equipped with 
cuirass, armlets, jambes, gorget, shoulder pieces, and a 'Burgundian' sallet (see Plate 5) 
also called Borgognotta 61 , and armed with 
lance and a sword and, or, a mace, the other 
a servant on a reserve horse 62 . Giovanni obviously was not the first to accept nor to 
employ this kind of cavalry sub-unit - which had been suggested in 1515 by his idol63 
Bartolomeo d'Alviano to his Venetian employers as a feasible solution to their shortage 
of good heavy horsemen- but the great emphasis put by many writers on this detail 
makes Giovanni's choice at least significant, if not original. In fact, it was a preference 
60 'Erano nel campo de Vinitiani dintorrio a mille cavai leggieri, fra li quall erano Albanesi e Greci 
co'cappelletti et con le targhe circa a cinquecento... Gli altri erano armati con 1'elmo et con la corazza 
alla italiana... '. Paolo Giovio, La seconda parte, book 25, p. 63. 
6 'The 'borgognotta' according to the Enciclopedia Ragionata delle Armi (Milan, 1979) was a light sallet 
that became popular (more or less) after 1520, takin the place of the traditional 'caschetto' of the Italian 
light cavalrymen. 
62 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization, pp. 330-33 1; confront with Fourquevaux, Tre Libri, p. 46 
V. 
03 Rossi, Vita, p. 99. 
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motivated by the interests and the tactical needs of an infantry commander rather than 
by the ambitions of a typical condottiere di cavalli. 
In 1515 Bartolomeo d'Alviano, pessimistic about the quality of all the potential 
capolancie of heavy cavalry who could be enlisted, advised that the average age of the 
candidates should be reduced, since only the young cavalrymen could accept the 
'Burgundian' solution - which was financially advantageous for the state, but whose 
social reputation was markedly inferior - and with time become good men-at-arms64. 
Things had changed, albeit to a limited extent, in 1527, when Florence started to 
deal with Carlo Nuvoloni, commander of the marquis of Mantua's men-at-arms. Since 
the marquis was about to withdraw his forces from the League's camp, the Ten were 
thinking about retaining the best of those available by stipulating a separate condotta 
with Nuvoloni, who was already a famous cavalry commander and was generally 
considered 'homo, da bene', and 'more for the embers than for the smoke' 65 . However, 
what Florence's troops needed, according to Orazio Baglioni, who was (a very relevant 
detail) its captain general of foot, were about three hundred light cavalrymen with 
Burgundian annour, rather than men-at-arms. The negotiations for the condotta failed 
for several different reasons, but Nuvoloni's straight answer shows the opinion of a 
successful professional on the topic. He was not, in principle, unwilling to accept such 
an appointment, but he pointed out that the command of a unit of men-at-arms was 
considered the culmination of one's career 66 ,a career started among the ranks of the 
light cavalry, which he eventually left thanks to his valour and good luck. The only way 
64Sanuto, Diarii, XX p. 15 1. 
65 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 24 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 245 r. The first 
idea was to agree on a mixed condotta of heavy and light cavalry. 
66Carlo Nuvoloni to the Florentine commissioner Lorenzo Martelli, 6 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 383 r.; 'Del mio particulare, dico che nel modo delli primi gradi che Phomo se 
aquista nella militia, lo havere compagnia de cavalli legieri dove de poi cum el bene operare o vero cum la 
bona sorte salise ad haver compagnia de homeni d'armi in greve, si come quel grado che ý il supremo 
delli altri... '. 
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to make such an investment profitable both for Florence and for him was to attract men 
(experienced veterans, and not simply young ones) who usually chose the career of a 
man-at-arms by 'mongrelizing' ('abastardare') the wages according to the equipment of 
the Burgundian horseman, considered already a mixture between a light cavalryman and 
the typical homo d'arme 67 . This ideal 'medium' cavalrymen 
68 could not easily accept 
the pay (in the case of Florence forty ducati per year) of their 'lighter' colleagues. 
Giovanni de'Medici's choice could have been that of a young man (after all he 
died at barely twenty-eight) but in practice, thanks to his family name, he was not as 
strictly tied as Carlo Nuvoloni was to a cursus honorum, while on the other hand the 
light cavalry offered the best support to the infantry troops. A Burgundian lancer 
represented an optimal compromise between the agility of a stradiot-like horseman and 
the capacity of penetration of a man-at-arms, and unlike the latter could pursue or 
escape an enemy, or prepare an ambush. However he was more vulnerable to the effects 
of the small firearms, as Giovanni's death shows, and to fulfil all his potential required 
the same level of training and coordination as the heavy cavalry. 
In this Giovanni was truly a representative of the 'Imperial' school, and after his 
death the Black Bands suffered badly because of the great tactical gap that there was in 
the League's anny between the French gendarmes and the Venetian stradiots, while the 
Spanish light horsemen were judged by the Florentine commissioner Marco del Nero 
'perfecti' (perfects) in their role of support for the infantry 69 . In April 1528 the Venetian 
67 Ibid.: 'Vero ý che quando se volese condurre gente della sorte che dico io, et che secundo che se 
abastardeno Parme et cavalli cosi anchor si abastardase el pagamento che non fussero pagati In cavalli 
legieri nd in tutto da homeni d'arme in greve, et fare la condutta in honesto et honorevole modo cum 
quella provesione che fusse honesta et ragionevole per la persona mia, ch'io non recusarei' 
68 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization, p. 331-332. 
69 di coraggio alla f ... cosa che toglie assal anteria, conoscendo non si potere 
fidare nel soccorso de i 
cavalli, come saria necessario. Et come fanno gli spagnioll, che gli hanno perfetti et se ne servono assai... ' 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 222 
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captain of Brescia reported that there were two thousand Burgundian lancers in the 
70 Imperial relief army destined for Naples . 
Indeed a process of 'mongrelization' must have been under way if in the following 
years the soldier-diplomat Fourquevaux felt the need to reaffirm the distinction between 
the real heavy cavalry and what in his time was often considered as such - that is well- 
annoured light cavalry, a result he thought of a dangerous tactical interference 71 . Given 
the little attention paid to these aspects of the war by messer Machiavelli, the part of 
Fourquevaux's Instruction dedicated to cavalry is obviously the one with more original 
additions and shows clearly the great influence, even linguistic, that the Italian Wars had 
on the theory, if not on the practice, of French military culture. Fourquevaux attempted 
to lay down a real cursus honorum, a one-way career in the course of which the young 
cavalrymen would have without exception to pass through four different phases; 
whereas, as we have seen, in Italy the reality was limited to a certain 'permeability' 
between light and heavy cavalry. Starting from the bottom the phases were: mounted 
arquebusier, stradiot ('estradiotz' even in the French text), light horseman, man-at- 
arms 72 , which correspond 
broadly to the categories being examined here. 
The mounted shooters, equipped with crossbow, arquebus or a schoppietto, were 
certainly some of the most common sorts of light horsemen during the Italian Wars 73 
and one of the most frequently deployed, even though they never lost the function of 
bodyguards or 'compensation' given to a particular condottiere. Two hundred mounted 
crossbowmen were part of the condotta of the captain general of the League's camp in 
'OSanuto, Diari, XLVII, p. 313. 
71 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 46 r. 'Questo ho specificato cosi per minuto per rispetto degli huomini d'arme 
del tempo presente, che voglion esser chiamati huomini d'arme et nondimeno sono armati et guarniti 
come son propriamente i cavai leggieri... ' 
72 For the detailed description of the time to be spent in each category, the equipment, the horses, the 
training, see Fourquevaux, Tre libri, pp. 41v. - 49 v. , that is the whole Chapter VIII of the first book. 
Fourquevaux's ideal unit of cavalry was formed by one hundred men-at-arms, one hundred light 
cavalrymen, fifty stradiots and fifty mounted arquebusiers. 
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Umbria in 1528, while forty were under the command of Malatesta Baglioni, an infantry 
commander 74 . They had the advantage of mobility and of their long-range weapon, 
but 
lacked the manageability necessary to a coordinated cavalry action, not to mention their 
vulnerability in case of a melee. As Mallett correctly says, they were an expression of 
the cavalry's adaptation process to new tactical and financial circumstances; on the 
other hand the mounted arquebusiers for which Giovanni de'Medici was famous (and 
that Taylor considered as the forerunners of the Dragoons) had their origins in the 
infantry and its needs. The difference is only apparently thin, since it implies a re- 
thinking of tactics and priorities; there were no hargulatiers on Giovanni's payroll, but 
just simple arquebusiers - possibly an 61ite selected among the homini da bene - who 
occasionally mounted on horses (untrained animals captured or simply stolen) that were 
not included in the condotta. 
The Greek and Albanians stradiots (and later on also the Corvati, the Croat light 
horsemen) had always been a highly visible feature of the Italian Wars (and a somewhat 
exotic one, given their origin and the enemies - the Turks - from whom they borrowed 
their tactics), and apparently even Fourquevaux had been impressed favourably enough 
by them to adopt the term 'estradiotz' in his book to refer to a category of mounted 
skirmishers and raiders especially effective against unarmoured enemies and their 
horses 75 rather than to a specific 'ethnic' group. Cruel and unpredictable, variable in 
performance 76 and mounted on their small Turkish horses, the stradiots formed in 1527 
the bulk - together with the mounted crossbowmen and arquebusiers - of the Venetian 
73 On the origins of the figure - at least in the Venetian military organisation - see Mallett and Hale, The 
Military organization, pp. 71-72. 
74 For the complete roll of the League's forces in Lombardy and Tuscany (which meant also Umbria) see 
Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI, pp. 428 -430. 
75 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 46 v.. 'Questi Stradiotti possan servire per le scaramuccie, et fan grande 
occisione di gente disarmate et di cavai con le loro zagaglie... ' 
76 For the origins of the 'stratioti' in the war of Ferrara and the battle of Fornovo in Venetian service see: 
Mallett, Mercenaries, pp. 152-153. See also Luigi da Porto's Lettere storiche dal 1509 al 1528 (Florence, 
75 
light cavalry, and were not an unusual sight nor a monopoly of the Serenissima 
anymore, since there were bands of Albanian horsemen in Imperial service during the 
siege of Naples. During their decades-long activity in Italy the stradiots, with their 
exotic features like the shield and the Turkish bow, influenced the Italian military scene 
deeply. Lightly annoured, the stradiots were at this juncture also increasingly vulnerable 
thanks to the steadily rising number of arquebusiers 77 .A remarkable example of the 
'second generation' of stradiots were the captains Giannetto Albanese, one of the twelve 
original infantry commanders of the Black Bands, and Angelo Bastardo, who was 
Albanian but had always lived in Italy, and was both an infantry and cavalry 
commander 78 . It is interesting to notice that Fourquevaux, who was quite conservative 
in his views about the offensive weapons appropriate for the cavalry - more or less 
always the same (that is lance, sword, mace) but in a different order of importance 
according to the speciality of the horseman - makes an exception for the 'estradiotz' by 
equipping them with a long 'zagaglia' with a blade at both ends 79 . 
The history and developments of the two last categories examined here, the more 
conventional Italian light cavalry and the heavy cavalry, were inextricably linked to each 
other, even though by the 1527-28 eampaign. they had already evolved into two separate 
tactical components. The figure of the cavallo leggiero - such as, for instance, the 
Burgundian lancer - owed its origins to the progressive reduction in the number of the 
(veri armigeri' (the real men-at-arms in heavy armour) and the contemporaneous 
1857) and - for the episodes regarding the 1527-28 campaign - the letters of Andrea Civran, a 
provveditore of the stratioti, in Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII. 
77 On the stradiots during this period see also Mallett and Hale, The Organization, p. 376-377. 
78 '.:. Agnolo Bastardo di natione albanese ma ý sempre stato in Italia et hauto bona conditione a cavallo et 
a pi&', Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 169 r. 
79 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 46 v. 'Gli stradiotti havran buoni cavalli et saranno armati come i cavali 
leggieri, eccetto delle braccia perchd in luogo di bracciali et guanti di ferro, porteranno maniche e guanti 
di maglia, la spada larga ai fianchi. la mazza all'arcione, et una zagaglia in mano longa dieci o dodici 
piedi ferrata da tutti e due i lati di un ferro ben acuto et tagliente, overamente porteran la lancia come gli 
altri... ' 
76 
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enlargement and subsequent fragmentation of the traditional unit of Italian cavalry, the 
lancia, whose leader was the man-at-arms 80 . 
In the condotta that the Florentine Republic entered into in 1528 with Ercole 
d'Este, the son of the duke of Ferrara, as captain general of all their troops, the lancie of 
the two hundred 'homini d'anne in bianco' granted to the young condottiere were to be 
equipped with three horses: a warhorse or 'capolancia', a replacement mount or 'piacto' 
, and a nag ('ronzino )81 - which means three horses and only one combatant. The 
traditional tripartite structure had included an additional, more lightly annoured, 
horseman but his absence, once simply tolerated when not objected to, had become 
normal. The saccomanno, or sergente, became a separate figure during the Wars, a light 
horseman with his own tactical features, and he was, moreover, was too expensive (forty 
ducats per year, while the average pay of the man-at-arms in Florentine service was one 
82 hundred ducats during this period) to simply retain his accustomed role as substitute . 
However Ercole d'Este's condotta specified that at least half - or more, according to the 
will of the captain general - of the homini d'arme were to be converted into cavalli 
leggieri at a ratio of two light horsemen to one man-at-arms, whose pay was therefore to 
be equally divided. It was a sort of compromise between the need to safeguard the 
riputatione of young Ercole - whose rank had more a political than a military 
significance - and Florence's tactical needs. 
The city had been abandoned by the Mantuan heavy cavalry and, as we shall see in 
detail, badly disappointed by the famous French gens d'armes, the armerie whose 
passivity and indiscipline demoralized the other troops besieging Naples. On the other 
hand, Orazio Baglioni's light horsemen performed well. and in the aftermath of the 
8OSee Mal lett and Hale, The Military organization, pp. 69-7 1. 
8 1ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f 29 v. 'Item... che Ii predecti homin, 
d'arme per tempo di guerra tenghino per ciascuno tre cavalli, cioý un capolancia, un piacto et un ronzino, 
Ii quali sia tenuto rescontrare per pell et segni cosi li homini d'arme come Ii cavalli'. 
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defeat in southern Italy the best advice the Ten could give, albeit indirectly, to Francis I 
was to leave his men-at-arms - who melted away when too far Erom the Alps - at home 
and to recruit Italian light cavalry and German infantry in order to reaffirrn his rights in 
83 the peninsula . 
Skirmish and attrition warfare was not suited to heavy cavalry because of its lack 
of mobility and the vulnerability of the complex tactical apparatus needed to keep the 
men-at-arms operational. However, this was a well-known fact which was hardly 
disputed by the defenders of the institution. Protected against the blows of any hand- 
wielded weapon and against most of the small firearms by his almost impenetrable shell, 
84 the homo d'arme was indeed relatively safe in the 'fortezza dell'armi proprie' . Even 
among the light cavalrymen the sight of armour pierced by a spear's thrust was rare, and 
even Giovanni's famous exploit - when he ran through a Spanish light horseman with 
his lance - of which Giovangirolarno de'Rossi claimed to have been a direct witness 85 1) 
was considered remarkable by the more practical and experienced treasurer 
Giovarnbattista, Tedaldi, who noticed how the head of Giovanni's lance hit the 
unfortunate Spaniard in the 'falso' (the joint between two steel plates) of his body 
annour 86 . During the melee the cavalrymen 
literally beat each other to death or into 
submission 87 with lances, maces and swords, but their cuirass was often not enough to 
withstand the arquebuses' bullets that - reduced to lead plates once they had penetrated 
82 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization, pp. 367-370. 
83 This judgement was recurrent in the Ten's letters, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 45, f, 
132 v. 
84 Delia necessitti di conservare la cavalleria di grave armatura nello esercito veneziano, ricordo di 
Scipio Costanzo alla Signoria di Venezia (Venice, 1868), pp. 11,19. Quoted from Mallet and Hale, The 
Military Organization, p. 369. 
85 Rossi, Vita, p. 85. Even the name of the victim -a Spaniard called Amos- is recorded. Rossi claims that 
Giovanni did the same in 1520 or 1521 against a stradiot who had turned to banditism. 
86 Vite, p. 174. 
" it is to Giovanni de'Medici's credit that he was never captured. His legendary endurance to pain was 
however put heavily to the test under the walls of Milan when, unsaddled and isolated, he was surrounded 
by the Spanish light horsemen who literally ruined his armour. Vite, p. 164. 
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the steel armour - the faithful Lucantonio Cuppano had sometimes to detach from the 
88 heavy leather coat of his lucky master Giovami . 
'Come un forte per resistere a qualunche venisse loro all'incontro, et per rompere 
et fracassare tutti coloro che essi assaliranno'. the men-at-arms were able to apply or to 
withstand very localized but considerable force for limited periods of time; but, 
89 
according to Fourquevaux, they were wasted in a skinnish . Monsieur the 
baron of 
Aigremont - who died during the siege of Naples in 1528 - blamed the frequent minor 
engagements of the Italian Wars for having taught the French gens d'armes to turn their 
backs to the enemy when manoeuvring during a skirmish, a bad habit that was then 
extended to circumstances (like a real battle) in which collective steadiness was 
require 90 . Beyond any chivalrous consideration, Aigremont was surely aware of the 
simple fact that the heavy cavalry was plainly not mobile enough and in certain 
circumstances was easily outmanoeuvred, its strength was diluted and could not cause to 
the enemy the massive losses that alone justified the considerable effort of maintaining 
such an expensive and awkward corps d'elite. A fight between one man-at-arms and a 
single light cavalryman - that is at least one hundred ducats against forty - was already a 
loss, no matter what the final outcome was. Furthermore, the still unreformed9l French 
lances of 1527-28 were larger units (up to six men) and, according to the Ordonnance 
of 1498, in a company of one hundred lances there were two hundred mounted archers. 
Of these, one hundred and twenty were ftancs-archers, who were paid separately from 
the homme d'armes by the king's treasurer (fifteen to twenty of them were actually 
crossbowmen), sixty-eight were archers-sujets and twelve archers-sujets a volonte, who 
88 
ibid. p. 179. 
89 Fourquevaux, Tre libri, p. 48 v. 
90 ibid, p. 49 r. 
9'For the outcome of the post-Pavia (and post-Naples) cavalry reform, see Histoire Militaire de la France, 
voL 1, p. 248; Hall, Weapons, p. 184-5. The ratio of mounted archers per man-at-arms was reduced to 
1.5: 1 in 1534. 
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were paid less. Four horses for each man-at-arms and another four for the two mounted 
92 
archers were, in theory, provided 
In the army that crossed the Alps in 1527, the nine hundred heavy 'lances' under 
the command of some of the most illustrious names of the French aristocracy who 
followed Lautrec in his march towards Naples 93 were accompanied by a mere two 
hundred light horsemen led by the English Sir Robert Jemingain 94 (about whom more 
will be said in Chapters IV and V) and by the brother of Gregorio Casale, the Italian 
ambassador of the 'Serenissimo d'Anglia' Henry VIII in the camp of the League 95 . 
Moreover, the general- quality of the gens d'armes was not what it had been before 
Pavia, and Lautrec himself was, as we shall see, frequently and bitterly disappointed by 
his peers. 
The period being considered here - immediately after Pavia and before the 
subsequent military reforms and events - is best viewed as a moment of transition, and is 
far too short to be really indicative of any general trend; but the historian who studies it 
is. 
) 
for that reason, less likely to fall victim to the temptation to search for some simple 
teleological relationship between developments in military technology and the so-called 
'death of chivalry' 96; the heavy cavalry retained its social prestige, so that belonging to it 
continued to offer the possibility of social mobility and promotion. One of the best 
examples comes from the Imperialist army that sacked Rome, one of the most 
successful annies of its time both tactically and financially: at the moment of leaving the 
92 On the evolution of the 'lancia' during the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth century, 
see Contarnine Histoire Militaire, p. 223. See also Contamine, La guerra, p. 181-190 and Pieri, 11 
Rinascimento, p. 229-233. 
93 Sanuto, Diarii XLVIII, p. 460,462. For a detailed list of the companies of heavy cavalry, see Martin du 
Bellay, Les Memoires de Messire Martin du Bellay, seigneur de Langey (Paris, 1573), p. 107 r. 
94 Du Bellay, Les Memoires, p. 107 r. '... maistre lerminghen Anglois gentilhomme de la chambre du Roy 
et du Roy d'Angleterre, ayant charge de deux cents chevaux legers, homme bien estimd et son Lieutenant 
Care, lesquels moururent audit voyage... '. 
95 Again according to Marin Sanuto the light horsemen were four hundred, under the command of four 
commanders: Monsignor de Girlingan, the brother of Gregorio Casale, the captain de la Grua, the captain 
Castiglia. See the complete list of Lautrec's army in Sanuto, Diarii XLVI, p. 428. 
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Holy City the cavalry had to be re-organized since many new men-at-arms were coming 
from the light cavalry, whose ranks had been in their turn filled up by former foot 
soldiers 97 . Although the tactical importance of 
heavy cavalry undoubtedly declined, 
there were several reasons for this 
98 
. 
Monsieur de Fourquevaux recommended the creation of an official 'training 
course' destined to create not simply a tactical, but also a social elite of men-at-arms, 
and for this reason he needed to define precisely what were in practice the somewhat 
blurred frontiers between the various categories of the cavalry. He dreamed of making 
the French state responsible for the already existing, but informal, cursus honorum and 
training of the gens d'armes. In Italy a profound process of re-definition and 
specification of the contours of the social elites was already under way 99 . 
After all, simple extinction is a rare phenomenon indeed, while transformation, 
'mongrelization' ('abastardamento', to quote Carlo Nuvoloni) either social or tactical, is 
not. 
96 See Hall, Weapons and Warfare, pp. 190-200. 
97c 
-perchd molti che erano cavalli 
leggeri son fatti homini d'arme, et de li fanti sono fatti cavalli 
leggieri.. ' Ferrante Gonzaga to the marquis of Mantua. Archivio di Stato di Mantova, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 460 r. 
"Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620, pp. 13 5-6. 
99 On the Tuscan area: Ann Katherine Isaacs, 'Impero, Francia, Medici: orientamenti politici e gruppi 
sociali a Siena nel pinno Cinquecento' in Firenze e la Toscana dei Medici nell'Europa del '500 (Firenze, 
1983) 
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3. The Living, the Dead, the Seafarers. 
'Capitano mio bello, ora che avete i piedi sull'acqua vi conviene sapere che il 
mondo si divide in tre distintefamiglie d'uomini, i vivi, i morti ei naviganti. Fin 
che dall'acqua non scendete non saprete piu' se vi tocchera d'esser vivo o se vi 
tocchera d'esser morto. Sarete soltanto un navigatore, come noi della ciurma. 
Oramai siete dentro, la nostra sorte, dentro, la ventura del mare. A quella soltanto 
appartenete. ' 
A grizzled sailor speaking to a young infantry captain embarked on his galley. 
Excerpt from the novel 'La battaglia di Lepanto', by Gianni Granzotto. 
On 18 March 1527 Orazio Baglioni, just recently (I January) freed by the pope from his 
cell in Castel Sant'Angelo and currently in command of part of the landing forces of a 
seaborne military expedition against the coastal cities of the Kingdom of Naples 100 , 
wrote to Rome announcing an unexpected victory against the Imperial forces at Salemo. 
Composed of a Venetian naval squadron of twenty-two galleys, three thousand soldiers 
under the command of monsieur de Vaudemont and two thousand Italian foot, twelve 
hundred of whom were arquebusiers, under the authority of Oraziolol, the League's 
'task force' had already taken many unprotected cities of the Neapolitan riviera like 
Torre del Greco and Sorrento, and had gone as far as Salerno in its attempt to bring that 
costly war back onto the lands of the Empire. However Ferdinando Sanseverino, prince 
of Salerno, went to Naples to organise a counter-attack to take back the city, whose 
fortress was still resisting, and came back with two thousand five hundred men recruited 
in his stato and accompanied by an elite unit of three hundred Spaniards, two hundred 
and fifty of them arquebusiers. On 17 March Orazio was still holding the city, but his 
forces were reduced to four galleys 'alla spiaggia' - that is moored to the beach - and six 
100Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chapt. III 
"' Galeotto de'Medici to the Eight, 18 February 1527, ASF, Otto di Pratica, responsive, 41, f. 77 r. The 
soldiers were recruited mainly between Liguria, Tuscany and Lazio. The fleet left the harbour of 
Civitavecchia on the 19 February. 
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hundred foot, since the rest of the fleet was chasing some ships loaded with sugar and 
wheat, the two basic ingredients of biscuit. Baglioni's situation was difficult, since the 
Imperialists could easily use the 'rocca' (the fortress) as a support and there was no way 
to re-embark his troops; however, to assault the League's troops the men of Sanseverino 
had to descend a tract of land on the slopes of a steep hill, on which it was very difficult 
to maintain an ordinanza, that is a proper combat formation. Even worse, the hill's ridge 
was well inside the maximum range (approximately eleven hundred metres) of the 
falconettil 02 that composed the counter-boarding stem artillery of three of the galleys' 03 . 
When the Imperialists launched their three-pronged attack on the sectors of San 
Francesco, San Lorenzo and San NiccolO' they were greeted by Venetian ordnance, 
which had to suspend its fire only briefly before the enemy encountered the concentrated 
fire of Orazio's arquebusiers. The fight was intense and uncertain everywhere but in the 
small trough of San Lorenzo, where the League's troops were gradually forced to fall 
back under the enemy's mounting pressure (possibly that of the Spanish arquebusiers). 
After having sent reinforcements twice in vain, Baglioni took an all-or-nothing gamble 
and counter-attacked there with more arquebusiers and all of his lancie spezzate, his 
own elite troops. The Imperialist front collapsed suddenly and the forces of the prince 
started a disorderly retreat. Afraid of not being able to 'proseguire la vittoria' given the 
initially high number of prisoners, Orazio turned to bad war and ordered them to be 
killed 104 . The rout was complete: two 
hundred and fifty of the enemy were dead while 
many more had been wounded or taken prisoners, or had lost their equipment, not to 
102 The Falconet could be considered as a man-killing gun (its caliber was around 7 cm. ), with a relatively 
high rate of fire. The main asset of a galley remained, however, its bow artillery which included heavier 
calibres. For a more detailed description and for a general overview of early modem Mediterranean 
navies, see Olesa Muffido, La organizacion naval, pp. 280-318 and 318-324. Many Spanish galleys had at 
least twofalconetes on their stems (p. 314, vol. 1). 
103 To row astern until the galleys were moored on the beach with the bow artillery still oriented towards 
the sea - and a possible enemy attack - was the classic defense and 'wait' position in Mediterranean 
warfare. 
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mention the companies' flags, all of which had been abandoned. Several 'homini di 
conto' worth a good ransom had been captured, while the prince himself, along with the 
count of Sarno, barely avoided such a destiny by climbing the hill's slopes along with 
the other fugitives under Venetian fire. The Perugian condottiere admitted the loss of 
one soldier, while three others were wounded. Orazio was very grateful for the conduct 
of the three galley captains of the Serenissima, and in particular for the fifty or so 
falconetto shots fired from the ship of Peregrino, Bragadin who he considered 'per terzo 
105 fratello', that is as a third brother together with Malatesta Baglioni 
The episode of Salerno, which was part of the League's campaign aimed at 
neutralising the Imperial forces in southern Italy, is a good example of the offensive 
amphibious strategy which was one of the peculiarities of the Italian Wars' last phase. 
The mission of the 'task force' - supported on the lands of the Church by the detachment 
of the Black Bands sent by Giovanni shortly before his death - was technically a 
success, and the troops of Naples's viceroy played only a marginal role in the 1526-27 
campaign; the killing blow was, however, coming from the north with Bourbon's 
Landsknechts and Orazio Baglioni was quickly recalled to Rome. The strategic plan set 
out in the memorandum 106 that the captain general of the League Francesco della. Rovere 
wrote to the king of France immediately after the Sack of the eternal city included the 
deployment of two fleets - one in the Adriatic, one in the Tyrrhenian sea - destined not 
simply to balance the enemy's sea power, but to land troops in his backlines. It is worth 
of note that no naval battle or blockade was mentioned by the duke. 
104 The commander of Salerno's fortress Ogeda was among the slaughtered prisoners together with other 
'homini qualificaff. 
1050razio Baglioni to the Eight, ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 46, f. 282 r. The names of the Venetian 
captains were Giovarnbattista Grimani, Giacomo Badoer and Peregrino Bragadin. 
106Francesco Maria della Rovere to Francis 1,30 May 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125. f. 27 
r. Also in Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chapt. IX, p. 1864. Guicciardini, however, does not 
mention the two fleets. 
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Given the attention paid in this study to fighting methods, units and tactics usually 
considered as 'minor', it should not be a surprise that in the case of sea warfare as well I 
shall be singling out those aspects of it that serve to distinguish it sharply from a 
Mahanian 107 conception' 08 of the purpose of naval conflict. In this sort of warfare there 
was little space for direct confrontations between fleets, and it earned the condottieri of 
the sea the sarne reputation for irresolution as their colleagues who fought on land. In 
fact one of the main features of sixteenth-century Mediterranean warfare is its offensive 
character because, unlike the sailing ships, the galleys and other oared vessels with their 
reduced range and extreme logistical fragility 'monopolised only offensive violence' 109 . 
There were, however, different offensive criteria: an efficient and complete blockade - 
as the section on the siege of Naples will show - was impossible to enforce with a 
squadron of galleys, and a direct confrontation with another fleet was not, therefore, 
considered either unavoidable or worthwhile. The operations in the Neapolitan and 
Salernitan gulfs against small and lightly fortified cities and harbours were by contrast 
thought to be perfectly standard undertakings. 
The battle of Capo d'Orso (28 April 1528) was the only major naval engagement 
of the war and was intentionally provoked by the side that was at that moment the losing 
one - the Imperial army besieged in Naples - for internal political reasons (see Chapter 
V and Appendix 2) rather than out of desperation at the imminent union of the Genoese 
and Venetian fleets. The subsequent loss of almost all of their galleys at the hands of 
107 Mahan's doctrine had its highest point in a strategy of annihilation of the enemy war fleet as opposed 
to raiding but - conceived in the shadow of the British oceanic supremacy in the nineteenth century - was 
far better suited to the tactical and strategical options offered by sailing ships, than to those afforded by 
the galleys of sixteenth century Mediterranean warfare. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon history, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890); Margaret Sprout, 'Mahan, Evangelist of Sea Power'. in 
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943). 
'"For my considerations on sea warfare I am greatly indebted to the works of John F. Guilmartin, 
especially 'The Military Revolution: Origins and First Tests Abroad' in The Military Revolution Debate, 
pp. 229-333 and, obviously Gunpowder and Galleys; Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare 
in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1974). 
'09 Quotation from Guillmartin, Gunpowder, p. 3. 
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Filippino Doria was a real blow for the Imperialists, but in fact it changed almost 
nothing - from a strictly tactical and logistical point of view - in the general state of the 
siege. On the eleven June 1528 the Venetian galleys arrived in ordinanza in front of 
Naples; the Genoese fleet went to meet them and after having politely hailed each other 
with a salvo of artillery, the two formations veered towards Naples and opened fire - this 
time in earnest. The harbour's ordnance responded in kind to the challenge, 
accompanied by the cannons of the land fortifications. From the League's camp in 
Poggioreale Lautrec ordered his artillery to open fire thrice, followed by a double round 
of all the arquebuses 'che parea qua che 'I mondo andasse in romore"10. However 
impressive, that was all that it amounted to: a demonstrative action, and not the prelude 
to a massive attack from the sea against the city's heavily fortified port. In fact, among 
other things the campaign of 1528 witnessed the victory of harbours over fleets. 
In Mediterranean sea warfare an expedition could be considered successful if, as 
in the case of Salerno, the squadron was able to capture a enemy land base, generally by 
outgunning it; however, Naples was not only one of the biggest European cities, it also 
had one of the most important and well-equipped harbours of the western Mediterranean 
which projected a tactical and logistical 'shadow' beyond the reach of its formidable 
artillery"'. Its beautiful roadstead could become a dangerous trap for any hostile force, 
forced to fight a losing battle of attrition far from its bases, waiting for the land forces to 
break a stalemate that forced the galleys to do for the army essentially the same job that 
the fortified harbour was doing for the besieged forces, but over a wider area and 
without appropriate logistical provisions. Even worse, during the siege the nearby island 
of Ischia (almost an integral part of Naples' defence system) was held by the Imperial 
'10 Sanuto, Diarii XVIII, p 116. From a letter of the ambassador of the duke of Milan Gerardo da ca' di 
Mosto, II june 1528. 
"' On the tactical relationship between fleets and harbours in Mediterranean warfare see Guillmartin, 
Gunpowder, chap. 2. 
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forces, along with its port and resources. When eventually the winds of the Italian 
summer started to blow - and among them the Scirocco from the south - the galleys 
could not hope to intercept the smaller ftegate and brigantini that entered the harbour 
12 ftill of supplies' . 
The Mediterranean area of operations, with its rather rigid strategical subdivision 
matured through the centuries, highlights the European dimension of this phase of the 
so-called 'Italian' Wars. On paper, the League's naval forces were superior to the 
Imperial (or rather Spanish) ones, since the young Charles of Habsburg was fighting 
against the allied navies of Venice, Genoa and France, a coalition that did not lack 
resources, experience, arsenals and very good harbour facilities but, despite the 
League's tactical superiority and important successes, its overall strategy proved to be a 
failure, and not simply because of the adverse fortuna del mare or the lack of 
coordination - even though both factors played an important role, as always. 
Usually, sixteenth-century Mediterranean sea warfare is analysed from a point of 
view conditioned by the dualism of the struggle between the Christian powers and the 
Barbaresque-Ottoman alliance for the control of the western part of the sea; the analysis 
of the internal dynmnics of the naval conflict between the League of Cognac and the 
Empire requires just a re-adjustment - or rather a restriction - of the interested area. At a 
reduced scale, the rules and the priorities were almost the same; after all the seafarers 
prayed to different gods but ate the sarne biscuit 113 . The infidels - with the exception of 
those Barbaresque pirates unlucky enough to cross the route of the various Christian 
fleets - remained at the margins of this conflict. The title of this section ('The Living, 
the Dead, the Seafarers') is not intended simply to underline the importance of the 
112 Brigantini andftegate were - along withfuste andfeluche - basically smaller versions of the galley, but 
were better at sailing. The maximum speed of a war galley was approximately six-seven knots, but such a 
rhythm under oars could not be maintained for long (twenty minutes, more or less). With strong winds 
from the right direction even roundships were difficult to intercept. 
87 
geographical factors, but also their unifying effect and the great role of manpower in a 
system dominated by oared vessels. 
The Mediteffanean coasts, and especially the Italian ones, were studded with 
ports, but there were only a few harbours that could equip a fleet and sustain the 
prolonged effort of a major expedition; the ones capable of giving hospitality to a 
significant number of galleys were only a little more numerous (see Map A). Venice, 
with its shipyards, its impero da Mar 114 and its fleets was a prominent member of the 
League. The Adriatic sea was not the scene of any great naval initiative - even though 
the Serenissima used its ships to regain the Apulian possessions lost during the 
preceding conflicts' 15, operating from the island-fortress of Corfk The Venetian galleys, 
while operating in the northern Tyrrhenian sea often in very difficult conditions, had to 
use other facilities like those of Genoa, but also the smaller landing places like Pisa or, 
more frequently, Leghorn 116 on the Tuscan shores. 
Genoa, erstwhile rival of Venice and in this phase controlled by France, was the 
other League's sea stronghold, supported by nearby Marseilles. The Genoese galleys of 
Andrea Doria and other condottieri of the sea operated under French contract, and 
contractual divergences gave to Doria the opportunity to justify his shift of allegiances 
in 1528. 
To these naval powerhouses the Empire opposed Naples on the Italian mainland, 
Messina in Sicily and Barcelona in Catalonia, with their respective galley squadrons, 
while the Balearic Islands and Sardinia were also Spanish possessions. Whether owing 
113 For the Florentine version of the biscotto's recipe, see ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 124, f. 5 r. 
114 On the structure and defense of the Venetian 'Impero da Mar', see Mallett and Hale, The Military 
Organization, pp. 429460. 
115 Vitale, T'impresa di Puglia degli anni 1528-1529'. 
116 Even though it had supplanted Porto Pisano, in this period Livorno was not yet the important harbour - 
and stronghold of the Knights of Santo Stefano - that it was destined to become under duke Cosimo I 
de'Medici and his descendants in the second half of the century. For a good general outline, see Cesare 
Ciano, I primi Medici e il mare (Pisa, 1980). On the Knights, although outdated, there is the volume of 
88 
14, ý. 
to a lack of resources, to indecisiveness or to a deliberate choice, the strategy of the 
Habsburg forces was characterised by a somewhat 'passive' attitude - especially when 
compared with the League navies' frantic activities. To set against the superior numbers 
and the intensity of the efforts of their enemies, the Spanish had the superior land and 
coastal extension of their Mediterranean possessions, which could sound like a nonsense 
in modem and contemporary naval warfare but not in sixteenth-century terms. The 
League's forces had to waste their energies and scatter their units in order to capture 
places that in practice the Empire could not effectively defend; a very expensive course 
of action in a world of oared vessels with a very reduced operational range. Moreover, 
the three points on which Spanish naval strategy was articulated - especially the two 
Italian ones - were fully self-sufficient, so that when in April 1528 (during the siege of 
Naples) a plan was proposed to attack the enemy fleet in Catalonia, Florence saw no 
4proficto' in it and considered the idea a dangerous diversion 
117 
. 
The Florentine republic, in this period, had no war galleys of his own and its 
efforts were almost exclusively dedicated to the land forces. Pisa had been brought back 
- this time permanently - under the authority of the Marzocco after a painfully long 
war 118 , 
but one of the victims of the decades of military, social and political conflicts 
that caused the decline in the standing of the Florentine state among the Italian powers 
had been its naval facilities. However, the heyday of the Florentine galleys' 19 - the 1420- 
1480 period - was long gone due to the general Italian financial crisis (or rather 
Gino Guarnieri, I Cavalieri di Santo Stefano (Pisa, 1960), and the more recent book of Cesare Ciano, 
Santo Stefano per mare e per terra (Pisa, 1985). 
117 The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 16 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 44, f, 54 
V. 
118 On the siege of Pisa and its consequences on Florentine politics, see Bayley, War and Society; Pieri, Il 
Rinascimento, pp. 433-443. For a Pisan 'Internal' and interesting point of view, see Michele Luzzati, Una 
guerra dipopolo (Pisa, 1984) 
119 On the history and the various details of the Florentine galley system, see Michael Mallett, The 
Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), pp. 40-6 1. 
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adjustment) of the seventies and to new mercantile circumstances 120. The republic could 
not, however, avoid being involved in (and paying for) the League's maritime 
operations. 
During the first days of November 1527 a Venetian fleet - sixteen galleys, eight of 
which were larger bastarde 
121 
- entered the harbour of Leghorn 
122 
, chosen as point of 
rendezvous for the League's forces destined to attack Sicily, flanking Lautrec's descent 
towards Naples and putting the Spanish forces of the whole Regno ('the Kingdom', as 
the realm of Naples was called) under pressure. In fact, it would have been the only way 
to really reduce the flow of supplies during the siege. Already in October, eight captains 
sent by Renzo da Ceri - the unlucky defender of Rome in French service - and 
authorised reluctantly by Florence had began to recruit in the Tuscan hinterland three 
thousand foot to be embarked at Leghorn, while as many were to come with the French- 
Genoese fleet under the command of Andrea Doria. 
The Venetian galleys - and the one hundred and fifty thousand biscotti that had to 
be prepared for their crews - were a considerable additional burden for Florence, already 
afflicted by a serious grain shortage 123 . Their presence would 
have been more profitable, 
argued the Ten, in the Sienese harbour of Tala-mone or in the papal one of 
Civitavecchia, where the Venetians could have lived at the expense of enemy or neutral 
120 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, pp. 144-152. This historical moment coincided with a crisis of the 
Medicean party in Florence and the finding of important alum deposits (a vital colouring agent for the 
Florentine panni)near the subject city of Volterra, an event that triggered a chain of events that culminated 
in the violent sack of the city (1472), quite a significative military event in that period. On this topic see 
Enrico Fiumi, L'impresa di Lorenzo deMedici contro, Volterra, 1472 (Florence, 1948). 
12 'The galera bastarda was bigger than the galera sottile; usually the galera capitana, the leading ship, 
was a bastarda. The 'mongrel galley' had a length/width ratio of 7 to 1, while a standard 'thin galley' was 
8 to 1. The conservative Andrea Doria did not appreciate such a model of galley, saying that 'cosa nata. 
bastarda non fu mai bona'; in fact the bastarde were slower and required even more resources than the 
4standard' models. For a thorough analysis of the various galley's sub-classes: Olesa Muiftido, La 
organizacion naval... Vol. 1. 
122 The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 2 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 42, f, 148 v. The operation is shortly outlined by Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, 
chap. XV. 
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powers. The situation was destined to worsen thanks to the arrival of the twenty galleys 
of Andrea Doria and to bad weather. Although for the land armies a rigid distinction 
between an appropriate or inappropriate campaigning season was a thing of the past, the 
ventura del mare and the winds refused to bend to mere tactical considerations: the end 
(March) and not the beginning of winter was the best moment to move a fleet of thirty- 
six galleys. For weeks contrary winds and heavy rains delayed the departure of the 
expedition, that finally left Leghorn on 13 December 1527. Several times the squadron 
had already tried to overcome the hostile weather by heading to Civitavecchia, but 
eventually, menaced by the wear and tear of the ships, the shortage of victuals and the 
scattering of the fleet, Andrea Doria had to follow thefortuna del mare and the winds to 
Corsica, then to Sardinia' 24 . However, four Venetian galleys were forced to return to 
Leghorn in very bad shape 
125 
. 
The 'impresa di Sardegna' was only technically a success: the Spanish troops and 
garrisons were defeated or forced to surrender, but any hope of using the island and its 
resources as a launching pad for the attack against Palermo - where the pro-French 
party, according to the Sicilian exiles, was preparing an uprising - were quickly 
disappointed. As in any unsuccessful amphibious operation the commander of the 
ground troops and the fleet admiral, Renzo da Ceri and Andrea Doria, started to blame 
each other,, aggravating the difficult tactical and logistical situation and the already 
existing tensions between the French and Doria and his partisans in Genoa. 
123 To have a complete picture of the logistical background of these events, it would be interesting to 
analyse thoroughly the letters from and to Luigi Alamanni, named Commissario ad hoc in Livorno during 
this period. 
124 Salvago, Istoria di Genova, f. 28: '... et como se fosse nel principio de lo invemo, regnomo tempi 
crudelissimi di piogie, venti, etfortune de mari, di modo che la fu sforzata stare molti et molti giorni ne li 
mari de la Toschana, non habbiando mai potutto pasare Monte Argentaro... et essendo como disperati et 
incomminciando a manchare le vitoaglie, uno giorrio la usci fuori per andare dove lo vento la conducese, '. 
125The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 16 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 
14 r. 
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On 26 January eight other Venetian galleys - on which there was also the 
provveditore Pietro Lando - were driven back to Leghorn by disease, lack of biscuit and 
need of refitting 126 , abandoning the League's squadron. Apparently, the Venetian 
forces 
- already the more vulnerable part of the fleet given the distance from Corfu at which 
they were operating - were quite low on Doria's list of priorities. Despite the fact that 
bread was being sold in the city at more than five lire per bushel, Florence ordered two 
months supply of biscuit to be prepared to sustain the men and replenish the galleys' 
reserves, but the death (for illness) of some of the captains and the long delay in the 
arrival of the money from Venice transformed the Serenissima's sailors from simply 
unwelcome guests 127 to dangerous ones, shielded from Florentine reprisals only by the 
capitoli of the League 
128 
. 
On 8 February 1528 the Ten wrote to their commissario with the Black Bands 
Lorenzo Martelli that the rest of the League's fleet (twenty-four galleys) had entered the 
harbour of Livorno. Renzo da Ceri, badly ill, remained in Pisa; monsieur de Langes, the 
French commander, went to Florence, while Andrea Doria, with sixteen ships, headed 
29 for Genoa after a few days' . 
The 'impresa di Sicilia' had been a failure. 
126 The Ten to Alessandro de'Pazzi, 28 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, 
f 112 v.: '... per non avere pifj cosa alcuna da vivere, et per essere state assai da sinistri tempi travagliate, 
sono molto male conditionate, perchd gran parte degli huomini si sono infermati, et alcuni de'capi 
morti... '. 
127 On their route to Livorno, the eight galleys boarded and took a sailship loaded with wheat already 
bought by Florence. Ibid, f 121 r/v. 
128 ibid. '... usando cotali modi disonesti, et non havere respetto alcuno, se non fosse stato, per rispetto del 
Christianissimo (Francis 1) si sarebbe mostro, Perrore loro... '. 
129ibid, f 145 r. 
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TABLE 11 
Ideal armies: Machiavelli and his disciples. 
Machiavelli's Arte della Guerra 
Battaglione Ali 
Pikes 'ordinarie' 1000 0 
Pikes 'estraordinarie' 0 1000 
Shield Bearers 3000 0 
Velites 'ordinari' 500 0 
Velites 'estraordinari' 0 500 
Cavalry: three hundred horsemen per battaglione. Half men-at-arms, half 
mounted crossbowmen and arquebusiers. 
Diego d e Salazar's Tratado de re militari 
Square Rearguard 
Pikes 'ordinarias' 2000 0 
Pikes 'estraordinarias' 0 1000 
Rodeleros 2000 0 
Arquebusiers 1000 0 
Cavalry: one hundred horsemen for every 
600 per squadron. Half men-at-arms, 
arquebusiers. 
one thousand footsoldiers, that is 
half mounted crossbowmen and 
Instruct ions of monsieur de Four uevaux 
Square Skirmishers 
Pikes 'ordinarie' 4020 0 
Pikes 'estraordinarie' 0 170 
Halberdiers 600 0 
Arquebusiers 420 680 
Cavalry: two companies of 100 men-at-arms, 100 light horsemen, 50 
stradiots and 50 mounted arquebusiers each. 
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Table IV 
The Black Bands. November 1527 
(Thirteen Companies) 
6 
(I halberds 
D muskets 
0 arquebus. 
13 p4kes 
94 
Arquebusiers 
M Pikes/anne corte 
TABLE V 
Federico Caraffa, colonnello with 1086 foot under the command of seven captains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
1.11 Bastardo 163 99 25 
2. Mazza 162 98 37 
3. Giovanni Calabrese 124 73 10 
4. Paolantonio da Ferrara 164 67 28 
5. Camillo di Lauro 133 75 15 
6. Tommasso da Leccio 205 129 29 
17. Vincenzo Castaldo 1 135 1 66 1 9 
Simone Romano, colonnello with 968 foot under the command of seven camains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
8. Jacopo da Bozzo, c6rso 237 127 35 
9. Napoletto c6rso * 232 129 34 
10. Giovanni siciliano 117 47 27 
11. Giovannandrea siciliano 96 35 19 
12. Angelo sardo 94 32 18 
13. Moretto 95 55 20 
14. Bemardino c6rso dalla 
Bastelica * 
97 31 16 
Principe di Melfi, colonnello with H 92 foot under the command of seven captains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
15. Hectorre d'Assia 254 159 35 
16. Carlo Seripana 202 157 19 
17. Quaranta 150 78 12 
18. Federigo Morone 129 73 19 
19. Camillo de Mons 136 85 15 
20. Luigi Bonaventura 161 88 18 
2 1. Aosto da Ghaeta 160 85 0 
Camillo Orsini, colonnello with 549 foot under the command of three captains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
22. Girolarno da Cremona 221 125 20 
23. Marco Tullio d'Ascoli 173 107 8 
24. Giandomenico da 
Piacenza 
155 65 3 
Galeazzo Farriese colonnello with 1267 foot under the command of seven captains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
25. Alfonso Farnese 292 158 39 
26. Marsilia 130 84 14 
27. Menicoccio 139 78 33 
28. Luigi Albanese 150 73 32 
29. Vincenzo da Spoleto 161 77 36 
130. Bernardino C6rso * 247 1 123 1 72 
13 1. Cherubino da Spoleto 148 1 71 1 27 
G iancorrado Orsini colonnello with 1000 foot under the command of four captains 
CAPTAINS FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) ARQUEBUSIERS SCOPPIETTIERI 
. 32. 
Rinaldo 400 151 124 
33. Squarta 200 157 37 
34. Bernardino da Crema 200 119 . 32 
35. RatTaello da Ravenna 200 97 23 
by himself- 
CAPTAIN FOOT SOLDIERS (tot) kýýRQUEBUSI COPPIETTIERI 
36. Robertino Francese 
1 
96 16 25 
* Corsican 
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Titian. Portrait of Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino and Capitano 
Generale of the League of Cognac. 
'Et questa regola e verissima che buona regola ý non servare sempre la stessa 
regola. ' 
Francesco Maria della Rovere 
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PLATE3: 
'Battaglia quadra de terreno' 
- JJdd# '4 ii 
.I 
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am - 
Francesco Ferretti, Della Osservanza militare (Venice, 1577) p. 10 1 
The battle array here suggested by captain Ferretti is the same as that of Giovambattista da Messina 
(Sheets ? and ? ): in both cases the formation of pikemen is a 'battaglia quadra di terreno', that is a 
geometrically perfect square, and the position of the sleeves ('maniche') and wings of arquebusiers is the 
same. The differences are due mainly to Ferretti's 'graphic' requirements and to the incompleteness of 
Giovambattista's work, that was more a handbook for sergeants than a military treatise. The arquebus 
required less space than the pike, so the arquebusiers, when in ordinanza, were arrayed closer to each 
other, and their 'maniche' were shorter than the square's side. It ought to be noticed that, unlike Ferretti's, 
the archibugieri sbandati of da Messina's wings were supported by halberdiers and unarmoured pikemen 
(15-30% of the total), as in Fourquevaux's Instructions. 
TABLE VII 
Giovambattista da Messina's Battle Array 
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lines of fire 
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This is a detail of a map from Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p. 65. 
The hexagons represent major military port cities 
The other minor harbours (included those added by me) are represented by squares 
The 'shadowed' coastal lines are the major recruiting areas for seamen and oarsmen. 
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Chapter III 
'In Dispecto Tuo Christo': Florence's Mercenaries 
1. The 'Reformation' of a Fighting Force: the 'Seditious' Black Bands. 
'Noi vogliamo pure chiamare questa una militia. Io dico che Ve una 
confusione... ma io so chefino in inferno e ordine et iustitia. ' 
Commissario Lorenzo Martelli on the Black Bands. 
The pessimistic forecasts made by the Duke of Urbino after the sack of Rome and even 
more after the surrender of the pope' proved to be aecurate: by the end of June 1527 the 
League's army had been forced to withdraw to the northern part of the State of the 
Church, near its borders with both the Florentine and Sienese dominions, between CittA 
della Pieve and lake Trasimeno, at the mouth of the Val di Chiana. One after another, 
the cities and seignories of the papal state offered their support or at least their neutrality 
to the mutinous and dreaded Habsburg army, while at the same time almost everywhere 
in the Marche and Umbria the pro-Imperial Colonna and their partisans were getting the 
upper hand in their long feud against the pro-French Orsini. The Imperial 'tide' was 
about to reach the Florentine state and the duchy of Urbino, while the League's an-ny 
was getting weaker by the day through desertion, and could barely sustain even a purely 
defensive campaign. The seigniory of the Baglioni in Perugia became the first line of 
defence of the League, and above all of Florence, whose money and troops - thanks to 
' The Ten promptly used the argument of the pope's 'cowardice' to discredit him in fi7ont of the other 
members of the League. 'El papa pensando, alla salute sua et mancho curando del stato eccleslastico ha 
facto quanto giA hai possuto sapere. 11 che a noi non occorre piii replicare essendo effore inremediabile, 
havendo piii stimato di campare la vita che di conservare, alla sede apostolica et la forteza di Hostia et di 
Civitavecchia et di Roma quel castello, che tutto 6 di giA venuto in mano delli inimici. ' The Ten to 
Roberto Acciaioli, 7 July 1527. ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f. 19 r. 
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the choice of Orazio Baglioni as Capitano Generale of the Florentine infantry2 _ were 
now directly deployed in support of the partisans of Orazio and Malatesta, the sons of 
Giovanpaolo, in their struggle against Gentile Baglioni, now deprived of papal 
assistance. 
During a period of almost nine months - from June 1527 to February 1528 - in 
which the army of the League was stationed in Umbria, Florence fought first to prevent 
the disbanding, then to take control of the troops on its payroll. It was not an easy task; 
although the condotta of the Black Bands had been one of the few welcome legacies of 
the Medicean regime, in a short time it revealed its true nature: a precious, irreplaceable 
but 'poisoned' gift. 
The thirteen captains of the Bands had devils painted on the silk of their flags, 
which were now black, and many of them had their armour decorated with four more 
devilish figures and the motto: 'In dispecto tuo Christo', (that is 'In spite of you, 
Christ' )3. Since the death of their leader and founder, the 'diavoli del signor Joannin 4ý 
the orphans of the Great Devil, had resisted any attempt to disband them or give them 
I\ 
another commander. They had formed a, 'unione' guided by the council of the captains 
(officers who in the condotta usually appeared as nameless sub-contractors of their 
colonnello), prolonging a situation that was regarded by the Florentine republic as 
dangerous, albeit orderly, 'seditione'. 
2 After the surrender of the pope in Castel Sant'Angelo, Orazio Baglioni was allowed to return to his 
estates in Perugia. His condotta as Capitano Generale of the Florentine foot was signed 27 June 1527, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, ff. 3 r. -4r. At the time his brother 
Malatesta, who also re-entered Perugia with the help of the Duke of Urbino, was commander of the 
Venetian infantry in northern Italy. 
3 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f, 343 v.: 
(Federigo da Bozzolo) sendo stato offeso un di un suo dalle bande nostre mi disse: "Commissario, non 
crediate per6 per ben che queste bande nere habbino e'diavoli dipinti nelle bandiere et che da uno in su di 
quelli capitani habbino quattro diavoli addosso dipinti et un breve che dice 'In dispecto tuo Christo'. che 
mangino e'bracciall... "' 
4SO they were called by Paolo Giovio in his famous description of the defence of Frosinone. All those 
'little devils' on the flags of their pursuers probably made the Landskinechts dub Giovanni de'Medici the 
'Great Devil'. 
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The formal appearance of a condotta - if not its reality - has much to do with the 
way in which Italian states conceived of themselves and of the services they required: it 
was a personal contract which established a chain of command and was centred on the 
condottiere and on the aim which was to be attained. By contrast, written agreements 
like the German Bestallung 5 and the Spanish asiento - the latter in the case of naval 
forces - were far more concerned with the means and the organizational structures 
offered and administered by the contractor. The Florentine Republic was ready to sign a 
condotta and to deal with princes like the marquis of Mantua in their capacity as 
military enterprisers or with single captains, but the consequences of the tactical 
innovations introduced by the Italian Wars did not stop at the borders of the battlefields. 
The creation and control of large bodies of infantry like the Black Bands required a 
radically different conceptual approach even on paper. 
Between the powers legally granted to a commander and the reality of an army's 
everyday life, there had always been intennediate, and frequently unofficial, levels of 
authority and autonomy, levels that at this juncture were highlighted by the sheer 
numbers and growing tactical importance of the infantrymen. These did not constitute 
an amorphous mass: the social and professional groups from which each one of them 
came had their own practices, customs and even their own legal systems 6; the world of 
soldiers was not, therefore, radically different from civil society. The 'master 
arquebusiers' of the units of German shooters, for instance, dressed in their 
distinguishing colour (black, indicating the 'black art' of the black powder) and had 
'On the Bestallung, see Redlich, The German Military, pp. 31-53 and Baumann, I lanzichenecchi, pp. 49- 
55. On the asiento: Olesa Muffido, La organizacion naval. These kinds of contracts specified, for 
instance, the number and the quality of the soldiers, recruiting procedures, wages, nourishment, weaponry. 
supplies... 
6 For instance, the artisan and merchant guilds had their own 'consoli' who judged the disputes between 
guild members or guild members and workers following customary informal procedures. On the 
relationship between informal and formal justice: Ann Katherine Isaacs, Giustizia mercantile e giustizia 
dotta dal Medioevo all'etti moderna, forthcoming. 
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their own system of exams, privileges and secrets like any other artisan guild. During 
that long, bloody and cruel carnival that was the sack of Rome the world was literally 
turned upside down, but was not altered 7. 
The Italian footsoldier's cultural impact - on customs and arts, for instance - or 
bargaining power appears to have been significantly less than that of his Swiss and 
Landsknecht colleagues, but the prominence of the oltramontani pikemen did not come 
only from their being, for the moment, tactically irreplaceable. Their complex and 
variegated world had its roots in the greater importance of customary law in Germany, 
and its vitality was highlighted by the involvement of the Landsknechts' 'order', often 
on both sides of the barricade but always as self-conscious element, in all the major 
social and religious events that took place in Germany, such as the Peasants' War and 
the Refonnation 8. The pikemen knew their own value and although Machiavelli - an 
admirer of their highly disciplined battle array - would hardly recognize it, the element 
of the 'seditione', that is of the constant confrontation between the interests of the ring 
and those of the commanders, was implicit in their model. Brandishing arquebuses 
instead of pikes as its main weapon, the most famous and reputed unit of Italian infantry 
of the time shared some of these characteristics. 
With the dismissal of men like Francesco Guicciardini, too compromised with the 
past regime, the Florentine republic secured its position, but lost their vast experience in 
dealing with the 'homini militari et grandi' 9, their familiarity with the aristocratic and 
military mentality which had been acquired by frequenting camps and courts. The Ten 
7 On this topic see Lenzi, H sacco di roma. 
813aumann, I lanzichenecchi, pp. 237-248. In Italy the religious temper was definitely different, and above 
all the rural communities had long since lost their autonomy to the benefit of the cities. 
9The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 13 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, f. 95 v. 
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were astonished by the endurance of the 'exercito del diavolo"O, that is the Imperial 
army, over the years: what stopped it disbanding as the League's 'bestiale exercito' II 
kept on doing? In fact, Florence had the explanation and one of the best examples of 
how this was possible under its very nose, and on its payrolls, but regarded it as 
dangerous and unacceptable. 
During his residence in the League's camp from June to September 1527 the 
Bands were and remained basically a mystery to the Florentine commissario generale 
Raffaele Girolami who, without the physical presence of capitano generale Orazio 
Baglioni, could do little to verify the truthfulness of the numbers given to his paymasters 
during the musters. Afraid of losing them all, the Republic kept on paying all the 
soldiers and captains who claimed their wages and not just the ones it wanted to pay. 
Although the Bands were directly employed by Florence 12 , the plans to reduce them to a 
less prestigious but more reliable militia guided by captains who recognised their status 
of lancie spezzate remained on paper 13 . Giovanni's lance was not yet broken. 
Girolami was an influential figure of the new regime 14 , and was used to a great 
degree of autonomy. While in the camp, he did not write frequently to the Ten and took 
'OThe Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 14 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 42, f 69 v.: '... loro sanno vivere con I'acqua et come habbiamo veduto senza pane... sanno 
aspettare 25 paghe con ]a speranza di rubare... et li franzesi non stanno senza pane et senza vino... '. The 
Ten repeated the same observation to Giuliano Soderini, bishop of Saintes, 30 Autust, ibid, f, 79 r. 'Loro 
hanno una militia che comporta stare senza danari con la speranza della preda fino a 25 paghe... li nostri 
non vogliono stare 25 giomi della pagha... quelli stanno senza pane e vivono. Li nostri disfano Ii paesi... '. 
"The Ten to Raffaele Girolarni, 8 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 
92 v. 'alcuni animali per le battiture spesso come inviliti si rimettono, alcuni sono che commossi a sdegno 
per le battiture piCi si resentano et fannosi animosi et perchd non sappiamo quale de'duoi effecti sia per 
accadere a questo bestiale exercito suto o percosso o vogliamo dire inritato ci pare tanto piii sia da stare 
con li occhi apert] et guardarsi da tutti li disordini' 
12 At the end of June 1527 the 'Capitani delle bande nere' as a whole were 'condotti' by the Ten. During 
the following year the money from Florence was sent directly to the commissario without any ftirther 
mention of the Bands, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 4 v. 
13 The Ten to Raffaele Girolami, 8 July 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f, 20 v. 
'Et perci6 intractieni quelli e'quali ti paiono di miglior conditione... con animo di volere piO tosto una 
militia obediente et mancho seditiosa che tanta bravura della quale alla fine si fa poco capitale. ' 
14 Raffaele Girolami became one of the Ten and, eventually, the last gonfalonier of Justice of the 
Florentine Republic during the siege in 1530. Although a member of the moderate faction and a personal 
friend of the Imperial commander Ferrante Gonzaga, Girolarni was first imprisoned and subsequently 
beheaded. 
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some personal initiatives that afterwards became sources of embarrassment both to the 
Ten and to his successor Lorenzo Martelli 15 who, with his responsive, kept a real journal 
of his activities and of his perspicacious - and often witty - considerations on the nature 
of the soldiers and on the duties of his office. Indeed, to read his letters is to follow him 
step by step during his 'discovery' of the Black Bands, and thus to acquire a far richer 
and more realistic picture of their activities than that provided by the terms of their 
condotta. 
Martelli arrived in the camp without 'a big piece of his tongue' 16 _ that is without 
money and riputatione among men who wanted to hear more than words 17 - but 
determined to free the city from the Black Bands' dangerous sedition. The captains (see 
Table IX) were 'huomini indiavolati' who thought only of money to the detriment of 
their own men 18 ; and the only way to break their 'union' was to replace some of them 
with commanders loyal to Florence. The captains of the Black Bands are listed on the 
Sheet in order of importance, because a captain's riputatione was proportionate to the 
number of the footsoldiers under his command. Since a newly-formed company of 
Italian infantry was usually 100 to 150 men strong, the high level of prestige reached 
over the years by Giovanni's group is quite obvious. The commissario planned to offer 
Tommaso C6rso, Amico da Venafro, Giovanantonio da Castello, Giannetto Albanese, 
15Lorenzo di NiccoI6 di Ugolino Martelli was enrolled in the Arte della lana in 1485. He was captain of 
Pistoia in 1507, of Montepulciano in 1511, of Cortona in 1513. During the siege, he became one of the 
Ten and one of the three commissarii in charge of overseeing the defence. Banished to the Mugello after 
the fall of the Republic, Martelli died in Montespertoli di Val d'Elsa while Alessandro was duke of 
Florence. His son NiccoI6 was one of the young Florentines involved in the Orti Oricellari's conspiracy of 
1522. See Litta, Famiglie celebri dItalia, dispensa 42, tav. 111. 
16 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 september 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 122 r.: '... la 
tardezza de'danari mi ha tagliato un gran pezo di lingua, et finchd con epsi non me la ricuciono Vostre 
Signorie, non ho ardire di intraprendere cosa che necessaria sia... '. 
17 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 28 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f, 109 r. 
ognuno m'ý atomo per questi benedetti danari, et veggho infine che le parole non mi bastono, che per 
assai che io ne habbi non vagliono per una... ' 
" Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 6 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125,240 r. : 'Costoro 
sono huomini indiavolati nd pensano ad altro che a' danari che se Vostre Signorie vedessino come 
tractono questi fantaccini... gliene verrebbe compassione. ' 
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Giovanni Turrini and Lucantonio Cuppano the opportunity to enter Florentine service 
even 'per ad tempo di pace' - albeit in different locations - while Puccini, Barbarossa 
and Giuliano Strozzi (who were Florentine citizens) would hold their current positions. 
The companies of Scipione, Morgante, Testino, Cesare Farina and Pasquino, now 
isolated, were to be given to new captainsI9. At the beginning of October Testino, 
Morgante and Scipione threatened to leave the camp without pennission, but were 
stopped by their fellow captains. The replacements that Martelli had in mind were 
Girolarno - nicknamed Rossino - de'Ciai, Benedetto di Ciriaco dal Borgo and 
Giovanpaolo da, Cortona; the proud Corsicans from Pasquino's and Cesare's companies 
would be assigned to the captain Guglielmo CO'rso. Rossino, Benedetto and 
Giovanpaolo had been among the captains enlisted by the Republic between the end of 
June and the first days of July. In the following weeks Rossino and Benedetto were 
condotti with 150 foot soldiers each. Rossino de'Ciai, who had been in the past one of 
Giovanni's allievi, did not accept the post (probably considering such a small company 
below his status) and went to the League's camp to join his former comrades, and 
apparently was urging Lorenzo Martelli to give him a company. The only way to realize 
such a reform was to have the money for the wages available in advance, in order to 
separate the five more seditious captains, the last to be paid, from their men with 
nothing more than the beating of five new drums calling soldiers to the banca. 
To succeed in such a direct and dangerous confrontation Martelli needed far 
stronger military and financial resources to draw upon than Florence could provide, and 
the Black Bands did not remain passive. At the beginning of October the Ten, appalled 
both by the nature of their interlocutor and by his requests, listened to the words of 
19ibid., On captain Testino, whose name is not in Table IX, more will be said afterwards. On Rossino, 
Benedetto and Giovanpaolo: ASK Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni , condotte e stanziamenti, 
64, ff. 4 v., 5 r. 
Guglielmo had been on Girolami's 'waiting list' as candidate both for the role of captain and, as we shall 
see, of maestro di campo, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 121, f. 77 r. 
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Giovanantonio da Castello, the Bands' spokesman, who wanted to discuss with them 
two petitioni on behalf of his fellow captains. Even though only the first one, concerning 
the much debated topic of the arrears in wages, was in fact discussed and approved, the 
Black Bands dared to hint that they would serve Florence only if allowed to remain 
toge er 20 . Although Giovanantonio did not officially present the second petitione, the 
threat was clearly perceived. The Bands were not mere soldiers, but a highly visible sign 
of Florence's will to support the League. Moreover, the impending threat of the Imperial 
anny and the weakness of the League's anny did not allow Florence to take any 
chances: the black flags were to be kept together. 
In the same period count Azzo da Correggio 21 was also in the city, discussing with 
the Ten and even personally with the Gonfaloniere the patente di colonnello which had 
been granted to him by Raffaele Girolami in July. Given the Bands' unsteady internal 
balance, Azzo's promotion was being kept secret, and the count was in Florence looking 
after his own interests, trying to persuade the Ten to make his rank public by including 
certain captains (unfortunately we don't know which ones) in the new colonnello. 
Although he ended up haggling over the price of his patience 22 , Azzo's preminence was 
20 'Quanto allo ambasciatore che hanno mandato li capitani delle Bande, benchd ci sia paruta cosa nuova, 
pure I'habbiamo ascoltato, et di due petitione che havea in commissione di exponerci se ne ha riservate 
una, che forse I'havrA meglio examinata, et si sarA vergognato ad fare palese una tale dishonestA, che era 
di non voler essere obligati a servire se non tutti insieme, che era cosa bestiale a pensarla... parendoci 
honesto di dovere dare et non havere ricevere legge da simili gente. Pure bisogna accomodarsi... ' The Ten 
to Lorenzo Martelli, 12 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f. 121 v. 
2 'Very little is known of Azzo di Gaspare da Correggio (? -1528), who was from the branch of the 
Correggio fwnily that held the county of Casalp6, between Reggio Emilia and Pan-na. The 'buon 
Contazzo da Casal Po' was among Aretino's fondliest memories. One day the count surprised the 
exhausted 'condottiere of letters', Aretino, asleep on the same bed as his indisposed wife, the 'contessa 
madrina', of whom Pietro had been taking care. After wakirig him up very loudly, 'Contazzo' humorously 
invited the poet to undress and to get under the covers. In another circumstance the flirtatious countess 
invited the 'divine Pietro' to join her again in bed, since her husband from Milan had written that she 
should do for Aretino the same things she would do for him; Pietro Aretino, Lettere, p. 569, letter to 
Gerolama Fontanella. Contazzo was also listed by Rossi among the solders 'made' by Giovanni de'Medici 
(Vita di Giovanni, p. 97). For more information on the da Correggio family and its condottieri, see Litta, 
Famiglie ceiebri, Dispensa 20, tav. 111. 
22 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 12 October 1527, ASF, Died di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 
120 v. 
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again recognised, as it had already been in MaY23 by the past regime and, unlike 
Giovanantonio, his reputation, social standing24 and more orthodox demands allowed 
him to deal with the Gonfaloniere and to leave a very positive impression on the Ten. 
During Azzo's stay in Florence (September-October 1527), his company had been 
a constant source of embarrassment for Lorenzo Martelli. In fact, a secret clause 
established between the Ten and the count of Casalpo' to please the latter 25 transfonned 
his big company, of 400 footsoldiers, into a sort of small colonnello made up of two 
smaller companies. His lieutenant Testino became a captain with his own staff and 
provvisione, while Azzo's salary remained unchanged 26. As if it were not enough - and 
besides his being 'un poco scandaloso 27 _ Testino proved to be the most troublesome, 
avaricious and undisciplined captain of the Black Bands, not quite able to handle four 
hundred men during his master's absence. On one occasion, he even threatened the 
commissario 28 . In 
fact, only Azzo's successful mission to Florence saved Testino's half 
of the company, which in Martelli's plans was meant to be the first to be disbanded and 
given to Rossino de'Ciai. However, even if Florence had accepted the first plan of 
23 When he had been given the command over three companies. Benedetto Agnello to the marquis of 
Mantua, 3 May 1527, ASMn, Archivi Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 874, f. 96 r/v. 
24 As we shall see, Azzo da Casalp6 had close ties with the Este family. One of his brothers, Carlo, died in 
1521 in France during his office as ambassador of Ferrara. 
25 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 10 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 333 v. 'pare 
che habbi parlato con la excellentia del gonfaloniere della sua provvisione che in facto trove che era scudi 
40... et 20 secreta, vedr6 di contentarlo benchd non sappi come mi habbi a govemare delle cose del 
Testino nd ancho so che in una compagnia di 400 fanti habbi ad essere duoi capitani et un soprasoldo et 
una provisione secreta.. ' 
26 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 206 v. '... le 
compagnie sono divise, et 200 fanti sono sotto Testino et 200 sotto il Contazo, in modo che oltra al non 
essere questo Testino sufficiente a 400 fanti, che ci sono due spese, perchd ognuno di loro passa garzoni, 
cancellieri, luoghitenenti et altre lor mangerie... ' 
27 The exact nature of Testino's often quoted 'unacceptable behaviour' is never fully explained, and may 
have been sexual habits. 
28ibid. f. 243 r. '... venne in camera mia dove non era se non un mio servitore et dissemi parole di natura 
che io dubitai forte non mi manomettessi. Et poi che m'hebbe decto le parole affivomo Puccino et 
Lucantonio che dovettono intendere qualcosa dicendomi "Che intendiam noi? ". lo dissi loro "Testino mi 
ha usato molto male parole et ha il torto" in modo che se io movevo punto lo scaccho egli harebbono facto 
qualche malo scherzo-'. 
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reform of its commissario, the chronic delays in the arrival of the money would have 
crippled any serious attempt to put it in action. 
By mid-October the situation in Perugia was stable enough to allow Orazio 
Baglioni to join the Florentine troops and to play a more direct role as capitano generale 
of the foot. At the same time the League's forces launched an offensive against the 
Imperial cavalry's positions, while the remaining troops moved to new quarters. 
Although Orazio carne too late to prevent the sack of Montefalco, his arrival and his 
talks with Lorenzo Martelli29 gave a new impulse to the project of reform of the Black 
Bands, adding to it the judgement - and, as we shall see, the personal interests - of an 
experienced infantry commander. Although he enjoyed Martelli's complete confidence, 
Orazio was another piece on the chessboard. 
According to the condottiere, the best way to discipline the troops was not simply 
to remove and replace the most 'seditious' captains, but to re-establish the central 
authority that had been lacking since Giovanni's death and the disintegration of his 
casa 30 .T is meant the appointment of 'regimental' officers like the maestro di campo 
and the aguzino 31 , and the creation of a single piazza for all the troops in Florentine 
service, a place in which to administer justice and build gallows 32 . The maestro 
di 
campo (broadly equivalent to the Schulteiss of the Landsknecht units) was basically a 
judge with criminal and civil jurisdiction. A soldier and not a jurist - usually a man-at- 
arms or a light cavalryman - he determined the encampment's structure, divided the 
29Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 19 October 1527. Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 204 r. 
30Many of Giovanni's followers were either devoted to young Cosimo or hostile to the Republic. Even the 
sergeant-major of the Black Bands, Giovambattista Gotti da Messina, wrote to the Ten asking to be 
discharged and replaced, 7 october 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 124, f 40 r. 
3 'Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 206 v. On the 
duties of a maestro di campo and aguzino, see Mora, Il Soldato, pp. 50-52; Ferretti, Della osservanza 
militare... pp. 35-40. 
32 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 206 v. '... da lui 
(Baglioni) non mi pare in questa cosa nd dall'altre da discostarsi, perchd in questi di che siamo stati 
insieme habbiamo molto discorsi et trita questa materia, et se noi haremo e'denari noi ordineremo una 
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various troops quarter by quarter according to their speciality and nationality, and 
determined the location of the marketplace. It was the maestro di campo that fixed the 
price of the goods, protected merchants and sutlers from abuses, charging them a fee, 
which was his main source of income. The maestro was also in charge of organising the 
baggage train during the marches and, according to some sources, was the leader of the 
sappers - who often were the camp followers themselves and not a distinct unit. He 
continued to receive his soldo and maintained quite a large staff, which in the case of 
the Black Bands included up to twenty-five soldiers. 
The 'aguzino' (provost) - also called arcaldo or prevosto - was the chief of the 
military police, with a retinue that included twenty soldiers 33 . The aguzino executed the 
judgements of the maestro di campo, enforced his decrees and restored order when 
needed. 
In the aftermath of Montefalco's sack Orazio had to hang some of Testino's and 
Azzo's men to restore order, but it was not among his duties, nor was it good for his 
34 honour 
. 
Nominally there was an aguzino, but the judicial functions were left in the 
hands of the single captains and, or, of the soldiers' assembly company by company. 
Such a situation weakened both Florence's authority and the bargaining power of the 
rank and file - to which Martelli had always been very sympathetic - whose strength 
was in numbers. It was the 'comunita de'fanti' that gave the soldiers a certain degree of 
control over the administration of justice and protection against arbitrariness and abuses. 
Unfortunately, the largely oral world of the Italian infantrymen, the words of their 
militia molto bene disciplinata.... et faremo nostri auzini, nostri maestri di campo, et la nostra piazza et 
metteremo mano alle forche... ' 
'-'ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 547 r. Florence tried constantly to reduce these two retinues but, 
of course, more soldiers meant more money and more prestige, the only two elements that rendered 
attractive these difficult and dangerous offices. 
34 Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 20 January 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 127, f. 96 r. 
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informal representatives - who were not only elected during an extreme event such as a 
mutiny - are almost completely lost to us. 
Although in Florence it was thought that the office of maestro di campo remained 
in practice vacant for months for more than merely financial reasons, this was not the 
case: the merchants and sutlers were already paying a maestro appointed by the duke of 
Urbino who, as capitano generale of the whole League, had the priority; the real 
problem was rather the lack of someone with sufficient authority to guarantee that the 
man who took up the office, whose duties required him to challenge vested interests, 
could safely discharge them. 
To quote Orazio Baglioni, the Bands were like a foal that needed to be tamed 
gradually, and not all at once, since such an attempt would bring them to reject the bit 
and the spurs forever 35 . The first to understand Orazio's plans was another experienced 
condottiere, the commander of the Mantuan heavy cavalry Carlo Nuvoloni. The marquis 
of Mantua was still the captain general of all Florentine forces, but - to avoid an 
excessive involvement - he was also habitually absent from the camp of the League. In 
the absence of his master, Nuvoloni was taking care both of the marquis' men-at-arms 
and of his interests, and he saw Baglioni's growing influence as a clear threat. During 
one meeting the general of the foot treated as unimportant the logistical and financial 
needs of the Mantuan lancie, in view of the fact that for the immediate future the Ten 
intended only to pay for light horsemen. According to Nuvoloni, the Perugian 
condottiere was openly trying to take control of all the Florentine forces 36 , since 
he was 
already capitano generale of the light cavalry. The careful Mantuan refused also to 
consider as a simple oversight Baglioni's signature as 'capitano generale dello exercito 
35 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 3 January 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 121, f. 121 r. 
36 Carlo Nuvoloni to the marquis of Mantua, 4 October 1527, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondeza 
estera, Roma, 875, f. 353 v. It ought to be noticed that Orazio Baglioni in his condotta was appointed only 
general captain of the foot, although with a remarkable number of lighthorsemen at his service. 
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fiorentino' on a herald's safe-conduct 37. in fact, Orazio really considered 250 or 300 
light cavalrymen as better able to support his troops' tactical role than 150 homini 
d'arme; one hundred cavalli leggieri were more useftil and far less expensive than an 
equal number of their more heavily armoured colleagues 38 . 
At the beginning of November Orazio Baglioni estimated that the Black Bands" 
effectives did not exceed two thousand soldiers, even though each month Florence was 
paying for 3500 men. Although the report confirmed what they had suspected since 
June, the Ten were surprised by the disparity between the official and the real figures 39 
and by the political and military implications of this, after all those months of great 
financial efforts during which the city had practically 'sacked' herself without waiting 
for the dreaded Imperial army to accomplish the task4o. 
Lorenzo Martelli continued in his effort to refonn the Bands, and started to give 
captain Rossino de'Ciai the money that would allow him to form a new company, while 
the Perugian condottiere did the same with one of his men, BeIriguardo da Castiglione. 
The presence of these new companies would help the commissario to present as a fait 
accompli the disbandment of some of the more unreliable existing ones - at least the 
company under Testino's command - at the next payday. The Ten did not approve of 
Martelli's excess of personal initiative: at the moment the balance of the League's forces 
was too fragile for a potentially very dangerous move, and above all they did not want 
Martelli to darnage Azzo's interests 41 , especially now that the count was eventually 
retuming to the camp with his rank of colonnello still kept, at least officially, secret. 
37 ibid. f 12 October 1527. 
38 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, I November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f 350 r. 
perch6 in vero questa militia lo ricercherebbe, et che e' vagliono pia 100 cavalli leggieri che 100 huomini 
d'armi et meno spesa. ' 
39The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 27 November 1527. ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 
200 v. 
40The Ten to Raffaele Girolami, 5 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 40 
V. 
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Moreover, although grateful to Orazio for offering his help, Florence, although short of 
cash, had plenty of faithful and good captains waiting to be rewarded with a command. 
However, events in the middle of November helped the troubled commissario, relieving 
him, temporarily, from a difficult position. 
On the pretext of the excessive and repeated delays in the arrival of the wages, the 
captains Morgante Dentini (or d'Antino) from Ferrara and the Corsican Cesare Farina - 
' parendo loro havere il coltello alla gola' -asked to be discharged, and not even 
Baglioni's intervention could dissuade them. In fact, they tried to persuade Scipione da 
Imola to join theM42. The Ferrarese captain had been already involved in October's 
'pocho di mutinatione' - half-mutiny, as Nuvoloni defined it43 _ together with Scipione 
and Testino. Martelli considered Morgante a hothead (a 'matto'), capable of saving or 
ruining a situation with equal ease. The Venetian proweditore Alvise Pisani, who had 
been spying on the captain while he was garrisoned in Nami, a few days before, called 
him Terrarese, et pazo, et forse cattivo', that is a probable traitor, since every day he 
44 
used to leave the city unaccompanied for 4-6 hours . Cesare Farina had always 
been so 
dishonest in his dealings with his men and with Florence, that is was not surprising that 
he was prepared to leave behind not only his men but even his staff, from the lieutenant 
to the secretarY45 . Lorenzo Martelli gave them their due and was delighted to see them 
go without the great majority of their soldiers, although in the end they persuaded 
captain Giannetto Albanese to leave Florentine service. Together, the three disbanded 
companies had amounted to nine hundred men: two hundred and fifty were given to 
"The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 2 november 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f. 
151 r. 
42 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 12 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 335 v. 
43 Carlo Nuvoloni to the Marquis of Mantua, 4 October 1527, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Roma, 875, f. 353 r. 
44Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 7 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 393 r. 
114 
Girolamo 'Rossino' de'Ciai46, two hundred to BeIriguardo da. Castiglione, fifty to 
Scipione da Imola and twenty-five to Amico da Venafro, while the others were to be 
divided among the remaining companies. A 'debaucheur', or more probably a hothead 
('matto') rather than a traitor, in March 1528 Morgante, together with the others, was 
already trying to enter Venetian service 47 in northern Italy. 
Having to act quickly to prevent the desertion or the disbandment of Giannetto's 
men, who were stationed in Catnerino, and assuming that there would be no further 
complications, Martelli tried to give the remaining company to Giacomo Filippo da 
Spoleto, one of Orazio's men. However, the Perugian condottiere was not pleased at all, 
since he wanted the company to be given instead to Bino Signorelli48 , another of his 
allievi who, following his requests, had left the Venetian army for this specific 
purpose 49 . Martelli, having been rebuked by the Ten 
50 for his excessive 'submission' to 
Orazio's previous requests, refused to comply and had to withdraw his offer to Giacomo 
51 Filippo . Complaining bitterly about the Ten's unjustified lack of trust in him, the 
capitano generale of the foot threatened to go to Florence to discuss the matter directly 
with his Signori. Azzo da Casalpo' wanted to do the same, while the captains of the 
45 ibid. '... non voglio mancare di dirlo: quel Cesare Farina non ý da cialde, ladro del padrone, ladro della 
brigata sua propria... Morgante ý un matto da saper cosi bene ruinare come salvare, sanza che come pi6 
giorni fa scrissi a Vostre Signorie era entrato in sospecto grande... ' 
46 The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 10 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 43, f. 3 
v. Rossino de'Ciai here is described as 'creato del signor Giovanni, nostro florentino, et valentissimo 
giovane'. 
47 Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, p. 97. 
480razio Baglioni to the Ten, 24 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 124, f 409. According 
to Rossi, the captain had been one of the allievi of signor Giovanni - Vita di Giovanni, p. 98 - but Bino 
Mancini-Signorelli was a relative of Orazio Baglioni himself. After surviving Naples' defeat he joined 
Malatesta's troops during the siege of Florence. 
49Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f, 489 v. 
50The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 27 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, ff. 
199 v- 200 r. 'Quando le promesse venghino da te, ad te similmente si lascia la pena del iustificarsi 
manchando tu a quelle... havendoti noi proposto Gianpagolo da Cortona et il figliuolo di Ciriaco (dal 
Borgo) non sappiamo perchd postposti questi a noi fidatissimi et benemeriti senza mai dame risposta hai 
voltato Panimo in altra resolutione.. '. 
51 To appease Orazio Baglioni and not to ruin completely the captain, Giacomo Filippo da Spoleto was 
given a provvisione while he was without a company. The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli. 15 February 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia. Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f, 13 v. 
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Black Bands lamented that albeit in the capitolo, the one drafted by their spokesman 
Giovanantonio da Castello and approved by the Ten, they had promised to be patient 52 
in the event of a delay of few days in the arrival of their wages, twenty days were 
definitely not 'a few'. 
Orazio did not leave the camp, and Giacomo Filippo along with Bino Signorelli 
had to wait a few months more for his new company, but the course of action had been 
outlined: both the condottiere and Florence were trying to 'infiltrate' the Black Bands 
with as many of their men as possible in order to control and, or, break the 'council of 
captains'. The Ten, financially and politically weakened, saw this correctly as a 
dangerous and unwanted competition; they really trusted Orazio, but in this case 
Florence's right of precedence over him was quite obvious. The point of view of 
Lorenzo Martelli, himself a staunch supporter of the Republic, was different. The 
commissario badly needed Orazio's support, as master of Perugia, during the meetings 
with the other representatives of the League and, as capitano generale, in front of the 
soldiers, since he was living in a world in which law, by itself, offered scarce support. 
Giving voice to what he imagined were the Ten's perplexities, Martelli asked himself 
what he was there for 53 : for months Florence's paymasters, commissioners and 
inspectors had been paying the Black Bands 'alla banca' - that is one by one according 
to the payrolls - and organising rassegne (musters), but even the most 'official' events 
had proved to be blunt instruments of control and investigation. The Black Bands' 
'right' of openly cheating and threatening their employers was based on force rather 
than law, and Florence alone could not hope to restore the balance. 
52 Their patience was linked to the fact that they would be paid also for the days they had been waiting. 
However, a delay of two or three weeks reduced (as we shall see) the captains' margin of gain. 
53 Wostre signorie potrebbono dire "0 che vi fa la rassegna, o tu? " E' sono (the soldiers) venuti in tanta 
arrogantia et tanto gambone hanno preso che oltre al minacciare di tagliare a pezzi ci dicono che e'ladri 
siamo noi et loro i buoni et e'belli... ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 125, f. 
490 v. 
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The fear that in the near future any privilege accorded too openly to the count of 
CasaIpO' would create further disorder among the Black Bands' captains was one of the 
reasons for the Ten's reluctance to render public Azzo's rank of colonnello , but there 
were also other more 'structural' reasons for this. 
Since the restoration of the Republic, Florence had on its payroll Giovanfrancesco 
Gonzaga. da. Bozzolo, nicknamed Tagnino', nephew of Federigo Gonzaga da Bozzolo, 
prestigious commander of the French infantry in the League's camp, 'con la persona 
suaý only, as commander of a colonnello (the term indicated both this kind of sub-unit 
and its commander) still to be constituted 54 . Eventually the negotiations to settle 
Cagnino's condotta, of more or less one thousand footsoldiers, failed because the Ten 
judged the big condotte awkward and dangerous, and wanted to reduce the total to five 
hundred men 55 . Florence's first intention apparently was to deal with the Black Bands 
one by one without intermediaries, as it was doing with the companies newly recruited 
since June. More than a simple attempt to break the 'unione de'capitani' to his personal 
advantage, Azzo's struggle for a higher rank is to be seen as an effort to re-establish a 
hierarchy that had existed among the captains even while Giovanni was alive. Twelve or 
thirteen companies were too many for a single colonnello, but enough for a 'regiment'. 
Among the captains there were at least three primi inter pares, that is Azzo da Casalpo', 
Lucantonio Cuppano - Giovio's 'Patroclus with a gilded arquebus' - and Pasquino 
CO'rso (informal leader of the Bands' Corsicans), not to mention Giovambattista. da 
Messina 56 who, without having a company, enjoyed the powers and respect due to any 
54 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 5 r. and f. 61 r. Cagnino remained a 
provvigione from July to November 1527. 
55 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 16 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f. 
127 r. It ought to be remembered also that Orazio Baglioni and Cagnino's uncle were bitter rivals. 
56C 
_3 
iovambattista Gotti da Messina (? - 1559) started his military career in 1500, leaving his native Sicilý'. 
Little is known of him until he got the appointment as sergeant-major of the Black Bands. After the defeat 
at Naples, he became sergeant major of all the Florentine foot. Later on he entered the service of the dukes 
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sergeant-major, as the man in charge of the Black Bands' training, whose orders 
overrode everybody else's during the execution of any tactical manoeuvre. 
As soon as his masters, the Ten, would allow him to deal with the Black Bands 
4senza haverli rispecto', Orazio claimed he would be able to restore order 57 and to that 
end he had taken into his service as chancellor, since November 1527, a man who was 
to become one of his assets in the struggle for control of the Florentine troops. During 
the distribution of November's wages in Montefalco, many of the soldiers of the Black 
Bands probably recognised the man who sat by the side of Florentine paymaster 
Giuliano Ciati, and felt a curious mix of melancholy and concern. Ser Bernardino di 
Ippolito politi58 
,a notary 
from Arezzo - 'huomo ritagliato' and 'persona del signor 
Giovanni' - had been inspector of the muster ('rassegna') of Giovanni de'Medici 
himself From 1520 to 1532 ser Bernardino worked mainly as chancellor and procurator 
for the Apostolic Treasury, following his patron Jacopo Salviati59, General Treasurer of 
the Holy See and father-in-law of the late Giovanni de'Medici. In 1527, while Clement 
VII was held hostage in Castel Sant'Angelo, the situation of the papal bureaucracy was 
rather chaotic, and the 'clients' of the Medici family - never a much-loved category of 
the papal administration - found themselves temporarily deprived of almost all support 
and protection. For this reason ser Bernardino was not averse from working for Orazio 
of Urbino, for whom he trained the Feltrian Legion. Even after the unit was disbanded, Giambattista 
remained in the service of the della Rovere family under Guidubaldo until he died. 
"Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 20 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, responsive, 127, f. 95 r. /v. 
58Ser Bernardino was active as notary from 1518 to 1569. The books containing his rogiti - those related 
to his activities in the Florentine dominion - are kept in the Notarile Antecosimiano of the Archivio di 
Stato of Florence. Unfortunately, the filze 17171 (1518-1520) and 17172 (1532-1557, that is since he 
resumed his office in Florence) give very little infon-nation about his 'Roman' period, and nothing about 
his months in the service of Orazio Baglioni. 
59 In November, Jacopo Salviati was still hostage of the Landsknechts in Rome, chained together with the 
bishop of Pistoia, and it was probably with a certain degree of satisfaction that Martelli announced to the 
Ten: '... che Jacopo haveva gran fluxo et che ogni volta che haveva andar del corpo si haveva a menar 
seco il vescovo di Pistoia con chi ý in coppia'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 23 November 1527, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 369 v. 
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Baglioni who, apart from his active role in Rome's defence, had always been an enemy 
of the pope and of all Medici but Giovanni. 
A consummate muster inspector, the notary knew the captains personally, as well 
as many of the intermediate and lower cadres of the Black Bands and, most of all, knew 
all their tricks and weaknesses. Ser Bernardino remembered what the 'ordine del signor 
Giovanni' was and could not be as easily threatened as Giuliano Ciati was by Fazio da. 
Pisa 60 , Azzo's 
lieutenant, who unjustly demanded his 'arrear' wages of September and 
October, that is the period (since 17 August) during which he had been with his master 
in Florence and not in the camp of the League 61 . 
During the distribution of November's and December's wages ser Bernardino 
acted on Orazio's behalf, maintaining a relatively low profile, receiving two cratie for 
each inspected soldier, but from November onwards Martelli received the first reliable 
and detailed information on the composition and the effective strength of the Bands and 
on how much Florence was being 'rubata'. The captains kept on lying and cheating 
openly but, to quote the exasperated commissario, 'che rimedio habbiam noi con quelli 
che par loro che per forza noi gli habbiamo a lasciar rubare? '. 
Since the beginning, Lorenzo Martelli approved and encouraged the presence of 
ser Bernardino at the banca as inspector: the Bands' captains were afraid of him 62 , the 
notary was being paid by a deduction from the soldiers' wages (and not by Florence's 
exhausted finances) and, since he had been 'persona del signor Giovanni', no one 
contested his role - not openly, at least. However, the problem for the Ten was political 
and not financial: Bernardino was a man of the capitano generale and was yet doing the 
job of Florentine officers like Giuliano Ciati and Marcello Strozzi. In January 1528, 
60 Rossi, Vita di Giovanni, p. 98. 
61 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 499 r. 
62 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 385 v. 
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when Orazio Baglioni and Lorenzo Martelli eventually started to tighten their hold on 
the captains, the Perugian condottiere considered the presence of ser Bernardino as an 
essential precondition if the Ten wanted him to accept the responsibility of reforming 
the Black Bands 63 
The commissario's initiatives and the more recent events had caused a wave of 
confusion and concern among the Ten and a certain degree of hostility in certain 
factions of the Consiglio Grande in Florence; however, Martelli successfully defended 
the choice of ser Bernardino as rassegna - in spite of the biased criticism that reached 
the ears of the members of the Dieci from the camp of the League - and protested his 
own innocence against veiled accusations of misappropriation of public money. At the 
end of January Florence urged Orazio to appoint a maestro di campo with all the 
prerogatives due to such an office, since the condottiere, after the withdrawal of the 
Mantuan men-at-arms, could now to be considered capitano generale of all the 
Republic's forces in the camp of the League (infantry and mounted troops) de facto if 
not de jure, while the commissario was to appoint the aguzino 64 . Orazio's choice was 
the infantry captain Guglielmo Co'rso, a man respected both by Italians and by his fellow 
Corsicans, who had been waiting patiently - receiving ten scudi di beveraggio per month 
as a member of the Florentine commissioners' retinue - for an appropriate appointment 
65 
since Girolarni's period in office . 
Martelli's first concern was, of course, to ascertain the effective strength and 
fighting capability of the Black Bands; for him and for his Florentine superiors the black 
flags' reputation as good arquebusiers, and their background as fanteria vecchia were a 
63 , 
'* . sanza costui non voleva pigliare carico 
di pagare nd di medicare questa. piagha, perch6 non vi 
haveva la mano come costui. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 18 January 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, f 77 r. 
64The Ten to Orazio Baglioni, 24 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, fII 
r. 
65Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten. 2 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 137 
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mixed blessing. Florence constantly reminded its allies that the city was fulfilling its 
duties as a member of League of Cognac by paying five thousand experienced 
footsoldiers, and according to November's payrolls the city had paid in fact - 'secondo il 
vero, calculo' and excluding Orazio's one thousand men - more or less 3800 men, that is 
2150 arquebusiers, 804 footsoldiers of other kinds and 806 'garzoni' (servants, see 
Table X). At the end of his report, disconsolate Lorenzo Martelli lamented: 'hor veghino 
Vostre Signorie che cosa e questa 966 . 
Blmning the greedy captains who were only enlisting shooters in order to pocket 
their half scudo di vantaggio, the commissario wrote to the Ten in December that in his 
opinion there were more or less 1500 arquebusiers 67 . Whatever the truth was, for both 
Orazio Baglioni and Florence the Black Bands had far too many arquebusiers and not 
enough pikernen. 
The city planned to 'tassare' the various companies, that is, to establish in each of 
them fixed percentages of the two categories of soldier. This involved the creation of a 
more (orthodox' unit in which two thirds of the members were pikemen and one third 
(or at the most forty percent) arquebusiers 68 . However, an eventual transformation of the 
Black Bands from an elite task force into a fully-fledged militia required time, a more 
direct control of the Ten over the recruitment and payment procedures, and a different 
strategic framework. Florence had not enough time or money to silence the Bands' 
arrogant captains, and its standing inside the League of Cognac was faithfully reflected 
in the auxiliary role that its troops were meant to have. 
66 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 491 r. 
67 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 27 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 547 v. '... et 
vo' morire che gli archibusi non arrivono a 1500... a questo modo voi vi lasciate rubare, et io vi dico non 
solamente rubare, ma assassinare... '. 
68 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 24 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarle, 43, f. 
108 r. '... molto pi6 ci saria stato, charo che si fusse mandato ad effecto il disegno di torre il terzo archibusi 
e il restante picche et quel pi6 che fusse parso al signore Horatio... '. Only in February did the Ten agree to 
an increased percentage of arquebusiers. 
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Far more concerned with requirements at the tactical level, during his talks with 
the commissario Orazio Baglioni expressed his worries about such a high percentage of 
arquebusiers. The Perugian condottiere estimated that 1000-1200 shooters would have 
enough firepower to perform all the duties required by their speciality during a siege - 
that is, 'levare le offese' - and in the event of a pitched battle, when the arquebusiers' 
11 
was to weaken the enemy units and to interdict their passage. However, when the troops 
were involved in a melee, the day, the giornata, would be decided by the pikemen and 
by the other 'armature'. Both Florence's purse and its army would benefit greatly from 
the 'reformation' of the Black Bands 69 
By larmatil, that is the footsoldiers equipped with corselets, which were 'arme 
defensive', Orazio did not mean only the armoured pikemen ('picche armate', or 
'corsaletti') that constituted at least the outer layer of any square of Landsknechts or 
Swiss. The great capacitti di arresto and support that small groups of pikemen could 
offer to skirmishing arquebusiers, especially against cavalry and even in relatively open 
formations made up of picche secche, should not be overlooked, even in a unit like the 
Black Bands, but the Italian and Spanish units also had a more 'offensive' role for their 
corsaletti. In 1610 the Italian Lelio Brancaccio, a veteran of the wars in the Netherlands, 
in his book on the 'carichi militari' warned his fellow commanders against the still quite 
common practice, which arose during the Italian Wars and had been widespread among 
Italian and Spanish troops, of including squads of 25-30 armati equipped with shorter 
polearms like halberds (but also half pikes, giannette or partigiane) in the arquebusiers' 
companies. His times, said Brancaccio, were different: these assault teams had been 
69 , 
... Parlando a questi giorni col signore 
(Orazio) circa Ii archibusi dice questo, che sarebbe bene 
correggerli, chd per compagnia non ne potessi essere pi6 che tanti che servirebbe prima a Putile del 
danaio, poi a quello dello exercito, et che quando in queste bande fussi mille o milledugento archibusieri 
che e'basterebbono in una factione, perchd al combattere una terra per levare Poffese sono assai, in una 
battaglia I'archibusieri e per isconciare et impedire passi ma al. venire alle mani operano le picche et Paltre 
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effective in skirmishes at a time when the pike had not yet become standard equipment 
in most armies, when Germans and Swiss were still regarded as masters in its handling, 
and when Italians and Spaniards confronted each other on equal tactical terms. In the 
Netherlands the skirmishes were not 'strette' anymore, but had been 'lengthened' by the 
enonnous diffusion of the pike (the 'regina dell'anne... che non basta altra arine 
contr'essa che la picca istessa') and by the massive deployment of the musket, with its 
longer range and heavier bullets, against which the corselet did not represent an 
adequate protection during the phases that preceded the melee 70. The tactical usefulness 
of the arme corte was a much-debated topic even during the first half of the sixteenth 
cenftwy, but in 'mannerist' skirmish and trench warfare they were still far from 
becoming a simple indication of a segnalato soldier's higher rank. 
One of the points on which Baglioni insisted was that each captain had to maintain 
between twenty-five and thirty percent of the footsoldiers armatj7 1, paying them with 
half of the capisoldi due to the homini da bene and to the soldati segnalati, the Italian 
version of the German Doppelsoldner. The Black Bands' wages will be examined in the 
following section. Together with the presence of ser Bernardino's watchful eye during 
the musters, this measure contributed to reduce considerably, at least from December to 
January, the number of arquebusiers (see Tables X and Xl) in the Black Bands' ranks, 
'step by step' in accordance with Orazio's plans: the bit first, then the spurs. His spurs, 
of course. Although they would have preferred a more radical approach, the Ten were 
pleased by the new trend. 
armadure.. '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 491 
V. 
701-elio Brancaccio, I carichi militari (Antwerp, 1610), p. 42. Brancaccio himself for years had been 
commander of one of these companies. In the Netherlands the place of the halberd had been taken by the 
half-pike. 
Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 3 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 121 r. 
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At the beginning of January, that is, when Lautrec's intention of moving 
southwards with all the League's forces appeared clear to everybody, the Bands' 
captains started to negotiate with Florence a quite large purchase of military equipment: 
one thousand good pikes (not like those that had been sent to messer Orazio), one 
thousand corselets and six or eight hundred sallets, 'ma che fussino bone', and not like 
the ones usually kept 'in monitione' in Florence's warehouses. The captains wanted to 
pay in two or three instalments with deductions from their monthly capisoldi- money 
which would be soon refunded to them (at the very least) by their soldiers, the final 
buyerS72 . Rompicoscia, Lucantonio's ensign, was sent to Florence, but in the Ten's 
registers there is no evidence that the deal was actually concluded. 
The famigh and garzoni, that is the servants, were another of the topics most 
frequently debated by Lorenzo Martelli and Florence. As showed in Table XI, the 
servants - the official ones, that is those present at the musters and registered asfamigh - 
constituted quite a significant portion of the Black Bands' effectives. During one of his 
excesses of pessimism, Lorenzo Martelli considered that the whole of the Florentine 
forces amounted to five thousand 'fra tutti', that is including the servants, the 'ragazzi', 
the whores and 'altre brigatacce, che ce We un mondo' 73 . The camp followers, and all 
the financial and logistical problems that derived from their cumbersome presence, were 
the favourite target of irate, and regularly evaded, edicts and ordinanze. Although there 
is no written evidence left of the world behind the lines, usually the older the unit was, 
the more extensive and structured the train was, and the Black Bands were fanteria 
vecchia. 
72 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 7 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121. f. 131 v. Marteill 
warned his superiors that weapons of inferior quality would simply remain unsold. 
73 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 80 r. 
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Notwithstanding the negative judgements to be found in the military treatises, the 
train was not simply a moving brothel, but was rather the 'roots' of the soldierly world; 
it was where the soldiers lived during the campaign, and where the unit 'reproduced' 
itself, making good its losses 74 . Moreover, the Black Bands' eight hundred servants 
were not mere lackeys, and should be considered more like their colleagues of the 
cavalry lancie, that is as an integrated and very active part of the infantry squadra. 
Although assigned individually to the various homini da bene, many of whom were also 
capi di squadra, corporals, thefamigh were servants of the squads and during the battles 
acted as support crew, delivering flasks and lead to the troops on the line and plundering 
the dead right under the walls of NapleS75. Many ragazzi were in fact soldiers-in- 
training, arquebusiers at the beginning of their careers who were learning from some of 
the masters of the craft. 
The servants were both a status-symbol, since they were assigned personally by 
the captain of the company to a homo da bene, and a financial advantage, since the 
famiglio's pay ended up in the pockets of his master. The Ten recognised the high 
percentage of servants as a necessary evil: the precious homini da bene considered it 
below their status to serve for only 23 lire. As long as they were in fact valenti, the 
soldiers could bring their servants to the muster to be regularly rassegnati76. On this 
topic, Martelli did not agree with his superiors; he resented the fact that, in addition to 
the servants ordinary for the squads, each captain demanded four garzoni for himself, 
74 For a good picture of the Landsknechts 'moving cities', see Baumann, I lanzichenecchi.. pp. 183-207, 
Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 158-184. Up to now there are no specialist studies of the Italian 
, bagaglie'. 
75 When Pierre de Veyre, monsieur de Migliau, was killed by the Black Bands right outside Naples 'iI 
ragazo di uno fante da piedi ha hauto la sua bareta, sopra la quale era una medaia et una catena piccola 
d'oro' ; Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, p. 339. 
76 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 31 December, 1527, ASF. Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 
46 v. 
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two for the ensign and two for the lieutenant77. The commissario wanted to 'taxare' the 
servants as well, reducing their numbers from twenty - and sometimes twenty-two - to 
sixteen percent of the total, a measure that would allow Florence to pay for an extra two 
hundred soldiers 78. In his Storiafiorentina the well informed Benedetto Varchi79agreed 
with Lorenzo Martelli, but the problem was apparently unsolvable: the inspector of the 
muster could not tell if a soldier was really a homo da bene or not, and had to trust the 
captains' assertions. The Ten seemed to think that, as long they did not exceed the 
twenty percent, the more servants there were, the more homini da bene there would be, 
and a unit like the Black Bands relied more on quality rather than on quantity. In fact, 
the proportion of famigh varied from 21 to 22 percent. 
Backed by Orazio Baglioni's presence and by ser Bernardino's data, Lorenzo 
Martelli was eventually able to judge the companies and captains one by one, and to 
ascertain how far Florence was in fact being 'rubata'. For instance, wrote Martelli, there 
were three captains who cheated the city of at least one thousand ducati at each payday 
(the commissario does not give their names) while Puccini and Contazzo each stole 60- 
70 wages 'con tanta braveria' under Martelli's very eyes8o. The bands of Scipione da 
Imola, Giuliano Strozzi, Pandolfo Puccini and Giovanni da Colle were not good at all, 
while Lucantonio's had its ratio of faults, and Azzo's company was 'buona' only when 
Testino was not in the camp 81 
For long months, that is since the end of October and his discussions with the 
Florentine Republic's Gonfaloniere, the count of CasalpO' had been patiently waiting for 
77 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 490 v. 
78 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 January 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 90v. 
79Varchi, Storiafiorentina, book 4, p. 267: '... quattromiladugento si contavano le Bande Nere, ma nel 
vero non passavano tremila; perchd senza quelli che tra. di peste e d'altro erano morti, si passavano loro 
ottocento servidori per paghe morte, come se non fusse stato assai meglio aveme meno e pagarli piCt... '. 
80 ,-. a'nostri occhi veggenti, et con tanta. braveria, come sa Giuliano Ciati... '; Lorenzo Martelli to the 
Ten, 25 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 539 r. 
81 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, I February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f 205 r. 
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his rank of colonnello to be revealed. He promised the Gonfaloniere NiccolO' Capponi to 
wait at least until December's payday, giving time to the commissario to prepare the 
82 
ground, but December's money had come and his patente had not yet been disclosed . 
At the beginning of January the controversial captain (or lieutenant, according to 
Martelli's opinion) Testino was sent to Florence to discuss his master's interests with 
the Ten, and the commissario warned his superiors about him, defining him as the 
army's most 'rifinito traforello', that is the greatest thief of all inside the League's camp. 
Since his return from Florence in November, Azzo da Correggio had become Martelli's 
second military point of reference after Orazio Baglioni, with whom, at least at this 
stage, the colonel in pectore co-operated actively. At the end of January it was the count 
of CasalpO' who was sent to Recanati to honour monsieur de Lautrec on behalf of the 
captain general of the Florentine foot, who was allegedly too busy to leave the League's 
camp near Todi 83 . Azzo's requests were supported 
by Orazio Baglioni, who described 
the Emilian condottiere as an 'horno da bene che merita' and approved his proposal of 
appointing not just one, but two or even three colonels, who were necessary in order to 
co-ordinate the groups of three-four companies (1000-1500 men) so frequently formed 
during the marches or for some specific tactical purpose. As always, Baglioni favoured 
the re-formation of 'regimental' offices, like the maestro di campo and the aguzino, and 
intermediary cadres that would allow him to control the Black Bands 84 more effectively 
during their march towards Naples, a fact that the Perugian condottiere was already 
taking for granted. 
82 Azzo da Corregio to the Ten, 10 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 120, f 80 r. 
83 As we shall see, there were other more 'political' reasons for Orazio's refusal to go to meet personally 
his new capitano generale. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
12 1, f 167 v. 
84 'El Contazzo mi ha pregato scriva... in racomandarlo maxime che lui ý homo da bene che merita, 
certificando quelle che ý forza fare non solo uno ma doi o tre colonnelli, che spesse volte accade mandare 
in mille o millecinquecento fanti et essendoci tre o quattro capitani sonno de' tanti cervelli. el che 
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The appointment of one or more colonels implied the confirmation, or rather the 
(rebirth,, of the Black Bands as a task force destined to operate far from Florence, that 
had in consequence a lot of scope for autonomous decisions and in which all the 
companies were to be kept together to maximize their tactical impact and resources. 
Testino's mission to Florence did not change the Ten's behaviour: on the matter 
of the colonnello the magistracy reaffirmed its confidence in Azzo, but kept on 
85 
temporizing . What did receive a new impulse were the negotiations to persuade the 
Bands' best captains to enter Florentine service on a more regular basis, that is with a 
prowisione a tempo di pace. With this kind of contract the condottiere received a soldo 
from his employer even during peacetime, when he was without a company. In the past, 
at least, this had been a coveted status. However, the Ten soon found out that 
Giovanni's orphans would not beg to achieve it: in fact the opportunities offered by war 
itself and by their unione were considered more appealing. 
The selection of the candidates and the bargaining had been going on since 
Girolami's period in office, and eventually the Ten decided to limit the offers to Azzo 
da Correggio, Lucantonio Cuppano and Pasquino Co'rso, even though Martelli also 
considered Giovanni Turrini and Amico da Venafro 86 to be worthy commanders. The 
essendo poi un colonnello quale a tucti comanda le cose sortiscano un bon effecto.. '. Orazio Baglioni to 
the Ten, 5 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 127, f. 140 v. 
85 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 29 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 
45 r. '11 conte Azo fu eletto capo di colonnello con promessione che quando fusse el tempo, se gli 
metterebbe sotto que' capi che se gli & promesso. Di presente ci pare che non si possa se non con qualche 
disordine et doverebbe havere patientia... perch6 Fanimo non ý di mancargli anzi di accrescergli, perch6 
di qua & buon conto... conoscendolo per bono gentilhorno siamo certissimi per amor nostro lo soporterA'. 
86 Amico da Venafro and Giovanni Turrini ('Giovanni da Turino') are also the two protagonists of one of 
the more famous 'episodes' of Giovanni de'Medici's life. Irritated by their continuous quarrels, Giovanni 
summoned the two captains into a room of his palace in Fano, gave them two swords and two rotelle and - 
while locking the door from outside - announced that he would allow only one of them to get out alive. 
Eventually only the prayers of Lucantonio Cuppano made Giovanni unlock the door, but in the meanwhile 
the two homini da bene had been actively trying to kill each other and were found lying on the ground, 
almost dead. From that day on Giovanni and Amico became and remained good fiiends; Vite, p. 114. It 
ought to be noticed that in Rossi's last version of Giovanni's life, the Gran Diavolo was persuaded to open 
the door by the famous Luigi Gonzaga da Bozzolo the Old, and not by his former lackey Lucantonio. 
Rossi, Vita di Giovanni , pp. 68-69. Moved presumably by an excess of Bonapartism, Gauthiez decided 
that Amico's opponent was not the Italian Giovanni Turrini but the Corsican Sampiero della Bastelica. 
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R Via wanted the provvisioni to become a symbol of the city's strength and confidence - Ba 
and not of its weakness, as in fact it was - the proof that the Republic recognised its 
faithful servants and, in time, would remember the names of other meritorious soldiers. 
Above all the privilege bestowed on the three captains on 18 January 1528 87 was meant 
to confer on them a higher rank in front of their colleagueS88 . However, the negotiations 
had been long and difficult; aware of their own reputation and of Florence's need, all the 
Black Bands' captains had, as Martelli put it, 'la testa alta'. Lucantonio Cuppano 
initially asked for a promsione of 400 ducati per year; after all, at the defence of 
Frosinone he had been in charge of fifteen hundred men (the size of the average 
(colonnello') and the French marquis of Saluzzo had already offered him the captaincy 
of Genoa's garrison 'per a tempo di pace 89 as well. However, what Giovanni's former 
'right eye' - and future 'right fist' of duke Cosimo - really desired was the long- 
promised 'accrescimento', that is an increase in footsoldiers. How many did not matter: 
even two men, said Lucantonio, would suffice 90 . 
Once more, the Ten were disconcerted and, given the scanty practical results of 
their initiative and the arrival of the insufferable Testino to Florence to discuss the 
matter of Azzo's colonnello, they asked Martelli polemically why he had not explained 
adequately to the three captains their intentions and final decisions about the 
provvisione9l. The disconsolate answer of the weary commissario - an embarrassing 
answer that initially he wanted to give to the Ten personally, given his imminent recall 
87 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f 10 Ov. '... per dua anni proximi 
ftituri, uno fermo et I'altro a beneplacito del magistrato loro... dichiarando che la detta condotta si intenda 
esser facta et sia per al tempo di pace et quando detto signore non harA la compagnia o altrimenti 
provisione da questa signoria... '. Lucantonio and Azzo were granted a provvsione of 300 scudi per year. 
while the Ten gave Pasquino only 250 scudi. 
88 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 30 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 
114 v. '... quanto alli tre capitani ci parrebbe ad proposito che facessi loro intendere loro le provisioni... 
ma con tale destreza et maniera che ne acquistassono grado... ' 
89 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 89 v. 
9OLorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 19 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f 84 r. 
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to Florence - was that in fact he had tried to comply with their orders, but the Bands' 
captains seemed to be well informed about the Ten's 'confidential' resolutions and not 
particularly impressed by them. 'I knew all about it since the beginning. As you can 
see'), added Azzo, 'I have some friends, too', while Pasquino less maliciously answered: 
'lo sono, advisato di tUtto. )92 . However, it was Lucantonio who eventually gave the most 
direct reply: in his view an addition of twenty five soldiers (a single squad) 'in su la 
guerra' was more desirable than one thousand ducats 'in pace 93 . Lorenzo Martelli 
admitted his defeat; maybe his successor would be able to reform the Black Bands in the 
way the Ten wanted. A few days later the Ten allowed the witty commissario to return 
to Florence in time to celebrate carnival with his family. 
As long as there was war, peace and peacetime appointments meant little to 
professionals like Giovanni's devils. As in the Landsknechts' case, war was their 
perspective, their horizon. Moreover, after long, and cold, months of tactical stasis on 
the Umbrian and Marche Apennines, that particular conflict was about to become 
'interesting' again. 
As we shall see, Florence wanted to keep at least the Black Bands near Perugia for 
its own defence, but since Azzo's return from his meeting with Lautrec in January it 
appeared clear to everybody, from the rank and file to the colonnelli up to the general 
captain of the Florentine foot, what the plans of the new French capitano generale were 
and, above all, what it was in their interests to do. 
Joined together, the two armies of the League - the one in Umbria whose forces 
were flagging and the already massive host that was descending from northern Italy - 
would soon form the biggest army seen in Italy since the glorious days of Marignano. 
9'The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 5 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 
129 r. 
92 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 8 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 217 r. 
93 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 February 1528, ASF. Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f 220 v. 
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Once the dangerous (but badly weakened) Imperial army had been defeated, nothing 
would stand between the French and their partisans and the spoils of the whole 
Kingdom of Naples: baronies, earldoms, principalities, seignories of cities that would 
soon be vacant. The general impression was that the day of reckoning in southern Italy 
was near. For a soldier, whatever his rank, it was the occasion of a lifetime; Lautrec 
asked specifically and repeatedly for the famous Black Bands to be at his side, and 
94 Orazio Baglioni wanted to be at the 'spoglie del Regno' . The Ten were worried by this 
'fantasia' of his, and asked Lorenzo Martelli to remind him that, given the danger the 
pope represented to Florence and to his own stato, it was time to protect their stati and 
not to conquer new ones 95 . Probably persuaded that the seigniory of his family in 
Perugia was doomed anyway, Orazio thought differently. The Ten were also so afraid of 
the negative reactions of the captains of the Black Bands, who were eager to join 
monsieur Lautrec in his campaign of conquest, that Lorenzo Martelli had to keep strictly 
secret his superiors' firm intention of using them as a defence force 96 . 
Eventually the pressure of both its allies and its mercenaries on Florence proved to 
be too great, and the Ten tried to reach a compromise: Orazio Baglioni, his light 
cavalrymen and four thousand footsoldiers would march southwards, while all the 
remaining forces, that were to include the two Black bands stationed in Montepulciano 
(those of Giovanantonio da Castello and Barbarossa) and the company of Pasquino 
94 The Ten to Marco del Nero, 5 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Cornmissarie, 43, f 133 
V.: '... quello ci dispiace di piii ý che noi veggiamo che il signor Horatio ancora egli ý in questa fantasia, et 
che la venuta del Contazo non 6 per altro che per havere desiderio di trovarse anco lui alle spog-lie del 
Regno. ' 
95The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 8 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 
144 v. 
96The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 8 February 1528ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 143 
V.: '... non vogliamo che questa nostra volontA esca di te che sarebbe per fare disordine, vedendo che tuttl 
cotesti capi hanno volontA di andare nel Regno, et quando si intendesse sarebbe disordine grande... ' 
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CO'rso, would remain between Perugia and Montepulciano 97 . However. this decision 
caused a half-mutiny among the ranks of Pasquino's band: determined to go 'in sulla 
guerra', the soldiers prepared themselves to desert their commander en masse 98 . Albeit 
ready to comply with the Ten's orders, the Corsican captain confessed to sharing his 
men') s desire and - since there was nothing he could really do to prevent the disbanding 
of his company - reminded them that he alone with 'la persona sua', deprived of the 
soldiers that had served under his command for long years, all of whom he knew 
personally, would be a rather inadequate tool". Following the advice of their new 
commissario Giovarnbattista Soderini, the Ten authorised Pasquino, to join his fellow 
captains. 
In November the companies of Giovanantonio da Castello and Barbarossa (whose 
name was probably Barbarossa de'Bartoli) had been sent to Montepulciano to deter pro- 
Imperial Siena from continuing with its incursions into Florentine territory'00. Their 
arrival provoked the usual chorus of protests among Montepulciano's citizens. The 
Black Bands, described as 'gente insatiabile et male avvezzi' by the city's commissario 
Pietro da Verrazzano, were not garrison material, and had treated the ville of the 
Florentine contado as if they had been marching through enemy countryside 101 . 
Moreover, the two companies had 90 mounts to be fed, most of which were nags, 
'inutilissimi et non profictativi' 102 ,a nwnber that was considered excessive for two 
97 The Ten to Giovambattista Soderini 15 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 
43, f. 165 v. It seems that the Ten agreed with the old saying that 'too many (three were clearly too many) 
cooks spoil the broth', and decided to intervene on the one that appeared to be weakest. 
98 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 24 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f, 247 v. 
99Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 25 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 241 r. 
1000n the situation on the Florentine-Sienese border during those months: Maurizio Arfaioll. 'Carlo 
Strozzi, Capitano e Commissario di Volterra, luglio-dicembre 1527', excerpt ftom Rassegna Volterrana, 
LXXIII-LXXIV, 1996-1997, pp. 53-83. 
'O'The Priori of Montepulciano to the Ten, 24 November 1527. ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 124, f. 
407 r. 
102 ibid. 
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103 infantry units . However, while the civil authorities were not 
happy, captains and 
soldiers had much to complain about as well: they were far from the war and near to 
Florence, their bargaining power was significantly lower, and the prices of victuals were 
definitely higher. 
By February 1528 the 'call of war' was strong in the League's camp and even 
more so in Montepulciano, where the soldiers, impoverished by three months of 
garrison duty far from the meagre comforts offered by the unpredictable life 'alla 
campagna', were afraid of being left behind by the rest of the anny, as Florence 
intended. The company of Giovannantonio da Castello had to be disbanded altogether, 
while Barbarossa's maintained its numerical level (possibly making good its losses with 
da Castello's pikemen), but saw the proportion of arquebusiers drop dramatically from 
sixty to thirty percent from January to February 104 . Pursued by the Ten's indignant 
edicts, the shooters - specialists who received the highest pay and constituted the real 
heart of the Black Bands - fled Montepulciano to join the League's camp, rightly 
confident that somebody would soon give them money and the chance to plunder. 
103 Pietro da Verrazzano to the Ten, 24 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 124, f. 405 v. 
Barbarossa had arrived first with 35 horses and nags, followed by Giovanantonio da Castello with 55 nags 
and donkeys. it would be interesting to know if such an high number of horses was part of Giovanni's 
tactical legacy (the mounted arquebusiers) or the product of chance. 
'04ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64,94 r. (Giovanantonio da Castello's 
company) and 94 v. Barbarossa's arquebusiers, dropped from 134 to 70. 
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2. On to Naples: the Taming of the Black Bands 
'In Firenze su per le piaze ci chiamon spadacini, et si fan beffe di noi quando 
non han bisogno. ' 
Captain Pandolfo Puccini speaking to his men 
Giovarnbattista Soderini 105 (1484-1528), the new Florentine commissario generale who 
arrived to the Bands' camp on 15 February 1528, lacked many of the qualities that make 
Lorenzo Martelli such an exemplary source. More influential and ambitious than his 
predecessor (and a far less talented writer) Soderini had no love for witty details and 
resented being demoted, as he used to put it, to the level of simple paymaster of unruly 
soldiers. When he arrived, the League's army in Umbria was ceasing to exist as an 
autonomous body, and the days of the lively 'consulte' in Todi (see Chapter IV) with 
Venetian and French representatives were gone. What remained to be done was the 
policing of the troops, and, unlike Martelli, Giovainbattista Soderini shared the 
traditional negative attitude of Florentine cittadini towards mercenaries. However, the 
choleric temperament and disinclination to compromise of the new commissario, 
together with his repeated requests for quick repatriation, did not prevent him from 
being an acute observer of the political and military situation and a scrupulous guardian 
of the Republic's interests. In fact, as we shall see, Soderini died doing his duty 
105 Giovambattista di Paolantonio Soderini was one of the nephews of the former Gonfaloniere a vita Piero 
Soderini. Exiled by the Medici in 1512 and again in 1522 after the Orti Oricellari's conspiracy, 
Giovambattista spent many years living between Milan and Venice. His brother Tommaso Soderini, 
Zanobi Bartolini, Zanobi Camesecchi and Piero Tosinghi had already refused the office of commissario in 
campo, and Giovambattista himself was in practice 'tricked' by the Ten into accepting it. According to 
Benedetto Varchi 'era Giovambatista d'animo grande e d'eccellenti virtfi, ma superbo e altiero molto.... 
aveva nell'universale, e massimamente essendo stato esule tant'anni, un favore e concorso incredibile' 
Storia Fiorentina, 5, p. 328. Jacopo Nardi wrote in Le Historie (11, p. 146) that Lautrec used to say about 
Soderini and Marco del Nero that 'se la cittA di Fiorenza avesse altri tanti cosi fatti personaggi, non 
direbbe mai che essa fusse povera di cittadini... ' . Other inforination in Litta, Famighe celebri, disp. 141 
tav. VI. 
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unflinchingly. While he longed to be in Florence playing the role that he felt appropriate 
to a member of such an illustrious 'republican' family, Giovambattista's first duty was 
to prepare the Black Bands to march towards Naples' 06 , an event that would take 
him far 
Jet- - from the Florentine political scene. 
Barely had the commissario arrived (15 February) when captain Azzo da 
Correggio asked him to keep the Ten's promise to increase the size of his company, a 
disregarded pledge of which the count of Casalpo' reminded Soderini again a few days 
later when asking to be discharged from Florentine service. He clearly deserved more 
than the other captains, and could not accept being treated in that way. 'Very surprised', 
the commissioner reminded him of the many privileges bestowed on him by Florence: 
the command of two - his own and Testino's - companies with corresponding 
remuneration, the provvisione during peacetime and the colonelship. However, since the 
captain persisted with his complaint, Soderini said that it was not up to him to allow his 
discharge or to deny it: Azzo was left free to choose by himself whether to stay or not 107 . 
Soderini's apparently uncaring remarks represented a radical change of attitude in 
comparison with the frantic negotiations of the past months. Now that the League's 
course of action was decided, albeit against Florence's will, the city could again take the 
initiative, and the commissario was detennined (too detennined, as we shall see) to 
assert his authority from the start. Azzo himself did not have many options: the army 
was about to move towards a new and lucrative conflict, and to leave Florentine service 
with the Ten's silent approval, but without an official statement, would have represented 
a great risk for his riputatione. Moreover, according to ser Bernardino's last survey, 
Contazzo's company was composed of very good, but very few, soldiers; had they been 
106For the Ten's istruzioni to Giovambattista., see ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarle, 44, ff. 
165 v. - 169 r. 107 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 22 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 239 r. 
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all 'Oriandi', wrote Soderini, they would have counterbalanced their captain's thievery. 
If allowed to continue in this way, the Emilian condottiere would soon become as 
expensive as the capitano generale himseW 08 . After a 
few days Azzo was again more 
than willing to serve his Florentine masters, and his example deterred other commanders 
. 
r__ - from trying to force Soderini's hand. Moreover, the Black Bands were eager to go to 
Naples, and there were enough captains without a company who were faithful to 
Florence and available to Soderini to stabilize the situation'09. This setback did not stop 
the count of Casalpo' from continuing to demand the 'publicatione' of his colonelship, 
but the commissioner thought that the moment was not right for this. The promotion of 
his rival would make Lucantonio - who was still asking for an 'accrescimento' to his 
company - lose his patience' 
10. 
In the meanwhile the preparations for leaving were going ahead at a fast pace: the 
artillery -a few moschette that had been used to reduce some small Umbrian castles - 
was sent back to Florence, Orazio recruited the sappers, necessary to open the way for 
the troops, and the Bands' captains kept on 'filling' their companies. 
The first of two grave incidents destined to change radically the internal balance of 
the Bands took place on 2 March: accompanied by a group of his arquebusiers, captain 
Pandolfo Puccini entered the quarters of Giovanni da Colle and, after a brief exchange 
of insults and accusations, had him killed by his soldiers. Puccini tried to avoid any 
immediate and summary punishment by leaving the camp, followed by his company, at 
least for a while, but he was overtaken by other Florentine troops after a few miles. 
Forced to dismount, the captain defended himself against his pursuers with a pike and 
kept them at bay, only giving finally himself up to Orazio Baglioni, whose arrival was 
108 ibid. ,f 240 v. 109Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 24 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f 247 r. 
"OGiovambattista Soderini to the Ten, ASF, 25 February 1528, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f 242 r. 
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followed shortly afterwards by that of a furious Soderini. However, not even the 
intervention of the capitano generale prevented what appeared to be a trivial quarrel 
between soldiers from becoming a major political incident"'. The commissario 
generale considered the murder of Giovanni da. Colle to be one of the many misdeeds of 
112 
the 'seditioso Puccino', and by no means the most senous . 
At the moment of the restoration of the republican regime, Pandolfo Puccini' 13 -a 
Florentine citizen and reputed 'allievo del signor Giovanni' - was in San Giovanni 
Valdarno with some soldiers, billeted on his family's estates' 14 . During those troubled 
days, Puccini was among the first to write to the newly-created Dieci di Balia offering 
his services, and he was quickly summoned to Florence' 15 by the Ten, who were 
desperately looking for faithful troops. His and Giovanni da Colle's were the first 
military condotte drawn up by the Republic' 16 . 
During Lorenzo Martelli's tenure of office, Pandolfo had been one of the recurrent 
thorns in the side of the commissario: even the slightest delay in the arrival of his 
wages, a frequent occurrence, gave rise to spectacular complaints, in the course of which 
the captain 'assassinated' (figuratively speaking) the commissioner enumerating with 
"'Varchi, Storia Fiorentina , book 6, pp. 
353-365; Giovarnbattista Busini, Lettere di Giovan Battista 
Busini a Benedetto Varchi (Pisa, 1822), pp. 48-5 1. 
112 Soderini's 'indictment' against Pandolfo Puccini (4 March 1528) is in ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, ff. 409 r. -4 10 v. 
113 Rossi, Vita di Giovanni... p. 98. Busini, Lettere: 'Era da primo il Puccino povero compagno, e pareva 
da poco, e spesso se ne veniva a Monte Reggi col Priore de'Sassetti e certi nostri parenti a spasso, pallido 
in viso. Avvenne che il Priore, credo per conto della Veronica ------ cosa del Priore, gli disse una gran 
villania, e gli volle dare, chd era insolente; onde costui ivi a poco Fammazz6 in Firenze da. S. Reparata 
con un pugnale, e fuggissi. And6 alla guerra, e combatt6 e vinse, onde il signor Giovanni gli dette la 
compagnia. Era valentissimo, ma superbissirno, e quasi si assomighava di cuore al Signor Giovanni. 
Viveva suntuosissimamente, onde eragli necessario rubare e paghe ed altro, come faceva... parlava e 
discorreva bene'. 
114 Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, book 4, p. 247. 
"5 The first list of the Ten was written on the register of the Eight's missive on 10 June 1527, f. 63 v. The 
Ten's letter to Pandolfo Puccini was written shortly afterwards (12 June 1527). The Ten to Pandolfo 
Puccini, 12 June 1527, ASF, Otto di Pratica, Missive, 49, f. 66 r. 
116 16 Juen 1527. Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, fIv. 
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laborious precision the hours of service for which he was owed remuneration 117 . Had 
Martelli tried to describe them, the Ten would never have believed the 'diverse pazie 
che fa Pandolfo' 
118 
. 
However, Giovarnbattista, Soderini was a far less tolerant interlocutor. During the 
meeting of 28 February, Puccini told the commissario - arrogantly and in the presence 
of other captains - that he was a soldier who should be paid punctually every thirty days 
and, if his pay-day was again postponed, he would lead his company to seek 'sua 
fortuna' elsewhere. Soderini reminded him that he was a Florentine citizen, and should 
therefore be ready to serve the 'patria' for free, but the argument simply provoked the 
irritated answer of the captain: it was the 'patria' that had sold his family's estates and 
failed him so many times. Eventually Puccini brought the other captains to Orazio's 
quarters to state their complaints to the capitano generale and then back to Soderini's 
tent, where Pasquino spoke with moderation on behalf of his colleagues, reaffirming 
their will to serve Florence -a wish that later on each one of them confirmed in several 
separate meetings. Puccini's voice remained a discordant one, however, for he persisted 
in talking like a 'pazo et cattivo'; eventually he sent word to Soderini that, if he was not 
paid, on the following day he would beat the drum and leave the League's camp, 
followed by one thousand footsoldiers. 
Giovanni da Colle's murder was a big scandal, but the commissioner in his report 
emphasized that Pandolfo led his company out of the camp 'in ordinanza' and made it 
fire on other Florentine troops to protect his flight. The unit was 'caught' and brought 
back to the camp shortly before its captain, whose life was saved only because Orazio, 
rather than Soderini, arrived on the spot first. The commissioner suspected that the 
117 To quote only one of the many episodes: '11 capitano Puccino mi assassina, et annovera le hore della 
paga sua, vegghino di prowedere per Parnore di Dio'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 25 October 1527, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 247 r. 
118Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 251 r. 
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' seditioso amutinatore' was in fact a traitor in Imperial service; according to many 
witnesses Puccini had been saying to his men that it was a good time to ask for double 
pay and so to punish those people who in Florence's piazzas referred contemptuously to 
the soldiers as 'spadacini' - when they were not needed, of course 
119 
. 
The four hundred and fifty soldiers left without captains were hastily divided 
between Giacomo Filippo da. Spoleto (250) and Francesco Rustichello (200), a 
renowned captain with fifteen years of experience 
120 
. 
It seems that at the beginning both Pandolfo Puccini 12 1 and Orazio Baglioni 122 
considered the whole episode to be a military rather than civilian matter. Giovanni da 
Colle had been killed for a question of honour; according to the capitano generale 
Puccini was a homo da bene, and among soldiers these things happened frequently. 
However, Pandolfo had soon realised that his situation was made dangerous by 
Soderini's personal 'isdegnio', an hostility that had arisen when the commissario 
misinterpreted as a threat Puccini's advice about the need to have an extra payment of 
wages quickly available, given the imminent departure for Naples. As any other good 
Florentine citizen, he was ready to serve con la persona sua without being paid but, 
deprived as he was of his father's possessions, he could not maintain his company. Most 
of all, he wanted to prevent the homini da bene from deserting, a scene that he had 
witnessed too many times 123 . During the passionate oratio 
defensoria reported by 
Varchi and pronounced in Florence in front of the Consiglio Grande, Puccini claimed 
119Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 4 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, ff. 409 r. - 
410 v. 
120ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 410 v. Giacomo Filippo da Spoleto in practice already had a 
company and his situation needed to be made official - mostly to please Orazio Baglioni. Francesco 
Rustichello was recommended by the duke of Urbino. 
121 Puccini's letters on the topic and the records of his interrogations in Cortona are kept in ASF, Signori, 
Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Missive e Responsive, 73, ff. 60-81. Together 
with Busini's letters, these papers were Varchi's main source of information on this case. 
1220raZio Baglioni to the Ten, 2 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 174 r. 
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that he had followed Giovanni de'Medici's teaching, pawning and selling his estates to 
better the conditions of the soldiers, and Busini wrote that even his temper resembled 
24 that of the Gran Diavolol . 
Giovanni da Colle's murder was caused by a quarrel about rank, when he drove 
away Puccini's tamburo, preventing him from beating the drum with his own drummer 
to call the two companies to the banca together. Besides the obvious difference in 
riputatione (300 soldiers against 150) Pandolfo had always considered Giovanni his 
direct subordinate, and not without reason, since da Colle's men had been formerly part 
of a larger body of soldiers which had been split up by the Ten and - according to 
Puccini's testimony - it was he who entrusted the one hundred and fifty soldiers to a 
different captain. The commander from Colle Valdelsa had been probably waiting for a 
favourable eireumstanee sueh as the army's imminent departure to deelare his 
'independence', and when Puccini arrived and tried to reaffirm his authority, he was 
given the lie in front of many homini da bene. Eventually, Giovanni draw his sword, and 
his halberdiers allegedly tried to kill his rival, who was forced to flee to save himself 
'Non lo potei soportare, che non era il mio honore', since a captain without 
honour was worth nothing. The 'mentita per la gola' was a very serious offence, and 
Pandolfo Puccini felt obliged - on the basis of the unwritten code of honour of the 
soldati - to kill his antagonist who, although suffounded by the arquebusiers of the 
125 Florentine captain, refused stubbornly to admit that he was a subordinate . Had 
123 In fact, the distribution of an extra pay on the eve of a long march was quite common. Pandolfo Puccini 
to the Ten, 7 March 1528, ASF, Signori, Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, missive 
e responsive, 73, f, 64 r. - 65 r. 124 Busini, Lettere, p. 49. 
125A Florentine notary to the Ten, 15 March 1528, ASF, Signori, Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni 
e Commissarie, missive e responsive, 73, ff. 73 r. - 74 v. 'Audite: la morte di Giovanni da Colle fu che la 
Signoria mi haveva dato di p41 150 compagni et per il respecto sapete li dei a Giovanni da Colle avenne 
che havendo a partire da Monte Marciano essendo in ordinanza rassegnai la compagnia sua et non trovai 
se non 48 compagni. Parendomi cosa pia che disonesta, riprese el fratello che era suo cancellieri et venni 
in tanta furia che li diei qualche bastonata ... Di poi sendo in Narni facendo la rassegna non 11 trovai che 
cinquantasetto compagni chel'tarnburo allora lo ripresi gravemente et epso sempre promesse far suo 
140 
Giovanni da Colle's murder been subject to the normal, somewhat informal, procedures 
of military justice, Puccini would have been treated with lenience or even acquitted. 
Orazio Baglioni, acting on behalf of certain homini da bene and claiming to be a 'friend 
of soldiers' 126 , wrote to the Ten recommending the captain, and he conceded that 
Puccini's actions had been not simply rash but also potentially very dangerous only after 
it was clear that the commissario was determined to cause Puccini's downfall in order to 
affinn his own authority over the Bands. 
The captain affirmed that his aim when he left the camp was not desertion, but to 
reach the quarters of the League's capitano generale, where he planned to give himself 
up to the duke of Urbino, who would grant him a fair trial and protection from 
Soderini's hostility. When the plan was thwarted, the only remaining option was 
surrender to another soldier,, like Orazio. What confused the situation was the fact that 
his eompany was lined up 'in ordinanza', ready to go to the banca to reeeive the soldo, 
and that his men - seeing their capitano in danger - decided to follow him for a while, 
against his own orders, so as to protect his flight (creating thereby the illusion of mass 01 
desertion) even after Puccini had entrusted the unit to Giovambattista. da. Messina, the 
sergente maggiore of the Black Bands 
127 
. 
debito di poi fra 2o3 di fui richiesto andare in campo et allora li dixi "Giovanni noi habbiamo andare in 
campo dove & Lutrech et tanti altri grandi, pensa che habbiamo affare honore alli nostri Signori" sempre 
promesse bene. Havendo di poi a tocchar denari mandai el tamburo d'epso Giovanni col mio per chiamare 
la compagnia che venisse a pigliare denari decto Giovanni lo ri-mand6 indrieto allora gli dixi "Giovanni 
sempre tu vuoi fare del grande et fai poco honore a me et alla Signoria di Firenze". Lui mi fispose non 
havere affare nulla mecho allora gli dixi "come tu stai mecho et possoti comandare" et per6 subito mi 
rispose "tu menti per la gola" et messe mano alla spada et perchd con lui era 12 o 14 delli sua da Colle li 
quali mi abbassomo le alabarde mi ritirai et chiamai 4o5 delli mia archibusieri et andai a trovare decto 
Giovanni et dissili "Giovanni parti haver facto bene a smentirmi per la gola? ", lui rispose "io non sono 
techo et quello che io ho decto ý ben decto". Allora 1i missi la mano al pecto et fecilo amazzare. ' 
126 Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 4 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128. f 170 r. 
127 ASF, Signori, Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, missive e responsive, 73, f 78 
r. During his subsequent testimony in Cortona, Puccini said that he entrusted his company to 
Giovambattista da Messina, Lucantonio and Azzo da Casalp6. It ought to be noticed that the companies 
invariably went to the banca in ordinanza. 
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Whatever the truth was and notwithstanding the delays of Orazio and Malatesta 
Baglioni (Orazio's elder brother), Giovambattista. Soderini used all his considerable 
political influence to have the captain 'extradited' from the lands of the Baglioni, judged 
and found guilty (24 March) by the Quarantia in Florence. A good speaker - at least for 
a soldier, according to Varchi - Pandolfo could not hope to persuade the Consiglio 
Grande to quash the Quarantia's verdict, the death sentence; and the Consiglio Grande 
was unable merely to lighten the punishment. 
Interrogated in the Florentine citadel of Cortona with many 'demostrationi 
spaventevoli' but without being tortured, the captain answered the questions asked by 
the Ten's envoy Giovanni Naldini. There were seven charges of which the murder of 
Giovanni da, Colle was simply one 128 . The accusations of being a secret supporter of the 
papal (that is Medici) and of the imperial party must have been an unpleasant surprise. 
The suspicions that lay behind the charges had their roots in the fact that in December, 
while he was stationed in Nami, Pandolfo Puccini gave hospitality to the four runaway 
hostages from Rome (see Chapter IV), that is the arehbishop of Pisa, the bishop of 
Pistoia, Lorenzo Ridolfi and Jacopo Salviati - all enemies of the Florentine republic. 
During the same month, Lorenzo Martelli noticed that some of the captains appeared 
relieved at the liberation of Clement VII in Orvieto, and Puccini expressed openly his 
29 
desire to go to pay homage to the pope' . 
The prisoner rejected decidedly all the accusations, conceding only that he had 
killed Giovanni da Colle, a deed that he considered a necessary and justifiable act rather 
128The seven questions were: 1. If he had any 'pratica' with the Empire. 2. If he was in contact with the 
pope. 3. Why did he kill Giovanni da Colle? 4. What happened while the four hostages were in his hands 
near Narni, and what did he discuss with them? 5. If he really incited the other captains of the Black 
Bands to mutiny. 6. If his threat to lead one thousand footsoldiers out of the League's camp was genuine. 
7. What were the circumstances of his arrest and of his company's march out of the camp? ASF, Signori, 
Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Missive e Responsive, 73, f. 79 r. /v. 
129Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 509 r. 
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than a crime. What the captain really resented was having been deprived of his company 
immediately after his arrest. 
The Florentine host could not wait for somebody whose fate was sealed. The 
commissario and Orazio Baglioni were being harassed by letters both from the Ten and 
from monsieur de Lautrec, who had entered the kingdom of Naples with his troops and 
was waiting for the arrival of the Black Bands and other allied units before attempting to 
force the Imperial army to fight in the open field. 
The problems of military seniority related to the re-organisation of the Black 
Bands kept Giovambattista. Soderini busy until the very day of departure 130 (6 March 
1528). Worried about the unavoidable 'publicatione' of Azzo's colonelship and the 
angry reactions of Pasquino and Lucantonio, the commissioner asked the Ten to give the 
rank of colonnello to the other two captains as well and not only to the count of CasalpO' 
who, according to the commissioner's opinion, was not the only one to deserve it 131 
This time the Ten agreed with Giovambattista, Soderini; they had been discussing this 
complex issue with Orazio Baglioni during his last visit to Florence, and their final 
decision was to appoint three colonnelli - even though the Perugian condottiere 
disagreed on Lucantonio's promotion - leaving to the commissioner and to the general 
captain of the foot the task of assigning the companies 132 . Their common defeat at the 
defence of Rome had apparently created a rift between Orazio and Lucantonio. 
However, owing to a second 'accident', this resolution of the Ten was never fully 
implemented. After long days of march (see Map B) in a mountainous and barren 
BoThe Ten to Marco del Nero, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 231 v. : 'Alli 6 di 
questo partirono con 4400 fanti et 150 cavalli, una bella et bonissima gente... per una giomata non hanno 
paragone in Italia, per essere tutti homini di guerra. ' 
13 'Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 6 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 407 r. 
1-32 , 
... et ci risolviamo 
darlo ancora a Lucantonio et Pasquino, et il signore (Orazio) and6 un poco 
masticando maxime quello di Lucantonio. Non vogliamo fare comparatione dall'uno all'altro che sono 
cose odiose, ma conosciarno che tutti e tre lo meritano... ' The Ten to Giovambattista Sodefini, 8 March 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 230 v. 
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territory during the harsh Apennine winter the Black Bands camped in sight of I'Aquila, 
a city that was already in the power of the pro-French party. Incited by their 
commanders, the companies of Azzo and Testino started to grumble and Orazio was 
forced to lend money (one thousand and fifty scudi) to Soderini to give them a pay. The 
question was only apparently settled: marching near I'Aquila, the Bands started to shout 
(all'Aquila, all'Aquila, allogia, allogia et danari, danari', and headed for the city. Orazio 
Baglioni tried to stop them, but the soldiers promptly levelled their arquebuses at him, 
threatening his life 'senza havenne alcuna reverentia'. The Black Bands entered 
I'Aquila demanding to be billeted; the captain general had no choice but to follow them 
with his Perugian troops, occupying the city's piazza and hanging on the spot four 
soldiers, but the partial sack of I'Aquila - albeit without casualties among the civilians - 
could not be prevented. On the following day the capitano generale took possession of 
the city gate, forcing the soldiers to return most of the stolen goods. The Bands gathered 
in ordinanza in the piazza, starting to grumble again about their arrears of wages, and 
were only persuaded to leave the city and resume their march after the commissioner 
gave more money to the captains 133 
L'Aquila was the League's comerstone in southern-central Italy, and such an 
incident endangered Florence's reputation among its allies. Giovarnbattista Soderini 
authorised Orazio Baglioni to inflict the appropriate punishment on the culprits, 
whoever they were 134 . The capitano generale 
decided that Azzo da Correggio and 
Testino were guilty not only of attempted mutiny, but also of treason, since they were in 
contact with the Imperial army and about to desert with their companies - or at least so 
he said. On the same day Testino was sent off with a fake mission to Lautrec's camp 
133 On the 'sack' of PAquila, see the letter of Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 30 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 175 r/v. Sanuto, Diard, XLVII, p. 105. 
134 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 21 March 1528, ASF, Died di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f. 411 r. 
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and killed by his escort, while the count of Casalpo' was executed during the march 
4senza, alcun tumulto' 135 . Da. Correggio's company 
(400 footsoldiers) was 'temporarily' 
entrusted to captain Bino Signorelli, whom Orazio called 'fratello'. According to 
Mantuan sources, helpless Azzo was killed with a blow of a mace to the head 136 and his 
naked body put on the road with only a sock on his right foot. Lodovico Ceresara, 
ambassador of the marquis of Mantua, considered this cruel act a wrong that Baglioni 
would eventually pay for. 
Soderini and the Ten 137 approved of the Perugian condottiere's line of action, but 
their approval sanctioned his victory over them in the struggle for the control of the 
Black Bands. When Soderini tried to appoint two new captains, Francesco Strozzi 138 
and Tommaso Gotti, the brother of the Bands' sergente maggiore, for the two halves of 
Azzo's company, his authority was openly contested by Baglioni, who asserted his pre- 
eminence in wartime and appointed Bino Signorelli instead. 
Many Florentine historians, especially Benedetto Varchi and Bernardo Segni, and 
their Risorgimento admirers portrayed the proud Giovarnbattista Soderini as the real 
soul of the Florentine host, but, from his departure from Spoleto to his death under the 
walls of Naples, the only person in control of the Black Bands was Orazio Baglioni. 
After captain Puccini's arrest - and more so after his execution in Florence - and 
the violent death of colonnello Azzo da Correggio, the remaining captains of the Black 
Bands appeared to have been brought to heel, but this happened far from Florence and 
near to the war zone, where the discretionary power of a field commander was at its 
135 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 175 v. ; Busini, Lettere, p. 48-, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina. p. 
35 3. 
136 Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera Roma, 
876, f. 181 v. 
137 The Ten to Orazio Baglioni, 17 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 44, f. 57 r.: 
4... la malignitA del Contazzo et di Testino, che sendo stati honorati da noi non haveano causa di mancarci. 
Daranno exemplo agli altri come dice vostra signoria che in simili casi non si ha havere rispetto alcuno. ' 
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peak. When the Florentine troops arrived at the League's camp near Troia (21 March 
1528; for more infon-nation on the tactical stalemate that had been reached at Troia, see 
Chapter IV), Giovarnbattista Soderini and Orazio Baglioni were already refusing to 
speak to each other. 
The chance to finish the campaign with a single pitched battle vanished during the 
night after the Bands' arrival, when the Imperial army, taking advantage of its superior 
mobility, hastily broke camp and headed for Naples. Monsieur de Lautrec chose not to 
pursue the enemy and, in view of the continuation of the war, decided instead to secure 
his army's position and supplies by reducing the remaining Imperial strongholds to the 
south of Naples. The Italian, French and Gascon companies under the command of 
Pedro Navarro and the Black Bands - that is about 10.000 footsoldiers, the best assault 
troops of the League - with two cannoni 
139 were sent (23 March) to conquer Melfi, a 
city of 2000 fochi 140 ('homes'). Sergiano Caracciolo, prince of Melfi, was in charge of 
the defence and could count on more or less 1500 men between the infantry companies 
under his command and the lance of heavy cavalry of his jamiglia 141 . Melfi 
had a 
citadel, while the city walls had been reinforced with bastions - or at least with bastion- 
like structures. 
After a first carmonade had brought down a short stretch of wall, the Black 
Bands, without waiting for their captains' orders, vied with Navarro's Gascons for the 
honour of being the first to stonn (and to plunder) the city. For two hours the crack 
"'Up to now I have found no information on Francesco Strozzi in the Carte Strozziane nor in the family 
trees drawn up by Pompeo Litta. 
139 The cannone was a heavy piece of artillery, powerful enough to participate in a batteria, that is to 
bombard the walls of a fortress. According to some sources, the troops sent to Melfi had only a few field 
guns with them, since the city's walls were not expected to be a great obstacle. 
140 Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 30 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 175 v. 
14 'According to Orazio Baglioni, inside Melfi there were nine 'flags' of Italian infantry (1400-1600 foot), 
while the Mantuan Ludovico Ceresara considered that Sergiano Caracciolo had at his disposal 1500 
footsoldiers. Paolo Giovio says that there were two Spanish companies, 400 Italians and Caracciolo's 
men-at-arms. Marco del Nero, Florence's ambassador in the League's camp wrote that there were more or 
less 600 soldiers. 
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troops of six companies of the Bande Nere - soldiers 'de' piU' eletti et arditi che vi fusse 
in quelle bande' 142 - battled under Melfi's walls before being driven back with the loss 
of about seventy men, including five standard bearers and the valiant Francesco Strozzi, 
one of Soderini's candidates for captaincy. The attack was poorly co-ordinated: in 
addition to the losses due to the intense fire of the arquebuses from the bastions" 
shoulders' 43 , further casualties were caused by the fact that the Bands had launched their 
rash assault without waiting for the end of the cannonade 144 . The Gascons did not fare 
better, and suffered even heavier losses. 
Another attempt to take Melfi by storm after sunset turned into a disaster for the 
Black Bands, since the enemy had been waiting for them and was better entrenched than 
in the morning 145 . During the night, while the Florentine troops were 
licking their 
wounds, more heavy guns sent by monsieur de Lautrec - who proclaimed the city 'a 
sacco'- arrived in the camp. Inside the city's walls, Melfi's elders implored the prince 
not to cause their total ruin, but Sergiano Caracciolo remained deaf to their entreaties. 
However, at dawn a battery of eight cannoni opened fire on Melfi, and any remaining 
hope that the League's army would move quickly towards Naples to keep the pressure 
on the main body of the Imperial army vanished. The prince decided to withdraw into 
the citadel with his soldiers, aware of the fact that he could keep at bay the enemy and 
the citizens at the same time. The villani raised white flags and started to shout 
Tranzal ',, but it was too late: the ftirious cannonade had already opened too many gaps, 
142 Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 23 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 183 r. 
143 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 442 r.; see also 
Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, pp. 1918-1019. 
144 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 24 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 423 r/v. 
145 According to Giovarnbattista Soderim the Bands attacked at IIp. m. , while Marco del Nero says that 
the assault started half an hour before sunset. Probably the fight started immediately before or after sunset 
and ended quite late at night. 
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leaving the town without defence. The Black Bands and the Gascons entered the city, 
and the slaughter began. 
The League's troops put to the sword all the soldiers who had not been able to 
take shelter in the citadel and all the inhabitants of Melfi - mostly men, but also women 
- they were able to lay their hands on. Those soldati and villani who tried to escape from 
the city by jumping from the walls suffered the same fate. The prince of Melfi tried to 
surrender on honourable terms, but the best he could do was to hand the citadel over to 
Lautrec himself a discretione; 'but our soldiers' wrote Marco del Nero, 'did not agree': 
only the personal intervention of the capitano generale of the League saved the lives of 
Sergiano Caracciolo, of his wife and of his daughters. A handful of 'gentilhomini' 
managed to surrender to various captains; the others were all slaughtered. In fact, the 
man that the troops of the Black Bands wanted most to kill was the prince: his 
resistance, they said, had been futile and unreasonable, and had caused the death of too 
many good soldiers' 46 . The partition of the plunder moreover caused a confrontation 
between Navarro's men and the Florentine troops. 
The next morning, when the Bands and the Gascons left the city at the end of the 
twenty-four hours granted for the sack, more than three thousand dead bodies lay in the 
streets of Melfi; a large number of women - 'infinite', wrote ambassador Ceresara - had 
been killed, and as many had been 'taken away' by the soldiers; 'molte' were saved. 
The League's casualties amounted in total - between Gascon and Florentine troops 
- to about five hundred men, but what caused the Bands' fury was the qualitative level 
146 Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 24 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 186 r. 'Monsignore (Lautrec) ha fatto assai a poter campare il 
principe, chd ogni modo le bande negre lo volevano amazare, perchd for di proposito loro dicono averse 
lui tenuto et da questo esser causato la morte de trecento homini de'loro, de la pia forbita. gente che tra 
loro fusse tra heri et ozzi'. 
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of the losses and the circumstances in which they had occurred 147 . Moreover, the 
captains resented the fact that most of the booty had ended up in the hands of somebody 
who had not fought or risked his life for it, that is Orazio Baglioni 148 
Another friction between the capitano generale and the remaining 'orphans' of 
Giovanni de'Medici was the appointment of Bino Signorelli, one of Orazio's men, as 
commander of the company of the late count of Casalpo': nothing, wrote Soderini, could 
have displeased them more 149 . Eventually - or maybe it would be better to say 
'paradoxically' - the captains of the Black Bands and the Florentine commissario found 
a common line of action, but both sides had been weakened by long months of 
reciprocal attacks to the benefit of the third party concerned, who, to quote his own 
words, had now bridled the 'horse' and was just starting to use the spurs. 
In fact, Orazio took full advantage of his superior experience as a military 
entrepreneur. Shortly before the departure from Spoleto, the capitano generale of the 
Florentine foot made an agreement with some merchants, who agreed to supply him 
with the money needed to pay his Perugian soldiers and light cavalrymen during the 
campaign in southern Italy in return for a sort of 'bill of exchange' payable in Florence 
with the Ten's guarantee 150 . During the mutiny at 
I'Aquila - while the soldiers of the 
Black Bands lined up in the piazza were shouting 'danari, danari' - Orazio had his own 
troops completely under control, and was even able to advance a considerable sum to 
the commissario. In Montefoscoli (6 April) the ominous cry 'danari, danari' was heard 
again, but this time Giovambattista Soderini, who was on very bad terms with Orazio, 
refused to 'beg' for money again, leaving this pleasure to Florentine ambassador Marco 
147 On the sack of Melfi see also Giovio, La seconda parte delle Istorie, book 25, p. 70; Du Bellay. 
Mimoires, p. 112 r. 
148Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 26 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 46 r. It 
ought to be noticed that this part of the letter was written in code. 
149Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 3 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 226 
'5oGiovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 6 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 407 r. 
149 
del Nero' 51 (on whose frantic financial activities more will be said in the next chapters). 
The commissario was right when he wrote to the Ten that despite the claims of his 
secretary and representative in Florence, Michele Conventini, Orazio Baglioni and his 
contacts did not have the financial resources to support the whole Florentine army, but 
his masters understood that they had to take the consequences of the situation. Between 
Florence and the Kingdom of Naples there was the sea with all the risks it posed, the 
hostile State of the Church and mobs of angry peasants: to face the unavoidable delays 
in the arrival of the wages and the losses of cash, the Ten's envoys were to rely 
increasingly on their own initiatives, personal resources and contacts in loco. 
However, Giovambattista Soderini did not fail to point out that Orazio Baglioni 
was trying to create a dangerous rift in the ranks of the Black Bands. Since he could not 
persuade the captains to demand more money from Florence or to agitate for their back 
pay, the condottiere was now inciting the privati (the rank and file) to stage protests, in 
order to erode what was left of the commissario's authority, that is the loyalty of the 
Bands' captains to Florence 152 . The renewed 
fidelity of the capitani was largely due to 
their fear of Orazio and to their need for protection from his ambitions, but it was still a 
force to be reckoned with. 
Availability of capital and the ability to act with ruthless determination, when 
combined with good command skills, had always been a powerful combination in the 
mercenary world, and Orazio Baglioni had all of these assets. Giovambattista Soderini 
tried to counter the 'perfidia' of the capitano generale with the meticulous application 
of the capitoli of his condotta and a rigid defence of Florence's prerogatives - especially 
when it came to the appointment and dismissal of captains - but Orazio Baglioni flatly 
15 'Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 279 r. The money 
sent by the Ten was still in Ancona, and Soderini refused even to speak to Orazio Baglioni. The 
condottiere loaned 3900 ducati to the ambassador. 
152 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 18 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 230 r. 
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replied that either he or the commissario would have to leave the League's camp 
153 
. The 
situation was so tense and damaging to the city's riputatione, that Florentine 
ambassador Marco del Nero tried to mediate between the litigants, trying to persuade 
them to come to a compromise: Azzo's company was to be divided in two; one half 
would remain under the command of Bino Signorelli, while the other would have a 
captain appointed by Soderini. After two days of talks, the proposal was accepted by 
Orazio Baglioni but rejected by the commissario. In principle, Marco del Nero agreed 
with his colleague: the Perugian condottiere was indeed acquiring control of the Black 
Bands; but 'what could not be cured was to be endured', and the situation required a 
compromiseI54. in faCt .a 
few days later Giovarnbattista Soderini gave in with a bad 
grace, entrusting 200 footsoldiers to Bernardo di Giovanni Strozzi (1502-1533), 
nicknamed Cattivanzal 
55 
. 
However, the 'matter' at issue (the Black Bands) had its own ideas, and did not 
remain quiescent: on 16' April ten captains of the Black Bands went 'unitamente et 
insieme' -a remarkable symptom of their uneasiness - to Marco del Nero's quarters to 
speak to the Ten's senior diplomatic representative about the quarrel between the 
capitano generale and the commissario 156 . The captains' main point was that 
Giovarnbattista Soderini (like his predecessors) had promised to please Giovarnbattista 
Gotti da Messina - the Black Bands' sergeant-major - by giving to his younger brother 
the command of a company as soon as possible. But, for his part, Tommaso Gotti 
refused to take charge of a company without the 'blessing' of Orazio Baglioni, who, had 
153 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 3 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 224 r. 
154 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 145 r. '... [egli 
(that is Soderini) ha ragione], ma in questo caso mi pareva da fare della necessitA virtii per evitare 
maggiore inconveniente. ' The square brackets indicate the parts written in code. 
155ASF, Carte Strozziane, Terza Serie, pezzo 35, Vite degli uomini illustri dellafamiglia Strozzi written by 
archdeacon Luigi Strozzi, p. 36; pezzo 36, Vite degli uomini illustri defla casa Strozzi, written by 
Lorenzo di Filippo di Matteo di Simone Strozzi, pp. 248-249. 
156 Marco del Nero to the Ten. 16 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 256 r. 
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expressed some reservations about him. After Bernardo Strozzi's appointment the 
Sicilian sergente generale got angry with both litigants. At first he threatened to leave 
the League's cwnp, and even refused to carry on with his duties. 
In his speciality Giovarnbattista da Messina had few, if any, equals, and at the 
height of the battle he was more the commander of the Black Bands than anybody else; 
to avoid such an irreparable loss, each captain was ready to deprive himself of a portion 
of his men to create ex novo a company for Tommaso Gotti. However, not even this 
makeshift agreement could really satisfy the Bands' tactical mind, who persisted in his 
57 
irafunestal , like a sort of early modem Achilles at the siege of Naples. 
At the end of April the military operations around Naples were already in 
progress, but the internal situation of the Florentine host kept on worsening. When 
eventually even Orazio Baglioni threatened to leave the camp of the League, claiming to 
have been driven to do this by the hostile attitude of Giovambattista Soderini, monsieur 
de Lautrec summoned the commissario and Marco del Nero to find a solution to the 
problem. The capitano generale of the League demanded the reinstatement of both 
Orazio Baglioni and Giovarnbattista da Messina - whom he firmly believed was the best 
Italian sergeant-major. The ambassador openly took Soderini's side, but invited him 
once again to be more flexible - for the sake of Florence's riputatione. The commissario 
promised to comply with this request; for his part, Lautrec would persuade Orazio 
158 Baglioni to be more respectful to the Ten's representatives 
157 These words, taken from the first verses of the Italian translation of Homer's Iliad have become a now 
somewhat old-fashioned way of referring to the behaviour of a highly qualified person who wishes to draw 
attention t his own indispensability. 
'58Marco del Nero to the Ten, 28 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 267 r. It ought to 
be remembered that Lautrec had a firsthand experience of Giovambattista da Messina's value at the battle 
of Bicocca (1522), when Giovanni de'Medici's companies fought under the French flag. '... monsignor 
per la experienza che Wha visto, anchora I'afferma che in quello exercitio non habbia pari in Italia et in 
queste fattioni riporta troppo havere uno che sappia bene ordinare le genti... '. 
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However, the damage done was not limited to riputatione. During the first weeks 
of the siege of Naples the Black Bands (see Table XII) had been constantly involved in 
frequent and bloody skirmishes with the Imperial footsoldiers and light cavalrymen, and 
probably some of their initial and costly setbacks (see Chapter V) were due to their 
failure to achieve the necessary degree of co-ordination, a failure to be attributed to 
Giovarnbattista da, Messina's absence from the battlefield. 
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3. Short Wages and Expensive Shoes 
... siamo parati a 
dovere pagare essendo ragionevole d'essere serviti bene, 
volendo noi pagare di quella sorte per la quale habbiamo meritamente el titulo 
delli migliori pagatori di soldati di tutta Italia. ' 
The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 2 November 1527. 
One cannot really understand the mercenari without analysing what fonned their 
mercede, that is their reward. When the Florentine republic decided to replace the pope 
as employer of the Black Bands after the death of Giovanni de'Medici and the sack of 
Rome, the city's system of metallic currencies was already going through a period of 
radical changes which were enhanced and accelerated - but not caused - by the war and 
by the costs of belonging to the League. The most conspicuous of these changes had 
been, during the fifteenth century, the victory throughout Europe first of the ducato of 
Venetian origin, then of the French ecu au soled over the glorious Florentine gold 
currency, the fiorino. In the period we are considering, the minting of the scudo in oro 
del sole in Italy was greatly promoted by the establishment of French hegemony over 
North and Central Italy; first Genoa (1508), then Milan (1520) and eventually Venice 
159 (1528) started to mint their own scudi , while Florence would do the same only in the 
most dire circumstances (during the siege of 1529-1530). Even though it maintained its 
traditional weight and value, in 1528 thefiorino was almost always called ducato even 
in Florentine documents, and was on its way to become a simple unit of account 160 used 
to calculate cash transactions in other currencies. 
159For the monetary part of this section I owe much to the studies of the late lamented prof. Carlo Maria 
Cipolla on the transformations of the Florentine monetary system in the sixteenth century; Carlo M. 
Cipolla, La moneta a Firenze nel Cinquecento (Bologna, 1987). For a more technical overview: M. 
Bernocchi, Le monete della Repubblicafiorentina (Firenze, 1974-1978), Edoardo Martinori, La moneta 
(Roma, 1977) and Friedrich Schrotter, W&terbuch der Mfinzkunde (Berl in-Leipzig, 1930). By scudo here 
I mean a coin of more or less 22-carat gold, weighing between 3.40 and 3.50 grams. 
'('OSee Cipolla, La moneta a Firen'ze, pp. 1943. 
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The value of a coin was determined according to the system lira - soldo - denaro: 
in a lira there were twenty soldi, in a soldo twelve danari. Lire and soldi were mere 
units of account. From 1502 to 1530 the value of thefiorinolducato remained stable at 7 
lire, while the scudo was worth 6 lire and 4 soldi. The two main units of account used 
by Florence were therefore the ducato - as we shall call it from now on - of 140 soldi 
and the scudo of 124 soldi. 
Even more radical changes had been occurring in the field of Florentine, and 
Italian, silver currencies. During the second half of the fifteenth century the flow of 
silver from the mines in Southern Germany promoted the minting of a generation of 
heavier coins, commonly called testoni - 'big heads' - because of the portraits of princes 
they bore on one side. In the case of Florence the barile, the new coin destined to 
become, albeit with a different name, 'quella moneta con la quale communemente si ha 
a negotiare e contrarre' was situated between the Milanese and Venetian testone and the 
traditional Florentine grosso 161 . The barile - so called because one was needed to pay 
the gabella of a barrel of wine - had been coined in Florence since 1504 and had been 
known at first as the carlino, like the equivalent silver currencies of the Kingdom of 
Naples and of the State of the Church. The carlino owed its production to the strong 
commercial and financial links that existed between Naples, Rome and Florence. After 
the fall of the republic, the monetary adjustment of 1531 and the decree of duke 
Alessandro de'Medici in 1535, the barile was commonly called the giulio as the papal 
carlino had been after the pontificate of Julius 11 - al secolo Giuliano della Rovere. 
16 1 The testoni went from 9.79 to 6.52 gr-, while the Florentine grosso weighed more or less 2 gr.; the 
barile 3.512 gr. The silver alloy of all Florentine coins remained the traditional 'Iega delpopolino', that is 
'a once 11 1/2' out of 12. On the carlino-barile-giulio see Schrotter, Worterbuch, pp. 225,93,58. 
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The value of the barile - 12 soldi and 6 denari di piccioli, that is 150 denari - 
remained officially unaltered from 1504 to 153 1, when it was brought up to 13 soldi and 
4 denari (160 denari), the same value that the giulio had had between 1526 and 1528. 
The cratie, the quattrini bianchi - that is 'whitened' by a slightly higher percent of 
silver in their alloy - and neri and the denari were moneta di biglione, with a copper- 
silver alloy of inferior quality. 
Table X111162 
Gold 
Fiorino or ducato = lire 7= 140 soldi = 1680 denari = 10 V2giuli 
Scudo = lire 6, soldi 4= 124 soldi = 1488 denari =9 1/3 giuli 
Silver 
Grosso =7 soldi 
Quinto, di scudo (Florentine testone) =I lira and 8 soldi 
Barile = 12 soldi and 6 denari 
Giulio = 13 soldi and 4 denari 
Biglione 
I cratia, or quattrino grosso =4 quattrini bianchi =5 quattrini neri 
I quattrino nero =4 denari 
According to the newly-elected Ten, since the beginning of a war in which 
Florence had been involved by the Medici and their partisans, the city had spent more 
than eight hundred thousand ducati, and the citizens were 'consurnati' 163 . After its 
restoration the Republic had agreed to sign, as the previous goverment had done, the 
articles of the League of Cognac, but refused to pay more than one-fifth of the total 
expenditure, since the period of the Medicean regime had been a long financial and 
political 'esterininio' for its opponents. 
However, Florence never really managed to reduce expenses: it was true that the 
city was no longer paying the pope's share, but at the same time its power to affect the 
162 These data are taken from Bernocchi, Le monete della Repubblicafiorentina, vol. 111, p. 233 ff. 163 The Ten to Roberto Acciaioli, 9 June 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f2 
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key political and strategic decisions was greatly reduced. The successors of Francesco 
Guicciardini, lieutenant general of the Church, in the League's camp never attained his 
degree of influence and were always forced to submit to the initiatives and requests of 
their French and Venetian counterparts. In November 1527 the Ten estimated that they 
were spending 25,000 scudi per month to sustain the war effort' 64 , while 
in January 
1528 the monthly expenditure amounted to 30,000 ducati. Three years of Florence's 
revenues 165 had already been pawned by that stage, the churches' silverware had 
disappeared and the Republic was about to impose an accatto of 100,000 ducati on the 
Florentine clergy without asking for the pope's pennission 166 . It ought to 
be 
remembered that in the same period the Serenissimo dAnglia Henry VIII was giving the 
League a contribution of 30,000 scudi per month. 
To pay their troops from June 1527 to August 1528, the three field commissioners 
received the following sums 
167 
: 
Raffaele Girolami - from June to the beginning of September 1527: 47,977 ducati, 6 
lire, 16 soldi; 
Lorenzo Martelli - from the end of September 1527 to February 1528: 54,574 ducati, 2 
lire, 10 soldi, 8 denari; 
Giovambattista, Soderini - from February to the end of August 1528: 85,625 ducati, 6 
lire, 12 soldi. 
The grand total - 188,178 ducati in fifteen months - represents only the payments 
for those persons or items of equipment for whose pay, maintenance or acquisition 
'64The Ten to Giuliano Soderini bishop of Saintes, 10 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 42, f. 165 r. 
165 In 1528 Marco Foscari, fonner Venetian ambassador in Florence, estimated that the city's gross 
revenues amounted to 340,000 ducati (Venetian ducati), of which 240,000 were 'di spesa'. This left 
100,000 ducati 'in piii'; Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, p. 64 
'66The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 19 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 
92 v. 
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Florence was directly responsible and that, like the Black Bands or the few fieldpieces, 
were in the camp of the League and directly on Florence's payroll; it does not include 
other forces, like those of the condottieri employed by the city. 
In June 1527 the marquis of Mantua was still the capitano generale of all 
Florentine forces, and 150 of his 315 men-at-anns were to be paid by Florence together 
with the 5,000 ducati - out of a total of 13,000 - of his annual piatto 
168 
. However, the 
Republic had little interest in maintaining such an expensive and cumbersome legacy of 
the past regime, and from June 1527 to March 1528 the Ten's most important condotta 
was the one Orazio Baglioni had as capitano generale of all Florentine foot. Florence 
gave to the condottiere 3274 ducati per month to pay his 1000 Perugian infantrymen, 
and four quartieri of 1875 ducati each, which included the wages of the 150 light 
horsemen (40 ducati per year each) and the four instalments of his own piatto - that is 
1500 ducati d'oro per year 169 . This amounted to a total sum of about 40,240 ducati. 
The conditions of payment of the Black Bands were the same ones that had been 
established by Francesco Guicciardini and Giovanni de'Medici at the beginning of the 
war, and the Florentine republic made no real effort to change them. The wages of the 
soldiers were calculated in papal carlini: every footsoldier received a basic pay of 28 
giuli; the arquebusiers were entitled to a soprasoldo of 4 2/3 giuli, and there was a 10% 
of capisoldi, that is, one extra wage every ten wages. The income of a captain was 
calculated in scudi d'oro in proportion, again, 10%, to the number of men nominally 
enrolled in his comPany, so that, for instance, Lucantonio Cuppano received a 
167 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Debitori e creditori, 66, ff. 6 v. -7 r. ; Debitori e creditori, 67, ff. 98 v. - 99 r. 
These data are confirmed in the Ten's main filza of condotte and allocations: ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64. 
168 On the condotta of Federico Gonzaga and other figures like Vitello Vitelli - governatore generale of 
the Republic's men-at-arms - see ASF, Otto di Pratica, Ricordanze, 3, f, 102 r. Each heavy cavalryman 
received 100 ducali di giuli per year, while the piatto of the marquis was 13,000 ducati di carlini per year. 
1690n the condotta of Orazio Baglioni: ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. f 
3 r. -4r. 
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provisione of 40 scudi each month. A ducato was valued at 10 112giuli, while a scudo 
was equivalent to 9 1/3 giuli 170 .A giulio was therefore worth 
13 soldi and 4 denari, and 
the Bands' basic pay was 18 lire, 13 soldi and 4 danari 171 per man; as a whole, the 
Black Bands required, approximately, a monthly expenditure of 12,000 ducati. 
Since the beginning of the century, the Florentine footsoldier had received three 
ducati per month 172 , and therefore at a first glance it would seem ab absurdo that the 
best Italian mercenaries were also the least well paid. The Florentine rank and file 
during the period between 1526 and 1528 received a salary of 20 lire and 4 soldi each, 
but in fact this sometimes produced dangerous tensions in some of the newly-recruited 
companies garrisoned in Tuscany. What Florence seemed unable to understand was that 
all soldiers were not, nor considered themselves as, equals; captain Daniello da 
Castiglione, for example, was afraid that if forced to follow his orders and to pay his 
men without respecting their established internal hierarchies, he would soon see his 
homini da bene, his capi di squadra and his sergeants desert the company. Carlo 
Strozzi, commissario of Montepulciano, agreed with Daniello and proposed to reduce 
the basic wages to 18 lire, 13 soldi and 4 denari in order to distribute the money saved 
73 
among the soldati segnalati and non-commissioned officers' . Other captains saw their 
precious arquebusiers without soprasoldo renounce their weapon of choice - for which 
they had to buy lead and powder - and take up the pike. 
The Black Bands and Orazio enjoyed also other privileges: theirs was a month of 
30 days, and not of 36 days as it was for the majority of their Italian colleagues. When, 
in April 1528, Venice tried to refonn its procedures for paying its soldiers, the Senate 
decreed that the footsoldiers were to be paid three scudi d'oro or di valuta (A Venetian 
170 To see how the Bands were paid see ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 28 v. and in 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, passim. 
17 'Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 224 r. 
172 Bayley. War and Society in Renaissance Florence, p. 280. 
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scudo =6 lire and 16 soldi) every 36 days, with a capisoldo of 15% for arquebusiers and 
homini segnalati 
174 
. 
The Bands' captains inherited from signor Giovanni a profitable agreement that 
could not be easily renegotiated in such troubled times. The Ten criticised Francesco 
Guicciardini for not having guarded the city's interests adequately, but the republic was 
also paying the price of its inexperience in dealing with military enterprisers. 
In Italian historiography there are excellent studies of merchants and bankers that 
provided the credit indispensable to the birth and survival of early modem states, but - 
as Fritz Redlich pointed out in his works on military entrepreneurship in the German 
area - little has been written on the Italian soldier-aristocrat 'in business' 175 . The social., 
political and even tactical leanings of the Italian condottieri of the sixteenth century 
have been investigated according to the well-established (and unjust) bias that - unlike 
their oltramontani colleagues - they were mainly figures with political aims. Therefore, 
the vast majority of the members of a category has been judged on the assumption that 
its priorities and interests were identical to those of the small minority who had famous 
family names, like Gonzaga, Este or Medici, and who, allegedly, had little interest in 
business. The debates of both detractors and eulogizers of the condottieri have 
contributed to separate the word condottiere from its meaning of 'contractor' and 
'businessman'. In fact, the Italian military entrepreneur of the sixteenth century who 
based his activity on the recruitment and deployment of bodies of tactical infantry, 
performed the two main functions ascribed by Redlich to his German counterpart: 
contracting and credit extension 176 . 
173 Carlo Strozzi to the Ten, 22 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 130, f. 436 r. 
174 The Senate to Alvise Pisani and Piero Pesaro, 23 April 1528. ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni secreta, 53, f. 
13 r. For a history of the wages of the Venetian infantry see Hale, L'organizzazione militare di Venezia, 
pp. 367-376. 
175 Fritz Redlich, The German Militar), Enterpriser; see the Preface of the first volume, pp. XIII-XV. 
176 Redlich, The German Militarj, Enterpriser, p. 30 ff. 
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Capitani generali, colonels, captains - even sergenti maggiori - all kinds of 
military enterprisers could become active participants in a credit system that was 
frequently tapped by their employer, in this case Florence. The most conspicuous case 
was, of course, Orazio Baglioni, on whose lands the League's army was camped. The 
Perugian condottiere who, as we have seen, had his own merchant-bankers willing to 
finance him, advanced thousands of ducati to the commissioner Lorenzo Martelli when 
the pay of the Black Bands was badly in arrears 177 , and 
did the swne when 
Giovambattista, Soderini held the office. Orazio loaned large sums of money also to the 
Venetian provveditore Alvise Pisani, to prevent the Swiss troops of the Serenissima 
78 from disbanding' . Sitting with his empty pockets at the Consulta's table in Todi, 
Lorenzo Martelli was put under pressure by the French and the Venetians in order to 
make him ask the captains of the Black Bands for money 
179 
. 
A military entrepreneur was sometimes forced to become one of his employer's 
creditors in order not to lose all his investments, his workforce or even his contract, but 
the situation presented also many advantages - such as the rates of interest and an 
increased bargaining power - especially in the case of Florence, that still had quite a 
good reputation for solvency. During the siege of Naples ambassador Marco del Nero 
tapped all available sources of cash in the camp of the League, and, besides his personal 
friends (see the last Chapter), many of his 'clients' were soldiers. There are a few 
examples: a French captain gave the ambassador 497 scudi in exchange for a 'lettera di 
cambio' at Lyon's Easter fair 180 ; count Wolf, Oberst (colonel) of the Landsknechts of 
177 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 224 v. 
17'Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, I November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 347 r. 
'Proveditore allora disse al signore Horatio: "Prestateci 400 scudi". Horatio disse "Molto volentieri"... poi 
si ritom6 pure in sul resto de' danari et per abbreviarla Horatio fd altri 400 ducati. Ma volle Pobligo del 
proveditore. El proveditore voleva che io lo facessi io... pure poi Horatio disse che voleva la promessa sua 
et non la mia... ' 
179 ibid. f 347 v. 
180Marco del Nero to the Ten, 16 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 256 r. 
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the German Black Legion loaned 100 scudi, that were to be paid back to his wife in 
Florence' 81 ; and the Bands' sergeant-major Giovambattista, da Messina advanced more 
than 400 scudi doro to Giovarnbattista. Soderini 182 . It was a good way to transfer one's 
money safely. 
However,, the main source of income of a military enterpriser remained his 
contract and the way in which he administered it. During these years (1520-1530) of 
transition that shortly preceded the creation of 'regimental' structures like the Spanish 
Tercios and the French Legions, the form and the informal assumptions of the contracts 
were already changing quickly. Traditionally, a newly-appointed colonel of infantry was 
given command over a certain number of pre-existent companies, whose recruitment 
and enlistment had been the responsibility of single captains. But it was in this period 
that the colonnello started its transformation into the regiment, that is a preconstituted 
administrative unit in which the captains had the role of sub-contractors of their 
commander. One of the first - or at least the first attested - examples were the troops 
that Georg von Frundsberg ffather' of the Landsknechts) led in Italy in 1526, the sarne 
183 
men that mortally wounded Giovanni de'Medici at Governolo 
In the case of the Italian Black Bands the level of involvement of the captains in 
the organisation of the unit can be easily inferred from their reaction to the death of their 
leader. Probably all the 'lesser demons' were sincerely united by the painful memory of 
the passing of the Great Devil, but the relative ease with which they decided to succeed 
him shows also their determination to protect their investments. Moreover, it is hard to 
believe that the captains discovered their 'unionist' vocation only after Giovanni's 
18 'Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 20 April, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 233 r. 
182 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, f. 153 r. ; eye witnesses of this loan 
were the captains Baldora di Arezzo and Tommasino C6rso. 
183 On this topic see Redlich, The German.., pp. 39-40. 
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death, or that, while alive, he could easily set aside his allievi's needs and expectations. 
In fact, the Black Bands behaved like a sort of proto-regimental entity. 
As we have seen in the other two section of this chapter the relationship between 
Florence and the Black Bands was a dialectical one, a complicated 'gioco delle parti' in 
which both employers and employees were, at different times, creditors and debtors. 
The captains - those 'huomini indiavolati' whose only thought was money - were 
determined to protect their two main direct sources of income, that is the margin of gain 
granted by the contract and their direct control over the payment of the soldiers' wages. 
Giovanantonio da Castello's mission to Florence is an example of this: he and his fellow 
captains resisted any attempt by the Ten to avoid paying their men for their services in 
the days that immediately preceded each payday, in order to, eventually, reduce the 
number of payments per year, whether this was caused by a deliberate choice of the Ten 
or by the disastrous financial situation of the city 184 . To quote what Pandolfo Puccini 
arrogantly said to the commissario, he was a soldier who had to be paid every thirty 
185 days 
The discretionary power held by any military entrepreneur -a coalition of 
captains, in this case - over his workforce was enormous. For months, the almost 
complete lack of an authoritative figure like capitano generale Orazio Baglioni to 
restrain the greed of the intermediate cadres worsened the situation. Besides being in 
charge of all aspects of military life, especially discipline, a captain exercised direct or 
indirect control over the means of subsistence in a world in which the margin of survival 
184 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 5 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 
129 r. 'Et se non si manda la paga cosi ogni 30 giomi ci pare che li pagamenti siano di sorte a 
comparatione degli altri confederati che sl doverrebbono contentare. ' 
185 Giovarnbattista Sodermi to the Ten, 4 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f 409 r. 'Mi 
domand6 danari con grandissima arrogantia, facendoml intendere... che era soldato per essere pagato ogni 
30 dU 
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for the rank and file, who had to pay for clothing, food, ammunitions and their own 
weapons, was very narrow indeed. 
The soldiers received their basic pay 'alla banca' ('on the table') and, as they also 
said, 'all'huomo proprio', one by one, under the watchful eye of Florentine paymasters 
and muster inspectors, looking at the books with the 'signs' and patronymics of the 
footsoldiers which were kept by the captains' chancellors 186 . However, as we 
have seen, 
it was at the banca that the confrontation between Florence and its mercenaries really 
began. Every soldier received 18 lire, 13 soldi and 4 denari (28 giuli), but the 
deductions made from their salary by the captains - with various excuses that Lorenzo 
Martelli thought amounted to so much brazen fiddling - reduced the final amount to 
less than 18 lire, even though (according to the commissario) in the carnp of the League 
in Umbria it was patently impossible to survive even on 24 lire 187 . However, it was by 
the distribution of the capisoldi (also called paghe morte) that the honesty of a 
commander could be measured, since the administration of these allowance ftinds - 
which were sent to the camp days or even weeks after the payments at the table - was 
entirely up to the captains. 'Shoes are very expensive, while wages are short'188 , and the 
capisoldi were important because they provided some relief to hungry soldiers at the end 
of the month, when their pockets were as empty as their stomachs. However, the paghe 
morte were mostly distributed among the officers of the company, the homini da bene 
and the soldiers who had performed some praiseworthy deed, or were simply pocketed 
by the captain. 
186 Here is one example taken from the payroll of the Florentine company of the 'bargello': 
'Giuliano di Caccino da Uzzano di Mugello, pelo nero, poca barba, el parlare alquanto impedito, statura 
mediocre, anni 30 incirca; Pasquino di Giannone di Luigi da Valbona di Romagna, pelo nero, barba non 
ancora messa o poco, buona statura, anni 26 in circa; Domenico di Donato da Vessa di Valdibagno, pelo 
nero, solito radersi, statura buona o pi6 presto piccola, anni 45 in circa... '; ASF, Otto di Pratica, 
Deliberazioni, partiti. condotte e stanziamenti, 14, f. 2 r. 
187 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 224 v. 
1880razio Baglioni to the Ten, 24 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 124, f. 409 r. 
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Specialized soldiers like the arquebusiers received each month a bonus of one half 
scudo -3 lire and 2 soldi, that is 4 2/3 giuli - but like the caposoldo it was not given 'at 
the table', and the chance to make a profit out of this encouraged the captains to enlist 
only arquebusiers as replacements. Florence and Venice tried, without success, to find a 
way to give that bonus 'all'huomo, proprio', but the Italian military entrepreneurs 
guarded their privileges and their account books jealously 189 . Eventually, even the 
wages of servants were in practice paghe morte, because only a captain could 
distinguish a homo da bene who deserved one ragazzo, and sometimes more than one, 
as in the case of company officers, from the rank and file. 
The captains of the Bands cared little how good the reasons were that forced 
Florence to postpone payments: for every day of delay, they felt authorised to retaliate 
by openly cheating at the muster and acting with growing independence and 
indiscipline; between two distant paydays, all the tricks of the military trade were 
employed. 'Soldiers' who were in fact lackeys or peasants (or even women, in the case 
of the Landsknechts), or had been 'borrowed' from other companies and existed only on 
paper - in German they were called Passavolanten, in Spanish santelmos - were 
presented at the muster to 'pad the payroll'. However, Giovanni's 'orphans' seemed to 
have specialized in taking advantage from the delay itself, since the wages of a company 
were calculated according to the last muster roll, regardless of whether the same soldiers 
were still in service or not, and the commander of the unit pocketed the difference. A 
captain could go as far as to 'encourage' desertion, by, for instance, deliberately refusing 
to use his funds in the hope that the soldiers would simply go 'con dio', as frequently 
189Such was the case of the attempted reform of 1528. The Venetian captains retained this privilege until 
the end of the century, on the history of the caposoldo see Mallett and Hale, The Military organization, 
pp. 494-50 1. For an analysis of the Spanish case: Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 158-161 
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happened'90; eventually, the captain's strong contractual position vis-a-vis his defaulting 
contractor would force the Florentine commissario to authorise him to 'rimettere' the 
missing soldiers. 
Lorenzo Martelli surnmarised the situation of the soldiers of the Black Bands 
during the cold Umbrian winter quite well: 'It is undeniable that our present situation 
exhibits two cases of extreme need, that of your Lordships (the Ten) and that of these 
footsoldiers, but, as for them, theirs is more important, because, since they have not got 
enough to provide themselves with victuals or footwear, since they have to pay 5 or 6 
giulff for a pair of shoes, they cannot wait as long as your Lordships, who have clothes 
and shoes to wear and food to eat while struggling to find the money"91. With his words 
the commissario did not intend to reproach the Ten, but rather to make them aware of 
the urgency of their soldiers' needs: they counted the days rather than the money, and 
their pay was, by itself, insufficient even when it arrived on time. Moreover, for long 
months the Umbrian scene was marginal; it was a guerra vecchia, whereas the 
mercenaries tended to migrate - following the flows of money - towards a guerra nuova, 
like the one that was being fought in Lombardy. Only Lautrec's arrival 'renewed' the 
war of the Bands. 
Florence sent to the camp of the League tens of thousands of ducati d'oro (but 
also of scudi d'oro del sole), of ducati di grossi and ducati di barili - that is silver coins 
- and of ducats of moneta di biglione (mostly cratie) to pay its troops. The finding of 
190 Lorenzo Martelli thought that it happened too frequently-'El non haver danari in tempo fa che e'non si 
possono correggere e'furti; perchd e'passa la pagha 12 o 15 o 20 di. Quel capitano che ha disegnato di 
rubare, che non so se ce n'ý pifi d'uno che forse credo tutti, dice: "Qui posso io rubare 15 o 20 paghe", 
perchd subito che hanno hauto la pagha che ýa 15 o 20 del mese in circa ne mandono quelli fanti che 
hanno accattati, et viene I'altra pagha, et quelli fanti li manchano o dove sono? Sonsi iti con dio, finita, che 
fu la pagha et fassi rimettere di quelli simili, et a questo non Vý rimedio'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 
Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 125, f 490 v. CfT. with Redlich, The German. p. 52. 
191ibid. f 489 r. 'E' non si pu6 negare che il caso nostro non verta in due extreme necessitA, cosi dalla 
parte di Vostre Signorie come dalla parte di questi fantaccini, ma la loro ý di piý importantia quanto a 
loro, perchd non havendo da vivere n6 da calzare, chd costa loro uno paio di scarpe 5o6 giulii, non 
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cash of any kind in financially exhausted Florence had become one of the Ten's main 
concerns, and every month they fought a losing battle against the clock; they had too 
much at stake to risk the same rate of desertion as French and Venetian forces. 
The situation was made more complicated by the fact that the League's camp in 
Umbria had its own exchange values -a sort of central 'currency market' governed by 
the army's maestro di campo generale on behalf of all the various elements of the host - 
and its own prices. In both cases their fluctuations were linked not only to military 
circumstances, needs and customs, but also to the deals which were settled with the 
army purveyors -a different kind of military entrepreneur - and to local practices. 
On several occasions Lorenzo Martelli asked the Ten not to send the traditional, 
and outdated, silver coins of Florence, the grossi, because it was almost impossible to 
persuade soldiers to accept it'92 . Soldiers and sutlers rejected the grossil 
93 
unless these 
were valued at 20 quattrini (I quattrino =4 denari di piccioli) rather than 7 soldi, their 
value in theory, not to mention the fact that objectively many coins were in such a bad 
shape that they were worth even less 194 ; every time using the grossi resulted in a loss for 
the city. The barile, that had originated as a Florentine counterpart of the papal giulio 
was much easier to distribute, but between the two coins there was not parity: in 
October 1527 a barile was valued at 37-38 quattrini 195 , while 
in December it was down 
96 to 36 quattrinil . In January 1528 the Ten, troubled 
by the complaints of the soldiers 
and by their possible future reactions, decided that for the city keeping the nominal 
possono aspectare come possino le signorie vostre havendo da vivere et da calzare et da vestire non 
obstante che e' si peni a mettere i denari insieme... ' 
192 , Egli ý di bisogno che Vostre Signorie non ci lascino mandare pia grossi che mi ý suto una passione di 
spacciarle. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 240 r. 
'9'A grosso coined after 1503 weighed 2 grains, and its alloy was 958,333/1000, that is the so-called 'Iega 
delpopolino'. See Bernocchi, Le monete, p. 233 ff. vol. 3. 
194 , 
... tutti costoro non gli vogliono se non per 
20 quattrini senza che ve n'ý assai che per Pordinario non 
gli varrebbono; honne scripto pifj volte che non se ne mandi. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 December 
1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 499 r. 
195Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 119 r. 
196Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f r. 499 r. 
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value of the barile at the same level as that of the giulio (40 quattrini) was an unfair 
gain, made mostly at the expense of the already vexed rank and file' 97 . 
The quality and the alloy of the gold coins sent to the camp caused many 
complaints, but the only times in which a ducato d'oro was openly 'sgridato' by the 
troops was when Florence, probably out of desperation, tried to pay its troops, which 
were stationed in the Papal State, with thousands of Turkish ducats, a sign of the good 
relationship between the city and the Sublime Porta. Lorenzo Martelli had to admit that 
getting rid of them was a real affliction, but he said that it was most amusing to watch 
the footsoldiers looking those strange coins up and down' 98 . However, the real problem 
was that the purchasing power of a Turkish ducat was a half giulio less' 99 . Even 
in the 
case of the moneta di biglione there were adjustments to be made: in the camp at the end 
of January 1528 a cratia was effectively worth, at the best, 4 quattrini, and the sutlers 
considered 8 112cratie as equivalent to a barile 
200 
The real wages of the soldiers of the Black Bands, and, more generally, of the 
Italian fanti privati, are difficult to estimate, but not only for monetary reasons. The 
great role played in their world by discretion makes it impossible to construct a rigorous 
typology of payment. As we have already seen, the soldiers did not have equal rights 
and duties, nor were there uniform customs. The veteran homini da bene, the specialist 
arquebusiers, the non-commissioned officers, had their interests comparatively protected 
by the fact that their loss was a substantial damage for the military entrepreneur who 
owned a company of fanteria vecchia; the 'others', that is the unskilled soldiers, 
received their due, if they were lucky and if the contractor was honest, but seldom any 
197 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 16 January 1528, ASF, Died di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 80 
V. 
198 , una festa vedere come 11 squadrono questi fantaccini. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 2 November 
1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 346 r. 
199Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 29 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 231 
20OLorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 87 r. 
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further financial help from their commander. They were a part of the company, but not 
the company, and went away as easily as they had arrived. 
In early modem armies the help of a captain did not come usually without a price: 
if, between the contractor and the military entrepreneur, lending money was a system 
that worked both ways, it was not so between the captain and the soldier, who was by 
far the weakest (and last) link in the chain. Any sum given in advance to the rank and 
file for food, or weapons, or clothes, became another instrument of control and source of 
gain for the captain. Every day of delay in the arrival of the wages worsened the 
situation of the soldier,, who was on subsistence pay, making him sink ftirther into the 
quicksand of indebtedness. It was not a manoeuvre devoid of danger; for instance, in 
Volterra (1527) captain Marco da Empoli advanced money to too many soldiers and 
went broke when the Ten suddenly discharged half of his company. 
The first half of the sixteenth century - that is the period that preceded the so- 
called 'price revolution' - is generally considered to have been a good period for the 
purchasing power of the footsoldiers' wages 201 . When the situation was not critical 
(as it 
was in the camp of the League) the monthly pay at least enabled afantaccino to survive, 
and offered a quite alluring profit margin to those specialists who earned more than a 
202 basic wage 
It is quite interesting to compare the daily wage in soldi of the footsoldiers of the 
Bands - here calculated assuming (optimistically) a month of 30 days - with those of 
201 See Hale, L'organizzazione militare, pp. 367-370; on prices and wages in sixteenth century Italy, see 
Felloni, Studi Economici (Genova, 1999), pp. 1159-1165, vol. 2. 
202 Such was the case of the German double-pay man, the Doppels6ldner; see Redlich, The German 
Military Enterpriser. pp. 124-130. 
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some categories of Florentine building and agricultural workers during the same 
period 
203: 
Table XIV 
Master mason 
Skilled labourer 
Unskilled labourer 
Agricultural labourer 
Black Bands'base soldier 
Black Bands' arquebusier 
Average daily wage (1525-1530) 
21.5 
17.3 
9.2 
8.5 
12.43 
14.43 
The wage of a Florentine general field commissioner like Lorenzo Martelli was 
calculated in ragione of 16 lire, 13 soldi and 4 denari per daY204 , while Marcello Strozzi 
- the paymaster - received a ducato. It ought to be noticq, that, unlike the soldiers, the 
Florentine construction workers were paid day by day, but the 'safety margin' granted to 
the soldati by their monthly wage was largely apparent. Far from the monetary stability 
granted in the city by the fact that even the most transactions were evaluated in 'ghost 
money' - the money of acCoUnt205 _ and by the buffer zone represented by bank credit, 
the rank and file lived in a world in which the measure of value was far more directly 
linked to the medium of exchange, that is the coins used for payment. According to 
colonnello Imperiale Cinuzzi, every footsoldier was to be given a daily ration of 1 V2 -2 
libbre - approximately 509-680 grams - of either biscuit or bread, and a boccale (a 
tankard) of wine or beer 206 . These values - with some variations - were quite typical of 
203 These data are extrapolated from Giuseppe Parenti, Prime ricerche sulla rivoluzione dei prezzi a 
Firenze (Firenze, 1939), Richard Goldthwaite, The Building of Renaissance Florence (London, 1980) and 
Felloni, Studi Economici, pp. 1163-1164. 
204ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f 64 v. ; 'Mastro Andrea mariscalco', 
one of Marcello's men in charge of the control of the warhorses, was paid 2 lire per day; one of the 
jamigli received I lira and 18 soldi. 
205 On the 'alchemies' of the Florentine banking systems and their relationship with the real wages of the 
town labourers, see Goldthwaite, The Building of Renaissance Florence, pp. 301-317. It is difficult to 
give a better definition of the 'moneta di conto' than the one given by Goldthwaite: 'The Florentine's 
sense of value was conditioned by a system that in effect separated the measure of value from the medium 
ofchange'. 
2061mperiale Cinuzzi, La vera militar disciplina (Siena, 1604), p. 106. A soldier from Siena, Cinuzzi 
fought for twelve years in France and Flanders under the command of Silvio Piccolomini and Camillo 
Capizzuchi. 
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early modem armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centur/ 07 , and are still now a 
good criterion by which to judge the effective purchasing power of the soldiers' wages. 
In August 1527 Lorenzo Tosinghi, commissario of Montepulciano, where two 
companies of the Black Bands were sent in December, had to intervene with emergency 
measures to subject to price control the victualling of the companies garrisoned in the 
city. He reduced the price of a libbra of bread from 2 to I soldo, while the wine fell 
from 4 soldi to 3 soldi and 4 denari for one boccale, and afiasco could be bought for 5 
soldi; a libbra of mutton or veal was to be sold for 2 soldi208. In October 1527 the 
soldiers of the Black Bands encamped in Umbria could buy a staioro of bread for 7 lire 
- which means approximatel Y209 2.25 soldi for a libbra of bread - and a barrel of wine 
wholesale for 12 giuli (14 giuli retail price), that is at least 8 soldi alfiasco 210 , while 
forage was sold at 36-40 soldi per staio. The League's encwnpment drained the 
Florentine grain market, already weakened by a series of bad harvests, and brought the 
price of wheat from the already high level of 2 lire and 5 soldi per staio in August 1527 
to 6 lire in February2l' 1528. The situation kept on worsening until May, when 
negotiations with Siena allowed Florence to import enough grain to lower the price of 
one staio to 20 soldi212 ; however, in March the Black Bands headed south to join 
Lautrec's army near Troia, where, according to the Mantuan ambassador, soldiers drank 
mostly water and a loaf of bread cost 3 gjUji213. 
207 See also Parker, The army offlanders, pp. 161-164 and Redlich, pp. 127-130. 
20'Lorenzo Tosinghi to the Ten, 8 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive 123, f. 138 r. 
209The Tuscan staioro - or staio - is a capacity measure that corresponded to 24.662 litres. Given the 
specific gravity of wheat and the baking process, a staio of bread should be approximately equal to 21 kg, 
that is 61.76 libbre. However, this is the result of a very empirical calculation. 
2 'OLorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 224 v. 
21 'The Ten to Giovambattista Soderini, 12 February 1528, ASF, Dieci d Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 
43, f. 158 r. 
212 The Ten to Marco del Nero, 15 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 44, f. 94 v. 
213 Lodovico Ceresara. to the marquis of Mantua, 18 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 177 v. 
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Other kinds of goods were not cheap either. In the first half of the sixteenth 
century the average footsoldier could expect to spend approximately a month's wages to 
buy a suit of clothes; in the case of the Black Bands we know that a good pair of shoes 
was worth 4-5 giuli: it lasted far less than a year and was as necessary as any an-nament 
for people who lived - and frequently died - marching. The main individual weapon of 
the Florentine troops, that is the arquebus 'da fante appie' with its respective equipment, 
cost the Ten 9-10 lire 214 ; the Ten also fixed the price of one lb of lead at 4 soldi, while 
the same quantity of black powder was sold to the men of the Black Bands for 16 
soldi 215 . Even though a systematization of calibres and ammunitions was still to come, 
we can assume that the arquebus 'da fante' could fire a ball of I oncia or something 
less, propelled by a charge that weighed slightly less than the ball itself'2 16 .A pike cost 
20 soldi, a light horseman's lance 3 grossi or I lira. 
Table XV 
Tuscan/Florentine Measures 
Corn measures: 
moggio = 24 staia =5 84.710 litres 
sacco = 72.088 litres 
staio = 24.662 litres = approx. 18 kg. 
Liquid measures: 
cognio = 10 barili of wine = 45 5.840 litres 
soma =2 barili of wine = 91.168 litres 
barile of wine = 20 fiaschi = 45.584 litres 
fiasco = 2.279 litres 
boccale = 2/3 of a fiasco 
soma of olive oil 91.118 kg. 
barile of olive oil 33.429 litres = 28.861 kg. 
Weights: 
libbra = 12 once = 339.542 grams 
214 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberaziom, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 101. 'Archibusi da fante appid, con 
vite, toppe, tenieri et bacchette'. 
215 The Ten to Raffaele Girolami, 2 July 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 99, f. 20 v. 
216 These were the proportions recommended by colonel Imperiale Cinuzzi, who probably left the more 
detailed sorts of technical information to the arquebusiers of all sixteenth century Italian military treatises, 
La vera militar disciplina, pp. 44-47. 
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oncia = . 295 grams 
Conversion: 
pounds avoirdupoids = kilograms multiplied by 2.20462 
ounces avoirdupoids = grams multiplied by 0.03257 
imperial gallons = litres multiplied by 0.220 
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Table IX 
23 May 15271: 
The Black Bands; 12 companies before the freeing of 3337 foot 
Lucantonio CuDDano. 
II 
Au2ust and Sentember 1527: 
INFANTRY AugUSt2 September 3 
COMMANDERS: Foot Foot 
The Captains of the Black Bands: 
Lucantonio Cuppano from Montefalco 400 400 
Azzo da Correggio, Count of Casalp6 400 400 
Pasquino C6rso ^ 320 320 
Giovanni Turrini' 310 310 
Giuliano Strozzi ' 300 300 
Morgante d'Antino from Ferrara 300 300 
Cesare Farina /' 300 300 
Giannetto Albanese 300 300 
Giovanantonio da Castello 250 250 
Amico da Venafro 225 225 
Barbarossa ' 224 225 
Tommasino C6rso 220 250 
Scipione da Imola 200 200 
Pandolfo Puccini" 300 300 
Giovanni da Colle" 150 150 
tot: 4229 4260 
Others: 
Orazio Baglioni, General Captain of the 
Foot, with his own three captains. 
1000 1000 
Light horsemen (lancers), under the 
command of Orazio Baglioni. 
150 150 
Mantuan heavy cavalrymen, under the 
command of Carlo Nuvoloni. 
150 150 
" Corsicans. 
* Captains hired directly by Florence immediately after the restoration of the Republic. It ought to be 
noticed that Pandolfo Puccini was one of the 'allievi del signor Giovanni' mentioned by Rossi. 
0 Florentine citizens or subjects by birth. 
The captains of the Black Bands are here listed in order of importance, because the 
ripufatione was proportionate to the number of the footsoldiers under a captain's 
command. Since a newly-formed company of Italian infantry was usually 100 to 150 
men strong, the high level of prestige reached along the years by Giovanni's group is 
quite obvious. 
' Francesco Guicciardini to the Eight, 16 May 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 22 r. and 
Otto di Balia, Responsive, 50. f. 34 r. 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 66 r. 
'ASF, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 108, f. 18 v. 
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Table X 
The Arauebusiers of the Black Bands 
The Black Flags (footsoldiers per captain) November Dicember January 
4 
Pasquino C6rso (320) 
Giovanni Turrini (3 10) 
Amico da Venafro (250) 
Together these bands had 80 'corsaletti' 
tot. 473 tot. 425 
Rossino de'Ciai (250) 
Lucantonio Cuppano (400) 
Scipione da Imola (250) 
Tommasino C6rso (220) 
tot. 675 tot. 525 
Count Azzo da Correggio (400) 245 210 
Barbarossa' (225) 128 134 
Giovanantonio da Castello (250) 162 162 
Pandolfo Puccini6 (300) 130 130 
Giovanni da Colle (150) 79 79 
Giuliano Strozzi (300) 
BeIriguardo da Castiglione (200) 
Giacomo Filippo da Spolet07 (200)* 
total (on paper): 4225 2150 1892 1665 
total ('infacto'): approx. 3800 
These two captains had been garrisoned in Montepulciano since November. 
This company existed since Giannetto Albanese's departure, but was not officially recognised by the 
Ten and maintained by Giacomo Filippo himself and Orazio. It ought to be remembered that many 
soldiers - like the remnants of the three disbanded companies, especially Giannetto's one - literally 
'gravitated' around the camp, waiting for their chance to join a company and possibly 'intractenuti' with 
'buone parole', bread and a few coins by captains who did not want to loose so many 'soldati pratichi' or 
were hoping for an 'accrescimento' (an increase) of their effectives. 
Unfortunately there is no detailed information on Giuliano Strozzi's company, or on the 
band led by Orazio's 'protege'. On paper, the Black Bands' effective force was of 4200 
men, but in fact it never exceeded 3800 units. The percentages of Chart ? are based on 
the 'vero calculo'. 
4 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 20 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f. 90 r. 
5 To see how many arquebusiers there were in the companies of Barbarossa and Antonio da Castello, see 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, Condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 94 r/v. 
6 The payday of Pandolfo Puccini and Giovanni da Colle was not the same of their colleagues. ASF, Dieci 
di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 28v - 29 r. , 23 Dicember 1527. 7 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 127, f 142 r. , Orazio Bagliom to the Ten, 27 January 1528. 
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Table X1 
The Black Bands from November 1527 to January 1528: 
Pikemen, Arquebusiers and Servants 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
lo% 
0% 
El Servants 
M Pikes/arme corte 
GArquebusiers 
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November 1527 December 1527 January 1528 
Table XII 
The Florentine Troops at the Siege of Naples (April 1528): 
The Captains of the Black Bands: foot 
Lucantonio Cuppano from Montefalco 400 
Pasquino C6rso 320 
Giovanni Turrini 310 
Giuliano Strozzi\ 300 
Girolamo'Rossino' de'Ciai 250 
Amico da Venafro 250 
Giacomo Filippo da Spoleto 250 
Sciplone da Imola 250 
Tommasino C6rso 220 
Bino Signorelli 200 
Belriguardo da Castiglione 200 
Bernardo Strozzi\ 200 
Francesco Rustichello 200 
tot. 3350 
Others: 
Orazio Baglioni, General Captain of the 
Infantry, with his own three captains. 
1000 
Light horsemen (lancers), under the 
command of Orazio Baglioni. 
150 
A: These two companies were garrisoned in Pozzuoli after the battle of Capo d'Orso 
(see Appendix 2). 
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Table XVI 
Lorenzo Martelli,, commissario in campo * 
Orazio Baglioni, captain general of the Florentine foot and colonnello of the three 
companies of Perugian infantry plus one of light cavalry. * 
Colonnelloli - colonel; captain of his own company. 
Count Azzo da Casalp6, Lucantonio da Montefalco, 
Pasquino da Stia. * 
Sergente 
maggiore - 
sergeant-major. * 
Giovambattista 
Gotti da Messina 
Maestro di 
Campo * 
Luogotenente 
lieutenant in charge of the colonnello's company 
Aguzino 
Tamburo maggiore - drum-major 
Furiere - quartermaster 
company officers: 
Capilano - captain 
Luogotenente - lieutenant 
Aýflere - ensign 
Sergente - sergeant 
Tamburo - drummer 
Capi di squadra - corporals (I each 25 men) 
* According to its 'regimental' role, the staff that was maintained by each one of these 
officers included chancellors, paymasters, inspectors, interpreters, servants, jailers, 
executioners, scouts, cooks, barbers and the ever-present lancie spezzate, whose duties 
ranged from bodyguards to watch officers. Usually a doctor was present only in the 
fiamighe of the more prestigious condottieri, and up to now I have found no evidence of 
the presence of a chaplain. In fact, the preti are mentioned almost always with open 
contempt. 
Table XVII 
'Valenti homini' made by 'Signor Giovanni' according to Giovangirolarno de'Rossi. 
Paolo Luzzasco Lucantonio Zuppano Scipione da Imola Giovanni Turrini 
Plerantonio da Verona Annibale da Napoli Tristano C6rso Bertaccio turco 
Camillo Campagna Annibale da Padova Napoleone C6rso Bemardo da Lantignola 
Azzo da Casalp6 Anton Testa da Padova Amico da Venafro Carlotto de'Garimberti 
Bino Signorelli Luigi di Gazzolo Pandolfo Puccini Berardo da Padova 
Pompeo Ramazzotti Gian Moro Quintino da Verona Mascella di Romagna 
Alberto da Treviso Rosa da Vicchio Fazio da Pisa 1 Barba da Pescia 
lomeo dal Monte I Federico Castracani da Fano 
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Chapter IV 
The 'Felicissima Lega -1: Florence's Allies 
1. In the Emperor's Talon: Florentine Diplomacy 
m 
si vede manifestamente che li homini stanno a vedere la ruina l'uno de Valtro, 
et non si risentono se il male non si diriza contro di loro. Il che janno tanto piU' li 
principi, quanto piu' dalli affecti humani sono discosto. ' 
The Ten to Alessandro de'Pazzi, Florentine wnbassador in Venice 
With the obvious exception of the famous siege that caused its fall in 1530, other military 
events are not considered to have had a great influence on the history of the Last 
Florentine Republic. Contemporary historians are often too concerned with Florence's 
domestic politics and inner balances, while during the Risorgimento and the fascist 
period historians were attracted by the more 'extreme' manifestations of the popular 
I. regime. Even military historians such as Pieri focused their attention on the Republican 
militia, ignoring more 'conventional' aspects like the mercenary troops that were sent to 
campaign in the Kingdom of Naples in 1528. However, the burden of the defence of the 
D- 
Republic followed the typical trajectory of the other Florentine internal crisis, falling first 
on the mercenaries, then on the city's subjects and only eventually on its citizens. 
Actually, it could be said that Florence really lost its freedom under the walls of faraway 
Naples, and not on the slopes of the nearby Pistoiese mountains, at Gavinana (15 3 0). 
When, on II May 1527, news of the sack of Rome (6 May) first reached the city, 
the Medici and their partisans were holding firmly in their hands the levers of power in 
Florence. Only three weeks before, on 26 April, the proximity of the Imperial army and 
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the simultaneous absence of the leading figures of the Medicean party, who had gone to 
discuss the city's predicament with papal lieutenant Francesco Guicciardini and the 
military commanders of the League, had been enough to spark a rebellion. A crowd led 
by opponents of the Medici stormed the Palazzo and forced the Signoria to re-estabfish 
the constitution of 1512. The success of the Tumulto del Venerdi (Friday 26 April) was, 
A 
however, very short-lived: that very day the cardinal of Cortona, protector of the two 
Medici bastards on behalf of the pope, re-entered the city at the head of troops of the 
League, restored order and canceHed all the measures taken during his absence. The 
opponents of the Medici had compromised themselves for nothing. The tumult was a 
(storm in a glass of water'. The roots of Medicean power lay far from the city, in Rome, 
and as long as Clement VII, al secolo Giulio de'Medici, retained his power and 
authority, every success of his Florentine enemies was destined to be, at best, brid. 
However, when the Imperial army outmanoeuvred the forces of the League and 
marched on Rome, Clement VII himself found out that he, in his turn, was not beyond 
the reach of the great European powers. The eclipse of papal power that followed the 
sack of Rome allowed the restoration of the 'popular' government in Florence (16 May 
1527), but this did not change the terms of the problem: the Republic was a minor 
power, and its capacity to control its own future remained, in the long run, very limited. 
Nevertheless, Florence's efforts to find a new position in the confused international scene 
or, better still, to influence it, are worth a closer investigation. 
Before beginning to analyse the details of the various diplomatic initiatives of the 
Republic after its rebirth, it wiH be useful to take a short look at their guidelines and basic 
assumptions. Florentine diplomats and politicians still prided themselves on taking their 
decisions following a policy based on rational calculations, that is, on ragione, but, if this 
11N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic (Oxford, 1983), pp. 191-202; on the rebirth of the 
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certainty had been severely put to the test several times since the beginning of the Italian 
WarS2, from their point of view Italy in the period after Pavia was peculiarly prey to the 
irrational and the unpredictable. 
The sack of Rome epitomised the triumph of fortuna - and more exactly of the 
fortuna di Cesare - over ragione, the same incredible series of events that had helped 
A 
Charles V of Habsburg every time his numerous and powerful enemies seemed to have 
the upper hand, and that had delivered into his hands first the king of France and then the 
pope. It was a crisis that affected pro-French partisans like Francesco Guicciardini' as 
well as pro-Imperial ones like Paolo Giovio, while Florence had to come to terms with 
its low rank among the powers that composed the League of Cognac, a status that had 
worsened considerably since the already difficult (and often humiliating) times of the first 
Republic. Even confining our attention to purely military questions, since 1512 the 
situation had completely changed, and the technical and social gap that prevented 
Florence from producing an autonomous military force had widened more than 
proportionally with respect to the already high number of years that had passed. 
As Stephens says, the Republic made the same mistake that pope Clement VII had 
made before the sack, underrating the Empire 4. However, more than the effective might 
of the Habsburg forces, Florence underrated the expectations and loyalties that the 
Imperial 'ideology', promoted by the recent events and by the intense diplomatic work of 
the great chancellor Mercurino Arborio da Gattinara, could excite in the Italian scene, 
Florentine republic, see also Philip Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London, 1925). 
2 On the evolution of the Florentine political thought, see Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli e Guicciardini 
(Torino, 1970) and Rudolf Von Albertini, Firenze dalla Repubblica al Principato (Torino, 1970); on the 
history of the Florentine republics, see also I N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic (Oxford, 
1983), H. Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, 1502-1519 (Oxford, 
1985). 
' On pre and post-1527 Guicciardini see Albertini, Firenze dalla Repubblica al Principato, pp. 85-103 
and 225-246; on Giovio: Zimmermann, Paolo Giovio. and the third section of the first chapter of this 
dissertation. 
'Stephens, The Fall, p. 242. 
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which was so different from the times of emperor Maximilian and of king Ferdinand of 
Aragon. In fact republican Florence could only reject the social premises of the Imperial 
system as it rejected - as we shall see - its line of action. Inside the Republic even the 
Black Bands, the best and most up-to-date Italian exarnple of the militia detempi 
moderni, remained a foreign body exactly because of their modem characteristics, which 
A 
are the traits that they shared with the Imperial arn-fies. Actually, how to get rid of a 
certain Imperial army was one of the first points on the Ten's agenda. 
During the days of the first Republic, Florentine ambassadors and Florence's ruling 
class had been left astonished by the undeniable successes obtained - mostly against them 
I - uora di ogni ragione' by the choleric pope Julius 11 della Rovere through his irrational 
consistency'. In 1527 they were terrified by the proximity of the army that had sacked 
Rome, even though it had been its passage near Florence that triggered the chain of 
events that led to the faH of the Medicean regime, which was only sanctioned by the Sack 
and by the surrender of the pope 6. The Imperial host that occupied Rome was indeed an 
'exercito del diavolo' that seemed to feed on victories rather than bread, uncaring of the 
fact that secondo ragione it should have been beaten and disbanded many times. Ahnost 
completely isolated both diplomatically and logistically since the beginning of the 1526 
campaign, pursued by the army of the League, cornered by Giovanni de'Medici, 
weakened by mutinies and epidemics, every time it had managed to survive, either by 
sheer luck or pure stubbornness. Its riputatione was provoking a political and cultural 
earthquake whose proportions are now difficult to imagine, not to mention the huge 
amount of capital that was made available in the aftermath of the sack of one of the 
wealthiest cities of the world. From summer 1527 to winter 1528 between this sword of 
5GiI bert, Machiavelli e Guicciardini, pp. I 10- 114 
'Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, pp. 1836-1852 
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Damocles and Florence there was only what was left of the army of the League, which 
had been defeated without a fight. 
Too feared, too unpredictable, the Imperial army in Rome was to be destroyed; this 
concept was constantly repeated in the letters of the Ten to the various Florentine 
ambassadors in Italy and Europe; it was an essential condition for the restoration of a 
It 
semblance of 'normality' - if not of peace. However, the Republic was not ready to wage 
a total war against the Empire, and the situation, at least at the beginning, allowed some 
distinctions to be made between the authority of Charles V and the mutinous army that 
represented a threat to all the Italian powers. It was clearly a political escamotage, but it 
was not without foundations. As the Ten wrote to their ambassador in Spain Domenico 
Canigiani', the Medici and not Florence had been enemies of Caesar, and the 'potentia 
del papa' had caused the city's involvement in the disastrous conflict. The Florentine 
republic was not ambitious, and its choice in favour of the League had been largely 
conditioned by the situation: the Imperial generals and ministers in Italy held no real 
authority over their unpaid troops and could hardly be considered as interlocutors. On 
the other hand, besides threatening it, Venice and France offered the city acceptable 
conditions. Neutrality had never been really an option. 
The triumphs in Lombardy and Rome of the Imperial captains, who were more 
intent on personal gain than on the eventual victory of their master - in Lombardy and 
Rome had won Charles Va reputation for ingratitude and disloyalty. Even when the 
emperor decided to keep his word, he had always done it through the use of his might, 
and never through his 'an-fici'. The real 'gloria del principe' - concluded the Ten - lay in 
the preservation of his 'popoli', and not in the extent of his 'imperlo 98. It seems that - at 
7 The Ten to Domenico Canigiani, 18 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioi e Commissarie, 42, ff. 
128 r. -129 r. 
'Ibid. f 128 v. -129 r. : 'Non ha dunque cotesto principe nel pigliare et tenere questa provincia 
(Lombardy) usato mota prudentia, perchd nel ocuparla s'6 valuto di tali exerciti 1 quali se bene gli hanno 
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least officially - it never dawned on the Ten that it was exactly its line of action that had 
won for the Imperial cause the loyalty and support of such a, "irnportant portion of the 
Italian military, political and financial elites. In fact, it is interesting to see how the 
republic's criticism of Charles V's attitude echoed the reproaches so frequently 
addressed against the Medici regime since the death of Lorenzo il Magnifico. 
#4 
The war had been declared to free the Italian peninsula from the danger 
represented by the Imperial supremacy, and the reasons that persuaded the pope and his 
partisans to fight against Charles of Habsburg still existed; if anything, they had been 
made more difficult and urgent by the fall of the Medici. The Ten were persuaded that 
the emperor was planning to become the 'monarcha de'christiani'9, and that 'a volere 
liberare l'Italia, bisogni extinguere 1'exercito Imperiale"o. It was not an easy task, since 
while the remaining Italian powers and France measured their military might by how 
much they could spend, Charles V fought without spending, ready as he was to give Italy 
over to plunder by his soldiers". Moreover, if Italy fell, France and England would soon 
12 feel 'the emperor's talon' . Charles V's unstable Italian domains, conquered against the 
odds and retained against reason, had become his force instead of his weakness. 
dato molte victorie gli hanno non di meno facto tutti Ii popoli nimici, et generato in tutti una opinione 
che apresso sua MaestA non si tengha conto della fede, nel tenerla poi ha voluto condurre ogni cosa per 
forza n6 ha cercato di Farsi amici... la gloria del principe, la quale consiste non tanto nella grandezza 
dello imperio quanto nella conservatione de' popoli... ' 
9The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 8 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 42, f 160 r. 
'('The Ten to Pierfrancesco Portinari, 25 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 
42, f 139 r. 
"The Ten to Alessandro de'Pazzi, 3 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 
114 r. 'Perche habbiamo ad combattere con uno che nella guerra non spende, n6 si cura per mantenerla 
di dare Italia ai suoi soldati in preda. Noi, 66ý, Francia e potentie italiane non ci vagliamo se non de' 
danari, il manchamento de'quali ci dara sempre la victoria al nemico. '. Compare with Guicciardini, 
Storia dwalia, book XVIII, chap. XIII, pp. 1888-1889. 
12 ,*- I'artiglio dell'] mperadore'. The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 10 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 166 r. 
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After a first attempt to make peace with the emperor through the mediation of the 
duke of Ferrara 13 , Florence placed all 
its hopes in the only power that could still 
counterbalance the Imperial supremacy, that is, France. The city was fully aware of the 
fact that Francis I was mainly interested in obtaining the release of his two sons 14 , who 
were hostages of Charles V, on less heavy conditions, and that Cesare's wrath after the 
refusal of the king of France to comply with the terms of the treaty of Madrid would not 
be easily appeased. The republic actually counted on this, even though, as in the case of 
Clement VII, the Ten overestimated the distance between the Emperor and his enemies. 
However, after a long series of military defeats - and especially after the 
catastrophe of Pavia - it seemed that there was little enthusiasm left for the Italian 
aventure and monsieur de Lautrec had accepted the cotnmand of the League's relief 
army almost unwillingly. In July 1527 the Florentine ambassadors wrote that the general 
feeling was that this impresa was to be considered as the last and decisive effort. Once 
more the Ten were disappointed by the lack of consistency of the French and, at the 
same time, by their overconfidence: their vision of the Italian situation was too narrow 
and their solutions simplistic. This last impresa would not be as easy as the king and his 
ministers were claiming, but, for Florence's sake, the ambassadors were told to 
encourage this mistaken point of view". In anticipation of Lautrec's arrival in central 
Italy, the Ten held that all the wrongs that the city was suffering at the hands of its allies 
13 Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, book XVIII, chap. XI, p. 1873. 
" On the return of Francis I to France after his imprisonment in Spain, see R. J. Knecht, Renaissance 
Warrior and Patron: the Reign of Francis I (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 249-27 1. 
15 'Intendiamo quello dici, che costi s'6 facto per questa impresa l'ultimo sforzo, et che questo sia ultimo 
perentorio. 11 che quando fussi non ci darebbe pocho dispiacere.. che le cose non sarebbono tanto facili 
quanto costori si persuadeno. Pure 6 da metterlo loro in confidatione perchd non restino di fare al 
continuo di fare nuove provisioni... ' The Ten to Roberto Acciaioli, 29 July 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 36 r. 
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and enemies alike could be tolerated for the moment; the new capitano generale would 
16 
eventually recognise Florence's merits . 
On August 1527 the new League's army started to campaign in Piedmont, but the 
Ten were determined to avert the danger that on this occasion, as before, the French 
forces would get bogged down in what they called 'Milanese mud"'. The road to Rome, 
A 
and to the weakened Imperial army, and not to Milan, the old dream of Francis 1, was the 
road to victory. The king probably remembered how many times he had cherished vain 
hopes in Lombardy only to be bitterly disappointed"; the Ten, with the utter failure of 
the League's army under the walls of Milan in 1526 still fresh in their memories, surely 
did, and Antonio de Leyva was still holding the city with an iron fist and with his veteran 
troops. With winter drawing near, Florence multiplied its ardent appeals to Lautrec, 
urging him to renounce Lombardy in order to go southwards 'ad vincere il mondo', 
giving to the Cristianissimo the imperio that was rightfuRy his, and that was now in the 
hands of the enemies of the Christian faith, and gaining the gratitude of the 'oltraggiata 
tanto et sua tanto fedele Toschana'19. Francis I agreed, at least partially: the loss of 
Naples would hurt Charles more than the loss of Milan, but the lack of enthusiasm the 
Ten had noticed was probably due to the fact that the Italian aventure was now a means 
and not an end. When the Cristianissimo ordered to Lautrec to guide his army towards 
16 The Ten to Raffaele Girolami, 8 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 42 
V. 
17 attendete a sollecitare la passata nel Reame o verso Roma con ogni studio perchd in questo consiste 
la victoria del tutto, n6 ci pare per cosa del mondo da perdere il tempo nelli fanghi di Milano... '. The 
Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 12 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 
42, f 123 v. 
18 
... 
diciamo che vostra signoria conforti la MaestA del Re a usare le sue forze in disfare quello 
exercito... et facci spignere avanti monsignor di Aultrech havere la vittoria di Roma et non perda tempo 
in Lombardia, dove tante volte le false speranze I'hanno ingannato... ma spigna avanti et batta questo 
exercito (the Imperial army) prima che si rassicuri che essendo uso a vincere sempre la prima bastonata 
lo pone in terra... '. The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 30 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 42, f 78 v. 
'9The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 24 September 1527, ASF, Died di Balia, Legazioni e 
Comm issarie, 42, f. 102 r. 
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Naples he did so not because of his dream of being called duke of Milan, but to force the 
Emperor to accept a ransom in money in exchange for his sons 20 . 
21 
The main weak point of Florentine foreign policy was, of course, Rome . 
Formal. ly, the renewal of the League of Cognac was motivated by the need to fiberate the 
pope, but the Ten spoke more willingly of the need to free the Holy Roman Church. The 
A 
destruction of the 'exercito del Diavolo' and the struggle against papal influence were 
priorities that clashed. After the fall of the Medicean r6gime, the Republic had to fight 
first to find, and then to protect its new role inside the League. Florence paid a high 
political price and exposed itself to all the dangers that derived from its internal instability 
and from the lack of reputation of the republican ruling class, two factors that in the eyes 
of the collegati were not compensated anymore by the presence of the Medici and of 
their partisans. Even before the release of Clement VII, the pope's family and its 
supporters had been trying to discredit the Republic in al-I the European courts; due to his 
ambiguous attitudes and his past pro-Medicean leanings, ambassador to France Roberto 
Acciaioli was replaced by Giuliano Soderini (1491-1554), half-brother of Giovambattista 
and bishop of Saintes 
22 
. 
A fl 
Aner the liberation of the pope, on 8 December 1527, the Ten hastened to remind 
Lautrec how little a Medici tyrant ever cared about maintaining his word 23 . 
Notwithstanding the extreme weakness of his situation, his forced neutrality and the 
considerable financial support given or promised to the Imperial army in exchange for his 
20 Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, pp. 253-260. 
21 On the relationship between the pope, the Medici, their partisans and the Republic see Stephens, The 
FaIL. pp. 220 ff. 
22 Giuliano Soderini, son of Paolantonio di Piero Soderini and Margherita di Strozza Strozzi, became 
bishop of Volterra when he was eighteen, taking the place of his uncle, then of Vicenza and eventually 
of Saintes - again, instead of his uncle. 'Uomo tutto dei suoi piacere e amantissimo 
della quiete', he 
became ambassador in France in 1527, but after a year asked to be replaced. In 1529 he refused to help 
the Republic in its dealings With Clement VII. Giuliano Soderini was among the exiles that contributed 
to the recruitment of the army that was defeated at Montemurlo, earning Cosimo de'Medici's hostility. 
He never became cardinal. 
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release 24 , the whole world, except Florence, from Muscovy to England, rushed to pay 
homage to Nostro Signore in Orvieto 25 . To Clement VII's ambiguous promises and 
buone parole, the Republic opposed its staunch loyalty to the League, the services of the 
best Itafian troops avaflable and even works of art sent as gifts to the king of FI rance 26 , 
but the Ten forewarned the Cristianissimo that this time he could not count on what in 
the past had been Florence's great asset, that is, its wealth. With the possible exception 
of Venice and Ferrara, the 'borsa di Italia' was eMptY17 . However, there were other 
sources that could be tapped: the 'borsa di Inghilterra', for instance, was still full. 
Already on April 1527 Henry VIII - who, incidentally, had been an admirer of 
Giovanni de'Medici28 - had decided to support the League of Cognac militarily, hoping 
to win the pope's assent to his divorce from Katherine of Aragon. After the Sack of 
D- 
Rome the Serenissimo di Anglia agreed to pay, for six months starting from June, more 
than thirty thousand scudi, that is the wages of the ten thousand men that composed the 
German Black Legion. This veteran Landsknecht unit, under the command of French 
count Luis de Lorraine-Vaudemont, was the backbone of Lautrec's army29. On August 
1527 cardinal Wolsey - who had brought with him 300,000 scudi 'per le spese 
occoffenti' - signed in France, on behalf of Henry VIII, the Treaty of Amiens. It was 
also established that 'gracious' Gregorio Casale, a Bolognese knight of St. John and 
23 The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 10 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e 
Commissarie, 43, f2 r/v. 
24 On the conditions imposed for his liberation, see Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, b. XVIII, chap. XIV, 
pp. 1895-1897. 
2' The ambassadors from Muscovy gave to the pope a sable fur, while the dinner-service was offered by 
their English colleagues. '... la corte 6 qual falita, senza un carlino. Li vescovi vanno a piedi con un 
capeleto in testa et mantellini fi-usti, et li cortesani biastemano Idio. Sono come disperati. Li cardinali 
vanno con 4 servitori et su la sua mula sicome andavano in primitiva ecclesia; pur a li soliti costumi 
disonesti, et per uno julio (that is for 13 soldi and 4 denari) si venderebbono Cristo. ' Aloisio Lippomano, 
7 January 1528, Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI, p. 488. 
26 The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 10 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, 
f 165 r. 
27 ibid. f 166 r. 
28 Varch i, Storia Fiorentina, book 5, p. 3 10. 
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ambassador of the Serenissimo to Venice and all Italy, would join Lautrec's retinue in 
order to verify that his master's money was weR spent30 . During his mission, the 
ambassador was also accompanied by two hundred English fight horsemen under the 
command of Sir Robert Jerningham. (see last section), the only unit of Lautrec's army 
that was not only paid by, but also fought under the flag of the Serenissimo dAnglia. 
#4 
The Ten appointed an envoy to the English court as soon as they had been assured 
that this would not endanger their privileged relationship with the changeable Francis 1. 
31 As it appears clearly from his instructione , the mission of ambassador Pierfrancesco 
Portinari was not easy, since the representatives of the Florentine Republic were 
'huomini novi' and without reputation in that court. Although the Italian language was 
generally understood if not spoken - and the ambassador was ready to speak also in 
French or in Latin - the real problem was how to gain access to the Serenissimo by 
overcoming the selfish objections of the ambassadors of the other Italian powers, Venice 
in the first place, that cared little for freedom or were completely ignorant about it. 
Freedom was in fact the keyword of Portinari's opening speech in front of the court: 
'liberta' for his homeland in the first place, then for the Holy Roman Church, then for 
Italy, 'patria tanto celebre et d'ogni specie di gratia omata'. 
However, in private the ambassador was to use the many ragioni with which he 
had been 'equipped' by the Ten, who were persuaded that, eventually, what was really 
important was to have the most tefling arguments at their disposa132 . The Venetians, 
29Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, b. XVIII, chap. XII, pp. 1871-1881. Vaudemont's Black Legion was an 
unit of 'fanteria vecchia' that had fought for many years against the 'secta Lutherana' in Germany. 
30 'Questo oratore anglico e persona molto gratiosa, et presumme assai del facto suo, col quale Lautrech 
per rispetto del Re di Inghilterra ha grande rispetto, intanto che io non credo che sua Excellentia habbi 
forza di sognare cosa che costui non voglia sapere... lui (Guido Rangone) et il Casale in fatto sono 
molto amici del Papa. ' Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi to the Ten, 17 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 125, f 300 v. On the treaty of Amiens see also Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, p. 272-274. 
3 'The Ten to Pierfi7ancesco Portinari, 25 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 
42, ff 136 v. - 139 v. 
32 '.. bisogna ci armiamo con molte ragione, le quali alla fine sono quelle che restano in campo... ', Ibid. 
f 138 v. 
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obsessed by their expansionist policy, were belying their reputation for wisdom. The king 
of England had to be informed dispassionately and in detail of the military, political and 
financial situation of the war in Italy as it was seen by a relatively weak power such as 
Florence, which was correspondingly more aware of the impending danger of the 
spreading of the Imperial influence beyond the Alps, 'to the ruin of all Christendom'. The 
A 
Ten saw only two possible positive outcomes to the war: in the first the Empire was 
expelled from the peninsula entirely, while in the second Charles V was allowed to retain 
the Kingdom of Naples, and the Serenissimo and the Cristianissimo - or at least the 
latter - were to be given 'buono stato' in Italy". In either case, the Imperial army had to 
be destroyed as soon as possible. Henry VIII should ignore the diplomatic proposals of 
the Emperor, who simply aimed to prolong the strategic stalemate till winter, draining 
the remaining financial resources of the League. The 'borsa, di Inghilterra' had to sustain 
the offensive efforts of the alliance in Italy, since the only way to really negotiate with 
Charles V was from a position of advantage. For this reason the Ten urged Henry VIII 
to spend his money freely through the 'right' channels, authorising - for instance - the 
loan of 60,000 scudi for which Antonfrancesco degh Albizzi had already asked 
ambassador Casale and that in their hands would have been equivalent to 
100,00034. 
Pierfrancesco Portinari was even encouraged to look for somebody in loco who - thanks 
to a donativo, a 'gift' - could help Florence in its constant search for money". The days 
of the Bardi and of the Peruzzi were very far indeed. 
Besides being a way to get money from a fuH purse, for the Ten the contacts with 
the Engfish court were another way to put pressure on Francis 1, who relied heavily on 
his alliance with the Defensor Fidei Henry VIII. Listening to cardinal Wolsey's advice 
33 Ibid, f 138 
34 Ibid., f 139 v. 
35The Ten to Pierfrancesco Portinari, 2 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazion' e Commissarie, 
43, f 50 v. 
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rather than that of the Florentine ambassadors, the Serenissimo ended up by following, 
up to a point, the Ten's strategic guidelines. Henry VIII discouraged all the military 
mitiatives of the League outside Italy, and in February 1528 he promoted a truce of eight 
months between Francis I and Marguerite of Habsburg, regent of Flanders and aunt of 
Charles V. England's financial contribution to the League's army in Italy was prolonged 
4 hS36. for six mont 
However, the issue that really interested the king of England was the divorce, and 
his attitude towards Florence changed after the liberation of the pope. The manifestations 
of Henry's desire to court Clement VII and the greater attention given to the reports of 
the other Italian powers annoyed the Ten. Cardinal Eboracense, that is, Wolsey, and 
Henry VIII were inclined to please the pope rather than the Florentine Republic, and 
ambassador Portinari was instructed to reveal to them the true aims of Clement VII, and 
how treacherous His Holiness was. The pope's liberation had been a positive event for 
the Italian cause, but it was in everybody's interest that the Holy Roman Church be free, 
f but not power UP7, otherwise it would eventually disturb the peace that was being 
created at such great cost. The Ten were right, but, as in the case of Francis 1, they could 
not change the priorities of Henry VIII: only unbiased political initiatives, and not 
ragione, could force the pope to concede him the divorce". 
Peace and the restoration of a balance in the Italian peninsula had always been 
Florence's objectives, and in its pursuit of them the Republic always considered Venice 
as its main opponent. Unlike the Florentine Republic, the Serenissima was 'grande' and 
36 Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, b. XVIII, chap. XVI, pp. 1905-1906. 
31 , ... debbono questi principi volere 
bene che la chiesa sia libera, ma non grande, acci6 che non habbia 
cagione di turbare poi quella pace alla quale con tanto spendio et fatica da loro si camina... ' The Ten to 
Pierfi7ancesco Portinari, 8 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f 146 v. 
38 On the struggle for the divorce and cardinal Wolsey initiative in foreign policy during this period, see 
J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), pp. 198-240 and S. J. Gunn, 'Wolsey's foreign policy and 
the domestic crisis of 1527-1528' in S. J. Gunn and P. G. Lindley (ed. ), Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State 
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followed a different and rather dangerous line of action. In comparison with the tone 
they used with the other allies, in their dealings with the Venetian Senate the Ten used a 
far more direct, and sometimes brutal, style. The two republics had been unanimous in 
calling for the immediate dispatch of another French army to Italy after the sack of 
Rome, but, immediately after Lautrec's arrival in Piedmont and the taking of Alessandria, 
their aims diverged. The matter of issue was, as always, the future of Lombardy and of 
the duchy of Milan. Venice wanted to see Francesco Sforza restored as duke of Milan, 
and, since the whole campaign in northern Italy was based on its financial support, the 
League's capitano generale had to accept the requests of the Serenissima, at least at the 
beginning. Duke Francesco, considered as 'fallito' even by many of the Milanese exiles 
who thronged Lautrec's court'9, would have been a quite malleable neighbour for 
40 Veruce 
Florence's point of view was completely different4l. She considered that this was 
not the time to plan for future territorial acquisitions. The freedom of their states was in 
danger, and the only way to assure their respective positions was to give the duchy of 
Milan to the king of France, the only power that could counter the Imperial supremacy in 
Italy. The Ten thought that in practice it would be impossible to drive Charles V and his 
partisans out of the peninsula. It did not matter how vigorously his Lombard domains 
were being attacked, for the emperor cared little for them, since Milan was a simply a 
(stato acquistato', and not an inherited patrimony such as the Kingdom of Naples. Only if 
the Regno was attacked would Charles V have felt the need to reconsider his ambitions. 
and Art (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 149-177; Peter Gwyn, The King's cardinal; the rise and the fall of 
Thomas Wolsey (London, 1990). 
"Antontrancesco degli Albizzi to the Ten, 31 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 60 
r. 
40 See also F. Bennato, Ta partecipazione militare di Venezia alla Lega di Cognac', Archivio Veneto, 
1956, pp. 70-87. 
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However, at that point the emperor could have offered the liberation of Francis I's sons, 
and the Cristianissimo most probably would have accepted his overture. Therefore, 
Charles was to be forced to cede Milan in order to retain Naples, and any idea of an 
attack against Aragon or Flanders was to be discarded, since Charles V was the 'naturale 
signore' of those 'armed' peopleS42 
A 
The Ten made it clear that they were quite aware that the king of France had made 
such a great effort not only to protect the interests of the Italian powers, but to promote 
his own, that is, to regain a strong foothold in Italy after the disaster of Pavia in 1525. 
Even though, they said, it appeared logical that he should intervene, if only to protect his 
own kingdom, which was the next to be threatened by the Imperial 'tide', in their 
experience men - and even more so princes, naturally aloof from human emotions - cared 
little about other people's ruin until it was their turn to suffer". In the view of the Ten, 
monsieur de Lautrec was slowing down his efforts because of Venice's attitude, afraid as 
he was to be fighting in theory for his king but in practice for Venice. Due to the slow 
progress of the League's troops in Lombardy, the duke of Ferrara and the marquis of 
Mantua - the two 'zolfanelh' (matches) that had triggered the great explosion of Rome - 
maintained their dangerous neutrality. According to the Ten, the excessive 'greatness' of 
Venice could even force Florence and Ferrara - should France decide to withdraw its 
army - to sign peace with the emperor, whom the Ten considered as a natural enemy of 
the Serenissima 44 . Even though the magistracy told the ambassador Alessandro de'Pazzi 
not to emphasise this threat too much, on another occasion it evoked explicitly Venice's 
worst nightmare: the dark days that had followed the battle of Agnadello (1509), and the 
4 'The Ten's letter to Alessandro de'Pazzi, appointed Florentine ambassador in Venice, could be 
considered as the manifesto of the Republic's foreign policy. The Ten to Alessandro de'Pazzi, 3 October 
1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, ff. 13 r. - 16 r. 42 Ibid. f 14 v. 
43 Ibid. f 15 r. See also the phrase in Italian that introduces this section. 
44 Ibid. f 14 v. 
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possibility of a renewal - after the defeat of the League of Cognac - of the League of 
Cambrai, 'la quale doverria restare sculpita etemalmente nella memoria di quefli 
Signori... '. Moreover, even if Florence had to have a 'patrone', the Venetians were not 
45 
great enough to play that role . Alessandro de'Pazzi received instructions to persuade 
English ambassador Gregorio Casale not to support the requests of duke Francesco 
Sforza, and he was to do this, if possible, without arousing the suspicions of the Milanese 
envoy. 
The Ten were determined not to fbHow the Venetian example by aflowing 
themselves to be carried away by their desires and their 'volonta', no matter how just and 
legitimate they were. The government of Florence claimed to be looking at the big 
picture and criticised the Serenissima for pursuing its own agenda even in such troubled 
times, but, besides the staunch and jealous defence of its identity, in fact it did not have a 
perspective of its own 46 . The popular and 'democratic' regimes of Florence and Sienaý' 
answered to their irremediable internal contradictions and to the deep transformations of 
the Italian political and social situation in two opposite ways, but both choices contained 
the seeds of their undoing. France and Empire sided with the two republics only in 
opposition to each other, and both powers were contributing to successfuUy difluse 
(aristocratic' models and tendencies in Italy. 
Florence's main diplomatic goal was the involvement, by hook or by crook, of the 
highest possible number of Italian powers in the League, and the creation of a united, if 
not homogeneous, front against the Empire. Mantova and Ferrara were the most 
conspicuous cases, but there were states closer to Florence that could represent a direct 
45 'Havendo havere patroni, non pare loro che li Venetiani siano tanto honorevoli che bastino... ' The 
Ten to Alessandro de'Pazzi, 29 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commssarie, 42, f 144 
V. 
46 On the Florentine republican 'ideology' see the book of Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al 
principato, especially pp. 119-145 
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threat to the Republic. Lucca, for instance, had remained faithful to its pro-Imperial 
leanings, but, according to the Ten, it was kept in check by its closeness to both Florence 
and Genoa and by the wisdom of its own ruling clasS48. What reafly worried the Ten was 
Siena's 'bestiale stato'. Utterly unreliable and hostile, the Sienese republic was 
Florence's uncovered flank, the obvious point of arrival for the Imperial army from 
A 
D- 
. Rorne, should it decide to march northwards. From afar, the Ten said, the most obvious 
answer to this dangerous situation might seem to be an attack of the Umbrian League's 
army against Siena and its subjugation to Florence, but the Republic had not 'stomacho 
da gran pasto 49 . Time was not ripe for the Ten to foRow their 'volonta'. The best 
choice, they wrote, was stifl to make Siena join the League through a change of ruling 
class and the return of the Noveschi exiles that would not involve Florence, at least not 
directly 50 . Moreover, if threatened directly the Sienese Balia could invoke the help of the 
'exercito del diavolo', that would probably rush to protect what was its granary, making 
fruitless all the Florentine efforts to keep the war far from Tuscany. 
47 See A. Katherine Isaacs, 'Popolo e monti nella Siena del primo Cinquecento', Rivista Storica Italiana, 
LXXXII, 1970, pp. 4-24. 
48 'Lucca dipende dalli Imperiali, benchd el freno di Genova et il nostro & per tenerli, ma sono savi... ', 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 138 r. 
49The Ten to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 4 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni C 
Commissarie, 42, f 207 r. 
50The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 7 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f 
118 r. /v. On the monle dei Nove, see Isaacs, 'Popolo e monti nella Siena del primo cinquecento.. 
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2. 'Battaglie di maledetto sennol. The Debates in the Consulta 
'Commissario, voi scrivete troppo minutamente de ogni cosa. ' 
Venetian Proweditore Alvise Pisani to Lorenzo Martelli 
A 
One of the first official acts of the newly appointed Florentine commissario Lorenzo 
Martelli after his arrival in the camp of the League in Umbria was to take the place of 
Raffaele Girolarni at the table of the Consulta. Given the social standing of his 
interlocutors, Martelli had probably been quite worried about it, but, after a first meeting 
with the duke of Urbino, the Venetian provveditore, the Milanese ambassador, Orazio 
and Malatesta Baglioni, he ended up by writing to the Ten that, to his great relief, 
Qquesti son poi huornini come noi, et qualcosa di meno ne) discorsi -)51 . 
The Consulta (the 'Council') was an informal consultative body made up of 
military and civilian representatives of all the powers that composed the League of 
Cognac; its task was, at least in theory, to choose the best way to implement in the field 
the League's policies and the orders of the Capitano Generale. In practice, the Consulta 
was more than that: it was a necessity. On paper, the duke of Urbino, who was also the 
capitano generale of the Venetian forces, had Ul powers, but in fact many important 
decisions were taken collectively and according to the unstable inner financial, political 
and tactical balances of the army of the League. This situation was only partially the 
result of the duke's style of leadership. Even before its controversial retreat from the 
siege of Milan, the army had mirrored the composite nature of the anti-Imperial front, 
51 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 27 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 107 
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but, after the sack of Rome, the utter failure of his strategy and his ensuing fall into 
discredit forced Francesco Maria della Rovere to tap all available resources and to 
involve more directly the other members of the Consulta. 
Moreover, the host stationed in Umbria was really an army of the League of 
Cognac, while Lautrec's, with which it would eventually converge, was in fact a French 
A 
army, not only because of the prevalence of the forces paid by the Cristianissimo, but 
also because of the different kind of leadership exercised by Odet de Foix. As we shall 
see, the new Capitano Generale of the League surrounded himself with a court rather 
than with a consultative body, and progressively centralized the decision-making 
process in his own hands. However, unlike the duke of Urbino - who has been harshly 
criticised by generations of Italian historians for his slowness at taking decisions - 
Lautrec eventually lost contact with the real situation and the needs of his army. 
With the entry of Lorenzo Martelli into the Consulta we gain a precious, if 
unorthodox, observer. Through his descriptive and literary talent, a world of 
subterfuges, winks, overheard phrases, sudden changes of expressions and tones around 
the 'tavola' comes to life, compensating for the commissario's relatively low rank on 
the Florentine political scene and his apparent lack of initiative in comparison with the 
other members of the Consulta. In fact, Martelli followed strictly the commissione given 
him by the Ten, and tried to cope with the lack of authoritativeness of the reborn 
Florentine republic. The fact that Lorenzo 52 was appointed commissario in campo in 
such difficult times - and with his son Niccolo' still prisoner in the papal stronghold of 
Civitavecchia - attests both his loyalty to the new regime and his enmity with the 
52 Niccol6 Martelli was among the young Florentines arrested after the failure of the conspiracy of the Orti 
Oricellari. Lorenzo's nephew Lodovico - together with Dante da Castiglione, another famous 'republican' 
- challenged two of the Florentine fuorusciti fi7om the Imperial camp that was besieging the city to a duel. 
The challenge was accepted by Giovanni Bandini and Bertino Aldobrandini. The result was a draw: 
Bertino died on the spot, his mouth transfixed by Dante's sword, while Lodovico, badly wounded, died a 
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Medici, which was strong enough to earn him the definition of 'empio et scelerato 
huomo' by Paolo Giovio 53 . The attitude of Lorenzo Martelli mirrored the hardening of 
the position of Florence - which had finally negotiated the first critical period of 
transition from Medici to Republican regime - towards its allies. 
Even though many signori, ambassadors and high-ranking military commanders 
44 
frequently sat at the Consulta's table, mostly as military and political consultants, the 
ones with the 'right to vote' (besides Lorenzo Martelli) were the Capitano Generale 
Francesco Maria della, Rovere, Venetian proweditore Alvise piSani54 (? -1528), the two 
leaders of the French forces Federico Gonzaga da, Bozzolo (? -1527)55 and Piedmontese 
marquis Michele Antonio di Saluzzo 56 (1484-1528), lieutenant of the Cristianissimo in 
Italy. Starting from his first Consulta, the commissario made clear that since Florence 
shared the common danger and expenses, the Republic had the right not only to take 
active part in the decision-making process, but also to maintain its positions; '... gli 
hanno visto che io non sono per cedere se non ad reputatione et honore di Vostre 
Signorie. In modo che io dubito che io non paia loro un pO' troppo rigido. Et per Dio non 
bisogna manco. ' 57 . However, 
it appeared also clear that Florence was in the minority. To 
quote Lorenzo Martelli, 'e' duoi terzi del giuoco e loro' 58 . 
few days later in Florence. This famous episode is narrated by all the Florentine historians of the period. 
For a general overview, see the book of Emanuella Scarano, Sette Assedi di Firenze. 
53 Paolo Giovio, La secondaparte dell'Historie del suo tempo (Florence, 1563) book 25, p. 49. 
54 Father of Francesco Pisani, cardinal-archbishop of Narbonne and bishop of Padua. 
55 Federico di Giovanfrancesco Gonzaga da Bozzolo, from the branch of the Gonzaga that held the title of 
dukes of Sabbioneta. A pro-French partisan who started his military career in 1496, Federico followed 
Charles VIII in France and followed Henry XII during the conquest of Milan. At the time of the League of 
Cambrai he fought against Venice. In 1512 he was wounded during the battle of Ravenna. Sacked by 
Lorenzo de'Medici from the office of 'generale' of the papal forces, he joined Francesco Maria della 
Rovere during his attempted reconquest of Urbino. In 1521 Federigo was again in French service against 
papal and imperial forces. He fought at Bicocca (1522) and was captured at Pavia (1525). 
56 Brought up at the court of Louis XII, Michele Antonio di Saluzzo was appointed governor of Asti in 
1527. Captured at the battle of Novara, he lost his marquisate and had to pay a ransom of 16,000 ducats to 
the duke of Milan. The marquis fought at Pavia and was afterwards appointed admiral of Guyenne and 
Lieutenant-general of Francis I in Italy. 
57 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 121 r. 
58 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 10 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f, 231 v. 
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France and Venice - or, more exactly, the duke, the proweditore, Federico da. 
Bozzolo and the marquis - shared a line of action that took little account of the interests 
of the Republic. Florence was the member of the League most directly in danger, and its 
allies exploited this fact. 'Costoro ci hanno per cenci. Par loro che noi abbiamo bisogno 
di loro... et come io non approvo in tutto le loro deliberationi saltano come bestie, che 
A 
mai piu vi sl molesta cosa. 959 . It was in Venice's interests if the war remained far from 
the Veneto and the bulk of the expenses fell on Florence. Moreover, given the 
importance of the Serenissima's support for any army that planned to campaign in 
Lombardy, it was in the interests of France to support Venice and not Florence. As far as 
it was possible the commissario tried to minimize the differences - 'bisognami fare piU' 
giuochi che una bertuccia 
60 
- but when all the others turned on him 'like dogs 
16l 
Martelli could only yield, in order to avoid complete isolation. 
In the consulta, the border between political and personal enmities was somewhat 
blurred; the relationship between the marquis of Saluzzo and Florence was, for instance, 
particu ar y tense. The Florentine republic was staunchly pro-French and had almost a 
'Messianic' confidence in Lautrec's arrival, but had no trust in Michele Antonio and 
tried constantly to discredit him in the eyes of Lautrec 62 and of the Cristianissimo - 
quite an easy task, given the very bad shape of the French and Venetian forces. 
-'9 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, date unknown, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 243 v. 
60 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 239 r. 'Et 
veggho che li vinitiani e lui (the duke of Urbino) fanno capace il Marchese quello che fa per loro di 
deviare il flume (the Imperial army) dalla parte loro, et bisognami fare pRi giuochi che una bertuccia... '. 
61 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, II October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 125, f 232 r. '... et io stando a mio 
uso sospeso mi si volsono tutti come cani... ' 
62 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, II October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 125, f 232 r. 'AlFultima Consulta 
il Marchese mi si volse dicendo: "Provveditore, io mi voglio dolere qui in presentia di tutti de' Signori 
del Commissario et forse di lui", et indegnatamente disse: "Vostri Signori hanno scripto -o voi -a 
Monsignor di Utrech, et lui lo scrive a me calumniandomi forte che io non ho le genti mie. lo lo ho avute 
sempre et fate male". lo li risposi che non lo avevo scripto'. 
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Merchants to the bone, the Ten would never have entrusted to him the 'conto della 
cassa 963 . 
According to the articles of the League of Cognac, Florence's allies were to keep 
20,000 footsoldiers in central Italy 64 , 
but, in October (see Table XVIII), Martelli's spies 
reported that Venice had in Umbria 800-1000 Landsknechts, 2200 Italian footsoldiers, 
A 
less than 40 men-at-arms 'destructi et ruinati', 250 Albanian stradiots 'e'quali non sono 
da factioni' and 150 Italian light horsemen; at the same time the marquis of Saluzzo had 
under his command 1400-1500 Swiss, 400-500 footsoldiers of various nationalities, 240 
men-at-arms 'male et pessimamente ad ordine, ch6 non li pagono', 150 ftanc-archers 
and 100 sujet-archers 'da. non fare molta factione' 65 . It was with these forces, together 
with Florence's. and without artillery, that Federico da Bozzolo planned to take Chiusi 
and possibly to subjugate Siena itself The offer was firmly rejected by Lorenzo 
Martelli66 for reasons of political opportunism, but the need to find safer and richer 
winter quarters. for the demoralised, impoverished and plague-stricken 67 troops of the 
League was real. 
However, Martelli's main interlocutor was his Venetian counterpart provveditore 
Alvise Pisani. In fact, the relationship between the two commissioners epitomised the 
63 'Per essersi fatto ben conoscere pu6 esser certo non li sarebbe fidato il conto della cassa', The Ten to 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 4 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 42, f 208 
r. 
64 20,000 out of a total of 25,000. Florence's 5000 soldiers were supposed to represent the city's 
contribution (one fifth of all expenses) to the League's expenses. The Milanese ambassador wrote to his 
master that the League could count on less than 8000 footsoldiers, 200 men-at-arms, 400 light horsemen 
and no artillery; Sanuto, Diarii, XL VI, p. 49. 
65Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 224 r. 
66 ,**. tn'ý bisognato fare una giostra col signor Federigo, il quale si ha cacciato nel capo de volere andare 
a Siena. Et dicendo io che non volevo, et che non volevo scrivere a quelle, cominci6 alzare le voce, et dire 
che vi andrebbono da loro. lo gli risposi che non si haveva a fare in questo modo, et che ogni homo ci ha 
la parte sua, et che noi non governavarno le cose a questo modo... '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 4 
October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 220 r. 
67 Carlo Nuvoloni to the marquis of Mantua, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 875, 
f. 350 v. '... son certo che in pocho tempo restaremo in pochi, et se la Excellentia Vostra vedesse queste 
bande franzese come sono redutte la se ne maravigliarebe, perchd non c'ý quasi rimaso niuno, et de quelli 
pochi che ce sono ogni giorno qualche duno per votto se ne va a Loreto armato cum tutte I'arme a pedi, et 
cum Io elmo atachato alle spale, si che la vaura fa fare de gran cose... ' 
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ancient tradition of rivalry between the republics they represented. Rich and influential 
Pisani, father of a cardinal and an experienced diplomat, enjoyed a freedom of action 
unknown to the Florentine commissario, whose daily reports to the Ten - punctually 
reported to him by the Venetian ambassador in Florence Marco Foscari - he considered 
far too detailed 68 and an obstacle to the progress of their common cause. Despite this 
'A 
warning, Pisani took full advantage of his superior experience, of his wealth and of his 
contacts,, especially of his son Francesco, cardinal of Narbonne, who wrote to him from 
Rome. 
The correspondence of the proweditore relating to this period has been 
unfortunately destroyed by a fire (what is left can be found in Marin Sanuto's Diarii), 
but scrupulous and pugnacious Lorenzo Martelli, who had to compete with him 
constantly, gives us an intriguing - albeit incomplete, a sprazzi - picture of Alvise 
Pisani that is, in its way, probably just as revealing. In the long run, Lorenzo Martelli 
took his revenge: what remains of the proweditore - from the memory of his duplicity 
to his strong Venetian accent - are the detailed reports of somebody who was his 
inferior as a diplomat. Thanks to the commissario's inexperience, and to a combination 
of wit and poor selectivity, his letters are a precious, if disorganized, source of 
information and of details that usually cannot be found in more 'refined' reports. 
On 6 October, for instance, Pisani was trying to persuade Martelli that on his 
muster roll 4800 Italian footsoldiers and 1500 Landsknechts were registered, but the 
sneer he saw on the face of the commissario interrupted his statement; 'Et disse: 
"Magnifico Commissario, voi nol crede vu' al corpo di cost" et comincio, a glurare che 
gli era vero'. Martelli answered that if those numbers were accurate. between the Black 
68 , *** commissario, voi scrivete troppo minutamente 
de ogni cosa... Lo ambasciatore mi scrive cose 
terribili... ' Alvise Pisani speaking to the commissario; Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 October 1527, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 213 r. In another letter, desperate Martelli asked his masters not 
to disclose everything to the Venetian ambassador in Florence. 
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Bands and the French soldiers there were enough troops to proceed immediately to the 
invasion of the Kingdom of Naples. 'Mo' - disse - io (Pisani) voglio che noi faziarno un 
pacto: piere vo' i denari nostri et noi e' vostri, e ogiüun paghi le compagnie Puno de 
Paltro'. Eventually, the pair ended up by making fun of the whole thing 69 , 
but theirs 
were tight-lipped smiles. 
A 
During a Consulta, laughters and sneers were not an unusual occurrence. 
especially when the participants were still 'ritti' (standing) and were not more officially 
'seduti' around the table. On 8 November the atmosphere was decidedly informal, and, 
after the arrival of Federico da, Bozzolo and of the marquis of Saluzzo, the members of 
the Consulta started to speak about almost everything but the war. Laughing, signor 
Federico boasted that, even though he could barely find one scudo among his things, he 
was creditor of two republics, Florence and Venice, for one thousand and six hundred 
scudi. Martelli answered that they would have paid him with the ransom they would 
demand to free the marquis, who was also indebted to Florence. 'Et cosi ridendo ridendo 
il signor Federigo ci disse che gli faciavarno un gran torto' 70 . 
However, the atmosphere could also turn dramatic: on 15 October, having sent 
everyone else out of the room, the duke of Urbino, 'appoggiato a un muro', addressed 
the proweditore, the commissario, the marquis of Saluzzo and Federico da Bozzolo, 
who stood 'rittl ntti Francesco Maria della Rovere asked them to act as witnesses of 
his words, whatever happened to him in the near future: the Venetian Signoria, deceived 
by 'male lingue', doubted his loyalty and his wife and children had recently been kept in 
69 c 
*'. et cosi ce la 
burlamo, et advisesi molto bene quel che io ne credeva. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 
October 1527. Responsive, 125, f 119 r. 
70 , 
... cominciossi a ragionare 
d'ogni altra cosa che della guerra, et entr6 Federigo cosi ridendo col 
proveditore a dire: io mi trovo in mia masseritia uno scudo, ma io son ben creditore di due Repubbliche, 
della vostra proweditore di scudi 400 per resto di mio sudore et mia fatica, et non megli volete dare, et 
della vostra commissario di 1200 et dite che havete havere dal Re et che io mi vaglia da sua maestA. Dissi 
che havarno havere dal marchese et che lo faremmo pigliare per pagare sua signoria. Et cosi fidendo 
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custody. It was the duke's firm intention to go to Venice, so that, had he in some way 
wronged his masters, they could punish the real culprit, and not the innocents. The 
moment was crucial: the consequences for the already weakened army of a possible fall 
into disgrace and departure of the Capitano Generale were unpredictable. Alvise Pisani 
tried to appease the duke's anger with 'buone parole', while the marquis and signore 
A 
Federico, the other soldiers present at the Consulta, showed their solidarity with the 
duke, saying to the provveditore: '11 Duca parla bene: noi altri stimiarno piU' Fhonore 
che la propria vita' 
71 
. 
Lorenzo Martelli saw the rift between the provveditore and the duke and took 
advantage of it: during the following weeks the commissario managed to acquire 'buona 
familiaritA' with Francesco Maria della Rovere. Even though it is difficult to say how 
much of the 'buona volontA' towards Florence displayed by the duke was sincere and 
not a tactic designed to put his Venetian masters under pressure, the meetings and 
fortuitous encounters between the duke and Martelli became increasingly frequent. The 
commissario assured the Ten that he was encouraging the favourable mood of the 
Capitano Generale and his confidences, taking good care to show that he was not doing 
it 'ex arte', that is artfully, but 'ex corde -)72 . It ought to 
be remembered that the lack of 
confidence of the Serenissima in della Rovere had been caused by the failure of the 
ridendo il signor Federigo ci disse che gli faciavarno un gran torto... '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 8 
November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, f 396 v. 
71 
.. Et cosi ritti ritti, il duca appoggiato a un muro 
disse: "Signori per scarico mio venendo caso nessuno 
di me in questa impresa che al presente siarno io voglio che voi mi siate testimoni a quel che io dir6. Le 
male lingue hanno subornato in modo la Illustrissima Signoria che ha messo sospecto loro di me talmente 
che gli hanno in mano la donna et i figh... come io potr6 prima io me n'andr6 a Vinetia a fine che 
havendo io errato che in questa cosa non domando altro che ragione e' possino fa la punitione nel 
peccatore et non nelli innocenti" con le pifi accomodate et le migliori parole che forse io udissi piý 
un'altra volta. 11 proweditore li andava dando buone parole. 11 Marchese e Federigo dissono al 
proweditore: 11 Duca parla bene, noi altri stimiamo piii Phonore che la propria vita. '. Lorenzo Martelli to 
the Ten, 15 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 229 v. - 230 r. 72 ,, -come anche ne scrissi a 
Vostre Signorie e' discorse meco piii di un'hora et mezo sopra le cose de' 
Vinitiani incipiens ab ovo, in modo che e' mi dette una occasione di tal natura che mi parve che tutto 
quello che io li detti mangiare in su quello appetito se gli appiccassi addosso, et cosi far6 sempre et a 
ogn'hora che ne dari occasione le occorrentie per non parere per6 che e' si facci ex arte et non ex corde. 
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siege of Milan (1526), and not by the sack of Rome. The duke stressed the necessity of 
his 'andata' to Venice, and for this reason he asked the Florentine Dieci di Balia, 
through its commissario in campo, to replace their ambassador Alessandro de'Pazzi, on 
the grounds of incompatibility of character. Martelli's manoeuvres did not go unnoticed: 
on 29 October, while the duke and the commissario were walking and talking together, 
A 
the provveditore was looking down at them from a nearby window, 'et di continuo ci 
haveva gli occhi addosso' 73. A few days later Martelli arrived quite early - that is, he 
arrived on purpose before the proweditore - at the table of the Consulta, and the duke 
told him in confidence that his problems in Venice had been caused by the false 
accusations of the papal lieutenant Francesco Guicciardini; a few moments later the 
proweditore appeared, remarking caustically that Martelli had become an early bird 74 . 
Although interesting, the constant bickering between Venetian and Florentine 
commissioners was only one of the consequences of the precarious strategic and 
political situation of the army of the League. After the sack of Rome and the surrender 
of the pope - and even more after Clement's statement of neutrality - the continued 
presence of the army on the lands of the Church had become not only a logistical 
nightmare, but also difficult to justify diplomatically. The collegati had consolidated 
Et vedesi manifestamente che e' fa capitale grande della Citti, et basti. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 25 
October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 247 r. 
73 , ... Poi mi disse "Havete voi mutato ambasciatore a 
Vinetia? " Dissi che no. "All'hora" mi disse "se io vi 
vo addunque non har6 con chi conferire, perchd el cervello di colui io non lo intendo nd mi pare di 
dovermi allargare con lui. Pu6 essere che e' non A sia da mandarvi di quegli che voi possiate fidare? Di 
quegli sapete". Et soggiunse "lo non mi tengo offeso nd mai mi tenni dalla CittA, ma da' particulari, a chi 
Dio habbi perdonato". Et molto si andava allargando meco, et il provveditore era col Marchese a una 
finestra. et di continuo ci haveva gli occhi adosso... '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 October 1527, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 216 r. 
74 , 
... uscimmo a una cosa che mai phi me 
Pha detta: "Et questa ý che tutta questa materia la riputa dal 
papa per haverli il Guicciardino facto capace che io nelle cose di Milano andai claudicando et fecelo per 
ricoprire il suo falso iuditio sulle cose di Milano con la vergogna mia"... lo Pandavo assentendo et lo 
confortavo a non volere gittarsi, maxime che questa era di presente piii cosa piii dannosa a noi che a altri. 
Dissemi: commissario per hora. et per Finteresse de'vostri signori et per qualche altra cosa e'mi basterA 
solo che quella signoria levi le guardie et della donna che ýa Padova con due putte, et del figlio che ý in 
Venezia... Et in questo mentre arriv6 il provveditore et vidi che e'non harebbe voluto che fussi suto si 
sollecito, et mi disse "Commissario voi siete venuto a buon hora ...... Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 10 
November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 331 r. 
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their positions around Perugia, but so great was its riputatione that every hint of a move 
by the Imperial army northwards forced the field commanders of the League to consider 
the only reasonable strategic alternative allowed by their few remaining forces - that is, 
a retreat towards either Siena or Florence. The Ten considered both these options 
unacceptable: they had paid much to keep the war far from the city, and the duke's 
A 
project of sending Federico da Bozzolo and Orazio Baglioni to oversee the 
reinforcement of Florence's fortresses provoked their sharp criticism 75 . More prudent 
were the Ten's answers to the anny's reiterated requests for pieces of ordnance that 
could be taken only from the already depleted, and obsolete, Florentine artillery park 76 . 
After having criticised the Venetians and the French for months for their failure to 
pay their troops stationed in Umbria punctually, Florence could hardly deny the 
expensive support of its artillery without appearing to default in its turn, but, at the saine 
time, it was the total lack of ordnance that, albeit dangerous, forced the army of the 
League to follow the purely defensive strategy desired by the Republic. In fact, the only 
practical use that the French and the Venetian forces could have had for the Florentine 
artillery was as a batteria against the walls of Chiusi or even Siena. Employing the 
duke's own arguments against him, the Ten maintained that, in view of the 
overwhelming superiority of the Imperial army, a few pieces of artillery were 
unimportant and even dangerous, since they would slow down the eventual retreat of the 
League's forces. In their turn, the duke, the proweditore and the marquis used their 
requests for Florentine cannoni as a very effective political weapon, forcing the Ten 
every time to pronounce an embarrassing 'no' that reduced the credibility of Florence's 
75 The Ten to Lorenzo Martelli, 14 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 42, f 
179 v. 
76 The first request for artillery - two 'mezzi cannoni', two 'quarti di cannone' and two other pieces that 
could shoot cannonballs of 6-9 libbre - dated back to Girolami's period; Raffaele Girolami to the Ten, 10 
September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 123, f. 432 v. 
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accusations against its allies both at the Consulta in Umbria and in front of the 
Cristianissimo in Paris. 
The isolation of Florence and its low bargaining power were partially 
counterbalanced by two factors that even its unreliable allies had to note: the Black 
Bands and Orazio Baglioni (1493-1528), capitano generale of the Florentine infantry. 
The Bands' contribution to the numerical and qualitative level of the League's army 
could not be underestimated 77 , but in the aftermath of the sack of Rome Orazio Baglioni 
played a more significant role. 
The Baglioni family has been used by Jacob Burckhardt as a negative exemplar of 
those powerful Italian families constantly involved in bloody intestine feuds, 'whose 
rule never took the shape of an avowed despotism' 78. The pro-republican Florentine 
historians of the sixteenth century 79 and the historians of the Risorgimento transformed 
Orazio's elder brother Malatesta into the traitor who in 1530 sold Florence, the last 
bastion of Italian freedom, to pope Clement VII and to the barbari 80 . In this still well 
established picture, Orazio has always been linked to Malatesta 81 and appears as a 
'typical' member of the family whose reign of terror in Perugia had been mercifully 
short. In fact, without the personal intervention of Orazio Baglioni and the support of 
the partisans of the two sons of Giampaolo - who silenced the supporters of their cousin 
77 c Et se noi non fossimo superiore come noi siarno di genti, e' ci harebbono in un calcetto... ' Lorenzo 
Martelli to the Ten, 29 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 121 v. 
78 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance Italy (reprint London, 1990) pp. 35-39. 
79For a general overview on this topic: Emmanuella Scarano, Sette Assedi di Firenze (Pisa, 1982) 
80 On the myth of 'traditor Malatesta' see Scarano-Ciardi-Vannocci, It Romanzo della Storia (Pisa, 1986), 
pp. 239-276; Bartolomeo Valori, La Difesa della Repubblica Fiorentina (Firenze, 1929); Francesco 
Domenico Guerrazzi, L'assedio di Firenze (Parigi, 1836). Marnbrino Roseo da Fabriano, the translator of 
Fourquevaux's work, was Malatesta's chancellor during the siege of Florence, and wrote a quite bad epic 
poem in which he tried to defend his master from the widespread accusations of betrayal; Mambrino 
Roseo da Fabriano, L'assedio di Firenze (Firenze, 1894). 
8' According to what Giovambattista Busini wrote in his letters to Benedetto Varchi, the night before his 
execution Pandolfo Puccini said that Orazio would betray Florence as he had betrayed him. In fact it was 
Malatesta that 'betrayed' the republic. This was just one of the many mistakes of Busini, but a quite 
indicative one; Giovambattista Busini, Lettere di Giovan Battista Busini a Benedetto Varchi, p. 50. 
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Gentile Baglioni, a protege of Clement VII - Perugia would have fallen into Imperial 
hands in July 1527. The capitano generale of the Florentine infantry made good use of 
the one thousand footsoldiers of his condotta and of all his 'amici' and connections in 
the ville of the Perugian contado, persuading the nearby cities of Todi and Spoleto to 
join him in his attempt to halt the advance of the Imperial army 'insolentemente per le 
i 82 
victone insuperbito' 
However, by the beginning of August the citizens of Perugia were so exasperated 
by the impositions of the League's troops stationed in their territory that only Orazio's 
presence prevented the city's Consiglio Grande from accepting the terms proposed by 
the Imperial generals. Pietro Squarcialupi, Florentine Podesta of Perugia, wrote that, 
albeit accused of excessive servility towards Florence and the duke of Urbino, Baglioni 
managed to cool the Perugians' rage with a remarkable display of 'patientia' and 
'dexteritA'. According to the Podestti, 'povero signore Oratio' was behaving like a 
'Cesare', and fully deserved the Ten's compliments and benevolence 83 . 
It was in this delicate political and military situation that Orazio Baglioni allegedly 
committed the crime most frequently associated with his name 84 , even though both 
Podestiz Squarcialupi in his letters and Francesco Guicciardini in his Storia dItalia 
considered the violent deaths of Gentile, Fileno, Annibale 
85 
and Galeotto86 Baglioni 
82 Pietro Squarcialupi, Podestti of Perugia, to the Ten, 21 July 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
122, f. 279 r. The fact that Perugia had a Florentine PodestA is quite interesting and the relationship 
between the Umbrian city and Florence would deserve a separate analysis. 83 6 
** .a questa hora questa ciptA harebbe dato la volta se non fussi stato la virtil et prestantia del signor Oratio, quale con grande animo, somma prudentia et mirabile ---- ha riparato a tutto... in modo che tutta 
la colpa davano al Signore Oratio dicendo che lui doveva et poteva riparare a queste cose et non lo ha 
voluto fare per non dispiacere a'Fiorentini et al Ducha... El povero signor Oratio si porta come uno Cesare 
per tenere ferma nella fede questa ciptA et drento et fuora che ogni di cavalca in campo, ma mi pare 
necessario che Vostre Signorie per uno aposta o per loro lectere lo ringratino, lo comendino et li dieno 
animo con qualche promessa o di crescerli condocta o di quello parrA... perchd questo caso lui Pha 
governato et condocto, con tanta desteritA che 6 parso dipinta... '. Pietro Squarcialupi to the Ten, 5 August 
1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 123, ff. 73 r. - 74 r. 84 Burckhardt, The Civilization, pp. 38-39. 
85 ,'*. iersera a ore 22 giunse qui el Signor Federigho da Bozolo con forse 40 cavalli et eravi parechi 
banda di archibusieri c6rsi. Venne il signor Federigho a visitare el Signore Gentile et parlando secho fu 
circhundata la casa sua da quelle bande de'corsi et signor Federigho pose le mane al pecto al signor 
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respectively as a necessary act or an infamous crime perpetrated to protect the interests 
of the League and not, at least not only, to quench Orazio's craving for revenge against 
his relatives. Gentile was suspected of being about to open Perugia's gates to the 
Imperial army with the help of his powerful Vitelli relatives, since he was married to 
Giulia, sister of Alessandro and Vitello Vitelli. Gentile Baglioni had always been a 
A 
protege of the Medici popes, while, on the other hand, Orazio had always lived his life 
as a survivor 87 of the infamous massacre of Midsummer 1500 between the court of the 
della Rovere family - fierce enemies of the Medici, who had tried to strip them of the 
duchy of Urbino - and the Sienese entourage of Pandolfo Petrucci, whose daughter 
Francesca he had married. 
Orazio's bloodthirsty and vengeful temper was well known, but the difficult 
strategic and political situation of the republic and the geographical location of 
Baglioni's domain rendered it an acceptable, and even useffil, aspect of the personality 
of the Capitano Generale of the Florentine infantry. The fact that Braccio Baglioni, 
brother of Galeotto, and commander of a company of light cavalry in Florentine 
88 
service , simply refused to go anywhere in the immediate proximity of Orazio, was just 
a minor side effect. Benedetto Varchi described Orazio as a valiant soldier and an 
ýuomo d'incredibile animositA e gagliardia', but also 'sanguinolento, crudele e 
Gentile et li disse "Sta forte che se' prigione della Legha". Et cosi rinchiusono in una camera el signor 
Gentile, el signor Fileno et Anibale tutti e tre de'Baglioni, e'quali tre a ore quatro di nocte ftirono arnazati 
da'C6rsi sopradecti con e'pugniali' Pietro Squarcialupi to the Ten, 5 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 123. See also Guicciardini, Storia dItalia, book XVIII, pp. 1879-1880. According to 
Guicciardini Orazio allowed Gentile to return in Perugia pretending to make peace with him and his 
followers. Annibale was the natural son of Gismondo Baglioni, while Fileno was a protonotario 
apostolico. 
86 Orazio had Galeotto, killed notwithstanding the fact the the latter was a prisoner of the duke of Urbino. 
Due to this grave insult, Francesco Maria della Rovere became furious with both Orazio and Federico da 
Bozzolo; see Sanuto, Diarii, 49, p. 617. 
87 Orazio and his brother Malatesta had been saved by the direct intervention of Atalanta Baglioni, mother 
of Grifone, who was the organiser of the massacre that followed the wedding of Astorre Baglioni with 
Lavinia Colonna. 
88 Braccio Baglioni had been one the accomplices of Grifone Baglioni during the massacre of 1500. 
Braccio's condotta included 400 fiorini per year 'per la persona sua' and the command of eighty light 
cavalrymen, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 60 
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vendicativo sopra modo' 89 . and Clement VII himself shared the historian's disgust 
for 
Baglioni's ruthlessness, even though the Perugian condottiere, together with Renzo da 
Ceri, had directed the efforts of the pope's last defenders in the fortress of Castel 
Sant'Angelo, while the Imperial troops were sacking Rome. However, there was another 
aspect of Orazio's personality that displeased Clement VU: his consistency9o. Once 
Baglioni had chosen whose side he was on, he had no second thoughts and fought 
wholeheartedly for his master; understandably, such an uncompromising attitude 
unnerved wavering Clement VII, who was if anything too susceptible to the changes 
under way around him. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the Perugian condottiere was an 
experienced and determined commander, and the priority he had given to his own plans 
for the Black Bands over those of the Ten did not invalidate his loyalty towards 
Florence. In fact, his success had caused no hann to the republic, which retained 
ultimate control of its best troops, albeit through an intermediary. It ought to be 
observed that Orazio was probably sincere in all his dealings with Florence: besides 
being, according to him, the best options available for the 6 servitio' and 'honore' of the 
Republic, the choices he had made generally consorted with the 'honore' and 
'riputatione' of a Captain General. 
His crudeltei did not prevent Orazio from acting and speaking lucidly, when the 
need arose, as was frequently the case9l during the sessions of the Consulta, during 
which he always assured his support to the otherwise isolated Martelli. The Perugian 
condottiere knew very well that his fate was linked to that of the Republic, and, whether 
89 Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, book 4, p. 219. 
90 , ... disse (to the marquis of Saluzzo) che era 
homo da bene, ma che quella sua crudeltA non li 
piaceva..... et soggiunse che Horatio haveva una altra parte, che dove si giptava e' non haveva mezo'; 
Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 Dicember 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 509 v. 
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a murderer or a 'Cesare'. Orazio was instrumental in Florence's strategy. Without his 
loans and advances to the marquis and to Federico da Bozzolo, the Swiss troops in 
Umbria would have disbanded long before Lautrec's arrival, and the same could be said 
of the French lances of heavy cavalry, that for months plagued the ville of Perugia's 
contado with their exorbitant requests. When provveditore Pisani asked him to oblige 
A 
the 'coMunitA' of Perugia to write a letter in which it asked to the pope to concede the 
'legatione' of the city to his son cardinal Francesco, Orazio agreed without ftirther ado. 
When the commissario warned him about the future implications of such a choice, the 
condottiere replied that it mattered little who held that benefice. 'Sievi chi vuole'; what 
the despised 'preti' wanted had no real relevance. What really mattered was that 
Florence. remained 'in libertA' and therefore able to protect the seigniory of the two sons 
of Giampaolo Baglioni over Perugia, a city of the State of the Church, from the constant 
threat represented by the Medici pope 92 . The Ten and Orazio were surely conscious of 
the fact that, to achieve their common goal, the power of the Medici family had to be 
reduced, if not broken, both in Florence and in Rome. 
Between October and November 1527, the strategic situation in central Italy was 
stable enough to allow the army of the League to move its quarters from Perugia's 
contado to Todi's without fear of attack (see Map B). Albeit a short one, it was 
nonetheless a step towards the south, that is towards Rome, where the bad feelings 
between the soldiers of the various nationi that composed the Imperial army, and 
between the soldiers and their commanders, remained strong, and prevented the host 
91 The relationship between Orazio and the marquis of Saluzzo - who, according to Martelli was 'un poco 
ardente alla Franzese' - was particularly bad. In more than one occasion, Michele Antonio provoked 
Orazio directly or indirectly, but the latter always managed to remain calm. 92 , 
'* Rispose: "Questo porta poco. 
0 questi preti potranno o non potranno; se potranno, qualunche vi 
ftissi drento mi potrebbe dare delli storpi; se non possono io non me ne curo, sievi chi vuole. Poi possino 
o non possino, a me basta che i miei signori operino per me quel che io far6 sempre per loro. Dio A dia 
pur gratia di mantenervi in libertA che io non temo di nulla" .' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, I November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 349 v. 
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from leaving the plague-ridden city. The negotiations between the Imperial 
representatives and the pope over the financial and political conditions for the release of 
such an embarrassing hostage proceeded slowly 93 , but Clement VII was already starting 
to make his voice heard and his influence felt outside his prison's walls. 
The partition of the territory, and of its resources, caused a new wave of harsh 
debates in the Consulta, as the various powers struggled to secure the richer and safer 
zones around Todi, where the sessions of the League's council were held. The transfer 
of the Black Bands' piazza from Montefalco to Diruta was one of the main issues, as 
Martelli tried to prevent his colleagues from giving the 'pan masticato' once again to the 
Florentine troops. According to the commissario, the other members of the Consulta 
had already come to an agreement with the castella around Todi, and were trying to 
divert the Black Bands to Diruta, where the countryside had already been 'tutto 
assassinato' during last summer, and there was no fodder within a radius of six miles. 
Once more, the Florentine commissioner found himself isolated: '... e una festa. il facto 
loro... Vogliono quel che vogliono, talmente che e una passione et, quid peius est, un 
pericolo grandissimo. Ma Idio ci aiuta' 94 . Moreover, the bad reputation of the Black 
Bands and the fact that the Florentine troops had sacked Montefalco a few months 
before hindered Martelli's efforts to have them garrisoned near Todi. 
The discussion on this topic went on session after session, and, to quote Lorenzo 
Martelli's joke, had he and signor Orazio not found in Todi a 'spetiale' (an apothecary) 
93 Guicciardini, Storia dItalia, book XVIII, chap. XIV, pp. 1894-1897. 94 , 
... Marchese si lev6 in piý et accostommi al horecchio et mi disse "Commissario questo non 
fa per voi 
prestaterni fede". Et io son certificato che ogniuno di loro ha bazzicato et tutti in Todi vivono con 
provisione delle castella a torno, et io so che uno d'un castello che si chiama Marcialla da al Marchese 
ogni giomo fra grano, biada, olio et legna per piCi di 15 scudi. Et poi vogliwno sconsigliare et storre che 
e' non si vada, dove vien commodo, al alloggiare. Dissi anche loro che havarno mandato a vedere li 
alloggiamenti di Diruta et che non Vera strarne vicino a6 miglia et tutto assassinato, el paese rispetto a 
questa state. Et che noi andremmo in que' castelli di Todi che havevon dato, et pur loro dicevano Diruta ý 
vostro, alloggiamento buono. Et a questo modo, non facemmo conclusione alchuna, che 6 una festa il facto 
loro. Sonsi ristretti insierne. Vogliono quel che vogliono, tah-nente che 6 una passione et quid peius est, un 
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who sold them a little bit of patience, they could never have endured it: 'fu una festa 
bella: quando volevano et quando non volevano... ' 95 . As a reaction, Florence tightened 
the strings of its purse, and the commissario reassured the Ten that in the Consulta 
'belle sberrettate, risi et inchini io ne do loro, ma innanzi che mi cavino un quattrino di 
mano saranno negromanti, et non ciurmadori. 996 . It ought to be noticed that, unlike the 
'4 other rmlitary and civilian leaders of the anny of the League, Lorenzo Martelli always 
refused to reside in Todi and remained with the Black Bands 97 , shuttling continuously 
between Todi, Montefalco and Elci. It was a hard life: when Martelli asked, tO the Ten to 
send a new chancellor, he insisted that they had to send a young and healthy one, since 
98 
qui si sta in su la paglia' . 
Eventually (2 December), the Bands were not sent to Diruta but quartered in 
various castles around Todi as requested by Martelli, even though Vepri, assigned to 
CL C C- , p; ý 
Azzo da CasalpO', refused to the company" that had caused the sack of Montefalco 
A 
inside its walls. However, this small success was overshadowed on the same day by the 
news of the arrival in Narni of the group of very important hostages that had escaped 
from Rome a few days before. The hostages, now in the hands of Pandolfo Puccini (see 
pericolo grandissimo. Ma Idio ci aiuta... '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 125, f 213 r. 95 , 
... et se non che noi trovarno a Todi uno spetiale che ci vendd in facto un poco di patientia non so 
come ci avessimo facto ... furno in su questi benedecti alloggiamenti, che fu una festa bella: quando 
volevano et quando non volevano... '. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, I November 1527, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 125, ff. 347 r. - 348 v. 96Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 339 r. 
97 'Costoro (the other members of the Consulta) si sono acconci bene a Todi et hanno buone provisioni, et 
non vorrebbono sbucare... et mi fanno instantia grande che io allogi a Todi, et mi pare star meglio a 
presso a le mie gente'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 26 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
125, f, 371 r. 
98 Martelli would have enjoyed having at his side old and experienced ser Baccio but'... non mi mandino 
per cosa del mondo ser Baccio perch6 io so che gl'ý vecchio et non pu6 e'disagi... ma quando potessi 
mandare uno di que'giovani di costi mi sarebbe piii charo che, benchd la fantasia mia fussi a ser Baccio, 
non di manco Marcello (Marcello Strozzi, the paymaster) mi ha facto intendere che e'sarebbe uno 
amazarlo'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 November 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 341 
r. 
99 Count Azzo da Correggio decided lay siege to Vepri, and was wounded to one hand during an assault, 
while four-six homini da bene were killed. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 16 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, f 515 r. 
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Chapter 3), were: Giovanni's father-in-law Jacopo Salviati, Lorenzo Ridolfi the brother 
of cardinal Ridolfi, the bishop of Pisa Onofrio Bartolini, the bishop of Pistoia, Antonio 
Pucci, the bishop of Verona and Datario Apostolico Giovan Matteo Giberti, and 
eventually Giovan Maria del Monte, bishop of Manfredonia and future pope Paolo 111. 
The fact that, having escaped from the Imperialists' clutches, they were, technically 
It 
speaking, in the hands of a Florentine captain in the League's service caused a serious 
outcry against the commissario, who refused to order Puccini to free the runaway 
hostages without asking the Ten for instructions. Todi's Duomo, where Lorenzo 
Martelli was together with the duke, became the scene of a mighty 'battaglia di 
maledetto senno' between the commissario and the provveditore, who threw in 
Martelli's face the fact that one of the basic assumptions of the League was the 
liberation of the pope. The commissario replied that he did not know anything for sure 
and denied ever having said that they were Puccini's hostages. Things worsened when, 
in quick succession, the marquis of Saluzzo and Federico da Bozzolo joined the 
discussion. The choleric marquis attacked Martelli frontally: 'Come! Non siamo noi qui 
per liberare il Papa? Et monsignor di Lautrech non viene per altroT. Federigo da 
Bozzolo decided on a different approach and, at the beginning, sided with the 
commissario, but, from the ironical smile on Martelli's lips, he saw that his efforts to 
deceive the Florentine were pointless. Filled with anger, signor Federigo 'cominciossi 
ad versare piU' terribilmente del mondo con parole molto mordaci', revealing his desire - 
which was also everybody else's real desire - to save Jacopo Salviati and to please the 
pope. The marquis of Saluzzo and Federico da, Bozzolo threatened to go themselves to 
free the hostages, whatever the opinion of the commissario. Alvise Pisani, seeing that 
things were going too far, mediated a solution with Lorenzo Martelli: since Florence did 
not consider them as prisoners, Salviati and the others were to be escorted to Todi, 
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where they would stay at the disposal of the League. However, the marquis and Federigo 
were so eager to show their concern for the pope's cause that they decided that it was up 
to them to free the hostages, and went to Narni. 'Per una giostra', wrote Lorenzo 
Martelli, 'io non vidi mai la piu' bella'100. 
In the hands of the Imperial army remained cardinal Pisani, whose father, 
A 
provveditore Alvise Pisani, was worried about the Landsknechts' possible reprisals. 
What worried Martelli was, by contrast, Jacopo Salviati's 'cervello di gatta', that would 
soon be free to plot against the Florentine republic 101 . In the 
days following the debate 
in the Duomo, the rumours about the liberation of the pope multiplied, and eventually 
the official confirmation arrived from Florence: on 8 December, Clement VII had 
02 
entered Orvieto, escorted by the Imperial commander Luigi Rodomonte Gonzagal . 
Technically speaking, the pope had 'escaped' from Rome, but not before he had made 
significant financial and territorial concessions to the Empire and had promised that he 
would remain neutral for the rest of the war. The presence of Luigi Gonzaga at the side 
of the pope was not accidental: Clement had just made Pirro Gonzaga, Luigi's 
brother 103 ,a cardinal, and 
it ought to be noticed that they were all Gonzaga da 
'00 The commissario used to call 'giostre' Oousts) his harsh discussions with Federico da Bozzolo and the 
other members of the Consulta. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 2 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 125, ff. 482 r. - 483 v. The punctuation marks of Saluzzo's answer are mine. Paolo Giovio, 
faithful to Clement VII, described in the following terms what happened to the runaway hostages after 
their arrival in Narni: 'i miseri non istettero molto, che uccellandogli quasi la fortuna, poco manc6 che non 
incontrassero in uno altro pericolo, per ch6 Lorenzo Martelli commessario de' Fiorentini con pazza 
bestialitA gli volle far pigliare. Ma il duca di Urbino e il signor Federigo da Bozzolo con severissime 
parole raffrenarono la pazzia di questo empio et scelerato horno', Paolo Giovio, La seconda parte delle 
Historie, book 25, p. 49. 
101 , ... un servitore 
del datario ha detto che il Vescovo di Pistoia gli aveva detto che questo cervello di 
gatta di Jacopo Salviati metteri nel capo al Papa di fargh cedere queste cose ad Firenze et che per questo 
mezo lui ritornerA et noi ce ne resteremo ftiori'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 6 December 1527, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 486 
102 6 
... per questa nuova 
la cittA si trova sollevata, perchd ciascuno giudicha che tale venuta non possa 
partorire altro che noia et travaglio... ' The Ten to Antonfi7ancesco degli Albizzi, 10 December 1527. See 
also Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XIV, pp. 1895-1897. 
103 Giovio, La seconda parte, book 25, p. 50. 
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Sabbioneta, like their uncle Federico da, Bozzolo' 
04 
Who 
, during the stay of the League's 
army in the State of the Church, had been constantly throwing in the commissario's face 
all the destruction caused by the Black Bands to the lands and cities of His Holiness. 
The liberation of the pope finally confronted Florence with the intrinsic 
contradictions of being a member of a League that had among its main objectives the 
A 
restoration of the power of the republic's greatest enemy, and it considerably weakened 
the position of Lorenzo Martelli. One after another, all the members of the Consulta 
went, or at least expressed their desire to go, to Orvieto to pay homage to Clement VII 
and to persuade him to support the cause of the League openly. Lorenzo Martelli and 
Orazio Baglioni, however, refused to be parties to this. In his constant search for 
political 'weak points' that could be turned to his advantage during the Consulta, the 
Venetian proweditore used the commissario's refusal to make him appear unreasonably 
uncompromising. Lorenzo Martelli was particularly annoyed by Pisani's persistent 
requests that he should go to Orvieto to 'bite' the pope's feet 105 . In fact, since he and the 
Black Bands had occupied the castella around Todi, and not the zone of Diruta as they 
were meant to do, Martelli had to put up with all kinds of complaints provoked by the 
damages caused by the Florentine troops. The commissario considered those complaints 
preposterous and disingenuous: the Venetian soldiers used to do in hours what their 
Florentine colleagues did in weeks, 'et se noi azoppiarno una gallina ne va il fumo a 
Faria' 106 . There was a lot of talk, especially in Orvieto, about what Contazzo was doing 
104 The Ten considered that Federico da Bozzolo had committed himself in favour of the pope after 
Clement VII's promise of a 'cappello' for Pirro and the hand of Pallavicina Salviati, one of Jacopo 
Salviati's nieces, for another of his nephews; the Ten to Antonfiwcesco degli Albizzi, 21 December 1527, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 23 r/v. Apparently, the Gonzaga da Sabbioneta, 
albeit divided by their choices between France and Spain, were united in defence of the family interests. 105 1 
* .. et molto 
insistentemente mi persuadeva (Pisani) che ancora io dovessi andare insieme con loro a 
mordergli i piedi... ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 14 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
125, f 509 r. It must be said that Pisani himself was having his problems: a few days before, he had been 
taken hostage by angry Corsican soldiers in Venetian service, who threatened to make him run the 
gauntlet if they did not receive their arrears of wages. 
106 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 9 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 498 r. 
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to Vepri, but no one remembered the poor villa of Bevagna, which the Swiss in 
Venetian service had turned into a brothel, not even sparing its nunneries 107 . To explain 
his point of view, Martelli turned to a Florentine 'novella', and told the duke of Urbino 
how Lorenzo de'Medici 'sent' Bartolino de'Daldi to Paradise and Antonio Vettori to 
Hell, even though they were guilty of the same sin, gluttony, simply because Bartolino 
04 108 
used to eat at Lorenzo's table . 
On 16 December a young cameriere of the pope arrived in the League's camp and, 
after the Consulta, addressed the proweditore, asking for further instructions. Noticing 
that Martelli was near, Pisani tried to present him to the cameriere, and asked the youth 
to turn towards the commissario. The cold and arrogant answer the cameriere gave on 
behalf of his master was: '11 Papa dice che non ha ad fare nulla co'Fiorentini'. 'lo' wrote 
Martelli 'guardai in viso el proveditore, che veramente lo vidi carnbiare'. Pisani, of 
course, was not shocked by what those hostile words meant for Florence, but by what 
they meant for him, since he could not exploit anymore the commissario's refusal to go 
to Orvieto 
109 
. 
However., the thought of how important for his ftiture it was to go, or not to go, to 
Orvieto, plagued Orazio Baglioni's nights. If the Perugian condottiere remained 
staunchly loyal to Florence and did not go to kiss Clement VII's feet, he would probably 
share the republic's destiny and would expose his family's seigniory over Perugia to the 
wrath of the pope. Those were the last days in which Clement VU was not strong 
107 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 16 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 516 v. 
108 , 
... mi volsi al 
duca, et dissegli la novella d'Antonio Vettori... che Lorenzo de'Medici mandava gli 
uomini d'uno medesimo peccato, Nno in paradiso, che era Bartolino de'Daldi, perchd pasteggiava con 
lui, et non Antonio, et pure erano ghiotti ad un modo, et I'altro in inferno, che era Antonio. '; ibid. f 516 r. 
'09 'in questo venne quivi al proveditore uno assai giovane, et volsesi al proveditore dicendo "Orbene, che 
io ho ad fare proveditore? " disse "Voltatevi costA, che questo ý el commissario florentino". Disse colui 11 
papa dice che non ha ad fare nulla co'fiorentini". lo guardai in viso el proveditore che veramente la vidi 
cambiare. Mostr6, havendo per male non per bene che e'ci voglia, ma perchd e'non pu6 piii molestare 
che io vadi et che io facci. ' Ibid. f 515 v. 
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enough' 10 to spurn an agreement with Gentile Baglioni's murderer. Orazio asked the 
commissario for a 'ricompenso' for the considerable 'perdita' that he was facing by not 
going to Orvieto, and Martelli encouraged him to follow Florence's line of action, a 
piece of advice Orazio, after many hesitations, decided to accept I 11. 
The session of the Consulta held on 18 December started in a very relaxed 
A 
atmosphere. In fact, as the duke of Urbino pointed out, it seemed a 'veglia' rather than a 
council: there was a lot of people 'ritti' in the room, engaged in 'cianciare di molte cose' 
and in 'fare inchini et baciamenti' to some friends of the marquis who had just arrived 
from Lombardy. When eventually the duke had the chairs brought in, so announcing the 
opening of the Consulta, those who did not have one left the room. From the start, the 
commissario appeared isolated: the liberation of the pope, his declaration of neutrality 
and his growing influence had altered an already delicate balance. The duke of Urbino 
and signor Federico stressed the need to leave the lands of the Papal State in order to 
respect the neutrality of the pope; since Florence had always rejected the idea of moving 
the camp of the League to Sienese territory, and since it was now too late to do this 
anyway, the only option left was to withdraw it to Florentine territory. 'In questo' writes 
Martelli 'balzO' drento quel cameriere del Papa', announcing the arrival of Ottavio da 
Cesis, 'chierico di camera' of Clement VII, who had with him two important papal 
brevi. As messer Ottavio entered the room, the already tense atmosphere became 
suddenly stifling: with one voice, the proweditore and Federico said that this time there 
was no time to ask Florence for instructions. At this point, Orazio made it clear to 
110 According to reliable witnesses, the pope had '... una barba biancha, spunto, macilento et molto 
pensieroso, brullo, lui et tutti e'sua, fino sanza masseritie, che se vi si mantenessi sarebbe vicino a San 
Piero se fussi nel Borgho degli Albizi (? )... referisce anchora che e'non ha uno quattrino, et che ý sbattuto 
forte, et come verrA lo ambasciatore di Inghilterra... gli donava numero d'argenti, perchd e'non mangiassi 
in terra, come e1a, et che fa un grande spacciare di brevi... ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 21 December 
1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, ff. 521 v- 522 r. 
111 ' El signor Horatio ancor lui ý suto hoggi qui, et hammi decto "Commissario, io mi sono rivoltolato ista 
nocte pel capo ]a gita mia al papa, et infine io non gli vorrei senza ricompenso della perdita che so fo del 
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Martelli that they should leave the room before the others could 'level' the brevi at 
them, for these probably contained Clement VH's orders that they leave the Papal 
State' 12 . In a frantic search for an excuse that would allow him to gain precious time, the 
commissario noticed that the 'scesa' that had been plaguing his shoulder had grown 
acute again, and begged to be excused; 'Horatio rest6, ch6 non si potette spaniare'. Later 
A on, Orazio reported that Ottavio had not broken the seals of the brevi, maybe thanks to 
113 Martelli's absence, or perhaps because of Baglioni's ominous presence 
The morning after, since Martelli was not around, the marquis and Federico kept 
on insisting to the duke of Urbino that the Florentine troops had to leave the lands of the 
Church immediately, and provoked the angry answer of Francesco Maria della Rovere: 
'Et se e'non si volessino partire, haremo noi per questo ad venire con loro ad FanneW. 
When Lorenzo Martelli was summoned once more to the table of the Consulta, he 
answered that he was still suffering from the 'scesa'. For his part, Orazio Baglioni was 
- r_. afraid that all those discussions were just a ruse to send him far from Perugia and 
deprive him of his stato, and he therefore fully backed the commissario 
114 
. 
On 19 December, the duke, Alvise Pisani and Ottavio da. Cesis went to visit 
Lorenzo Martelli, who received them in his room with a towel (a 'sciugatoietto") 
wrapped around his neck, prestunably to relieve the sufferings caused by the 'scesa'. 
Ottavio assured the commissario that the pope trusted him and considered him a homo 
-1 -- da bene, but also asked him to remove the Florentine troops from around Todi; 
non vi andare, dare altra ombre che e' si possa havere de'facti mia". lo gli dissi che la pensassi bene... '. 
Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 16 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 514 v. 
112 c 
... come si venne a questo, il signor Horatio mi 
fe' intendere che era bene che noi ce n'andassirno 
avanti che ci spianassimo adosso que'brievi, che debbono essere comandatorii che noi dobiarno 
nectare... ', ibid, f 526 v. 
113 'Per vedere se potessimo acquistare tanto tempo che Vostre Signorie si potessimo risolvere, che non lo 
credo. Et per questo io mi arzai et chiesi licentia dicendo che havevo una spalla che non era mia - et ý 
vero - per un po' di scesa... Ottavio non volle presentare el breve, o per paura di Horatio, o per non vi 
vedere me' fbid. ff. 526 v. - 527 r. 
114 'dice (Orazio): "Costoro ci vogliono levare di qui per mandarci in sul Vostro per levare me da Perugia 
et mettervisi loro et poi menarci per il naso... " ibid. f 527 r. 
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according to Marteli Ottavio 'parlo' assai honestamente' but his words were 'minatorie'. 
In fact, the chierico di camera was trying to gloss over the untimely words of the 
cameriere, whom he called a 'pazerello', but, at the same time, he did not refrain from 
criticism and pronounced more than one 'parola pugnente', especially against the 
Florentine forces. Eventually Orazio and the duke left the room to discuss military 
issues, and Lorenzo Martelli remained alone with Ottavio. After 'mille belle parole', the 
chierico revealed to the commissario that he was the son of messer Agnolo da Cesis, a 
very close friend of his through his brother (maybe Giovanfrancesco Martelli, the father 
of Ludovico), and he dismissed the cameriere's blunder as personal and unconnected 
with the commissione given to the young man by the pope. It is difficult to tell how 
Clement VII had selected the bearer of his brevi, or even if he had deliberately chosen 
someone who could boast, at some level, a connection with Lorenzo Martelli, in order to 
try to influence him. The pope had certainly not forgotten that he still had in his hands 
something that could interest the commissario. After all his 'belle parole', messer 
115 Ottavio 'm'entr6 in mio figlio' 
Since his arrest, in 1522, for his involvement in the congiura of the Orti Oricellari, 
Niccolo' di Lorenzo Martelli had been held prisoner in the papal stronghold of 
Civitavecchia. In August 1527, Niccolo' wrote to the Ten, asking them to intervene with 
Andrea Dona, who was currently his 'owner', that is the holder of the 'cedola' of two 
hundred and fifty scudi Niccolo' was supposed to pay to refund the expenses of his own 
captivity. However, wrote NiccolO', during the last year he had been prisoner of 
Bartolomeo della Valle, a Florentine citizen and a 'sviscerato servitore della casa 
de'Medici', who had kept him in chains, naked and barefoot like 'el pia vil homo del 
115 , 
... quel messer 
Ottavio restb mecho et fernmi mille belle parole, clandomisi ad conoscere per figlio di 
messer Agnolo da Cesis, wnicissirno mio per conto di mio fratello, et scusommi le parole di quel 
cameriere, dicendo che era un pazerello, et che il Papa non gli aveva clato questa commissione. Poi mi 
entr6 in mio figlio. Ibid. f 519 v. 
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mondo'. From the bottom of the papal dungeons Niccolo' Martelli argued that 
Bartolomeo could not have spent more than thirty SCUdj116 . 
'Habbiate fede' said Ottavio 'et ricordatevi che il papa ha nome Clemente, et 
usera clementia'. The commissario's sharp reply was that, up to that day, he had never 
seen any evidence of Clement's clemency, and that he had 'piU' caro che lui havesse 
A 
questo, charico con tutto il mondo, che rihavere il mio figlio'. So rebuked, the chierico 
took his leave, after having lavished 'one thousand bows and isberrettate' 117 
Determined to hamper the works of the Consulta as much as possible, in the days 
that followed Lorenzo Martelli kept on playing the role of the sick man, laying in his 
ýpolitical' bed far from Todi. On 21 December, 'con arte di malattia et con ciurmeria di 
parole' 118 , the Black Bands were still in Umbria and were not headiný'. Tuscany. 
4'', - 
However, although on 23 December Martelli alleged that he was taking pills ('pigliavo 
pillole') and could not ride, the 'signori da Todi' could, and the whole Consulta went to 
the commissario's quarters in Elci. Martelli faced the requests of those who were all too 
eager to please Clement VII by leaving the Papal State, and countered them with 
Florence's strategic guidelines. Martelli distrusted the pope' 19 and his vague promises, 
116 & 
... quando il papa fu preso, per sua commessione mi trovavo prigione nella rocha 
di Civita Vechia, 
sotto la cura di Bartolomeo della Valle fiorentino, qual, oltre alle stranezze grande pel passato mi ha fatto 
senza commessione, per dimostrare esser sviscerato servitore della casa de'Medici, mi forz6 at farli una 
cedola di scudi CCL, per un anno sono stato a spese sua. Et la dette a messer Andrea Doria che li 
promesse non mi relaxare se non lo satisfacevo... Hora decto Bartolomeo della Valle mi ha tenuto sempre 
scalzo et nudo come el piii vil homo del mondo, con libre LX di ferri a'piedi, di modo che non che se li 
venga scudi CCL ma a pena scudi XXX. Et perchd io non vorrei mi facessi questo torto... ' NiccoI6 
Martelli to the Ten, 10 August 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 123, f 155 r. 
117 c ... dissegli che fino a qui non gnene avevo veduto usare, et che 
io havevo piii caro che lui avesse 
questo carico con tutto il mondo che rihavere il mio figho... et con mille inchini et isberrettate si parti da 
me. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 19 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, ff. 519 v. - 
520 r. 
118 'lo scripsi una lettera a quelli signori, molta dolce et grata inverso messer Ottavio, dolendomi non 
poter cost subito levarmi. Et perchd per non poter ancor cavalchare, feci loro intendere che mi havessino 
per iscusato... con arte di malattia et con ciurmeria di parole, siarn anchora qui.. .' Lorenzo Martelli to the 
Ten, 21 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 521 r/v. 
119 , Uno arnico mi ha detto che il Papa non mi ha punto in concepto, et lo credo perchd m'ha offeso et 
offende, come egli mal disposto delle cose della cittA ... et cost mal contento 
di Horatio, quale se non 
muta proposito non per andare pki da lui, ancorchd il maestro di casa del Papa, che ý molto suo, ogni 
giomo ne lo infesti. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 23 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
125, f 543 v. 
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and suggested that the army of the League should set up a line of defence around Todi, 
where it would receive logistical support from Perugia and from the Florentine state. In 
fact, what really plagued the commissario was not the 'scesa' but the complete lack of 
news and instructions from Florence, where the new Ten were about to be appointed 120 
Eventually Martelli's passive resistance and his delaying actions managed to 
It 
appease the pro-papal inclinations of the other members of the Consulta; they had tried 
everything to change his and Orazio's mind: 'commissari di Papa, brevi, lettere loro di 
fuocho, parole efficacissime, et ultimo, ogni duo giomi, 3 volte alla fila venire qui in 
persona tutti', but in vain. The 'battaglia' fought on 23 December had been, apparently, 
Tultima' 121 , and still the seals of the papal brevi - that dreaded 'bavalischio' 
('basilisk') - were intact. The 'monster' could still come out of his den during one of the 
future 'battles', but the commissario had already asked messer Ottavio twice to read the 
brevi, and the chierico had refused to do so 122 . It is possible that they were, in fact, just a 
gambit, if not a complete bluff, designed to check how far the pope could still influence 
events and, if possible, to make Martelli - that is, Florence - flinch. On 29 December 
the commissario made his 'recovery' official by going to Todi to visit the duke of 
Urbino, who warmly welcomed him: 'Commissario, voi siate el ben guarito' and added 
4se voi pure havete havuto male. ' 123 
However, those of the second half of December were the last important 'battaglie 
di maledetto senno' which were to be fought in the camp of the League in Umbria. 
120 'Per Pamore di Dio quelle mi advisino come m'habbi ad governare et non fidate di dire "Lorenzo farA 
et dirV. Che se pure io ci erro, non lo imputino Vostre Signorie al manco ad me, e maxime che io non 
veggho che qui si facci altro che macchinare di levarci di qui ad complacentia del Papa... ' Ibid. f. 542 r. 
121 'Veduta la resistentia nostra, hanno mutato vento... da 23 in qua, che mi dettono Fultima battaglia, mai 
pifi me Whanno parlato. ' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 25 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 125, f 538 v. 
122 c*. io gli ho ben visti (the brevi) in mano a messer Ottavio, ma suggellati, et credo io che le parole mie 
dolci et le lettere buone fino a qui I'habbino ritenuto di non gli pubblicare, non ostante che io due volte 
dicessi che gli mostrassi. Ma pocho staremo ad havere una altra battaglia, et forse uscira fuori questo 
bavalischio... '. Ibid. f 539 r. 
'2' Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 28 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f 531 r. 
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During the last days of the year Federico da Bozzolo died in Todi; according to Martelli 
ýveramente... da buono, christiano'. Federico had been suffering since May from internal 
bleeding since his horse had fallen on him three times during the last failed attempt to 
. C-. - free the pope immediately after the fall of Rome, breaking first an arm, then a leg and 
eventually his body armour 124 . When the physicians opened him up, they noticed that 
- 1125 his entrails were 'marcie . With his death, the Consulta lost one of its more active 
members, but by the end of 1527 the strategic context in central Italy had started to 
change, and, after months of skirmishes in Lombardy, the Kingdom of Naples had 
become the League's main target for the campaign that was about to begin. The road 
that Lautrec's army would follow in its march towards the south was yet to be decided, 
but the League's host quartered near Todi was about to lose much of the importance 
that, even with its weakened forces, it had had in the region before it lost its identity 
completely. There was no point in fighting a battaglia or a giostra around the table of 
the Consulta if it was not a point of reference for all the powers of the area (see the 
'Carta de casa. Orsina', Map C), from the pope to the minor signori like the Varano of 
Camerino, the Orsini or the Vitelli. The military side also prevailed over politics in the 
letters of Martelli, in which the principal subject addressed was taking control of the 
Black Bands. 
Obviously, the military hierarchies had to be revised. His honore and his 
riputatione did not allow the duke of Urbino to stay in the same camp as monsieur de 
124 c 
... 
il prefato signore and6 per far prova di liberare il papa, li casc6 adosso tre volte il cavallo, la prima 
li ruppe una gamba, la seconda un brazzo, et la terza essendosi il cavallo levato in piede casc6 a Findrieto, 
et con I'arcione de la sella che era ferrata Ii dette sullo stomaco, et la botta fu tanto grande che li ruppe la 
coraccia che haveva in dosso, dove si crede che sia tutto guasto di dentro... ' Benedetto Agnello to the 
marquis of Mantua, 19 May 1527, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 874, f. 96 r/v. 
125 & 
" .. mi condolsi assai 
della morte del signor Federigho, quale veramente ý morto da. buono christiano. 
Feciolono sparare, et trovarono le interiora tutte marcie, et dannone causa alla caduta di questo anno. ' 
Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 29 December 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 534 r. In 
announcing his death to their ambassadors to Lautrec's camp, the Ten were quite explicit: 'li signor 
Federigo si mori. 11 Christianissimo Wha fatto perdita, et essendosi dimostrato dopo la liberatione del papa 
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Lautrec, who held the title of capitano generale of the League now as he had formerly. 
Effectively Francesco Maria della Rovere had been discharged, and he went back to 
Venice, with his troops from Urbino, shortly before the remaining units of the 
Serenissima joined the French army. The marquis of Saluzzo, lieutenant of the 
Cristianissimo in Italy, carved out a role for himself under the command of Lautrec. In 
'k the end, before they merged with the new main body , all the different parts of the army 
of the League in Umbria had started to operate separately. 
As far as the Black Bands and the plan to reform them were concerned, Lorenzo 
Martelli had failed in his mission (see Chap. 3), but, from a diplomatic point of view, 
there is no doubt that he had carried out his commissione with success. Almost 
invariably Martelli had had to fight his 'battles' in the Consulta from a position of 
inferiority, but, at the time of his recall to Florence, the army of the League had not only 
not entered Florentine territory, it had moved to the south, regaining, at least partially, 
the initiative. With his transfer we lose a precious, witty and meticulous observer. 
However, even if Giovarnbattista Soderini had had the same literary talent as Lorenzo 
Martelli (which he did not), he would not have had occasion to expatiate much about his 
oNNm 'battles'; as we shall see, the decision-making process in Lautrec's army was quite 
a different matter. 
nimico nostro, non ci pare havere perso niente. ' The Ten to Antonft-ancesco degli Albizzi, 2 January 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 43, f 57 v. 
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3. Cortigiani and Commissarii: Lautrec's Descent 
ý... e per aver li figlioli si calerebbe le brache el Re ftancese, e lasciarebe el mondo in 
bordello... ' 
Paolo Giovio to Domenichi, 14 February 1527 
Albeit rude, this phrase of papal courtier Paolo Giovio express effectively what in fact 
was a widespread feeling about France's real intentions and effective margin of 
manoeuvre in the Italian peninsula in the years after Pavia. Between 1527 and 1528, no 
one doubted that the first aim of Francis 1, after his release and his disavowal of the 
Treaty of Madrid, was the liberation of his two sons, hostages of Charles V who, having 
been cheated by their father, was not favourable to any compromise that did not include 
the application of Madrid's articles 126 . The only dignified choice left to the Refirancese 
was to put the Emperor under military and political pressure, in order to make Charles 
accept a substantial ransom in money, as a substitute for the lands that were part of his 
Burgundian inheritance. The descent, in August 1527, of the new French army into Italy 
should be viewed in this political and strategic framework, which implied, once the 
main objective had been attained, the option of leaving France's Italian allies like 
Florence 'in bordello' (in real trouble). As we shall see, there is also the possibility that 
Lautrec and his host were eventually included among the 'expendables'. 
In September Genoa was recaptured by Andrea Doria, then still in French service, 
while Odet de Foix, the 'Stormer of Cities', took Alessandria. On 5 October the honte of 
Pavia was partially avenged, as the city itself was occupied and sacked by the troops of 
12o Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, p. 257. 
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the League 127 . After long weeks of skirmishes with the 
Imperialists in Lombardy, and of 
diplomatic manoeuvres to persuade Ferrara and Mantua 128 to join the League, monsieur 
de Lautrec established his winter quarters between Panna and Piacenza, whence he set 
out having reorganized his army for the expedition against the Kingdom of Naples. At 
the beginning of January the troops of the League (see Table XIX) left Bologna, and 
headed southwards following the 'cammino del Tronto' (see Map B). By that time 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi had been replaced as Florentine ambassador to Lautrec by 
Marco del Nero. 'Amantissimo del popolo' and, since he did not like either NiccolO' 
Capponi or Baldassarre Carducci, not compromised with the various 'sette' 129 that 
dominated the Florentine political scene, Marco del Nero was 'se non valentissimo, 
almen fedelissimo, e santo, e piU' che di comunal cervello... '. According to the pro- 
republican Busini, had Marco not been too young, he would have probably been elected 
Gonfaloniere after Capponi's first term of office 130 . Del Nero was also very rich, a 
connoisseur of French customs, and fulfilled his duties as ambassador with 'splendore': 
he always dressed with elegance, kept open house and was always surrounded by 
127 , atti molti La cittA and6 a sacco, e vi fu per otto di continui usata da'franzesi crudeltA grande ef 
incendi, per memoria della rotta ricevuta nel barco. ' Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XIII, 
pp. 1886-1887. On the sack of Pavia, and on the interesting distinction between the attitude of the Italian 
soldiers and of the 'oltramontani', see Sanuto, Diarii, 46, p. 172. '... se prese Pavia per forza, con 
grandissima reputatione di soldati italici, quali forrio li primi ad entrare, combatendo et expulsando li 
nemici, con pochissimo danno di questo exercito. Da poi la expulsatione de lo inimico, la cittA 6 ita tutta a 
sacco, fatto presoni dal canto nostro ad usanza di bona guerra. De quelli della terra non ý perito alcuno nd 
non periranno altramente, salvo ne la roba, et pagare qualche taglia come si serva; vero, ý che de' 
guasconi, lanzinech et altra gente barbara hanno usato qualche mali termini ne' tractamenti a la usanza 
loro, non di equiparar a la militia de italiani'. 
128 Alfonso d'Este, duke of Ferrara, joined the League in November; see Knecht, Francis I, p. 215. After 
the disaster of 1526 and the sack of Rome - caused in part by the ambiguous political conduct of those 
two 'zolfanelli', as Ferrara and Mantova were sometimes called by the Ten - there was no way to leave 
them behind once more without taking precautions. As we shall see, Mantova and Ferrara sent each a 
company of heavy cavalry to the camp of the League. See Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, 
chapt. XIV, pp. 1892-1893. 
1291-lowever, Benedetto Varchi says that Marco del Nero was 'troppo buono, cioý alquanto superstizioso, 
e troppo credulo, dando fede a'profeti falsi, come il frate (Savonarola) e altri... '. Varchi, Storia 
Fiorentina, book 5, p. 325. On the Florentine 'sette', see Von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al 
principato. 
130 Busini, Lettere a Benedetto Varchi, 5th letter, p. 32. 'Si ragion6 di fare una legge solo per conto suo 
circa el tempo, ma si dubit6... per il favore de'Medici e dei Capponi per quella legge... Nd mai Firenze 
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servants. The French loved this 'religione' of his 13 1. However, during his stay in the 
camp of the League, del Nero's patience and great talent for finding compromises was 
put severely to the test, and not only, as we have seen, by the contrast between Orazio 
Baglioni and Giovambattista Soderini. 
His past experiences in Italy and his defeats apparently had taught Marshal 
Lautrec 132 (1483-1528, see Plates 4 and 5) very little. He was still the epitome of the 
great French noble: he was 'superbo' and fully aware of this irritating fact, a detail 
which, according to his own point of view, was largely offset by his undeniable 
merits 133 . As a matter of fact, any advantage that he derived from his military skills as a 
strategist was often nullified by his style of leadership, which was to be, eventually, his 
undoing. Unlike the duke of Urbino, the viscount of Lautrec was not surrounded by a 
Consulta, but by a 'corte', and a 'king', even one on a reduced scale, does not really 
negotiate important matters with his courtiers; a ruler issues orders. However, while a 
good ruler at least listened to the advice of other people, Lautrec almost always reacted 
with anger to those who persisted in having a view of the situation that differed 
markedly from his, and rewarded them with his disfavour. Moreover, since nobody else 
seemed able to execute his orders correctly, he tended to concentrate power in his own 
hands. However, a single man could not coordinate everything, and eventually it became 
ebbe si bella coppia, perchd quello (Marco de Nero) per la pace, questo (Giovambattista Soderim) per la 
guerra era singolarissimo. ' 
131 , 
... vestiva onorato, teneva tavola, copioso 
di servitori, e quella religione molto piaceva ai Francesi... '. 
Ibid. In the same period Lorenzo Martelli slept 'in sulla paglia' and sometimes had to say to the other 
members of the Consulta: 'Non consumiamo il tempo in questo, terminiamo la cose... che si fa tardi, et io 
no ho ordine da darvi cena... ' 
132 Famous for having been beaten at the battle of Bicocca and for being the brother of Madame de 
Chateaubriant, the mistress of Francis 1, Odet de Foix's figure has never been thoroughly studied; see the 
quite outdated biography written by Bertrand de Chanterac, Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec (Paris, 
1930). 
133 , 
... una bellissima gentildonna amata 
da Odetto di Fois, chiamato Monsignor di Lutrec... gli diceva 
motteggiando ch'egli era ben nobile e valente ma ch'era troppo superbo, come'era forse vero, perchd 
essendogli corteggiato ogni mattina da nobilissimi e ricchissimi signori feudatarii dello stato, non levando 
la berretta, appena degnava di guardarli in viso, il che faceva scandalizzare e ammutinare tutta ]a nobiltA 
di Milano'. Lautrec's impresa was 'un largo camino d'una fornace che ardeva con un gran fuoco dentro e 
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Lautrec's invariable practice to issue peremptory instructions, which could not be 
implemented without a well-articulated chain of command. that is one that could pass 
on information, and sometimes orders, in both directions. By the time of his fatal illness 
in August 1528 no bad news regarding his dying army was able to reach the hearing of 
134 
the dying general Lautrec 
However, there was bad news that even the Captain General of the League could 
not ignore: that coming from France and from his king. In January 1528, just when the 
n" army was aDOUt to begin its march towards Naples, Lautrec saw the French financial 
allocations assigned to his troops reduced from one hundred and thirty thousand scudi 
per month, granted to him by Francis I at the moment of leaving Paris, to sixty thousand 
scudi per month, and even in this case only for the next three months' 35 . According to 
del Nero's sources of infonnation, this drastic reduction was the result of the rivalry 
between Lautrec and the chancellor of France Antoine Duprat 136 (1464-1535), who was 
scheming to turn Francis I against the general 137 . Either a scheme to 
draw on the 'borsa 
d'Italia', or a necessity imposed by the huge effort of collecting in France the two 
million ecus au soleil needed for the ransom of the two princes, the reduction forced 
Lautrec to turn to his Italian allies, that is Venice and Florence. 
Marco del Nero quickly saw that the sums of money he was allowed to offer on 
behalf of the Ten, and the way in which Florence stuck rigidly to the percentage of one 
per le bocche usciva fuora molta nebbia di furno con un motto che diceva: "Dov'& gran foco & gran 
furno"... '. Giovio, Dialogo dellImprese militari e amorose. 
134 In Italian, Lautrec would be considered an evident case of 'cadomismo'. This word, that has never 
acquired currency in Italian, originated from the (infamous) popular memory of general Cadorna, who 
managed to destroy - with his systematic denial of reality, his senseless idea of discipline and his 
contempt for the life of his soldiers - the fighting spirit of his own men during the Great War of 1915- 
1918, and came exceedingly near to annihilating the entire Italian army. 
135 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 4 February, ASF. Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 360 r., - see 
Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XVII, pp. 1912-1913. 
136 On Antoine Duprat, chancellor of France and archbishop of Sens, see Knecht, Renaissance Warrior. 
137 , 
... secondo che 
io ritraggo ý tanta emulatione in fral gran Cancelliere che ha il carico di tutto, et 
questo illustrissimo capitano, che si dimentica lo honore et 11 bene di tutta questa impresa'. Marco del 
Nero to the Ten, 29 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 157 
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fifth of all expenses the city was expected to sustain, risked alienating the capitano 
generale. On the other hand, Venetian ambassador Piero da Ca'di Pesaro (? - 1528) 
answered Lautrec's requests for money with fair promises - which were often empty 
ones, since Pesaro passed off the money Venice had to give to the League anyway as an 
allocation of funds made ad hoc for the occasion - that appeased the French commander 
as much as Florence's reasonable 'excusationi' seemed to irritate him' 38 . However, 
according to del Nero, what really made things look bad for Florence's 'riputatione' 
were the negotiations about the 'pratica de'Lanzi'. The military leaders of the League 
had managed to get in touch with the remaining commanders and the elected 
representatives of the Landsknechts in Rome, who had allegedly agreed to leave the 
Emperor's service and to go back to Germany in return for a payment of one hundred 
sixty thousand scudi. Marco del Nero tried to persuade Ambrogio da Fiorenza (or 'da, 
Firenze', but he was from Milan), Lautrec's secretary, of the state of exhaustion in 
which the 'esterminio' of the 'govemo tyrannico' had left his city. Messer Ambrogio 
replied that 'ciaschuno si haveva a sforzare', and that on this occasion Florence could 
not content itself with paying one fifth of the expenses; Venice, Florence and France 
were to contribute each one third of the required sum. In fact, owing to Lautrec's 
financial problems, Venice and Florence were to advance the French share of the burden 
- an effort for which the two republics would be (eventually) reimbursed, but that 
brought the sum the Florentine republic was expected to scrape together to eighty 
thousand scudi 139. Lautrec simply refused to accept any justification presented by Marco 
del Nero and, 'faccendo con loro doglienza della mia scarsita' in front of the Venetian 
131 Ibid. 
139 c 
.... Pregai 
lui (Ambrogio da Fiorenza) con grande instantia volesse fare capace monsignore 
Illustrissimo che e'non era bene fusserno forzati o ricerchi di fare oltre a quello che ci toccava et oltre alla 
possibilitA nostra,... rispetto a quello estenninio il quale si lungamente sopportato, bench6 hora per gratia 
di Dio ne sia libera, la aveva totalmente fatta inabile al fare quello desiderrebbe... '. Marco del Nero to the 
Ten, 6 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 297 r. /v. 
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ambassador and messer Ambrogio, ordered them to have a meeting and to find a 
solution to that impasse, so that he could give more precise instructions to the marquis 
of Saluzzo, who was conducting the negotiations with the Imperial Landsknechts 140 . 
At this point it appeared clear, and not only to Marco del Nero, that Florence's 
'reasonable' attitude was out of place, and that it could represent a problem for the cause 
of the League. When dealing with monsieur de Lautrec, appearances were as important 
as facts. Ambrogio da Fiorenza approached Marco del Nero as an 'arnico', and tried to 
explain to him that the best approach was to 'acquistare la prima gratia dell'offerte', 
even though later on these offers could be withdrawn and the ambassador could plead 
the opposition of his 'padroni'. 'A pena s'era partito il detto messer Ambrosio da me', 
Marco reported, he 'stumbled' into 'un'altro di questi di corte', one of Lautrec's 
confidants. Even though he had been instructed to do so by his master, the French 
courtier addressed the Florentine ambassador, again, 'come da se' and as an 'amico', 
expressing Lautrec's discontent with Marco's prudent attitude in comparison with that 
of the Venetian ambassador who, 'offerendo gagliardamente', allowed Lautrec to see 
Piero Pesaro's goodwill. Marco del Nero replied that during the campaign Lautrec 
would probably come to appreciate more the modest, but reliable, help offered by 
141 Florence 'che di chi forse ha tanto largheggiato' 
In an attempt to remove the doubts about Florence's loyalty and to defend the city 
from the false accusations spread by the marquis of Saluzzo, the Florentine ambassador 
decided to deal directly with Lautrec, 'sendo serrati soli in camera'. The capitano 
140 4 
... n6 accettando Sua Excellentia cosa che per me gli 
fusse replicata, n6 giustificatione di Vostre 
Signorie... ci impose che ci restringessimo assierne, et gli referissimo la ultima resolutione... '. Marco del 
Nero to the Ten, 7 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 349 r. 
141 , 
* .. scontrandomi 
in un altro di questi di corte, con chi confida Lautrech, et mi si mostra amico. mi 
disse liberamente non ostante avesse commissione di parlarmi, ma come da s6.. et di me gli pareva ch'io 
fussi pi6 intento al risparmio de'danafi che non si convenisse... giustificandolo io della mia ottima 
dispositione ... et che sua excellentia quando s'havesse a mettere ad effetto, 
forse si plauderebbe piý della 
buona osservantia nostra di quel tanto si promettesse che di chi ha tanto largheggiato'. Marco del Nero to 
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generale did not deny that 'pifj volte et piu' di uno' had attempted to persuade him of the 
republic's bad faith, but without success. In fact, he rather believed that, after fourteen 
years of Medicean domination, the representatives of the republican ruling class, 'non 
sendo exercitati', were somewhat inexperienced in affairs of state. If he had appeared 
ftequently angry with Florence, it had been for its sake and to persuade Marco and the 
Ten to do what was necessary to preserve the city. Marco del Nero admitted that without 
the Medicean tyranny there would have been 'piU' huomini, et piu' affinati nell'esercitio 
dello stato'. On the other hand, many of those who had learned that craft before 1512 
were still active, while the young ones made up for their lack of experience with their 
zea 
142 
. 
However, for the capitano generale the interests and strategical needs of the army 
of the League came first. When, on 31 February 1528, Lautrec revealed to Marco del 
Nero his intention of combining the two armies of the League, Marco del Nero pointed 
out that the Imperialists were still in Rome, dangerous and unpredictable as ever. If the 
'Umbrian' army followed the line of the Apennines towards L'Aquila, while the main 
body (Lautrec's) marched southwards along the Tyrrhenian coast (see Map B), Florence 
would be left without protection from the attacks that could come not only ftom Rome, 
but also from Clement VIL Lautrec still trusted the pope, but the republic did not. Odet 
de Foix dismissed del Nero's worries as baseless, and eventually snapped that he was 
the capitano generale, and that the Ten were obliged by the League's articles to entrust 
him with their troops every time the League needed them. Then he turned towards 
captain Azzo da Correggio, who, despite the marquis of Saluzzo's requests, had been 
sent by Orazio Baglioni in his stead, and told him to carry his direct order to the 
the Ten, 7 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 345 r. It ought to be noticed that the 
confidential remarks of Ambrogio and of the courtier are written in code. 
142 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 14 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f, 314 v. 
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capitano generale of the Florentine foot: as soon as the Imperial army had left Rome to 
go towards the Kingdom of Naples, 'ad ogni requisitione del marchese (of Saluzzo)' the 
Perugian condottiere was to bring the Black Bands to join the main body 143 . This was a 
very crucial moment: not only had Orazio refused to go to Lautrec's camp precisely 
because he had not wanted to receive that order in person, but the relations between 
Florence and the marquis of Saluzzo were very tense (see the second section of this 
chapter). Issuing such an order in those circumstances, overriding both the Ten and their 
representative, Lautrec had damaged the Ten's reputation and 'dignita'. Not even during 
the worst 'battaglia, di maledetto senno' had the duke of Urbino dared to challenge the 
city's authority openly. This fact caused major worries in Florence, but Marco del Nero 
tried to minimize them: those who frequented Lautrec's court were used to these things, 
he said and, probably, had hardly noticed the episode; 'et se si havesse a tener conto di 
questi particolari, ci harerno a contristare troppo spesso. Bisogna, con Sua Excellentia, 
tollerare et fare vista di non vedere ne udire quel che dispiace... ' 144 . In their turn, the 
Ten reminded del Nero that with the French he had to be 'piu' largo' with his words, and 
not to stand upon his dignity all the time, as with the Spaniards 145 . 
Unlike the ambassadors of the other Italian powers, and inexperienced as he was 
in military matters, Marco del Nero had a quite low opinion of Lautrec's army, a 
judgment that was shared by the Ten. The host was, on paper, huge (see Table XIX), 
143 4 ... Sua Excellentia a questo si scald6 
in dire che era capitano generale della Lega, et che secondo le 
convenzioni Vostre Signorie erono obligate al farlo seguire dalle loro bande sempre che cosi fussi il 
bisogno della Lega... et cosi voltandosi al capitano Contazzo, presente et suto mandato dal signor Horatio 
in compagnia del marchese per scusare lo impedimento del venir lui, come il prefato marchese gli faceva 
instantia, et per parte sua comandasse al signor Horatio che ad ogni requisitione del marchese, doppo 
1'essersi assicurato della gita degli imperiali alla volta del Regno, lo seguisse con le sue bande per 
congiungersi a questo esercito. '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 January 1528, ASF, Died di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, f 167 v. During his stay in Lautrec's camp, Azzo da Correggio was contacted by Fabio 
Petrucci who, on behalf of the pope, tried to 'sviare' the count of Casalp6 from the Florentine service. 
144 ." e' circurnstanti et tutto il resto della corte sono bene assuefatti... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, II 
February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 339 v. 
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and if its 'diligenza' had been equal to its forces, it would have been, 'per discorso 
humano'(toýýsure that victory was close at hand 146 . As always, the 
lack of discipline 
among the troops was appalling, but what worried the ambassador was the atmosphere 
of political and strategic carelessness that seemed to permeate the army. Things had not 
changed since Lautrec's departure from Paris; none of the commanders seemed able or 
willing to grasp the complexity of the situation. At the end of February, no one knew the 
position of the other forces of the League, and no one was trying to find out where the 
marquis of Saluzzo, Orazio Baglioni and the Venetians were. Apparently, Lautrec 
believed that he could achieve all his goals by force of reputation alone' 47 , that 
is to 
conquer Italy 'col gesso' like Charles VIII, but now the Imperial influence was strong 
and had rarnified at every level of Italian society. 
The Ten were not satisfied, either. According to their estimates, by March 1528 
the effective strength of the League's anny had dwindled to twelve thousand foot and 
four hundred lances of heavy cavalry, which, untried as they were, were not enough to 
assure the defeat of the Imperialist army, that was not only victorious, but also 
'fortunato'. Unlike the French, the Empire had always been willing to increase its forces 
according to the needs of the moment 148 . Moreover, an enormous number of 'genti 
inutili' (camp followers), a pennanent feature of sixteenth-century annies 149 , crippled 
145 '... Non vogliamo mancare di ricordarti che con i Franzesi bisogna essere pi6 largo con le parole, et 
non stare del continuo sul puntiglio come con gli Spagnoli... '. The Ten to Marco del Nero, 15 February 
1528. Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43, f. 170 v. 
146 'Se Pordine et la diligenza di questo esercito fusse corrispondente alle sue forze, si potrebbe per 
discorso humano promettere la vittoria certa, et presto. Ma s'ella seguirA si potrA conoscere 
particolan-nente dalla gratia di Dio. '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 29 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, f. 352 r. 
147 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 2 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1. f. 424 r. 
148 , 
... n6 sono (the French troops) 
di tale qualitA che ce ne possiamo promettere indubitata vittoria, 
maxime avendo all'incontro uno esercito vittorioso et fortunato... La consuetudine degli Imperiall ý 
sempre stata d'accrescere le forze su' bisogni. 11 contrario hanno sempre fatto i Franzesl. '. The Ten to 
Giuliano Soderini, I March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 4' )ýf. 2 10 r. 
149 However, according to the general opinion, the number of camp followers and of the whores that 
followed the French armies seemed to surpass those of other 'nationi ...... molto abondanti ne sono (of 
whores) gli eserciti corrotti d'oggidi, massimamente de gli Spagnuoll, et de gi'ltallani. De' Francesi non 
dico nulla, perciochd se si unissero tutte insierne in uniforme le puttane che vi sono, mi potrebbe far una 
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the already inefficient logistics of Lautrec's anny. According to the Mantuan 
ambassador, between paid and unpaid personnel, the host of the League amounted to 
more than severity thousand 'pedoni", without mentioning the horses and the carts, and 
150 
occupied iýýea,,, of sixty miles 
By contrast, the Ten believed that the Imperial army could count on five thousand 
Landsknechts, four thousand Spanish and two thousand Italian footsoldiers, all veterans 
'di tanta bontA et virtii che tutta, Italia ne trema' 151 , flanked by almost two thousand very 
good light cavalrymen. The only real asset left to the largely untried army of the League 
was its artillery (see Table XIX). Given these premises, Marco del Nero pointed out that 
the presence of the far less numerous, but far more experienced troops of the Umbrian 
anny, and especially of the Black Bands, was going to be decisive. 
On 17 February 1528, the Imperial army left Rome and marched towards the 
Kingdom of Naples. Lautrec, whose army was slower owing to its size, to its artillery 
train and to its seemingly limitless logistical apparatus, was forced to take the road that 
led to Puglia and not directly to Naples. On the diplomatic side, the representatives of 
the cities on the route of his army rushed one after another to pay homage to Odet de 
Foix 152 , in adherence to the decree he had issued at the end of January, with which he 
had promised a retroactive pardon for the crime of lese-majeste to those who greeted the 
matta paura, se ben fussero a mia difesa et le Italiane et le Spagnuole, ch'io so che resterebbono vinte dal 
numero di quelle... '. Aurelio Cicuta, La vera militar disciplina, p. 410. In the Landsknecht regiments the 
commander of the baggage train was called Hureinwabel, that is 'sergeant of the women'. On the 
Landsknechts and 'love', see Baumann, I Lanzichenecchi, pp. 188-207. 150 1 
** .A mio iuditio, tutto questo exercito si trova molto volenteroso al combater, et vi si trovano soldati da factione numerati da 21 in 22 milia combatenti ogni volta che tutto lo exercito de la lega sii unito, 
senza quelli che non sono pagati, che in tutto si tiene che ascendano pi6 de 50 mila fanti; cosa quasi 
incredibile. Et tutto questo exercito occupa apresso 60 mia di paese; sichd pensi Vostra Excellentia se 
bisognerano di le vituarie. ' Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 25 February 1528. Sanuto, 
Diarii, 47, p. 26. 
'5' Even worse, there were three thousand Italians under the command of the prince of Melfi and two 
thousand Spaniards under the command of Alarqon in the Kingdom of Naples. The Ten to Giuliano 
Soderini, 2 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 43), f. 206 r. 
152 , 
** . quasi tutte 
le terre anticipavano a darsi venticinque o trenta miglia innanzi la venuta dell'esercito. '. 
Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XVIL p. 1914. 
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League's troops as friends, and the abolition of all taxes imposed by the Aragonese 
rulers after the expulsion of the Angevin kings `3 . On the other hand, the pope remained 
neutral, but in fact his neutrality favoured the Emperor, while his money allowed the 
Imperial generals to regain control of their army and to leave Rome before Lautrec could 
get ahead of them to Naples. Marco del Nero did not fail to remark to Lautrec how 
(. C--: 54 friendly' indeed the pope had eventually proved to be' . 
During his march towards Apulia (see Map B and Plate 6), other problems 
plagued the capitano generale: the expedition of the League's fleet to attack Sicily had 
been diverted by the 'ventura del mare' to plague-ridden Sardinia (See section 3, chapter 
2), where, in exchange for a handful of strategically unimportant coastal strongholds, 
Andrea Doria lost a sizeable portion of his fleet's precious 'manpower'. Moreover, the 
galleys badly needed refitting, and were not able to support the advance of the army with 
diversionary actions and the landing of troops' 55 . 
1534 
... 11 primo che rimette a ciaschuno che accepterA le genti della Lega come amici, ogni delltto et offesa, 
et etiam di crimine lese majestatis fatta di qui a dietro, reservando le ragioni de'particulari, le quali di 
ragione s'habbino a conoscere. 11 secondo, che chi farA resistentia non solo perderA il privilegio di sopra, 
ma venendo in loro forze sarA castigato aspramente in exemplo delli altri. 11 terzo che e'lieva et annulla 
tutti i diritti, dazi et graveze di qualunche sorte sute imposte da qui indrieto, per la casa di Ragona volendo 
che solo restino e'dazi che correvano al tempo del re d'Angois... 11 quarto che nessuno fuoruscito o altro 
ardisca entrare in possessione d'alchuno stato o bene mobile di propria auctoritA, sotto pena di perdere 
tutte le ragioni che e'vi havesse, ma vuole se ne conosca di ragione, che sommariamente la administrino 
commissarii da sua excellentia deputati, che son tutte cose da muovere gagliardamente e'popoli alla sua 
devotione, benchd questa ultima parte dispiaccia a'fuoriusciti, ma per facilitare la victoria non vi harA 
rispetto. '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 154 r. 
154 There was probably a badly concealed sense of satisfaction in Marco del Nero's words when he 
feci gustare a Sua Excellentia quanto era suto da amico [il colpo che gli haveva riservato il papa] a tempo 
de'danari dati all'Imperiali senza e'quali non si sarebbono partiti da Roma... ma bene lui (Piero Pesaro) et 
io gli diciamo [che se ne ricordi poi quando harA vinto]... et non si satisfaccia [all'hora delle buone parole 
come egh ha fatto in passato]... sono certo che Sua Excellentia non sarebbe hora del medesimo animo a 
confortare le Signorie Vostre a mandargil (to the pope) oratore... '. [in code]. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 
6 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, ff. 425 v- 426 r. See also Guicciardini, Storia 
d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XVII, pp. 1913-1914. 
155 It seemed that '... [messer Andrea Doria... habbia perduto quello calore con che e'cominci6 questa, 
impresa. Et pochi giorni fa se ne dolse molto con noi Monsignor Illustrissimo... che quando era il colmo 
del bisogno... (Andrea Doria) aveva usato dire che se ne voleva andare a Genova a riposare]... io gli ho 
detto che almanco 10 galere andando verso Napoli li farebbono buoni effecti... '. Marco del Nero to the 
Ten, 4 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f 436 r. 
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Pedro Navarro' 56 (? -1528) and his Gascon assault troops spearheaded the 
advance of the anny of the League, often acting as a separate body: they forced the 
prince of Melfi to retreat from I'Aquila, and, seldom losing contact with the Imperial 
troops, took Capistrano, and expelled the enemy from Celano, Nocera and eventually 
Foggia. The relations between Lautrec and the famous master engineer were not good, 
but low-bom count Navarro was one of the few persons whose support the capitano 
generale did not dare to alienate 157 . The reason for the Gascons' swift advance in order 
to take control of northern Apulia was of a practical nature: March was the month of the 
year in which it was possible to collect the 'dogana delle pecore', that is the toll on the 
transhumance of the flocks of sheep from the pastures of Apulia to those of Abruzzi, a 
158 tax that each year could yield between eighty and one hundred thousand ducati 
Lautrec managed to take control of the area, but the revenues of the great dogana and of 
other revenues of the Kingdom of Naples were, because of war, considerably less (one 
half, roughly) than they were expected to be. 
On 4 March Lautrec received the first intelligence about a large contingent of 
Imperial troops in Troia (see Map B), and sent a mixed reconnaissance group of French 
156 The history of Navarro's career as a military engineer and field commander coincides with the history 
of the Italian Wars and its tactical and technological innovations. He had been the lieutenant of Consalvo 
de Cordova and had made a considerable contribution to the development of the defensive-offensive tactic 
(based on the combined use of gunpowder weapons and earthworks) in response to the initial marked 
French superiority in offensive capacity, while thanks to the explosive mines he had perfected he was a 
dreaded opponent for any enemy garrison commander. Navarro was captured after the Spanish defeat at 
Ravenna (1512) and, having waited in vain for what he considered a reasonable period of time to be 
ransomed as adequate reward for his past services, he decided to offer his favours to the king of France 
see Pieri, Il Rinascimento... pp. 390,401,406,410,413-14,417,425-26,487,492-3; Taylor, The Art of 
War (especially the section on siegecraft) and Hall, Weapons and Warfare pp. 100,167,168,170-75. 
157 After a mutiny of the Gascon companies, who had murdered their provost, Navarro went back to the 
camp '... sdegnato, parendoli con loro havere perso l'obedientia... Et Lautrec n'era tanto malcontento 
stasera, che era mezo disperato, dolendosi a cielo del detto conte Pietro et de' suoi modi, che del continuo 
dice essere molto strano, ma avendo bisogno di lui ý necessario lo comporti senza poterlo neanche 
riprendere, per non farlo sdegnare... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 12 1, f. 286 v. Cfr. with Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, ibid, p. 1914. 
"' As a matter of fact, many wealthy citizens of PAquila had supported the pro-French party in order to 
save their flocks, which were at the moment still in Apulia. They had an interest in Lautrec's taking 
control of the whole area, for he would then be able to grant safe passage to their 'bestiame'. Marco del 
Nero to the Ten, II February 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 333 r. 
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men-at-arms and Italian light cavalry under the command of Valerio Orsini to 
investigate 159 
. Against Lautrec's orders and 
Orsini's advice, the French, guided by 
monsieur de Gruffy, waded the river between Lucera and Troia and fell into an ambush 
of the Imperial light cavalry. 'Oggimai accerchiati et rotti', the gendarmes had to be 
rescued by Orsini's horsemen 160 . In fact, the whole Imperial army was in Troia, and in a 
few days the two an-nies would face each other, from 12 to 21 March, on the plains that 
surrounded the small Apulian city. 
This long confrontation 161 , which did not lead to a pitched battle, can be divided 
into three phases: 
First phase: contact. On 12 March the army of the League camps five miles from 
Troia; and, after a first series of skirmishes, the Imperialists retreat into the city. By the 
end of the following day, the Imperial troops - five thousand Landskechts, five thousand 
Spaniards, three thousand five hundred Italians, almost two thousand light 
cavalrymen 162 , 
but no artillery - are encamped on the top of a hill outside Troia, and 
dominate both the League's camp and the 'probable' battlefield. The Mantuan heavy 
cavalry (eighty men-at-arms) arrives in the camp of the League. 
Second phase: Lautrec's advance. On 14 March, preceded by its artillery, the 
whole army of the League moves forward divided into three echelons: first the Gascons 
along with the other French troops, then the Swiss together with the Italians, then the 
159 , 
... armati con 1'elmo et la corazza alla 
italiana, fra i quali la banda del signor Valerio (Orsini) era 
stimata che fosse meglio armata et meglio a cavallo con buoni cavai turchi... '. Paolo Giovio, La Seconda 
parte, book XXV, p. 63, on Gruffy, see the section on the French lances of Table XIX. 
160 Ibid., pp. 65-66. Valerio Orsini was about to be punished by Lautrec for contravening his orders, but 
was 'rescued' in his turn by the testimony of monsieur de Gruffy. 
161 On the quasi-battle of Troia, see Giovio, La Seconda parte, pp. 66-69; Du Bellay, Wmoires, pp. I 10 
v. - 112 r., Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XV111, chap. XVIL pp. 1915-1918; Lodovico Ceresara to 
the Marquis of Mantua, 15 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, ff. 
173 r. - 175 v. ; Marco del Nero to the Ten, 13-23 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, the 
folios are not in numerical order. 
162 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 7 March, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 456 r. (decoded at f. 45 8 
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Landsknechts, followed by the men-at-arms and by the light horsemen 163 . After 
cannonading the enemy ineffectively'64 for half an hour, Lautrec leads his army to the 
top of a hill that dominates the one occupied by the Imperialists. After the initial 
skirmishes provoked by Navarro's arquebusiers, the fighting in the valley below was 
confined to the cavalry on both sides. Towards the end of the day the Imperial 
Landsknechts seem willing to counterattack, but are 'dissuaded' by the reaction of the 
League's artillery, now in a favourable position. 'Et cosi scaramuzzando si prese lo 
alloggiamento designato, con grandissimo onore de la Legha. '. 
Thirdphase: unstable equilibrium (15-21 March). The two camps are so close that 
the soldiers of each army can clearly see what the others are doing' 65 . Both sides declare 
their willingness to fight a decisive giornata 166 , 
but decide to wait for reinforcements 167 
and try to cut each other's lines of supply. The damages caused by the League's artillery 
eventually (19 March) force the Imperial troops to leave their camp and to retreat, at 
16' Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 15 March, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Roma, 876, f, 173 v. ; Martin du Bellay gives us a very different battle array, and one most unusual 
for the period: according to him the army of the League, vanguard, battle and rearguard marched 'tout 
d'un front', that is not in echelons but in line (left wing, center, right wing) and at its sides each battalion 
(deployed in this order: Landsknechts, Swiss, French, Gascons, Italians -a sort of classification) was 
supported by a 'trouppe' of men-at-arms. 
164 In this phase the cannonade of the famed French artillery was rendered ineffective by the slope of the 
hill, that prevented the cannonballs from 'bouncing' and taking a heavy toll of victims in the ranks of the 
ýordinanze': Ma le palle, scaricate contra i nemici 1 quali erano all'alto, facevano poco danno, per6 
che subito inghiottite dal terreno, avendone a pena amazzato uno o due, non saltavano, nd urtavano nelle 
ordinanze folte. ' Giovio, La seconda parte, p. 66. 
165 'll loco in che si trova l'uno et I'altro esercito non potria esser pifj idoneo per il combattere come &, et 
tanto vicino che Partiglieria danneggia da la parte de li cesarei e da questi doi picciol colletti in fori tutto 
il resto & spaciosa campagna... e cosi l'uno et I'altro esercito si vedeno tutti li movimenti che ciascuno 
fanno e tanto sono vicini che se un homo de una parte chiamassi uno de I'altra, io credo si intenderiano il 
loro parlare... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua libidý f. 174 v. 
166 Their past experiences persuaded the marquis of Vasto and Juan de Urbina to dampen the enthusiasm 
of the prince of Orange: '... i Francesi s'havevano a trattenere et tenere a bada, et che finalmente quando 
si fosse raffrenata, l'ingordigia di combattere di quelle nationi, le quali vagliono molto nella prima furia, 
all'hora poi si sarebbono vinti senza ferita, come molte altre volte s'era fatto'. Giovio, La seconda parte. 
p. 67. 
167 The Imperialists were waiting for the Italian colonnello of Fabrizio Marainaldo, the men-at-arms of the 
Neapolitan barons, and the artillery. 
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least partially, to Troia' 68 . The 
'alloggiamento' of the League gives Lautrec control of 
the main road from Naples to Troia. The Black Bands arrive (20 March) near the camp 
of the League, and the Imperial army, now severely outclassed in firepower, begins that 
very night a hasty retreat towards Naples' 69 . On 21 March, the troops of the League sack 
Troia. 
Besides the fact that it represented an important tactical achievement for the 
League of Cognac, the encounter at Troia presents some interesting features, the most 
evident of which is that it was fought almost entirely by cavalry and artillery. For almost 
a week, in the plains around Troia, the men-at-arms, the light cavalrymen and the 
stradiots of both sides fought a series of skirmishes that, thanks to the absence of the 
arquebusiers, became an 'honorato piU' tosto che sanguinoso spettacolo'. There, wrote 
Giovio, following the plumed helms and colours, one could see how good a knight was 
with lance and sword 170 . According to the Imperial officer Ferrante Gonzaga (see Plate 
7)1, 'di continuo siarno alle mani insierne con bellissime scaramucce. Attendesi in breve 
la giornata' 
171 
. The French gendarmes performed well 
in the open field 
172 
, but showed 
once more their limitations and lack of discipline when they were asked to coordinate 
their actions with those of the other forces of cavalry, such as the Venetian stradiots 173 
168 According to Marco del Nero and to Guicciardini , the cannons shots and the constant threat of the 
French artillery forced the Imperialists to leave their 'alloggiamento' on the top of the hill, and to go back 
to Troia. It is not clear if the army of the League moved to the position abandoned by the Imperial army. 
169According to the letters of Ferrante Gonzaga, commander of the Imperial cavalry, their intention was to 
go to meet the reinforcement halfway and to fight the 'giornata' immediately after, but on their own 
terms. Eventually, the Imperial generals were not able to regroup. Ferrante Gonzaga to his brother, the 
marquis of Mantua, 23 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 
8 10, ff. 177 r. - 178 v. 170 Paolo Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 66 and 68. However, there were a few violations of chivalrous 
behaviour: Teia de Aguilar, one of the captains of the Spanish light cavalry, went to the fight too elegantly 
dressed and was mistaken for the prince of Orange and '... I nemici (the French) veggendolo cosi ben 
vestito... I'uno a gara dell'altro gli furono adosso et I'amazzomo... '. 
17 ' Ferrante Gonzaga to his mother Isabella d'Este, 20 March, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 810, f. 178 r. 
172 Du Bellay, Alimoires. p. III r/v. 
173 ,*.. lo cominzai a retirarme per tirare Ii inimici ne la nostra zente d'arme; pensandomi esser soccorso 
da loro, me voltai et feci testa. Allor mi fu tolto 4 stratioti, et questo perchd el mio banderaro mise la 
bandiera dentro, talmente che fti preso il banderaro con la mia bandiera. lo viti persa la bandiera, cosi mi 
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Everybody was convinced that the battle was imminent, and that it was just a matter of 
time before one of the two armies was forced either to retreat or to attack the entrenched 
positions of the other. The weather was extremely cold, rainy and windy, and every 
night the Spaniards, following their usual tactic, caused the alarm in the camp of the 
League to be sounded with mock attacks. The Imperialists declared that the only thing 
that worried them was the French artillery 174 . On the other hand, many qualified 
witnesses noticed that the Gennans and the Spaniards were not living up to the 
reputation 175 of the 'exercito del diavolo'. 
Unlike the otherarnbassadors, Marco del Nero did not enjoy the sight. In addition 
to his concerns regarding the quality of the army of the League, even after the arrival of 
the marquis of Saluzzo and of his troops, what really worried him was the inexplicable, 
and increasingly embarrassing, delay of the Black Bands. Where were they? Once the 
Imperial army and an acceptable battlefield (Troia) had been found, Lautrec could not 
speak of anything else. 'Troppo benefitio farebbono le genti di Vostre Signorie, se le ci 
fussino', cried out Marco del Nero on 7 March 176 . The bad weather, the 
impassable 
Apennine roads and the 'villani disperati', who killed all the stragglers, messengers and 
scouts they could find, frustrated every attempt to locate the Black Bands. 'Horamai sara 
voltai verso nimici come rabiato cridando a stratioti: "Hozi dobiarno murir tutti per honor nostro" .... Ne fui poi carcato troppo i panni addosso, talmente che ne convene voltar, et liftancesi nonjazendo mai testa 
se misero in fuga, talmente che per spazio di uno miglio ne fu data la caza; et de loro ne fu presi cerca 6 
avenga me pensava havessemo receputo maggior danno di quello habiamo hauto. Monsignor di Lautrech 
biasima molto quei capitanei franzesi, et lauda il nostro combattere... '. Venetian Provveditore agli 
Stradioti Andrea Civran to his brother Cristoforo, Sanuto, DiariiXLVII, pp. 137-138. Civran wrote also 
that the French men-at-arms reprimanded by Lautrec were shifting the blame and challenging each other 
to duels. Italics are mine. 174 c 
*' . gli Spagnoli dicono che quando non fusse I'artellaria che tiene alto questo esercito, che non seriano 
statO sin hora a fare de le faccende, et monstra temerla molto... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of 
Mantua, 20 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 180 r. 
175 ,- come io intesi dal marchese (Alfonso de Avalos, marquis del Vasto) e da Giovanni Dorbino (Juan 
de Urbina) gli spagnoli et Tedeschi non mostrarono punto quel giomo (14 March) l'usata prontezza degli 
animi loro... '. Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 67; '... e certamente combatteno (the Imperialists) 
valentissimamente, ancor che sin qui habbino perso grossamente, et non habbiano trovato questi soldati 
come credevano... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 15 March, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 174 v. 
176 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 7 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 456 r. 
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facil cosa che arrivino, dopo il fatto', that is, after the battle, but 'da esserci a non esserci 
quelle (the Black Bands), pu6 risultare la vittoria, o esser vinti. '. For Lautrec, the 
Florentine forces, 'delle quali si intende li inimici temano et costoro (the League) 
-077 confidano assai... , represented the element that could tip the balance of forces 
178 
around Troia . Marco del Nero was only too aware of this fact, especially having seen 
how much the enemy commanders used 'astutia' in addition to force 179 . Since. ) 
according to his letters, Lautrec '[resta. di lui malissimo contento]', Marco del Nero was 
forced to maintain a low profile and to stay away from 'court', even if that meant 
leaving the capitano generale alone with the papal arnbassador; the results of weeks of 
intense diplomatic activity were frustrated by the delay of the Black Bands. 
However, even in the absence of del Nero, Lautrec '[si duole a cielo et con parole 
di troppa indignatione per la tardita di quelle Bande]' 180 , and the Florentine ambassador 
was afraid that, in case of defeat, everybody would blarne Florence, while, in case of 
victory, the city would be seen as guilty of failing to contribute to it181 . 
The arrival (21 
March) of the Black Bands in the camp was a great relief for Marco del Nero and a 
remarkable success for Florence's image: marching through the camp of the League in 
177 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 16 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 479 v. 178 c 
... Una sola cosa gli (the Imperialists) poteva confortare a venire alla giornata: che'l signor Horatio Baglione non era giunto anchora in campo di Lotrecco con le fanterie Toscane, et perci6 se diferivano la 
battaglia, conoscevano che havrebbono poi trovato il nemico molto pi6 forte per 1'essercitatissime 
compagnie sue di archibugieri. Era quella fanteria del Baglione in gran parte di soldati vecchi, i quali 
sotto Giovanni de'Medici s'havevano acquistato gran credito di valor di Guerra'. Giovio, La Seconda 
parte, p. 67. , 'Aussi une des occasions qui meut monsieur 
de Lautrec de ne donner bataille le jour qu'il la 
presenta, fut qu'il attendoit le seigneur Horace Baglion, qui amenoit treze enseignes de gens de pied, des 
plus aguerris d'Italie, qui estoient les Bandes Noires, qui avoient estd de longue main, soubs la chage du 
seigneur lean de Medicis... ' Du Bellay, Mimoires, p. IIIv. 
179 Marco del Nero to the Ten, Ibid. It is quite amazing how del Nero's point of view on the army of the 
League differed from the one of his Mantuan collegague, Lodovico Ceresara: '... Vostra Excellentia 
sappia che ý XX anni che alla campagna non si vide mai cosi forbita gente et bello exercito como ý questo 
a iuditio di tutti gli homini di guerra, talmente che fa spantare ogniuno, et ý con tanto ordine condutto che 
non se portia existimare... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 15 March 1528, ASMn, 
Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f, 174 v. 
180 , ... [si duole a cielo et con parole 
di troppa indignatione per la tarditA di quelle bande... et d'essere 
suto da me ripieno di una speranza. et quasi adirato verrebbe a qualche parola di rottural... ', ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 12 1, ff. 483 v- 484 r. 
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ordinanza, the Black Bands deeply impressed Lautrec' 
82 
and the other observers 
183 
- 
When, on 28 March, provveditore Pisani arrived with his few remaining soldiers, he 
was received with 'poco romore et con manco satisfactione', while Lautrec, together 
with his court, was 'piu' contento un giorno che Faltro delle Bande di Vostre Signorie, et 
non fa risparmio... di laudarsene ý 
184 
- 
The approach of the Black Bands, sighted by both armies on 20 March, probably 
forced the Imperial commanders to reconsider their tactical situation: if they remained, 
the French with their artillery could force them to fight a battle on unfavourable terms, 
and now the margin of advantage of the Habsburg troops - their qualitative level and 
their reputation - was very narrow. Moreover, they had much to lose: the fabulous 
plunder of the sack of Rome had to be protected. The Imperialists broke camp at night - 
always a dangerous operation - leaving Troia, still full of victuals, with most of their 
'bagagli' and 'senza strepito alchuno'. This retreat was a blow for the 'riputatione' of 
the Imperial army, and boosted the spirit of the League's troops' 85 . On 24 March 
Ferrante Gonzaga. wrote to his brother that, thanks to the reinforcements sent from 
181 , 
... et si perdessi, di tutto saremo fatti debitori noi, et se si vincerd resteremo ad ogni modo 
in 
contumacia... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 13 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 12 1, f. 473 
r. 
182 '... Hevevono le Signorie Vostre visto di quanta satisfactione erono sute le Lor genti di qua et a 
Monsignore et a tutti gli altri, la reputatione delle quali ý sempre cresciuta et presso di costoro, et - per 
quanto si intende - apresso li nimici, et ý reputato che le sieno uno de' principali membri di questo 
esercito, et senza il quale li nimici si renderebbono sicuri... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, date unknown 
(23-24 March 1528), ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 121, f. 365 r. The last pages of this letter are 
missing. 
183 'Ozzi le Bande Negre condotte dal signor Oratio Baione sono agionte in campo, et ý una bellissima et 
capata gente, et di numero sono tremila e cinquecento fanti, che non manca uno come se dice, che sono a 
gran subsidio e favore di questo esercito e di che facevano grandi existimatione gli Cesarei... '. Lodovico 
Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 21 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, 
Roma, 876, f. 181 v. 
184 According to Marco del Nero, Alvise Pisani arrived with 1600 foot soldiers instead of the 6500 that he 
was supposed to bring with him. His soldiers 'hanno fatto buono paragone a quelle delle Signorie Vostre' 
- that is, they were so bad that they actually 'promoted' the Black Bands. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 28 
March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 150 
185 , 
... questo (the retreat of the 
Imperial army) non si credeva, anzi se tenea certo che dovessero venire 
alla giornata per la bella et la bona gente che sono di guerra, et per non cognoscerli soldati che sempre 
non volessero honore'. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 21 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio 
Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 181 r. , according to Paolo Giovio, the Imperialists '... 
erano posti in fuga, et poco manco che rotti. ', La Seconda parte, p. 70. 
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Naples - artillery, six thousand foot soldiers and two hundred men-at-arms - the 
Imperial army was ready to fight '... con tanto di buon core come andassimo a 
combattere con tante femine... ' 186 , but the reality was different. Pursued by the 
League's light cavalry, the Imperialists, now divided into several columns and following 
different roads, marched towards Naples 'molto timidi, e non parevano quelli 
valorosi' 
187 
. They were undergoing their own version of the Taudine Forks' 
188 
Lautrec refused to follow the advice of many of his commanders, who urged him 
to attack the enemy in order to deprive him at least of his precious booty 189 , and 
accepted Navarro's reconu-nendation that, in view of the siege of Naples, the army's 
backline and supplies should be secured by reducing all the remaining Imperial 
strongholds; 'ayant pris le reste du Royaume, il auroit la ville (Naples) la corde au col'. 
After Melfi (see chapter 3) it was the turn of Venosa, where the Spanish garrison 
surrended to Navarro without conditions 190 , while the other cities of the area had been 
left unguarded. 
While the anny of the League proceeded towards Naples in ordinanza at an 
average of eight miles per day, its light cavalrymen were sent ahead to re-establish 
186 Ferrante Gonzaga to the marquis of Mantua, 24 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga- 
corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 8 10, f, 177 v. 187 , 
... questi Cesarei andavano molto timidi, e non parevano quelli valorosi, e nella loro ordinanza erano 
mescolati spagnoli , lanzchenetti e italiani insieme, e tutti sotto sopra al meglio che Dio gli mostrava 
caminavano... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 21 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 181 r. 
118 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f, 145 r. 189 , 
... Al conte Guido Rangone... a monsignor di Valdimo, a quasi tutti i capitani de cavalli et 
massimamente al Signor Valerio Orsino piaceva grandemente che si tenesse lor dietro et che con tutta la 
cavalleria si perseguitassero i nimici, i quali senza dubbio per la secreta et vergognosa ritirata loro erano 
spaventati... et se si fosse messa in fuga, gli havrebbono tolte le bagaglie; di che non poteva accadere loro 
cosa alcuna pifi grave, i quali erano carichi della preda di Roma, nd a nostri soldati maggiore allegrezza, 
ne cosa pifi utile et phi honorata a confermare et accrescere Popenione della sperata vittoria. '. Paolo 
G iovio, La Seconda parte, p. 69. 
190 Pedro Navarro gave the Spaniards two choices: they could go to Naples with a white wand in their 
hands (a sign of surrender) surrendering all their weapons and possessions to the League, or they could go 
back to Spain 'con tutte le loro cose'. 'Questi Spagnoli - per essere ricchi - accettaranno d'andare in 
Spagna pifi presto che perdere le robbe... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 28 March 1528, 
ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f 191 r.; see also Guicciardini, Storia 
d7talia, book XVIII, chap. XVII, p. 1919. 
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contact with the enemy, but, as always, their ability in tactical reconnaissance left much 
to be desired, as they sent back little or no intelligence to the main body'91. In fact, 
unlike the Imperial host, in the army of the League there was not a large body of tactical 
light cavalry, since the French archers fought as a part of the lances of heavy cavalry, 
and the unruly Venetian stradiots --** specialized in 'scorte et pizzicamenti'. The 
Italian cavalli leggieri of Valerio Orsini and Girolarno da Silva 192 , together with the 
'peculiar banda' 193 of, probably, English light horsemen (two hundred, see Sheet Table 
XIX) under the command of Sir Robert Jerningham 194 (? -1528) had to undertake that 
duty. However, the retreating Imperialists were demoralized, and evaded any direct 
confrontation. Their confused situation was confinned by prisoners captured by Sir 
Robert: the Imperialists still did not know whether they were to take refuge inside 
'9' The commanders of the League '... si dolgono et maravigliono di non haver advisi piCt recti da e' loro 
cavalli leggieri che sono innanti solo a questo effecto, et & certo grande inconveniente che e'sieno [tanto 
male advisati da loro, ma ý usanza vecchia]... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 4 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 273 r. 
192 On the Italian light cavalry and on its specific features, see the second charter of this dissertation. On 
Valerio Orsini and his men: '... gli altri (the Italians) erano armati con 1'elmo et con la corazza alla. 
Italiana, fra i quali la banda del signor Valerio era stimata che fosse ]a meglio a cavallo con buoni cavalli 
turchi. ' Paolo Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 63. 
193 c*.. la cavalleria di Francia. era molto grande et illustre, alla quale Gherlindano (Sir Robert Jerningham) 
Inglese, mandato dal Re Arrigo, aveva aggiunto una sua peculiar banda... '. Ibid. p. 64. At the time Tudor 
light cavalry was equipped in two quite distinct ways: the more common demi-lances, that is heavier 
version of the Italian and continental light cavalrymen, and a sort of English version of the Albanian 
stradiots, that is lancers with light armours, a 'caschetto' instead of the typical Burgundian sallet, and 
mounted on small but resistant horses. It is probable that Sir Robert's company was made up of demi- 
lances, but the Italian military writers were more acquainted with the other kind; Giulio Cesare 
Brancaccio, Il Brancatio, p. 178. Brancaccio probably saw English light cavalry in action during his 
service in France and Flanders. On the English cavalry during the sixteenth century, see Eltis, The 
Military Revolution, p. 114. 
194 Robert Jerninghani was knighted in France by the duke of Suffolk on I November 1523. On 12 April 
1526 he was appointed keeper of the new fortress of Newnhambridge and given the command of twenty 
men. In September 1527 he was sent by cardinal Wolsey to Lautrec's camp in Italy together with Gregorio 
Casale and John Carew. Being a soldier rather than a diplomat, he remained with the army of the League 
while ambassador Casale went to Orvieto to discuss the difficult issue of Henry VIII's divorce; see 
Calendar ofState Papers, Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, voll. III 
part 11, IV part I and II.; '... et maistre lerminghen Anglois, gentilhomme de la chambre du Roy (Francis 
1) et du Roy d'Angleterre, ayant charge de deux cents chevaux. legers, homme bien estim6 et son 
Lieutenant maistre Care (John Carew)-'. Du Bellay, Mjmoires, p. 107. 
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Naples or to fight a pitched battle' 95 ; their cowardice left the League's officers 
96 
astonished: it seemed that eventually 'iudicio divino' had overtaken the Imperialists' . 
There were, apparently, also signs of disintegration in the enemy army: 
deliberately left unpaid, one after another the companies of Italian infantry were leaving 
the Imperial camp 1 97 . The choice to expel most of the Italians from the army was, 
however, a deliberate one. The Imperial commanders were screening their troops, 
bracing themselves for the coming siege. 
On II April, when the army of the League was still seven miles from Naples, 
Jerningharn, Orsini, Selva and the other captains of light cavalry went to skirmish with 
the enemy at Poggioreale, in sight of Naples's walls. After the usual initial success, and 
after their horses were exhausted, they were ambushed by more than four hundred 
Imperial light horsemen. Even though sir Robert and Valerio Orsini had foreseen the 
'imboscata', the latter was wounded twice in the face, thirty of Selva's horsemen were 
198 
captured, and the League's light cavalry was forced to return to its camp . 
195 1 
... come Berlinghan capitanio di cavalli leggieri del Re Anglico ha scritto a Monsignor prefato, che 
ritrovandosi alla coda de li Imperiali, scaramuzzando con loro ha preso alcuni de'loro, et intende gli 
Imperiali non havere determinato il partito che vogliono pigliare... scrive ancora che elli scaramuzzano 
freddamente. '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 6 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 205 r. 
196 Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 29 March 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga- 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 193 r. 
197 On 5 April, 200 Italian footsoldiers had left the Imperial camp, where 'spagnoli e lanzichenecchi fanno 
malissima compagnia alli Italiani, e gli fanno morir di fame di modo a poco a poco tutti i Italiani sono 
costretti a partirsene'. Three days later a company left the Habsburg camp at midday marching with flying 
colours to join the army of the League. It seems that the Spaniards had broken the agreement according to 
which neither the Italians nor the Spaniards would agree to accept their wages unless both were paid. 
Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 8 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Roma, 876, f. 207 r. 
198 , 
... Heri le compagnie di Berlinghan, 
del signor Valerio Orsino e di Hieronimo Selva con loro 
capitanei and6 alla scaramuzza contra gli Cesarei sotto Napoli... questi de la Legha ne venivano con molti 
prigioni... et molti bagaggi... che gli Cesarei non haveano potuto fare cosa onorevole. In quel instante 
venne un caval leggiero di quelli di Hieronimo Selva a dire come alcune reliquie de li cavalli di Cesarei 
erano poco inanti, tutti stracchi. Allora il Silva deliber6 prendere quel resto de li cavalli... contra il volere 
del resto de li capitani... I'altre compagnie lo seguirono, ma con sospetto... che ella non fusse imboscata, 
e grossa. Cossi in un momento usci l'imboscata de Cesarei da quattro cento cavalli in suso, et trov6 queste 
compagnie stracche, e ne prese forse altre trenta di questi del Selva... '. Lodovico Ceresara to the marquis 
of Mantua, 12 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 211 r. 
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The conclusion of the campaign was not close at hand, as many commanders and 
ambassadors of the army of the League seemed to think, and the 'exercito del diavolo' 
was not defeated. 
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Plate 4 
'Dove e gran foco, e gran fumo' 
The motto on Lautrec's impresa 
'Dove era grande valore d'animo nasce 
gran fumo di superbia' 
Giovio's comment on Lautrec's motto 
Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec and 
Capitano Generale of the League of 
Cognac - author unknown. Two ritratti 
are conserved in the Sacristy of the 
Shrine of Our Lady of the Tears, in 
Treviglio. 
Plate 5 
The sallet and the sword of general Lautrec are still conserved under the altar of 
the Shrine of Our Lady of the Tears in Treviglio (Bergamo). It ought to be noticed 
that this sallet is a 'Burgonet', an helmet 'alla Borgognona', that is the model 
preferred by Giovanni de'Medici, even though in this case the sallet has a buffa (a 
protection for the face and the throat) strapped to it. 
On 28 February 1522 French general Odet de Foix decided to raze to the ground the city of Treviglio. The I 
population took refuge in the Convent of the Agostiniane invoking the divine protection. The Madonna, 
painted on the wall of the bell tower of the church, started to shed tears. Informed by his soldiers of the 
miraculous event, and having verified the truth of the report, Lautrec knelt down at the feet of the image 
and laid down there, in sign of submission, his weapons. 
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Plate 6: THE 'PONTE PORTATILE I. 
H 
_zw, 
IL 
IN 
This drawing of a pontoon bridge, taken from Della Osservanza Militare of Francesco 
Ferretti, gives us a good idea of the ponti mobili used by the army of the League to cross 
the treacherous fiumare 1 of the Marche and the Abruzzi that, on a previous occasion, 
had claimed the life of Muzio Attendolo Sforza. On the right bank, one of the boats of 
which the bridge was constructed is still upside down on the wagon used for their 
transport from one river to another. 
Table XVIII 
The Armv of the Lenjue: Umbria, October 1527 - Januarv 1528 
October 1527 2 January 1528' 
Infantry 1000 Landsknechts 1000 Landsknechts 
2200 Italian foot 2000 Italian foot 
Venice Cavalry 40 Men-at-arrns 250 Albanian and Croat Stradiots 
250 Albanian and Croat Stradiots 150 Mounted Crossbowmen 
150 Mounted Crossbowmen 
Infantry 1400-1500 Swiss 1800-2000 Swiss 
4-500 various nationalities 
France 
Cavalry 240 men-at-arms Unknown. At least 100 men-at- 
150 'archers' arms. 
100 archers-sujets 
Florence See Chapter Three 
There is not a good translation for this word. A 'fiumara' is a kind of river that is usually low or even 
dry, but that can swollen very quickly by heavy rains. 
2 Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 5 October 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 125, f. 121 v. 
Orazio Baglioni to the Ten, 20 January 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Reposnsive, 127, f. 95 r. /v. 
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Table XIX: LOMBARDY, DECEMBER 1527: THE FRENCH ARMY 
Captain General: Giovan Giovachino da Genova for France. 
Odet de Foix, vicomte de Lautrec. 
Mounted troops 
Field Commanders: Lances of heavy cavalry (I man-at -arms and 2 lightly- 
Claude de Savoye, count of Tenda, armoured archers per lance): 
commander of the 'vanguardia' Vicomte de Lautrec ; 60 
Odet de Foix, vicomte de Lautrec, lieutenant the baron of 
commander of the 'battaglia' Grandmont 
Monsieur de Montpesat, commander of Count Guido Rangoni; 60 
the rearguard. lieutenant count Ludovico 
Rangoni: 
'Court' of monsieur de Lautrec: Monsieur de Bonaval; 36 
Monsieur de La Val, with 24 lances and lieutenant his brother 
48 archers, stationed in Rome Monsieur de Negre-Pelice 30 
Monsieur d'Este, lieutenant of the lieutenant his brother 
marquis of Saluzzo; Monsieur de Monpesat 30 
Monsieur de Robodanges lieutenant monsieur de Scandiiach 
Monsieur the duke of Albany 60 
'Gentilshommes' of the 'Camera del lieutenant Moriac 
Re' : Monsieur the duke of Lorraine; 45 
Messieurs de Laune, Jamac, Nantouillet, lieutenant Pierrespont, maestro di 
Bonnivet campo 
Paolo Camillo Trivulzio, in Rome Monsieur de Vandemont 42 
Marquis of Vigevano, with 20 lances and lieutenant Gruffy 
40 archers, in Rome Monsieur de la Tremouille; 20 
Monsieur de Pierpon, maestro di campo Lieutenant Louis de Beavillier 
Jan da Asti, Jan da Anza, provosts Monsieur the count of Tenda 36 
marquis of Mortara, in charge of victuals lieutenant the baron of Lille 
Stefano Colonna Monsieur de Sant-Andr6 30 
Monsieur de Severgny, 'generale di Monsieur Claude d'Etampes de la 30 
finanza' Fert6 Nabert 
Monsieur de la Fayette 24 
Commissioners in charge of the Total 503 
musters: 
Monsieur de la Foccoedra, Pietro Light cavalrymen: 
Rizardo, monsieur de Lomlae, the baron Sir Robert Jemingharn 100 
of Lecco Antonio Casale, in English 100 
Jan Beltrand, general treasurer service. 
Monsieur de Scandiiach. Captain de la Grua 100 
Captain Pastiglia 100 
Secretaries of monsieur de Lautrec Total: 400 
Messer Ambrogio da Fiorenza, Gian Vio, 
Gracian, Piloes. GRAND TOTAL (including the 1909 
' archers) 
Gentlemen of the court of monsieur de 
Vandemont Infantry 
Baron of Bussanses, Sandio, Campois, Troops under the command of Pedro Navarro, captain 
Luier. general of the Gascons - lieutenan t captain Borja: Faies, general quartermaster. Commanders of the Gascon 
companies: 
Ambassadors The baron of Beam 700 
Knight Gregorio Casale for England Don Masano 400 
Count Francesco di Somaglia and Mascaron 300 
Massimiliano Stampa for Milan Caiait 300 
Piero da ca'di Pesaro for Venice La Flota 360 
Count Galeazzo Tassoni for Ferrara Blaise de Montluc 300 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi for Aussun 400 
Florence Lamesan 300 
Cardinal Cybo for the pope San Julian 300 
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Granian 
Langhile 
Montruel 
Total 
French aventuriers under 
of monsieur de Burie, 
Commanders of the French 
companies: 
Lambrande 
Forchades 
San Giovanni 
Don Piero de Boemonte 
Moye 
El Basso 
Maro 
Thermes 
Montalt 
Total: 
300 
200 
200 
4060 
the command 
300 
300 
290 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
2690 
Italian troops in French service (the 
'White Bands'): 
Commanders of the Italian 
companies: 
Count Gerolamo da Castiglione 600 
Count Cesare Scotti 600 
Moran Carbon 201 
Maceran 253 
Jan Paolo Cossa 200 
Sorgio Baratta 30 
Grogheto 274 
Le Liol 92 
Giovanni dal Brando, c6rso 98 
Marco Antonio Cusano 210 
Frabaston 150 
Claudio de Rispa 137 
Marco Antonio Trotto 228 
Alfonso Galante 300 
Alfonso Ozerio 800 
Stafirino 300 
Total 3633 
Landsknects under the command of captain general 
Vandemont - that is the German Black Bands: 
Obrist (colonel) Brandech 2000 
Obrist count Wolf 2000 
Imperial 'defectors' under the 700 
command of 'Lupe' 
Total (? ) 4754 
Swiss under the command of captain general monsieur 
Ducrech: 
Swiss 1780 
GRAND TOTAL 16917 
Artillery 
Commander (according to Du Bellay): monsieur de 
Mondragon, a Gascon. 
60 pieces of ordnance; 
900 horses for the drawing of the artillery and of the 
ammunitions; 
600 carts. 
These data are mostly taken from a Venetian rassegna of Lautrec's army in Lombardy compiled in 
December 1527 and included in Marin Sanuto's Diarii (46, pp. 428 ff. ). It ought to be noticed that this 
was not a rassegna of the anny of the League, and did not include Venetian or Milanese forces that at the 
moment were operating in the area or the French troops stationed elsewhere. I have also introduced a few 
corrections and specifications based on comparisons between subsequent Italian muster rolls and French 
secondary sources. According to Sanuto, a French livre was more or less equal to half a Venetian ducat, 
that at the time was worth 6 lire and 4 soldi. The Italian footsoldiers in French service were paid 27,320 
libre per month, the Gascons 29,141 libre and the French 19,505. This means that the average wage was 
about 3 Venetian ducats per month. The monthly cost of such an army was, according to monsieur de 
Lautrec, fifteen hundred thousand scudi. The 'companies' of infantry that exceeded two hundred units 
were almost always ensembles of several companies, that is colonnelli, as in the case of the Gascon baron 
of Beam, whose seven hundred men were divided into five companies, or the Italian Girolamo da 
Castiglione, who had three insegne under his command. The case of Pandolfo Puccini and Giovanantonio 
da Castello should be also remembered, and it would be interesting to compare it with the case of the 
company fort-ned by Blaise the Montluc and Aussun, who, in Alessandria, divided between them 
(unequally) the men previously enlisted by MontlUC4. Unfortunately the Venetian muster inspectors did 
not consider this detail important. It is interesting to compare this muster roll with the one compiled by 
the Ferrarese ambassador in June 1528 (Sheet XX). The figures given by Martin du Bellay in his 
Wmoires' are far more impressive, but, besides not being a reliable source for this campaign, monsieur 
du Bellay emphasise excessively the role of the French cavalry and credits them with a function that they 
never had during Naples's campaign. However, it ought to be remembered that, after almost five months 
of campaigning, many lances had been garrisoned in the cities and castles conquered, and that there were 
scores of unpaid 'gentils-hommes... venus pour leur plaisir pour voir la guerre', who were not included 
in the muster rolls. Count Ugo dei Pepoli. who was to become the last leader of the Black Bands and 
commanded fifty lances at the time, does not appear on Sanuto's list. 
' Blaise de Montluc, Commentaires, p. 77. 
5 Martin du Bellay, Mimoires, p. 107 r. 
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Plate 7 
TERDINANIM GONZAGA SENJOR, PRO- 
RE& SICILIA, FRODVX Ii$Vji&j&. 
Tvrteýrje trado velfatta in medik 
jVull, pidicitiimpoteritproflernere labei, 
infibrimprx. -na Pro duce donre dgrti, 
IVSTICI, fE, & bellic4rm, FE R NiND El4lorel 
7'e, GO NZd G414bermonfiridiffe mori. 
COSAIM 
Ferrante Gonzaga (1507-1557), was the third son of marquis Francesco 11 Gonzaga and Isabella d'Este. 
While Federico, the firstborn, was educated at the court of Francis I of France, and second born Francesco 
was to become a cardinal, Ferrante was sent to Spain in 1523 and became a gentleman of the retinue of 
Charles V, as well as one of the emperor's closest friends'. In September 1526 Ferrante went back to 
Italy, where he started a long and successful career in Imperial service. During the siege of Naples he was 
in command of the Imperial light cavalry, while, at the same time, his brother the marquis Federico had 
joined the League of Cognac and eighty Mantuan men-at-arms were fighting on the side the besieging 
army. During the whole campaign, Ferrante maintained a friendly and detailed correspondence with 
Federico and with his mother Isabella. 
' On this topic, see the books of Raffaele Tamalio on the Gonzaga family and especially his article 'Tra 
Parigi e Madrid. Strategie famigliari gonzaghesche al principio del Cinquecento', Atti del Convegno The 
Court of the Gonzaga in the Age (? f Mantegna: 1450-1550, pp. 69-90. See also Giuliano Gosellini. Vita di 
don Ferrando Gon: aga (Pisa, 182 1). 
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The 'Carta de casa Orsina' 
the North of the State of the Church on January 1528 
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This map was drawn in January 1528 by partisans of the powerful pro-French Orsini 
family to show the commanders of the army of the League the tactical situation at the 
confluence of river Nera with the Tevere. 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 127, f 99 r. 
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Map C: The Road to Naples 
J 
A 
N 0; 
P, 
G A-A G No 
k 
1.1t. TýCrnsf' Un a 
w c 
A 
ej K -M 
6"n, - _rl- 
f.,,, 
.. 
----.. __. __-.. ---. 
AfMC d-... 
*Ti iý1 -1 
Milo sdu, 
I 1'ý ý% trorm. * -'.. .-.: ýTo- i ý4 1.. '-P"" AN -: 4 1, Ap -1 3 VILO CL or 
. A 
A 
oze) 4p 
.t 
co , 1ý. 6 ,, 
5 CUETO 6P. Ififlo., Itip Co. 
C. woý 
.. 
i 
sokmi, 
VLIA 
cin4K:, Uýj I '' ''6 
Io JLI. Iý AT hii 6mcn 
Oc a. 
n. 
.t 
ma.. Ay-- Petloom. cOrArr6vw 
lica 
V. 
1%. 
C. wk-vw 
&%)) -, I (C IN " Co. a, lakno -ffff, k 
V. Ito. 
RVZ 
A jtro. -lip 
Nocca 
OPP 
ceretO 
acnarp. 
0. ' 
0 
M. Falý 
.9- *e-. 
cordD 
IA 
Ab 
tatr 
Of 
ano ,ý 'i ,,. 
3-cro .bF. I 
11,5 
r age. 
cen 
Tr 
cafrmv. 
AL 
Pronmo, 
A. r Vito no 
coda& Wfimo 
,j -7 JLA Ar". 
- 
, xv ---. iýý 
11 
A 11% 1 
VIc 
0 
G ne 
F ID k Ik 1.1 it Ito 
S. Cýc e)". 
vio -W r. .I-0, ýV. C0 1ý -- Mau: A 10 -.. AL 
011-T. 
S. cot 
FOrdVID r, ýýep 
--A it COJIa. -. -. 
ý,: 
a. LF6 0.1 WA-MI 
: ------- ZvO. D1 GAINTA. 
01 
:------. --ý 
Capi. A 
act 
Sak 01,11,146,91. 
Aydia zirraciwa 
Tmcrcf. 
01W 
R. 
At 
45. 
Blue line: the army of the League 
Green line: the Black Bands 
Red line: the Imperial army 
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Chapter V. 
The Siege of Naples 
1. Bastions and Galleys: Naples' Blockade 
,... ma quando il sol gli aridi campifiede 
con raggi assaiferventi e in alto sorge, 
ecco apparir Gierusalem si vede 
ecco additar Gierusalem si scorge 
ecco da mille voci unitamente 
Gierusalemme salutar si sente. 'l 
Torquato Tasso, Gerusalemme Liberata, chant 3. 
After its 'strategic' retreat Erom Troia had become almost a fully fledged rout, the 
Imperial army had been unable to regroup in order to fight the much-spoken of 
giornata, even after the arrival of substantial infantry and artillery reinforcements. 
Eventually, the demoralized columns converged on Naples and camped outside the city, 
while the Imperial generals - the marquis of Vasto (see Plate 8), the prince of Orange, 
Fernando de Alarco'n, Ferrante Gonzaga - and the viceroy Hugo de Moncada devised a 
new strategy. The ideas of a pitched battle or of a retreat towards the south were quickly 
discarded. Against the opinion of the marquis and the pleas of Naples's city Council, 
which wanted to avoid the grim fate of Milan, the viceroy Moncada. decided to secure 
the capital against both the French army and the restless Neapolitan baroni by billeting 
the whole army in the city2: approximately five thousand Spaniards, five thousand 
,, 
*** but when the sun rose 
high over the and fields, / its burning rays at utmost fervour, / Behold, 
Jerusalem appears in sight, / Behold! Jerusalem they show and point / Behold! A thousand voices unite to 
salute Jerusalem. ' 
2 Gregorio Rosso, Historia delle cose di Napoli sotto Vimperio di Carlo quinto, cominciando dall'anno 
1526 per infino all'anno 1537 (Napoli, 1635), p. 15; '... et cosi piangendo indamo i Napoletani, fu 
1'essercito distribuito per le contrade... ' Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 74. 
253 
Landsknechts, two thousand Italians, fifteen hundred cavalrymen both light and heaVY3 
and several thousand camp followerS4 . According to Marco 
Guazzo, the Italians, the 
Spaniards and the Gennans were respectively in charge of the defence of the western, 
5 
northern and eastern sections of the city walls 
In the meantime, the army of the League was advancing very slowly, both for 
logistical and political reasons. All sources agree on the fact that Lautrec's was a huge 
host; Marco del Nero estimated that in total it was made up of eighty thousand persons 
and twenty thousand horses, more than two thirds of which were useless 'mangiatori 96 . 
The provisions and the organizational skills of the maestri di campo were never 
sufficient for the needs of such an anny, and for this reason, before proceeding towards 
Naples, Lautrec wanted to have the logistical and financial support of all the cities south 
of the river Garigliano. Already on II April, while inspecting the camp, the capitano 
generale was greeted by the ominous and multi-lingual chorus of his soldiers shouting 
17 'Ghelt, ghelt! Argent! Denari, denari! . In 
fact, the Florentine representatives did not 
share the optimistic mood of their Mantuan and Ferrarese colleagues: the army had 
plenty of men-at-arms, especially after the arrival of the reinforcements from Mantua 
and Ferrara 8. but its light horsemen were few and 'cattivi', and, despite the imminence 
of the siege of Naples, of all the League's commanders only Lautrec seemed really 
3 Such were the estimates of Venetian colonnello Antonio Maria Avogadro in April 1528, Sanuto, Diarii, 
XLVII, p. 383. 
4 According to a Florentine merchant, the Imperialists in Naples '... avevano con loro 6000 femene... '; 
Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, p. 260,14 April 1528. 
5 Marco Guazzo, Historie di messer Marco Guazzo (Venezia, 1564), p. 82 v. 
6, 
- phi che ottanta mila persone et ventimila cavalli 
[che li dua terzi o piCi inutili et non si potria credere 
la gran quantitA di vectovaglie si consuma]... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 March 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 145 r. 
7, 
- cominciorno 
li tedeschi a gridare "ghelde, ghelde", li franzesi "argent", et li italiani "denari, denari", 
di modo che presto si (Lautrec) ritir6 all'alloggiamento, et pocho apresso mand6 per e'capitani 
exhortandoli a dare speranza a'soldati'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 13 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 128, f, 292 v. Even Marco del Nero was asking for money: his purse was empty, and where 
he was 'bisogna esser copioso et di servitori, di cavalli et chariaggi per potersi accomodare delle cose 
necessario... volendo stare secondo che richiede il grado di chi rappresenta. le Signorie Vostre... '. 
' The marquis of Mantua sent eighty lances, while the duke of Ferrara sent one hundred. The Mantuans 
arrived during the confrontation at Troia, while the Ferrarese contingent joined the army a few days after 
the Black Bands. 
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concerned about the future'. And, albeit 'invictissimo', there was no one else with his 
qualities, wrote Soderini'O. 
Notwithstanding these problems, the pressure of the forces of the League on 
Naples was growing constantly. While the League's light cavalry harassed the 
Imperialists from the east, on 13 April the Genoese galleys of Andrea Doria (1466- 
1560), under the command of his nephew Filippino, bombarded the Landsknechts 
camped near the church of La Maddalena (see Map D). Under the cover of a landing 
party of seven hundred arquebusiers, the Genoese took on fresh water and headed to 
Amalfi. Thanks to his raids on coastal cities and on Spanish ships trying to leave 
Naples, Filippino Doria amassed a considerable booty and captured five hundred 
Spaniards, whom he immediately chained to the oars' 1, exacerbating their old grudges 
against the Genoese. 
On 21 April, while the main camp was still three miles from the city on the road 
to Aversa, the infantry of the League attacked Naples for the first time. Orazio and the 
Black Bands, acting as 'stracorritori' 12 - that is, advancing and attacking at a run - 
caught by surprise and in the open a Spanish contingent of two hundred foot soldiers 
and five hundred light horsemen, forcing them to retreat towards the Porta Capuana 
(see Map D). A first relief sortie made by the Italian companies and a second one 
attempted by the Landsknechts were similarly repelled, and the Imperialists were 
9 Marco del Nero was afraid that the protection of the lines of supply, threatened by the Imperial light 
cavalry, would be entrusted to infantry rather than cavalry troops, '... per esser loro copiosi di cavalli 
leggieri e noi ne siamo scarsi'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 18 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 128, f. 260 r. ; on 27 April Soderini echoed del Nero's words: '... per havere noi pochi cavalli 
legieri et cattivi, che e'nimici corrono ove a lor pare et ci rompono ogni strada... ', f, 234 r. 
10 4 ** . per quel che mi pare non ci veggo 
homo nessuno pensi a questa Guerra se non monsignor 
Illustrissimo, el quale benchd sia invictissimo, mi pare che da solo harA molte fatiche... '. Giovambattista 
Soderini to the Ten, 20 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 233 r. However, the idea that 
Lautrec was 'invictissimo' was rather questionable. 
" Ludovico Ceresara. to the marquis of Mantua, 15 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f, 219 r. 
12 Giovio, La secondaparte, p. 75. Paolo Giovio speaks about French 'stracorritori', but in fact it was the 
Black Bands, whom Giovio himself considered 'velocissimi archibuggieri' (ibid., p. 87), that attacked 
Naples for the first time. The 'stracorritori' were basically infantry companies which, among other things, 
were specialized in running. Still today the Italian Bersaglieri maintain this peculiarity as an important 
part of their regimental tradition. 
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pursued up to Naples' borghi, where Pierre de Veyre 13 ,a gentleman of 
Charles V's 
retinue, was killed by an arquebus shot. More than fifty Imperial foot soldiers and 
twenty-five light horsemen were either killed or captured, while the Bands lost ten men, 
killed or badly wounded. The generals of the League were impressed by this first 
victory of the Black Bands, 'tal che ogni giorno, cresce la reputatione loro' 14 . On the 
other hand, the Imperialists looked 'worse discomfited than when they fled at the town 
of Troye' 
15 
. 
As the League's army advanced towards Naples, the skirmishes intensified and 
reached their peak on 25 April, when almost two thousand Imperial arquebusiers went 
to attack a group of shooters, who were defending a house near Poggioreale, where 
Lautrec was planning to build his main 'alloggiamento'. To support them, Lautrec, now 
encamped only half a mile away from Poggioreale, sent first the White Bands under the 
command of Gerolamo da. Castiglione (see Table XIX) with fifteen hundred 
arquebusiers, and then Baglioni, with two thousand arquebusiers of the Black Bands. 
On their arrival, the Italians of Castiglione were involved in 'una scaramuzza 
grossissima, tutta d'archebusieri'. The losses were heavy on both sides, but the 
Imperialists, possibly Spaniards, were still holding their positions when the fray was 
joined by Baglioni's crack troops. Under their ftnious assault, the Imperial front 
collapsed, and from Naples one thousand arquebusiers and three hundred horsemen 
were sent to support the first contingent, that was now facing annihilation. The skinnish 
continued until sunset, when, after a final charge, the troops of the League managed to 
drive back the enemies and pursued them up to the Porta Capuana. However, their rush 
13 '11 ragazo di uno fante da piedi ha havuto la sua bereta, sopra la quale era una medaia et una catena 
piccola d'oro' Girardo Cadeno to the duke of Milan, Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, pp. 338-339. Pierre de Veyre. 
better known as monsieur de Migliau, had been sent to Italy by Charles V after the sack of Rome with the 
conditions for the liberation of the pope. Since he ended up by trying to stop the negotiations because they 
were taking a turn too favourable to Clement VII, both Guicciardini and Giovio considered his death the 
just reward for his empieui; Guicciardini, Storia d1talia, book XVIII, chapt. XIV, pp. 1894-1895. 
14 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 21 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f, 265 r. 
15 Sir Robert Jerningharn to Henry VIII, 26 April 1528. Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the 
Reign of Henry VIII, vol. IV, part 11,4207, p. 1857. 
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brought the soldiers of the Black Bands within range of the Imperial artillery, and, once 
in front of the Porta, exposed them to the fire of the muskets and arquebuses da posta of 
the bastions' flanks 16 . One of the many victims of the crossfire was captain Lucantonio 
Cuppano, who had his right thigh-bone shattered by a musket shot shortly after killing 
an Imperial light horseman' 7. Eventually, the Florentine forces had to withdraw with 
heavy losses, but Lucantonio, one of their best commanders, was out of combat for the 
rest of the siege, at a time when the Bands' sergente maggiore Giovambattista da 
Messina was still refusing to put aside his irafunesta against Baglioni 18 
On 26 April Lautrec transferred his headquarters to the villa of the duke of 
Montalto on the hill of Poggioreale, which during the preceding days had been heavily 
fortified with trenches and bastions. The camp of the League on Poggioreale and its 
impressive defence system were regarded as Navarro's masterpiece even by the 
Imperialists, and Charles V decided to inspect them during his visit to Naples in 1535 19 . 
Looking at the beautiful city (see Plate 10) from their new position, Lautrec and his 
staff officers pondered the tactical situation. The League's slow advance had given time 
to the Imperialists to strengthen Naples's walls, and the Aragonese defensive system 
(see Plate 9) had been crowned by the massive earthworks that now encircled the top of 
16 On the 'archibusi da posta', 'moschette' - bigger versions of the arquebuses and muskets utilised by the 
footsoldiers - and the use of the 'rampart guns', see Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, Firearms and 
Fortifications (Chicago, 1986), pp. 15-17. 
17 'De questi de la Legha che furrio morti, che furno in quantitate, non vi sono homeni da conto, ma solo 
fanteria privata, ma ben valente, excetto che il capitanio Luca Antonio, allievo del Signor Giovanni 
de'Medici ý sta' ferito da un archebuso e chi dice da un moschetto in una gamba, che gli ha rotto l'ossa... 
lui dimostr6 gran valore che fu uno tra quelli che entr6 sino su le porte di Napoli et amazz6 uno cavallo 
leggiero de'cesarei su le porte ...... Ludovico 
Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 25 April 1528, ASN4n, 
Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f, 238 r. - 239 v. ; see also Lucantonio Zuppano to 
the Ten, 28 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 129, f. 235 r. 
" Three splinters of bone were extracted from Lucantonio's wound. By the beginning of July he was 
doing well, but 'per li soi disordini' he relapsed and his life was again in danger. His own brother did not 
expect him to survive; Nobile Cuppano to the marquis of Mantua, 3 July 1528, ASMn, Archivio 
Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 810, f. 150 r. Nobile Cuppano, who, like his brothers 
Annibale, Scipione, Tommaso and Quintino, was in Mantuan service, had been sent to the camp of the 
League by the marquis to buy the best warhorses the Kingdom of Naples could offer. 
19 1- molti de' capitani Imperiali confessarono che all'etA nostra nessuno altro in luogo veruno non 
s'havea nd meglio nd con maggior diligenza accampato, et dicevano che gran parte di quella disciplina era 
venuta dall'ingegno del Navarro' Paolo Giovio, La Seconda Parte, p. 104. On the visit of Charles V: 
Paolo Giovio, Lettere, vol. 1. p. 169. 
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mount San Martino, reinforced by four cannoni and by a garrison of at least eight 
hundred men. 'Fortificato maravighosamente ý20 and situated just outside the western 
city walls on a rock basement that prevented mining, San Martino did not represent a 
direct threat to the besiegers, but prevented the French from taking possession of a 
position that dominated the city and from encircling it completely. Moreover, Naples 
was not Pavia; Naples was one of the largest European cities and its inhabitants 
numbered more than one hundred thousand 21 ,a fact that, added to the numerical ratio 
between besiegers and besieged - at the very best 2: 1 - argued against a general assault. 
The twenty thousand footsoldiers of the League were barely enough to blockade the 
city. According to del Nero's reports, some ten thousand more men were needed to 
22 launch a proper attack against the town . On the other 
hand, after the surrender of 
Capua, Aversa, Nola and Pozzuoli the League controlled the surrounding cities (see 
Map E), the aqueduct that supplied with water Naples's fountains and watermills had 
been destroyed and most of the fields between the camp and Naples were flooded -a 
decision that Lautrec would eventually regret, because it broke Poggioreale's delicate 
hydro-geological balance 23 (Plate 10). 
However, Naples was also a major harbour, and, in Mediterranean warfare, 
harbours, and not fleets, dominated the sea (see Chapter 2, third section). Naples hosted 
a squadron of six galleys, while Gaeta and the island of Ischia were still in Imperial 
hands (see Map E). Sixteen Venetian galleys were expected to arrive in a few weeks, 
but in the meanwhile the eight galleys of Doria's squadron were not enough to 
blockade the port. In order to intercept the small sailing ships that carried provisions and 
20 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 21 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 265 r. 
2 'According to Pardi and Mols, in the period of the siege the population amounted to approximately one 
hundred and fifty thousand. G. Pardi, Napoli attraverso i secoli, disegno di storia economica e 
demografica (Milano, Roma, Napoli 1924), Roger Mols, Introduction a la Demographie Historique des 
villes d Europe du XIV au XVIII sikle (Gembouse, 1956). 
22 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 26 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 270 r. 
23 G iovio, La Seconda parte, p. 90. , Rosso, Historia 
delle cose di Napoli, p. 3 3. 
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reinforcements to Naples, a galley captain had at his disposal a quite reduced angle of 
at-tack and many other factors to consider, such as the artillery of the harbour or the 
constant threat of a counterattack by the Imperial galleys. Speed under oars and the 
manpower needed to achieve it did not come cheaply, and did not last long. The galley 
was an oared fighting vessel designed to apply its mainly offensive potential on a very 
limited front and for short periods of time; its defensive capacity, in open sea 24 , was 
negligible and its range of action was limited 25 . The best option was a line of blockade 
close to the city, but the sheer size of Naples, its defences, its squadron and the fact that 
the Imperialists maintained, through Ischia and Pozzuoli, partial control over the 
entrance of the Gulf of Naples, prevented the League from establishing one. Since the 
beginning of the siege, the galleys of Filippino Doria were forced to use distant Salemo 
(see Map E) as their main base. 
Aware of the fact that he had not enough troops to storm both San Martino and 
Naples, during this first phase of the siege Lautrec decided to focus on the first. For this 
reason the capitano generale planned to move his main alloggiamento from 
Poggioreale, which was in front of the Porta Capuana, towards San Martino, opposite 
Porta, San Gennaro and closer to the city 26 . While the new quarters were 
being 'posti in 
fortezza' by thousands of sappers, Anton Maria Avogadro, colonnello of the Venetian 
Landsknechts, was sent to preside over the advanced positions. Quartered with his men 
on a hilltop, a 'loco molto scoperto', at an arquebus' shot from San Martino as the crow 
flies, the Brescian condottiere considered it a 'loco fortissimo', and felt little enthusiasm 
2' If caught by a superior force near to the coastline, a galley could protect its main weak point - the stem 
- by mooring at the edge of the beach with its bow artillery turned towards the enemy ships. 25 On the operational limits of the galleys during a blockade, see Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 
57-84. 
26 6'* Monsignor Illustrissimo... vuole mutarsi in un altro allogiamento piCi propinquo a Napoli et al 
Monte San Martino... et giA ha facto cominciare le trincee et si guardano, ch6 in tre o quattro di doverrA 
essere totalmente in fortezza... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 8 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 128, f, 404 r.; see also Guicciardini, Storia dItalia, book XVIII, chapt. XVIII, pp. 1925- 
1926. 
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for the idea of an assault; 'mi par cosa dura, et forsi si potrA dir "Si Africa pianse, Italia 
99927 non ne nse 
At the same time, in Naples the situation was not very roSY18 . The Imperialists 
had 
imposed on the Neapolitans, unaccustomed to war since the first phase of the Italian 
Wars in 1504, the same harsh discipline they had enforced in Milan during the sieges: 
the popolo was disarmed, any 'romore' was forbidden and curfew was enforced 29 . The 
warehouses of Castel Nuovo were full of wheat, and there was, at least at the beginning 
of the siege, plenty of wine to soften the bad mood of the Landsknechts, who, unlike the 
Spaniards, kept on grumbling about their arrears of wages 30 . The city wells made up for 
the lack of aqueducts, but not for the almost complete lack of watermills and, therefore, 
for the shortage of bread. The soldiers used rudimentary handmills to Produce very low- 
quality flour (Spaniards and Italians) or ate boiled grain (the Gennans). However, the 
indiscipline of the Imperial troops, especially when it cairne to the consumption of wine, 
soon jeopardized the logistical situation and exasperated Naples' population 31 , already 
disheartened by the fact that on 2 May the 'miracle' of San Gennaro had not taken 
place, and the blood of the city's patron saint had refused to melt. 
As we have seen, the tactical situation was grave, but not totally compromised, 
and the strategic aim of the Imperialist commanders was now to resist until the arrival 
27 Anton Maria Avogadro to Antonio Capriolo, 28 April 1528. Sanuto, Diard, XL VII, p. 3 83. 
28Neapolitan edited sources on the siege of 1528: Gregorio Rosso, Historie, cit. and Leonardo Santoro, 
Dei successi del sacco di Roma e Guerra del Regno di Napoli sotto Lotrech (Napoli, 1858). Although 
both contain many mistakes and are not up to the works of Giovio and Guicciardini, they give a quite 
vivid picture of the war from the point of view of the besiegers (Santoro was the representative sent by 
the city of Caserta to give Lautrec the key of the city) and of the besieged (Rosso). 
29 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 18 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 259 r. According to 
Rosso, the Imperial generals started to take a census of able-bodied Neapolitans, but soon rejected the 
idea of organizing a militia as dangerous, Rosso, Historia, p. 19. However, it is not clear if a full-fledged 
contribution 'come si fa a la Lombarda' (Girardo Cadeno to the duke of Milan. Sanuto, Diarii, 47, p. 339) 
was really enforced on the capital city of the Kingdom of Naples. 
10 1 ... massimamente 
di vino, col quale solo si sa, come si possono allettare e acquistare gli animi de' 
Tedeschi. '. Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 72. 
11 1 ... nd hoggimai 
Vera pia tanta abondanza, di vino, che bastasse a' Tedeschi, i quali fiiggono il ber 
dell'acqua, come quella che nuoce al corpo... ' Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 74. The Landsknechts raided 
the cellars and the residences of their commanders, Santoro, Dei Successi, p. 65. . Moreovoer, '. -. usati a 
molta libertA, e crudeltA contro a Milanesi et a Romani, sforzavano donne, occidevano, maltrattavano, 
arrobavano... '. Rosso, Historia, p. 33. 
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of the relief army that was being mustered north of the Alps by the duke of Brunswick. 
The political situation was, however, worsening. The majority of the well-off 
Neapolitans - up to eight thousand, according to Santoro - had left the city with their 
families seeking refuge in Sorrento, Gaeta, Ischia and Procida, while the baroni of the 
Kingdom chose their side and prepared for the day of reckoning between Aragonese and 
Angevin factions 32 . 
but at this stage it was Lautrec's army which benefited the most 
from the activities of the pro-French partisans. In Naples, the Imperial consulta was 
paralysed by the contrast between the supporters of viceroy Hugo de Moncada - the 
marquis of Vasto, Cesare Fieramosca, Ascanio Colonna. - and those of the capitano 
generale the prince of Orange, that is Ferrante Gonzaga and AlarcO'n. According to the 
Ferrarese representative in Naples Gerolamo Naselli, in those days the most frequently 
heard phrase was: 'lo me ne lavo le mani'. The reasons for the dispute were of a 
jurisdictional rather than tactical nature, but the situation had been worsened by the fact 
that the prince had been verbally granted by Charles V either the duchy of Milan or the 
viceroyalty of Naples, and Moncada was frantically looking for a way to reinforce his 
position 33 . Given the situation, a military success was the easiest way to 
do it, and so the 
viceroy and his party embarked (literally) on a hazardous expedition aimed at 
destroying Doria's fleet before it could join up with the Venetian galleys (see Appendix 
2). Albeit a terrible blow for the Imperial forces, the defeat at Capo d'Orso in fact 
removed from the consulta Orange's opponents, allowed Charles V's army to have once 
aggain a single strong leader and, as we shall see, planted the seed of discord in the 
League's camp. In fact, the defences did not waver, and the Imperialists strengthened 
their position by expelling from Naples thousands of 'bocche disutill'. Ferrante 
3 32 Leonardo Santoro, who eventually found himself on the wrong side (the losing one) of the barricade, 
gives us a very detailed account of the names and rank of all the barons who actively supported France 
and Lautrec during the siege, and a full list of all the pro-French partisans who paid for their untimely 
choice with their life and/or their lands; Santoro, Dei Successi, pp. 64-65,66-69,127-138. 
33 Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 23 May 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio principi 
esteri, Napoli, busta 9, the folios are not numbered. 
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Gonzaga wrote to his brother that he was still confident in the justness of the Imperial 
cause and in its 'buona fortuna', and remarked upon the great opportunities offered by 
ý1- 34 the eventual confiscation of the lands of such a great number of rebellious barons . 
In the meantime, the excavation of the trenches towards San Martino advanced 
slowly, 'combatendo il tereno a spana a spana' in the plain between the fortress and 
Naples, from which the Imperialists launched frequent counterattacks and organised 
dangerous ambushes 35 . On 2 May, Rossino de'Ciai's company and Avogadro's 
Landsknechts drove back the enemy, pursuing them up to the walls of Naples. In doing 
so the Florentines 36 came under the intense fire of the city's small firearms and started 
to withdraw but, caught in the open without support, they were overwhelmed and 
scattered by a well-timed sortie of the Imperial light cavalry. Hit by an arquebus shot in 
the thigh, captain Rossino found himself isolated and surrounded by enemy horsemen. 
He fought to the death, receiving three lance strokes in the face (together with the thigh, 
one of the partially exposed points of the infantryman's suit of armour the captains used 
37 38 
to wear ) and one - probably the coup-de-grace - in his chest . Some 
fifty men of the 
Black Bands fell with him. 
34 c ... non manchiamo di buona speranza, mediante il soccorso che viene... restare alfine vittoriosi, come 
per i meriti de la MaestA Cesarea accompagnatida buona fortuna habbiarno veduto ogni volta accadere 
che da le imprese pifi disperate le succede la vittoria... et a noi habbia a resultare in grandissimo 
profitto... '. Ferrante Gonzaga to the marquis of Mantua, 7 May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 8 10, f. 181 r. 
However, a few days before he had written to his mother, asking urgently for money, '... per modo ch'io 
mi moro di fame se la Reverentia Vostra non mi sovviene per qualche via... acci6 non habbia a 
sopportare tanta indignitA come io sopporto con vergogna mia, et di tutta la Casa (Gonzaga)... '. Ferrante 
Gonzaga to his mother Isabella d'Este, marchioness widow of Mantua, 23 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio 
Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 8 10, f. 180 r. 
35 t- et se guadagnarno ditto San Martino, habbiamo bona speranza... a sforzarli et taiarli a pezi et 
liberar questa povera Italia da questi marani. '. Antonio Maria Avogadro to Antonio Capriolo, 4 May 
1528. Sanuto, Diard, XL VII, p. 466. 
36 Rossino's company was 'tutta di Fiorentini'. Giovarnbattista, Soderini to the Ten, 6 April 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 224 v. 
37 A typical infantry suit of armour utilized by the first-line pikemen and by the company officers was 
made up of a 'corsaletto' (body armour), 'bracciali' (armlets) and 'manopole' (gauntlets). The 
-scarselloni' (thigh guards) often shielded only half the thigh, and some soldiers preferred not to wear 
them at all. Since Rossino was an infantry commander and an 'allievo del signor Giovanni', to protect his 
head he probably wore a burgonet without 'buffie' (see Chapter 4, Plate 5). 
38 ,- questo caso del capitano Rossino, che in una grossa scaramuccia... vi rimase lui, fento d'uno 
archibuso in una coscia, et poi con tre lanciate nel volto et una nel petto fu amazato... non s'ý per6 parlato 
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The sight of the League's infantry, and especially the Black Bands, caught in the 
open and slaughtered by the imperial light cavalry was becoming ever too common, and 
the death of Rossino was just the last straw39. Signor Giovanni knew how to 'fare 
spalle' to the light infantry with the light cavalry, but he had been trained by the 
Imperialists, and in the French camp, where the value of tactical bodies of light cavalry 
was yet to be recognised, it was hard to find somebody like him 40 . In fact, the precious 
light cavalry of the League had been badly neglected: to the advantage of the men-at- 
arms in the French case, to the benefit of the war waged by the Serenissima in Apulia! 1 
in the case of Venice. Sir Robert Jerningharn and John Carew had died 42 , and their 
company had probably disbanded; proweditore Civran and most of his stradiots had 
been sent to Apulia, while Valerio Orsini, unpaid, had left Venetian service 43 . The 
remaining horsemen were too few - like those of Orazio Baglioni, of whom, according 
to the Florentine commissario, there had never been more than f1fty44 - and were 
altro che della morte di questo Rossino, il quale per le virtfi et buone qualitA sue ci era di ottima 
riputatione, et universalmente arnato da ciascuno.. '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 3 May 1528, ASF, Dieci 
di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 373 r/v. 39 c 
... che ci pare di guadagnarli correndo 
for (to the enemies) drieto et ne tiron nel forte, dove fin dalle 
mura con li archibugi ne offendono, et nel ritirarsi de'nostri per non havere nessuno cavallo che facci loro 
spalle son amazati da'cavalli delli inimici, per modo che credo quando queste Bande ritorneranno, sarA 
mutato la magior parte de'capitani et de'fanti... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 3 May 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 333 r. 
40 Even at the siege of Pavia, during an absence of signor Giovanni, the gendarmes of the duke of 
Alenqon had been unable to support the companies of the Gran Dia-volo, and left them exposed to a 
devastating sortie of the Imperialist garrison. Giovanni '... poi che fu fitornato mosso a ira, et dolore con 
ogni sorte di villanie vituper6 la viltA de'cavalli francesi, i quali erano delle bande di Lanson, perchd 
come havevano promesso, essendoli tanti vicini non havevano dato pure un poco di soccorso alle fanterie, 
abandonate et tolte di mezzo. Perciochd egli da principio haveva biasimato quel luogo, di maniera che se 
if Re e Lanson, vicini al luogo, non gli havessero honoratamente promesso di dargli soccorso, egli era in 
ogni modo per levarle di la fuor di quel pericolo... '. Paolo Giovio, Delle Istorie del suo tempo di 
monsignor Paolo Giovio vescovo di Nocera, tradotte da M. Lodovico Domenichi. Prima parte. (Venezia, 
15 81), book 22, p. 5 00 v. 
41 Vito Vitale, 'L'impresa di Puglia degli anni 1528-1529', Nuovo Archivio Veneto, Tomo XIII, part If 
(1906), pp. 5-68. 
42 John Carowe (Carew) to Henry VIII, 28 April 1528. Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the 
Reign of Henry VIII, vol. IV, part 11,4215, p. 1858. John Carowe died a few days later of typhus like sir 
Robert. 
'3 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 339 r. 
Soderini considered Orsini's discharge a considerable loss for the League. 
44 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 29 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 238 v. 
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ineffectual45 
. Nor was this Orazio's only fault (on the origins of the 
feud between 
Baglioni and Soderini, see Chapter 111). The Black Bands were 'valente et licentiose', 
and most of the captains were 'homini da bene', but the capitano generale, wrote 
Giovaimbattista Soderini, was not a 'grandissirno horno di guerra' and, a capital sin in 
the eyes of a Florentine republican, 'si scorda la militia per il principato'46 . The 
commissario simply could not accept the way in which Baglioni and his Perugian 
followers lorded it 'alla, Perugina' in the Bands' piazza in the camp of the League. The 
maestro di campo and the aguzino were a disgrace 47 , and Orazio was taking 
full 
advantage of the circumstances and of the distance from Florence to 'fare bottega' and 
to break, one after another, the terms of his condotta. The commissario had been 
deprived of his authority and was being kept in the dark about everything just like a 
simple footsoldier 48 . 
The main issue was, as always, the right of 'cassare et rimettere' 
the captains of the Black Bands, who already hated and dreaded Baglioni. Soderini 
wanted to give Rossino's company to Gian Moro 'fiorentino' or to Braccio de'Pazzi49, 
4per non uscire dalla natione', Baglioni was determined to increase Bino Signorelli's 
command, while the captains of the Bands wished to please their sergente maggiore by 
giving the company to his brother. Giovanni Turrini, one of the Bands' best captains, 
45 '... Tentasi ogni di qualche scaramuccia, et per non avere cavali non acquistiamo niente. Questi del 
signor Horatio non sono in essere... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 16 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 337 r. 
46 'Del capitano delle fanterie... n6 si pu6 dire che sia grandissimo homo di guerra, non avendo piii 
experientia che si habi, et forse pifi intentione al suo dominio di Perugia che al mestiero del soldo, come 
accadde etiam al presente, che si scorda la militia per il principato. N6 anchora mostra sapere che autoritA 
habi un commissario florentino ne' vostri eserciti. '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 18 April 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 230 v. 
47 ,*" ci si vive troppo alla Perugina... lo ho pagato lo Auzino pensando si ordinassi meglio le cose di 
questo campo, et si facessi uno Maestro di campo che non fussi uno obbrobrio, ma qui non si pensa altro 
se non a PutilitA che viene per ogni via recta et indirecta in modo di questi ministri... '. Ibid. 48 , 
... lui ha voluto 
far la piaza et far patire i soldati che io pago e dare le grasce a'sua et metter maestri di 
campo che rubino in grosso, lui ha voluto ministrare la iustitia senza alcuna mentione di commissario, lui 
ha voluto fare la decisione tra sd ei soldati quando ha tolto loro i bottini... lui vi rompe i capitoli et vuole 
sforzarvi... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 29 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 
240 v. 
49Gian Moro is included in Giovangirolamo de' Rossi's list of Giovanni's 'valenti homini'. Rossi, Vita, 
p. 98. Both Giovan Moro and Braccio de'Pazzi were on the list of the captains 'condotti a provvisione' 
by Florence in July 1527. Giovanni was given a company of two hundred men, Braccio one of one 
hundred and fifty; ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 5 r. 
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chose this moment to ask permission to entrust his company to his lieutenant - his 
brother - and to come to Florence to discuss, possibly on behalf of the unione, very 
important questions with the Ten 50 . In the meanwhile, on II May, the Imperial light 
cavalry once again inflicted heavy losses on the Florentine infantry; 'et cosi andiamo 
consumando il tempo et li homini da bene' 
51 
. 
Reassured by the victory at Capo d'Orso, Lautrec continued to unfold his plan. 
The capitano generale decided not to leave Poggioreale, and sent Navarro's Gascons 
and the White Bands to guard the new positions towards San Martino, extending the 
whole camp of the League along a fortified line which was now more than a mile and a 
half long. Since the beginning, many commanders had argued that the length was 
excessive, but, as always, Lautrec was inflexible: he planned to tighten the League's 
hold on Naples on two fronts, that is towards San Martino (west) and in the direction of 
the seashore, in the area of La Maddalena (eaSt)52 . To break up Naples' defence system., 
the excavation of new trenches between San Martino and the city was being organised. 
Del Nero believed that, to take the fortress, Lautrec was planning to launch a three- 
pronged assault: two diversions, one from the sea, where the fleet was to cannonade the 
harbour,, and one from the land, directly against the city, would mask the real attack 
53 
against San Martino and force the Imperialists to split their forces . The Florentine 
ambassador was pessimistic, and argued that the coordination of the Imperial forces was 
superior to the League's 
54 
. 
50 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 3 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 333 r. 
5'Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 354 v. 
52 'L'allogiamento che per Paltra mia dissi s'acconciava ý poi ridotto in fortezza, [et di giA vi sono iti 
e'Guasconi et Italiani del conte Petro et del signor Giovangirolamo et del conte Cesare Scotto ad 
allogiare] , che mi pare 
lo continuaranno con questo allungandolo per la testa, et stringendolo per la coda, 
di modo che monsignore non diloggerA dall'habitatione sua, che ý da Poggioreale per non lasciare questa 
parte libera a'nimici donde potrebbono ripigliare I'acque et impedirle a noi'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 9 
May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 409 r. 
53 Ibid. 
54 '[Et in effecto delle loro forze si sanno servire assai meglio di questi altrij (the League)-'. Marco del 
Nero to the Ten, 15 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 413 
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However, after having secured the positions in front of San Martino, by mid May 
the resources of the League were largely devoted to the excavation of the trenches in the 
direction of la Maddalena, and to the preparation of the network of earthworks, bays and 
bastions destined to support their great length - at least one mile, ftom the edge of the 
camp of the League to the 'marina'. To cover the excavations, the artillery positioned at 
Capo di Monte frequently opened fire on the fortifications between Porta. San Gennaro 
and Porta Capuana (see Map D), where the enemy was trying to build a bastion that 
could threaten the League's fortified line. Some shots were also aimed at the city, 
955 apparently without 'grandi effecti . Unknown to del Nero, on 15 May a cannon shot 
hit the quarters of Ferrante Gonzaga and Alarco'n, leaving them stunned and covered 
with rubble 56 . The 'fortuna, di Cesare' was holding out. What was not holding out was 
the patience of the Imperial Landsknechts, a contingent of whom, on 19 May, 
abandoned its positions and was seen marching towards the camp of the League 
ý57 shouting 'Ghelt! Ghelt! . It was just a 'token strike', but also a symptom of the acute 
financial problems the Imperialists were having in Naples. 
On the sea, the delay of the Venetian navy, which was still supporting the action 
of the Serenissima's land forces in the conquest of the Apulian coastal cities of Brindisi 
and Otranto, was starting to upset Lautrec. Doria's fleet had destroyed the Neapolitan 
squadron, but the Genoese galleys were now badly damaged and needed refitting. The 
blockade, already inefficient, was becoming ineffectual, as many round ships entered 
55 'La artiglieria che fu piantata a Capo di Monte trae spesso a alcuni torrioni che sono tra la porta di San 
Gennaro et Porta Capuana, et cosi impedisce di fare certo bastione... e qualche volta trae dentro, ma non 
ne vego fin qua grandi effect]... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 16 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 128, f. 337 r. 
56 Gerolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 23 May 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio principi 
esteri, busta 9, the folii are not numbered. 
57 c*, fu sentito nella terra un gran tumulto, col quale usci fuora una parte de'Lanzichenet gridando 
"ghelde ghelde" e pigliando il cammino verso i nostri ripari, come quelli che debbono essere soprastati et 
tenuti in parole della lor paga. In sul che furono visti i capitani che li richiamarono drento, et subito 
feciono dare nei tarnburi et metter lor guardie... che si pensa fussi qualche loro intentione da quietargli. '. 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f, 421 v. 
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Naples' harbour bringing in precious supplies or, as in the case of the convoy of five 
ships that arrived on 12 May, a reinforcement of eight hundred Spaniards 58 - 
In order to make life in Naples even harder, Lautrec decided to capture and 
destroy the watermills placed near La Maddalena. Besides being advanced fortified 
positions outside the city walls and guarded by Landsknechts, the watermills were also 
the only places where the Imperialists could produce the flour needed to relieve the 
increasingly damaging shortage of bread in NapleS59. The Black Bands, considered by 
both sides one of the most, if not the most, combative units in the army of the League 60 11 
spearheaded the attacks and covered the excavation of the new trenches. Their duty was 
not easy: from the Porta del Mercato (see Map D), the Imperialists could observe every 
move of the enemy infantry and follow the progress of the trenches, while the 
skirmishes were fought at two arquebus shots from Naples itself6l. For long days the 
area became the setting for some of the more violent and intense clashes of the siege, as 
every watermill was sometimes taken and lost four or even five times during a single 
day, according to the savage rituals of trench warfare. Eventually, the forces of the 
League prevailed, but not without heavy losses: the captain general of the Florentine 
infantry himself was among the fallen. 
On 22 of May, during an assault from the newly-made trenches and bastions 
against one of La Maddalena's watermills, Orazio Baglioni found himself separated 
from the arquebusiers of his escort and, 'troppo animosamente messosi con poca 
compagnia in luogo di periculo', was caught in the open by a group of Spaniards. 
'Disannato', that is without corselet, with only leather artnour on and an halberd in his 
58 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 12 May 1528, ASF, Diecl di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 405 r. 
59 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 421 r. 
60 The testimonies to the extreme valour shown by the Black Bands during the siege of Naples and to the 
admiration they excited among both friends and enemies are simply too many to be listed here. 
6' Guazzo, Historie, pp. 84 v. - 85 r. 
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handS62 
, Baglioni was surrounded by the Imperialists, who certainly did not identify 
him 
as a high-ranking enemy officer. According to some sources, he even refused to yield 
ground and tried to make a stand along with a few soldiers". The rescuers found him 
dying, already stripped, his body covered with wounds inflicted by swords and halberds. 
To avenge the death of the Perugian condottiere, Lautrec ordered a general assault on 
the watermill, which was eventually taken by storm. The grindstone, which milled one 
hundred and fifty tomoli of wheat each day, was destroyed64. WIiile Marco del Nero 
joined in the general chorus of dismay at the death of Baglioni - who had been publicly 
commended by Lautrec just a few days before - Soderini pointed out that he had died 
4 solo, come un privato fante', a suitable end for somebody who had always shown little 
regard for 'boni soldati 965 . The Mantuan ambassador remarked that Baglioni had been 
left by the enemies in the same state in which he had left Azzo da Correggio, that is 
naked and with only a sock on. 
62 , .... 
fu amaciato el signor Oracio, el qual mandato da monsignor a far lavore a le sopra ditte trinzee eso 
signor Oracio aveva mandato tre maniche de archebuseri per sua scorta et vedendo che esi non tornavano 
perchd erano stati forciati ritornare per altra strada, ma lui, vedendo questo, deliber6 andare a vedere lui 
proprio dove procedeva questa dimora, et caminando solo in giupone con una alabarda in mano, acapit6 
in la inboscata de li inimici, dove da spate et alabarde fu arnaciato e cavato nudo del medemo modo che 
lui fece lasare el Contaccio cioý con uno calceto drito solo in pede... '. Francesco Benaduso to the marquis 
of Mantua, 25 May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 8 10, ff. 118 
v. - 119 r. 63 'Come sendo il signor Horatio alle nuove trincee... fue asalito da'nimici et non si potendo prevalere 
restb da pifi ferite di arme corte morto et per meglio dire tanto maltractato che mentre si conduceva a casa 
pass6 di questa vita. Che Dio habbia hauto I'anima... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 23 May 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f, 441 r. ; Giovio, La Seconda parte, p. 87: '... quando il S. Horatio 
Baglione per fatal bestialitA discostandosi troppo dalla sua trincea... trovandosi disartnato, fu morto da un 
fantaccin Navarrese, il quale ritirandosi egli gli veniva dietro, che gli cacci6 la punta d'una alabarda nella 
schiena, non essendo egli conosciuto da veruno... '. See also Sanuto, Diarii, XLVII, p. 534. 
64The account of the death of Baglioni written by Cora di Corrado, commander of the Mantuan men-at- 
arms, is slightly different from that of the Mantuan ambassador: in it the Perugian condottiere is hit first 
by an arquebus shot: '... et al principio il signor Oratio andete inanti con qualche 25 fanti de li soi dove 
gie fu dato una archebusada et come il se sentete ferito volse retirarse ma li spagnolli che erano al decto 
molino deteno fora et queli compagni che non erano feriti parte se salvete et parte ne rimaste morti et uno 
fante spagnolo arivete il signor Oratio et gie dette cum una alabarda. in testa et il ----- d'amazare, qua] 
Monsignore come sepe la sua morte fece atachare una grosa scaramuccia de sorte che li nostri andete 
tanto inanti che anivetteno al molino sempre combatendo qual molino masinava cento cinquanta tomoli 
de fon-nento &a il di et la nocte de sorte che li nostri Pano rotto e fracasato. '. Francesco Benaduso to the 
marquis of Mantua, 28 May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 
8 10, f. 121 r. 
65 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 23 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 341 v. 
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The Imperialists responded to the loss of the watermills with a daring 
encamisada 66 in Spanish style. Juan de Urbina, who had taken the place of the marquis 
of Vasto, organised the operation with great care 67 . During the night between 30 and 31 
May, three thousand Spaniards and Landsknechts, equipped with ladders, 'trombe di 
fuoco', 'pignatte', 'fochi artificiati -)68 and 'con loro bravarie de camisate', silently stole 
into the still incomplete perimeter of the League's new earthworks and went up the 
empty trenches that had yet to be 'poste in fortezza', until they reached a passage to the 
main 'alloggiamento' of the League which was not bounded by a ditch. If they had 
managed to reach Poggioreale with all those 'fireworks', the three thousand Imperialists 
could have inflicted serious damage. However, the passage was dominated by a house 
guarded by two Basque companies, whose sentries had sighted the enemy quite early 
and had alerted, in silence, their comrades. To quote Mantuan ambassador Benaduso, 
the white shirts turned into red ones as the Basques repelled the desperate assault 
launched by the Imperialists once they realized that they had been discovered. More 
than two hundred Spaniards, and among them five or six captains, died during the short 
and violent attack, while the losses of the League were minimal69. It ought to be 
66 An 'encamisada', or, in Italian, 'incamiciata', was a surprise attack launched at night - generally a few 
hours before dusk - in which the members of the raiding party wore the 'camisa', that is a white shirt or 
surcoat that allowed them to tell friend from foe at night and in the confusion that invariably followed the 
surprise attack. Spanish and Italian troops excelled in this kind of operations. 
6' This 'encamisada' is mentioned by almost all the sixteenth-century historians who wrote about the 
siege of Naples. Du Bellay, Mimoires, p. 113 r. ; Giovio, La Secondaparte, p. 89. 
68 The 'trombe dafuoco' were handmade flamethrowers that could be utilised only once, made up of a 
reamed log, reinforced with leather and iron rings and placed at the top of a long pole. The 'pignatta' (the 
&pot') was basically a low-potential grenade. On the production of black powder and the military use of 
fireworks, see Girolarno Ruscelli, Precetti della militia moderna, tanto per mare quanto per terra 
(Venezia, 1568), pp. 26 r. - 35 v. 69 'El signor Zan d'Urbino volse fare una camisata bianca et la fece rossa... che non li valse n6 travi, n6 
scale, nd niuno altro in strumento bellico, cume saria a dire pignate, trombe et altri fochi artificiali, che 
cum tuti lori artificii, bisogn6 che se aritiraseno cum gran perzeda de li homeni et capitanii, el numero de 
li quali li capitanii dicono essere morti cinque over sei, dui ne ho visti feriti a morte, lasati in el fato... ma 
d'altri soldati tra guasti et morti se estima che pasano ducento... '. Francesco Benaduso to the marquis of 
Mantua, 31 May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 810, f. 123 r. 
According to Du Bellay, of the two Basque captains, one (Martin) was killed, while Raymonnet was 
badly wounded in the leg, Wmoires, p. 113 r. 
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remembered that, even though the Basques did not receive any support from the main 
camp, the Spaniards, surprised in their turn, were not attacking 'in ordinanza'. 
This was the last great Imperialist counterattack on the side of La Maddalena until 
July, and in fact it concluded the 'settling-down' phase of the siege of Naples. From that 
night on, both sides would move more warily and, as we shall see, far from the city. 
However, Lautrec utilized this success to reassure the duke of Mantua on this point: 
'fortuna'. and not 'valore', had given the Emperor so many victories, but now 
everybody agreed that 'la fortuna e mutata', and 'li cieli... hora li voleno punire 70 . The 
capitano generale felt that the fall of Naples was imminent, and refused even to 
consider the idea of relaxing his army's hold on the city. The news from Florence that 
the Ten were thinking of withdrawing a part, if not all, of their troops from the siege in 
order to protect the republic from the Imperial relief army which was about to descend 
on Italy, excited his anger. Lautrec even threatened to exclude Florence from the 
League of Cognac 71 . Del Nero and Soderini 
had tried, in vain, to keep these new 
instructions secret while they dissuaded the Ten from pursuing their project, since both 
were aware that only the presence of the Black Bands allowed Lautrec to keep the 
enemy under such intense pressure 72 , and 
it took all the remarkable diplomatic skill of 
del Nero to appease the captain general's fury. 
Lautrec's optimism was not shared by everybody. In fact, his decision to proceed 
to a blockade by staying so close to Naples' walls had been motivated by the 
70 Odet de Foix to the marquis of Mantua, I June 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, 
Napoli e Sicilia, 810, f. 125 r/v. 
71 Oratore Carlo Gondi's instructions were to propose to Lautrec three options: either all the Florentine 
forces, or Orazio and his Perugians, or Orazio alone (the Ten did not know that he was dead) were to go 
back to Florence. '... Sua Excellentia era venuta in grandissima collera, parendogli che questo fussi uno 
sinixtro procedere verso lui, in levargli sl buone genti nel colmo della importantia di quella impresa. Et 
che se Vostre Signorie perseverassino in tale deliberatione protestava che le terrebbe per disciolte dalla 
colegatione, et al tempo si ricorderebbe di valersi di tanta ingiuria... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 May 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 380 v. ; the list of the apologies lavished by Marco del 
Nero is two-pages long. 
72 c ... egli 
(Lautrec) stima di poi queste Bande tanto et in fatti conosce quello che ý vero, che se ne fussi 
privo non starebbe bene sicuro sl presso a'nimici, i quali come piý volte ho scritto non fanno rispartnio di 
dire che se non ci fussino queste genti di Vostre Signorie terrebbono il resto poco conto... '. Ibid. 
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assumption that this would heighten the already existing rifts between the various 
components of the Imperial army, and that the siege would be very short. However, 
albeit demoralized and weakened by their recent defeats, the Imperialists kept on 
responding to every blow, while the attrition caused by the sheer size of Naples, by its 
resources and by its 'garrison' had already begun to wear down the initial advantage of 
the besieging army. 
By the end of May the camp of the League had assumed its final configuration. 
The main 'alloggiamento', as well as Lautrec's headquarters, was in Poggioreale, which 
was outside the range of Naples' artillery and protected by ditches, fences, 
'terrepleined' wooden towers 73 and earthen bastions that housed the French heavy 
ordnance. No frontal assault was ever attempted by the Imperialists against this part of 
the camp, in which were stored the ammunition`ý the provisions, the army's 
baggage/artillery train and, of course, the money. It was a veritable city constructed of 
earth, wood and tents, with thousands of inhabitants and many piazze - one for each 
colonneliolregiment of the army and, generally, at least one for merchants and 
victuallerS74 . The alloggiamento was the 
backbone of the besieging army, but, with 
regard to the city, its primary purpose was that of containment. A more offensive role 
was played by the forti that protruded from the eastern and western sides of the main 
quarters, that is towards San Martino and La. Maddalena, which were called by Du 
Bellay respectively 'Fort de Gascogne' (or 'Fort de France') and 'Fort des Basques' 75 . 
Positioned lower and closer to the city, the 'forti' were defined by earthen bastions and 
ramparts 76 , and their 
heavy ordnance - especially that of the bigger 'Fort des Basques' - 
had played an active role in the reduction of the watennills at La Maddalena, and in the 
73 Santoro, Dei successi, pp. 50-5 1. 
74 The pla=-a d'arme, constantly guarded, was at the same time a place in which to assemble and/or to 
drill the troops and where justice was administered. For an early example: Ferretti, Della Osservanza, pp. 
35-40. 
7' Du Bellay, Wmoires, pp. 112-113. 
On earthworks and field fortifications, see Pepper and Adams, Firearms, pp. 71-78. 
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interruption of the works on the bastion the Imperialists were building between Porta. 
San Gennaro and Porta Capuana, and sometimes it had opened fire on the city itself On 
the plain below the hills that surrounded the city the two networks of trenches that 
stretched towards San Martino and the seashore were the third and last 'step' of the 
League's impressive complex of earthworks, the closest to Naples' defences. 
It is really interesting to compare the tactical choices made by Lautrec and 
Navarro during the siege of Naples with those suggested by Francesco Maria della 
77 Rovere in his Discorsi Militari 
. In a century that saw, especially during its second 
half, the publication of dozens of specialized treatises on siegecraft and fortifications, 
the work of the duke of Urbino -a rather incoherent raccolta of personal papers which 
was published long after his death in 1537 - could look quite rough and unscientific. 
However, the Discorsi are the testimony of a soldier of the same generation as Odet de 
Foix and Navarro, a soldier who had been in command of many of the men who fought 
at Naples and had plenty of personal and professional reasons for criticizing the conduct 
of Lautrec and the French 'tactical school'. Remarkably, the model of a besieging camp 
proposed by the duke (see Plate 11) corresponds to the one which had been set up 
outside Naples: it consisted of an 'alloggiamento sicurissimo et fortissimo', a 'forte' 
closer to the city walls and 'a cavaliere' of trenches that stretched towards the city 
walls 78 . Since the arquebusiers could not yet 
develop enough firepower to protect the 
advanced positions from a sortie, and since the trenches were too narrow to shelter a 
sufficient number of men, the duke suggested interspersing with 'gabbionate' (a sort of 
casemates) equipped with muskets, falconetti and archibusi da posta any trench that 
was positioned too far from the range of the fort's heavy artillery 79 . However, this was a 
disposition that was intended to prelude a direct assault against a besieged city. In the 
77 Francesco Maria della Rovere, Discorsi Militari dell'eccellentissimo signore Francesco Maria I della 
Rovere duca d'Urbino (Ferrara. 1583). 
78 Della Rovere, Discorsi, pp. 20 v. - 21 r. 79 Ibid., p. 21 Ov. 
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case of a blockade, Francesco Maria recommended that the camp should not be pitched 
close to the city; that had been, he wrote, the great mistake of Francis I at Pavia, and of 
Lautrec at Naples. The best option was to occupy one or two 'buone terre' ten-fifteen 
miles from the city, taking control of the area that surrounded them. This disposition 
gave the besieger safe back lines, a better time of reaction, and more occasions to 
intercept the enemy supplies before they entered the city; and, in case of a sortie, it 
forced the besieged troops to fight far from their base, without the support of artillery 
and on ground chosen by the enemy8o. What Lautrec did was too much for a blockade, 
and too little for an assault. Furthermore, the duke emphasised the usefulness of light 
cavalry and of reconnaissance parties, two of the weak points of the army of the League. 
By sending most of his men-at-arms to the small towns that surrounded Naples, the 
captain general was probably trying to create a sort of 'safety zone' around the city, but 
the French gendarmerie was the wrong instrument for this: the heavy cavalrymen 
lacked the right equipment, the right training and the right mindset, and quickly 
disappointed everybody with their inactivity and lack of discipline 81 . The French 
controlled the cities, but the more mobile Imperial light cavalry controlled the roads. At 
the same time, close to the city, the League's light cavalry and light infantry were 
subjected to accelerated erosion. Even a civilian like Soderini was aware of the fact that 
'questi Franzesi si straccono', and that, when it came to a war of attrition, the French 
had never shown the same level of endurance as the Spaniards 82 . Marco del Nero 
pointed out how 'ingannevoli' were the losses inflicted on the Black Bands during the 
80 Ibid., p. 26 r. 
81 After Troia, the French heavy cavalry had never lived up to its reputation and had demonstrated on 
many occasions a complete inability to coordinate its efforts with those of other units. By the end of May 
the distrust of them was spreading among the soldiers and the diplomats that lived in the camp of the 
League. '... (Lautrec) metterA in ftituro piý studio al fare cavalcare queste sue armerie, che se fino a qui 
egh havessino [facto el debito suo forse saremmo fuori di briga, o pure che anchora e' lo facessino ... 1'. 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f, 369 r. ; '... 'et se 
questi nostri (horsemen) volessin cavalcare piCi spesso terrebbon piCi sicuro el paese' Giovambattista 
Soderini to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 339 r. 
82 'Questi Franzesi si straccono come la guerra va in lungo... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 16 
May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 337 r. 
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skirmishes under the walls of Naples: by themselves, the figures were not impressive, 
but the qualitative level of the fatalities was 83 
Francesco Maria della Rovere had always tried to act according to strictly military 
considerations and circumstances - sometimes with catastrophic results, as in the case 
of the sack of Rome - and in his Discorsi he recommended that the help that could 
come from external 'sources' (treason, popular uprising, mutiny ... ) should 
be 
considered as a last resort on which a commander should not base his strategy 84 . At the 
end of April the 'pratica de'Lanzi', a secret negotiation conducted by the marquis of 
Saluzzo with the intention of persuading the Landsknechts to leave the Imperial service, 
was still going on, 'benche', wrote del Nero, 'il filo ancora sia sottile 85 . By 26 May, 
many of the high-ranking officers of the army of the League believed that it was time at 
least to prepare a second line, distant from Naples, on which the army could fall back if 
forced to. However, not only was Lautrec sure that the city would soon fall, but 
everybody was so in awe of him that no one dared to propose anything that could clash 
with his forecasts. In the same way, many issues concerning the situation of the army, 
and that should have been discussed in the consulta, were left unresolved because, 
besides Lautrec, only Pedro Navarro, who strongly supported the choice of a 'close' 
blockade, could really propose anything and be listened to 86 . 
81 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 26 April 1526, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 269 r. 
84 Delia Rovere, Discorsi, p. IIr. 
85 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 20 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 366 v. 
86 , ... Sua Excellentia 
ha tanto Pappetito et la speranza del havere prima Napoli inanzi che altro 
impedimento venga che e'non consulta. come questi altri capitani, et del consiglio desiderrebbono che da 
hora si facessi col preparare con ogni abondante cautela le vectovaglie et ogni altra cosa necessaria da 
poter poi soggiornare in quelli luoghi, dove, occorrendo ritirarsi di qua bisognassi, et non Phavere a fare 
di poi tumultuariamente. Et ý tanto Sua Excellentia temuta da qualunque ci sia che nessuno ardisce di 
proporli tutto quello che gli'intende, temendo ciascuno di non essere con mal grado da sua excellentia 
ributtato se forse gli dispiacessi il pensare hora a una simile consulta. Et per questo medesimo rispetto 
molte cose che occorrono giornalmente a diverse persone di questo campo, et forse sarebbono utili, si 
ritnangono indiscusse, et da quel che depende da Sua Excellentia in fuora, o talvolta. del conte Pietro 
Navarra, che ha piCi entratura d'ogni altro, tutto el resto ý poco apprezato, donde che quasi ognuno si 
lascia menare dal filo dell'acqua... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 26 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 128, f 438 r. 
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2. 'Caldi insuportabili et malattie infinite': the Struggle for Naples. 
'Dubitiamo cotesta impresa non habbi a essere un pO' lunghetta.. -' 
The Ten to Giovarnbattista Soderini, 31 May 1528. 
To quote Marco del Nero, the death (22 May) of signor Orazio - 'a chi Dio perdoni'- 
solved many problems 87 , and made possible the reorganization of the Florentine forces 
so frequently urged by commissario Soderini. The very day after Baglioni's tragic 
demise 88 
, Lautrec summoned to his quarters ambassador Marco del Nero, 
Giovarnbattista Soderini, the captains of the Black Bands and of Orazio's colonnello, in 
order to discuss with them the appointment of his Italian protege count Ugo de'Pepoli (? 
- 1528) as temporary 'governatore' of the Florentine troops, that is, at least until the Ten 
chose a successor to the late capitano generale. The importance of the Black Bands was 
such that no leadership vacuum could be allowed, and it is remarkable that in this case,, 
and even after del Nero and Soderini had given their official approval, the assent of the 
Bands' captains was considered important, if not essential. The answer of the 'unione' 
was positive: free at last from Orazio's violent and oppressive leadership, the captains 
declared themselves pleased ('contenti') to have a new commander who was not only a 
soldier of renown, but a man who was 'reasonable and amiable' and knew how to make 
himself obeyed 'with skill' 89 . Since the first day, the commissario approved of the 
87 Dopo la morte del signor Horatio -a chi Dio perdoni - s'6 levato molte difficoltA che fastidiavano ii 
signor commissario. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 26 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, 
f. 430 v. Marco del Nero considered the death of Orazio a considerable blow to the 'impresa', but pointed 
out rather philosophically that it was a 'fructo di questo mestiero', that is the mercenary's life (f. 441 r. ). 88 To celebrate the death of Orazio and the arrival of encouraging letters (probably forged by the staff of 
the prince of Orange) from the relief army in northern Italy, the Imperialists rang all the bells of Naples 
and fired five volleys with all their cannons and arquebuses. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 23 May 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 444 r. 
" 'Cosl chiamati in nostra presentia tuti i capitani delle bande et quelli che servivono el signore Oratio 
parl6 Sua Excellentia exhortandoli non obstante la morte del signor Oratio a dovere servire con 11 valore 
che fin qui havevano dimostro et che accioch6 lo potessino meglio fare haveva di consenso nostro 
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choice of Pepoli: the Bolognese count was 'honorevole, prudente et moderato' and, 
moreover, was a favourite of Lautrec, who had enthusiastically backed his 
candidature9o. 
At the same time, the Florentine representatives struggled to prevent the troops 
who had been under the direct command of Orazio from disbanding completely. The 
Peirugian captains Febo and Leandro, who, according to Soderini, were not 'homini da. 
guerra', refused to remain in Florentine service after the death of their master, and the 
commissario welcomed their decision. On the other hand, Bino Signorelli and Ceccone 
Martelli were good soldiers, but their demands were considered excessive 91 , and were 
therefore 'cassati' (discharged) by Soderini, now at the height of his powers. However, 
the rank and file of the Perugian. companies, which now amounted to seven hundred and 
fifty footsoldiers, had decided to remain in the camp of the League and were divided 
between three newly-appointed captains: the Sicilian Tommaso Gotti da Messina (the 
brother of the sergente maggiore), the Florentine Braccio de'Pazzi and the Corsican 
Giami di Restino 92 . 
Of the one hundred and fifty light horsemen that were included in Baglioni's 
condotta, less than one hundred were in fact fit for service. Given the League's 
desperate need for good light cavalrymen, the commissario decided to give the 
command of the remaining eighty-four light horsemen to the Sienese lacopo Bichi 93 , 
who had been Orazio's cavalry lieutenant. Soderini also managed to retain the services 
disegnato che il conte Ugo ftissi loro governatore et capo sino che dalle Signorie Vostre a chi si 
aparteneva fussi provisto et loro tutti allegramente acceptandolo con la dicta conditione promessono di 
portarsi meglio che mai et cosi in particulare ---- di loro a noi efficacemente hanno promesso et molto 
son contenti di questo govematore che in vero ý persona di reputatione grande in questo campo et molto 
discreto et affabile da farsi pur amare et con dextreza bene ubidire... ' Ibid. f 441 v. 
90 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 23 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 341 r. /v. 
9' Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 27 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 349 r. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Even though lacopo Bichi was from Siena, his fwnily lived in Florentine territory, and he fought 
staunchly for the Republic during the siege of Florence of 1529-1530, where he was killed by artillery 
fire. The Florentines, who admired his loyalty and his valour, greatly regretted his loss; Varchi, Storia 
Fiorentina, vol. 3, pp. 341,3390. 
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of the fifteen lancie spezzate that made up the famiglia d'armi of the late Perugian 
condottiere, and which were now operating as a small independent cavalry unit under 
the command of Angelo Bastardo, an Albanian, after their first leader count Carlo da 
Montone had decided to go back to Perugia ý4. In total, Florence had at its disposal 
ninety-nine light horsemen, a figure that clashes with the estimates of the Ferrarese 
ambassador (see Table 20). 
According to Marco del Nero, at the moment of Baglioni's death, Florence's 
monthly expenditure for the maintenance of the Bands amounted in total to four 
thousand three hundred and fifty 'paghe' (wages) or, approximately eleven thousand six 
hundred ducati. The 'teste vive', that is the soldiers in fact enlisted in the thirteen 
companies, were, broadly speaking, 'el quarto meno, fanti che non sono le paghe', which 
means more or less three thousand three hundred men (see also Table XXI). However, 
owing to the high number of injured and sick, who still collected their pay, the Black 
Bands could in practice count on an effective operational force of two thousand 
footsoldierS95 . Even though the 
losses sustained by the Bands since the beginning of the 
campaign, more or less four hundred men, had been made good, the standard of the 
6 
recruits was judged unsatisfactory9 . 
Owing to their high morale and to the fact that 
between them and Tuscany there were hundreds of miles of ravaged and dangerous 
territory, during this campaign desertion was never a major problem for the Florentine 
troops. 
However, there were other difficulties. The 'forzo', that is the backbone, of the 
Black Bands were their arquebusiers: at least eighteen hundred 97 , according to the 
94 Angelo Bastardo was an Albanian who had always lived in Italy. He was both a cavalry and an infantry 
commander, and was considered by Soderini a 'homo valentissimo'. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 
3 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 23 r. /v. 
95 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 422 r. / v. 
96Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 21 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia. Responsive, 128, f. 345 r. 
97 ,'* nd si pu6 mandarne tanta (gunpowder) che sia troppa, che quelle intendino quanto consumino 1800 
arch ibuseri... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 6 April 1528, ASF, Diec, di Balia, Responsive, 128, 
f 224 v. 
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estimates made by Soderini at the beginning of the siege. The quantity of lead and of 
gunpowder 'fine' consumed by the Florentine forces was astonishing, but 'non si puo' 
servire di questa gente chi non serve della polvere et piombo'98. To buy gunpowder and 
lead in the camp meant paying at least four times the normal price for it. Since the 
beginning of the siege of Naples, the Florentine troops had to draw regularly on French 
and Venetian supplies, 'con grandissimo disavantagio nostro', since the price was 2 
giuli for one libbra of either powder or lead. During the first half of May alone, 
Florence had spent more than three hundred scudi to refill the Bands' flasks and 
pouches, which means that the Florentine forces had fired approximately eight thousand 
rounds in two weeks". The commissario calculated that, at that rate, the monthly 
expense would soon exceed five hundred scudi, 100, and constantly urged the Ten to send 
by ship all the powder and the lead they could find. However, Florence directly supplied 
its troops only once, in June, when one thousand libbre of lead and three thousand of 
black powder were sent to Pozzuoli, escorted by Florentine troops. However, one third 
101 
of the gunpowder was 'grossa', too costly to refine and therefore completely useless 
The main obstacle to the production of black powder was the almost complete lack, in 
Tuscany, of facilities for the production of saltpetre 102 , which 
had always been imported 
from the Kingdom of Naples. Showing his usual spirit of enterprise, ambassador Marco 
98 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 353 r. 
99 My calculations are based on the quantity of powder and lead judged optimal by Imperiale Cinuzzi in 
his book La vera military disciplina, pp. 4447. Cinuzzi calculated that one oncia of powder was needed 
for a palla which weighed slightly less than one oncia. In one libbra there were twelve once, and three 
hundred scudi corresponded more or less to two thousand eight hundred giuli, that is approximately six 
shots per libbra. 
'00 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 19 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 340 r. 
10' Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 24 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 15 r. ; on 
the history of and the differences between the 'polvere fine', utilized by the small firearms, and the 
4polvere grossa' of the ordnance, see Hall, Weapons and Warfare, pp. 67-104. 
'0' On the production of saltpetre: Hall, Weapons and Warfare, pp. 74-79. It is worthy to note that 
Florence started to produce important quantities of saltpetre only during the siege of 1530, when the city 
was cut off from its regular suppliers. 
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del Nero tried to promote the export of saltpetre from Apulia to Tuscany 
103 
, 
but it was 
too little and too late. 
Del Nero's personal initiatives were far more successful on the financial side. The 
already considerable distance between Naples and Florence was increased by the fact 
that the crossing of the Papal States was made dangerous by the presence of angry mobs 
of 'desperati' peasants and by the not-so-veiled hostility of Clement VII towards the 
Florentine Republic. The routes most frequently followed by those who carried the 
wages of the Black Bands were two: one on the Adriatic and one on the Tyrrhenian 
side. The first, the 'via di terra', went from Florence to Ancona, then to Ortona (near 
Pescara) and eventually to the camp of the League through the Apennines with a heavy 
escort of mounted arquebusiers. It was extremely slow - it took more than a month for 
the porters to reach the camp of the League - and unsafe . The 'via del mar Tirreno' was 
only apparently shorter: its lack of a naval force forced Florence to rely on French and 
Genoese ships to send the money to Naples. However, this was not a regular service and 
left the Ten at the mercy of their allies' priorities and of the 'fortune del mare'. For the 
commissario and for the ambassador, the continuous delays represented a constant 
4agonia'. In fact, without the latter's frantic activity as financial broker, the Black Bands 
would have probably disbanded. As we have seen, Marco del Nero was a member of the 
Florentine moneyed elite, and he used his personal wealth - as well as his vast network 
of friendships and connections - to find in the camp of the League the cash that the 
Republic needed desperately. The loans negotiated by the ambassador, often of 
thousands of scudi (see also Chapter Three, third section), were made to him personally, 
and not to the Republic. Del Nero would prepare 'lettere di credito' payable, for 
instance, on the markets of Lyon or Venice (or even directly in Florence), as required by 
the lenders, then would ask the Ten to give 'his' people, that is his relatives and/or 
103 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 8 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 396 v. 
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agents in Florence ('a'miei'), the same amount of money 104 - However, 
del Nero 
repeatedly warned his superiors that these and other financial expedients could not, in 
the long run, make up for all the problems caused by the chronic delays in the arrival of 
the wages. His amici were not a resource that could be tapped too often, without 
occasioning 'dishonore del publico et del privato' 105 which, in this case, were 
inextricably mixed. The ambassador was aware of the financial crisis Florence was 
experiencing, but he declared that had the Ten known the damage done by a ten-days 
delay, they would have borrowed the money even if they had to pay 20% interest on the 
loan' 06 - which, for business-minded del Nero, was presumably a very bad deal. The 
commissario, who lived among the troops, was even more insistent. The death of Orazio 
had added seven hundred footsoldiers and one hundred light horsemen to his payrolls 
and to his worries. The Bands were suffering from the high prices and food shortages 
typical of the 'campi Franzesi' and could not survive if the capisoldi were not 
distributed twenty days after the payday' 07 . In the carnp, of the League everything was 
expensive, and the prices were 'as high as the sun' 108 . The situation of the two 
companies garrisoned in Pozzuoli was even worse: only the fact that they were under 
the command of the two Strozzi captains, Giuliano and Bernardo, was preventing them 
from disbanding'09. The commissario also asked the Ten to send a substantial amount of 
'04 Here is one example: '... io ho provisto il signor commissario di 1050 scudi... con parte de'sopradecti 
denari Who fatto lettere per Venetia et per Lione. 11 perchd piacerA alle Signorie Vostre far pagare costi 
a'miei scudi 450... acciocchd essi ne faccino la provisione et a Lione et a Venetia... '. Marco del Nero to 
the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 211 r. 
105 , 
... oramai 
ho troppo affaticato li amici, et avergh a ricercare si spesso non passa senza disonore del 
publico et del privato... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 12 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, 
f 49 r. 
106 ,... non ostante la difficultA - che io presumo grandissima - di mettere insieme di costA denari, mi 
rendo per6 certo che se le Signorie Vostre vedessimo con gli occhi quanto sia grande il detrimento nel 
tardar qua e' pagamenti solo X giorni, vorrebbono pigliargli ad interesso di 20 per 100 per mandargli qui 
in tempo... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive. 13 1, f 209 v. 
'0' Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 20 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f9 
108 c 
... quelle 
(the Ten) pensono quanto travaglio sia havere queste fanterie sanza danari giA X di in luogo 
ove si compra caro insino al sole'. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 13 1, f 169 r. 
109 et se fussi altri che questi Strozi haremo hauto dificultA tenerli... 'Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 
19 May 1528, ASE Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 340 r. ; in June the commissario pointed out that 
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silver coins such as bardi and lucchesi, which would have been most useful, because in 
practice only gold coins were circulating in the camp, 'con danno comune'. The 
shortage of moneta was causing many problems, but, since Lautrec seemed to ignore it, 
no one dared to intervene' 10. Faced with a possible, and disastrous, failure, Soderini 
asked the Ten polemically if there was somebody in Florence who knew how to keep 
together four thousand soldiers without using money; if so, they should send him to 
Naples, 'perche questa e una scientia che io non posseggo, ne crederei mai 
impararla... ' III . 
Being the elite unit of the assault troops of the League's anny, the Black Bands 
were almost constantly in action. In this phase of the siege, one of their main duties was 
to guard the trenches whose excavation had cost them so much. Following a system of 
rotating shifts, every four days the Bands were on guard duty in the trenches for twenty- 
four hours, while during the other three they were available for the various 'factioni 
extraordinarie', that is to spearhead all the offensive operations in which their skill as 
skirmishers and their aggressiveness were often decisive 112 . However, as the siege went 
on, these heavy duties began to drain the energies of the Black Bands. Their own 
13 
reputation was playing against them' 
On the other hand, there was also some good news. One of the big 'difficultA' 
solved by the death of Orazio was the 'strike' of the sergente maggiore. After the man 
who had offended him had been killed and his brother Tommaso had been given the 
command of a company, Giovambattista. da Messina resumed his role as tactical 
nobody else but Giuliano could have resisted so much in Pozzuoli: '... ogni altro che lui in questo ten-nine 
non si sarebbe potuto ritenere... ' ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, fIIr. 
"0 Giovambattista. Soderini to the Ten, 24 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Respnsive, 13 1, f 15 r. ; on 
the ship that brought the gunpowder and the lead to Pozzuoli, the Ten sent also five thousand scudi 'di 
sole' and six hundred 'ducati di moneta' The Ten to Soderini and del Nero, 28 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 44, f 204 v. 
... piaccili 
(to the Ten) fare provvisione(of money), o, se ý nessuno che si persuada tractenerli sanza 
danari, Vostre Signorie ce lo mandino qua, chd questa 6 una scientia che io non posseggo, n6 crederei mai 
impararla... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 22 June, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f7 
112 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 18 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, fIIr. 
11-1.1 
... nuoce la opinione 
di ioro che ha Monsignore Illustrissimo... '. Ibid. ,fIIr. 
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coordinator and executor of the actions of the Black Bands, and the good effects of his 
return were soon clear. At the same time, the new approach adopted by count Ugo dei 
Pepoli aimed at reducing the excessive demands the Black Bands had been subjected to 
since the beginning of the siege. Not only were the Florentine troops less frequently 
involved in 'factioni', they were also more prudently deployed 114 and, even more 
important, light cavalry were deployed in direct support of the infantry' 15 . Always 
respectful of the authority of the commissario, count Ugo had moved into the quarters 
of the late Orazio and lived among the Florentine troops, where he, like any good 
commander, was forced to 'tenere tavola', that is to spend a lot of money and keep open 
house for the captains and other 'homini da bene' of the Black Bands' 16 . among whom 
he was very popular. Since the beginning, the Bolognese condottiere displayed his deep 
desire to retain a command that, even on an informal basis, would have been enough to 
enhance the reputation of any commander 117 . The Black Bands were the 
best and most 
famous Italian unit of the day and, for Ugo de'Pepoli, who hitherto had commanded a 
mere sixty men-at-arms (see Table XX), they represented the chance of a lifetime. 
However, the longer count Ugo remained in a sort of limbo as provisional 'govematore' 
of the Florentine troops without a regular condotta, the greater the risks became for his 
114 , 
.. ino sotto le mura di Napoli, et non hanno . et hoggi di nuovo el conte 
Ugo con queste Bande ý ito fi 
usato quei di drento uscir fuora, perchd infatti e' vi va con tale ordine che e' conoscono vi sarebbe pocho 
guadagno... ha dimostro et coraggio et prudentia ne Fordinare le cose sue, tale che ciascuno lo comenda. 1 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 7 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 46 r. However, it 
would be interesting to know how much of the 'ordine' of the Black Bands was due to the leadership of 
Ugo de'Pepoli and how much to the skill of sergente maggiore Giovambattista da Messina. 
115 , 
... tutte le 
fattioni che si sono haute a fare a tempo suo (of Ugo), sono state con honore et con 
preservatione di queste genti.... che giA due volte che le sono ite ftiora in sieme con e'cavalli leggieri che 
comanda questo messer Jacopo Bichi hanno fatto sempre buona fattione... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 
15 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, ff. 91 v. - 92 r. ; '... el conte Ugo... si adopera assai 
di alleviame delle factione, che in vero ý stato imposto a questa nostra gente piO che parte conveniente... ' 
Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 3 v. 
116 , 
... il conte 
Ugo... ý tomato nelle Bande Nere e vive con gran spesa come si richiede a chi tien un 
simile loco... '. Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 22 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, 
f7v. ; '... tomato alloggiare dove alloggiava el signor Horatio nel mezo delle bande, dove ý forzato a 
tener tavola et intrattenere li capitani et gli altri huomini da bene... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 22 June 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 79 r. 
117 'Lui (count Ugo) molto prudentemente rispose faccendo prima un fondamento, che non solo in una 
carica come era questa onorata d'havere a govemare queste si valorose Bande da dare reputatione ad 
ogni huomo piii qualificato di lui... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 13 1, f. 44 v. 
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reputatione were his command not be made official or were somebody else eventually 
to replace him. 
In fact, since the beginning the Ten had made it clear that they would not appoint 
another captain general of infantry. On the contrary, their original intention had been 
that, after the death of Orazio, the Bands should stay under the direct command of 
Soderini. According to the Ten, the military skill of their captains, combined with the 
authority of the commissario, were enough to face any challenge' 18 . Even though 
Florence promptly accepted the candidature of Ugo de'Pepoli, the first choice of the 
Ten would have been Pedro Navarro. The preference accorded to the celebrated 
Navarro, who already had all the honours he wanted and would guide the Florentine 
troops from afar, was due to the fact that, for better or worse, at that point the Black 
Bands constituted the Florentine army, and any new condotta would hamper, both 
financially and politically, the secret negotiations for the appointment of Ercole d'Este, 
firstborn of the duke of Ferrara, as Capitano Generale of all Florentine forces 119 
Lautrec approved of this project - Ercole had recently married princess Renee, the 
daughter of late French king Luis XII - but said that, either with or without a condotta, 
the Bands required a real field commander, and, since no soldier could accept such task 
without committing his honour, the sacrifices made by count Ugo required some kind of 
compensation 120 . Moreover, the 
League's captain general pointed out that, besides the 
advantages that Florence would derive from the generalship of young Ercole d'Este, the 
118 ,*'. il desiderio nostro ý che il commissario ne sia padrone, sappiendo che i capitani delle Bande Negre 
o la maggior parte di loro sarebbero apti ad fare ogni factione quando fussero comandati da 
commissarii... ' The Ten to Marco del Nero, 27 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 
44, f 139 r. 
119 The Ten to Giovambattista Soderini. 31 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 44, 
f 148 r. 
120 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 44 r. /,, -. 
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Republic would still need in the future someone like count Ugo both as adviser and as 
executor 121 , and asked a 'grado honorevole' for his protege. 
Giovambattista Soderini, who had to care for the Florentine troops and was 
moved by more practical considerations, strongly recommended the Bolognese 
condottiere to the Ten. The commissario knew very well that the duties of a captain 
general were not limited to the battlefield; as Lorenzo Martelli had to learn during the 
absence of Orazio Baglioni, a unit without a commander who lived among his men soon 
found itself 'declassed', cut off from decisions and exposed to all kind of abuses, and 
more so in the camp of the League, where 'licentia sfrenata' was the rule. The men of 
the Black Bands were not more disciplined than the others, but, being Italians, they 
were more noticed, and Ugo had always backed them as a good 'protectore' and 
'scudo'. Moreover, any 'homo novo' appointed by Florence would have first to win 
122 Lautrec's respect, while the count already enjoyed the captain general's esteem 
Immediately after Orazio's death, the Ten had sent a representative to Mantua in 
great haste to discuss with Paolo Luzzasco the terms of a possible condotta. Giovanni 
de'Medici's fonner lieutenant and associate had recently left Venetian service in 
disgrace 123 , but the negotiations never got started, because Luzzasco had already 
'impegnata la fede' with the pope 124 . At the same time, the negotiations with Ferrara 
had reached a deadlock,, owing to the excessive financial demands made by the duke on 
12 1 Even though the youth of Ercole was not mentioned by Lautrec, it ought to be remembered that the 
condotta of the son of the duke of Ferrara had mainly a political significance. 'Ma perchd egli (Lautrec) 
ama anchora assai il conte Ugo, et gli pare che oltre alla reputatione di don Hercole, le Signorie Vostre 
habbiano bisogno d'un par suo (Ugo de'Pepoli) che sia et per consigliare et per mettere in opera, 
lauderebbe assai che e' segli desse qualche grado conveniente... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 22 June 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 133 1, f. 79 r. /v. 
122 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 3 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 23 v. 
123 Charged with treasonable activities on behalf of the Emperor, Luzzasco had been painted hanged by 
his feet, and had on his head a reward of two thousand ducati, an income for life of five hundred ducati 
per year for his murderer's descendants and the right to pardon three 'banditi'. If the executioner was a 
man-at-arms, he would'be given the command of fifty 'homini d'arme", if he was a light cavalrymen a 
company of one hundred 'cavalli', if he was a footsoldier a company of five hundred men. Francesco 
Gonzaga to the Ten, 27 May 1528, ASF Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 129, f 467 r. 
124 Paolo Luzzasco to the Ten, 31 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 129, f. 511 r. 
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behalf of his son' 25 . On 16 June, the Ten authorised the ambassador and the 
commissario to try to talk count Ugo into joining Florentine service with 'honeste 
conditioni', that is with a salary markedly inferior to that of Orazio and with an 
amended condotta which, this time, would safeguard the city's rights and define more 
clearly the limitations of a captain's authority 126 . The Ten clearly resented the fact that, 
at the moment, they had no real choice in this matter, but eventually they agreed with 
their representatives that Ugo de'Pepoli had all the qualities of a good commander, and 
his prudent behaviour was particularly appreciated. In fact, during the night of 25 June, 
count Ugo led the Black Bands in what was to be their last great success. 
After the disastrous failure of the 'encamisada', on 18 June the Imperialists again 
attacked the still incomplete earthworks and trenches near La Maddalena, and were 
repelled once again with heavy losses by Pedro Navarro and his Gascons 127 . However,, 
the camp of the League still had no safe direct access to the sea, and even though the 
Imperialists could no longer launch an attack from Naples through the marshes of La 
Maddalena, thanks to the superiority of their light cavalry their raiding parties could still 
re-enter the city using the 'via di Somma. The League's fortified line was a sort of half- 
moon that went from the eastern seashore to the fortress of San Martino (see Map D), 
and the encirclement of the city was never completed. Had the siege been short, a 
complete encirclement of Naples would not have been necessary. From their positions 
the troops of the League controlled the access to the main roads, and although the 
125 The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 16 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 44, f 173 
r. 
126 4'*. et per6 quando esso venissi alle conditioni honeste che la cittA potessi sopportarle, lo condurremo 
alli stipendi nostri... sopra che ý necessario che tagliate ogni richiesta. di quelle cose che rendono 
e'capitani insolenti et finalmente poco utili a'loro signori, come sono le condotte delle fanterie et altre 
cose le quali per havere avuto aa maneggiare il signore Horatio avete molto bene potuto conoscere. ' The 
Ten to Giovambattista Soderini, 16 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 44, ff. 173 
v. - 174 r. 127 'Hoggi uscirono li spagnoli molto grossi alla volta di quella trincea dove era il signor conte Piero 
Navarra con e' suoi guastatori a fare lavorare, e' quall per ordine suo mettendosi in fuga, condussono e' 
nimici che li seguitavono fino all'imboscata che gli aveva ordinato. Et essendone fra feriti et morti da 
cento di loro, con perdita solo di tre o quattro de'nostri, si ritirorno in Napoli, dove del continovo si 
intende che e'sono molto allo stremo... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 18 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 13 1, f 83 r. 
285 
fortress of San Martino and mount Posillipo denied them access to the eastern part of 
the city, the fortifications of the League, French control of neighbouring cities, the lack 
of good roads and the ridge of the peninsula of Cuma (partially visible in Map D) were 
all factors that prevented the Imperialists from moving large bodies of troops. While 
Naples itself was not completely blockaded, the Imperial army as a whole was. 
The real danger, wrote Marco del Nero, came from behind the League's fortified 
line 128 . As their enemies tightened, or attempted to tighten, their 
direct hold on Naples, 
the Imperialists intensified their attacks against the League's backlines. The problem 
represented by mount Posillipo, when there was a need to despatch troops quickly from 
one side of the Cuman peninsula to the other was an age-old one, and in Roman times it 
had been partially solved by the famous architect Cocceius, who, when the gigantic 
works for the construction of the Portus Julius were in progress, dug a tunnel 
approximately one mile long through (see Map F) mount Posillipo between Naples and 
Pozzuoli 129 
. At the 
beginning of June, Ferrante Gonzaga used the tunnel to guide his 
light horsemen first to Pozzuoli and then to Aversa. There, they ambushed, 
outmanoeuvred and captured a company of Scots men-at-arms' 30 who had imprudently 
left the city and pursued in open order the group of Albanian stradiots used by Ferrante 
as bait 131 . During the night between 
24 and 25 June, Gonzaga tried the same trick, this 
time with a bigger party made up of light cavalry, Landsknechts, men-at-arms and 
foragers to reap the corn. However, this time the enemy was waiting for him: count Ugo 
with all the Florentine troops, monsieur de Burie with his aventuriers and a unit of 
128 , 
.. ori rarissime volte, et e'loro sono ogni giomo . e'cavalli 
(the light horsemen of the League) vanno f 
per tutto el paese, et pi6 pericolo ý di loro dreto alle nostre spalle che davanti, perchd siamo ben riparati' 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 31 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128. f 351 
129 In the reign of Octavian Augustus. 
130 They were probably the company of John Stuart, duke of Albany (see Plate XX), count of Boulogne, 
Auvergne and regent of Scotland. 
131 'Non si ritennero i cavalli francesi, fra i quali erano le bande de gli uomini d'arme scozzesi ... dove il 
Gonzaga uscendo a tempo fuor dell'imboscata... accerchiando una gran parte di loro co' cavai leggeri, et 
facendo un grande sforzo li ruppe, et perch'erano carichi d'armi gravi, et erano sopra cavai grossi et tardi, 
et gl i fece prigioni... ' Paolo Giovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, pp. 85-86. 
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Landsknechts, supported by Ferrarese and French men-at-arms, converged on the 
narrow valley where the unwitting Imperialists were, in their turn, waiting for their 
prey. 
As they observed hundreds of French gendarmes charging them 'in ordinanza' 
and cutting them off from the place of the ambush, the Albanians sent to provoke 
Aversa's garrison soon realized that this was not a normal sortie. In fact, the French had 
been waiting for them, and the stradiots had to scatter and to gallop away at full speed, 
without being able to forewarn Ferrante Gonzaga. Shortly afterwards, the Florentine 
light cavalrymen and the French and Ferrarese men-at-arms launched a surprise attack 
on the Imperialists, whose cover had become a trap, while the arquebusiers of the Black 
Bands, positioned on the steep slopes of the surrounding hills, fired at them. In the thick 
of the fight, Ferrante Gonzaga was unhorsed and captured by Anguillotto da. Pisa 132 ,a 
light horseman in Florentine service, but was rescued by a counterattack of the Imperial 
Landsknechts, who were routed in their turn immediately afterwards by the gendarmes; 
lacopo Bichi's nose was almost cut off by a knife wound 133 , and the 
bold son of the late 
admiral Bonnivet was stabbed in the stomach 134 . To escape capture, Ferrante had to run 
away on foot and to jump down an escarpment. The Imperial force was dispersed, and 
avoided annihilation only because monsieur de Burie, for unknown reasons, had ignored 
132 Captured by the Imperialists at the end of the siege of Naples, Anguillotto da Pisa joined the company 
of light cavalry under the command of count Pier Maria da San Secondo, Giovanni's half-nephew. During 
the siege of Florence, Anguillotto deserted the Imperial army and went back into Florentine service. 
Promoted to the rank of captain, shortly afterwards he was captured and murdered by his former 
commander; Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, p. 294. 
"' 'I cavali legieri de la Signoria Vostra, per quanto ý referito, hanno facto bene el debito loro; ma in tutta 
sua vita si parrA al volto de missier Jacopo Bichi, che gli comanda, per una gran coltellata che gli ha quasi 
tagliato el naso... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 25 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 70 
r. 
"' 'le seigneur de Bonnivet jeune gentilhomme et vaillant, apr6s avoir fort bien faict son devoir, fut 
bless6 de sorte que les entrailles luy sortirent du corps; toutefois fut port6 a Venouze (Venosa) et fut gueri 
sa playe, mais depuis il mourut par maladie. ' Du Bellay, Memoires, p. 113 r. ; '... il figlio del amiraglio 
passato che come giovane si misse intra li nimici, che se havessin facto cosi li altri franzesi non campava 
homo delli imperiali' Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 25 June, ASF, Dieci di Balla, Responsive, 13 1, 
f. 17 v. 
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count Ugo's instructions to seize' 35 the entrance to the tunnel (see Map F), which was 
the only escape route the fugitives had that would enable them to get back to Naples. 
The losses of the League were minimal, while the Imperialists lost almost four hundred 
men between dead and prisoners, and it took them days to reconstitute the scattered 
136 
companies . 
By July, the status of count Ugo as commander pro tempore, and without 
condotta, of the Black Bands was becoming embarrassing both for him and for 
Florence. Eventually, the Ten decided to offer the Bolognese condottiere the rank of 
Governatore of all the Florentine forces in the Kingdom of Naples and a prowisione of 
one thousand scudi. However, Soderini and del Nero judged this proposal to be 
dangerously inadequate: both the titulo and the prowisione (Baglioni had been given 
the title of captain general of the foot and fifteen hundred ducati per year) were 
insufficient and risked hurting Pepoli's pride, and for this reason they asked the Ten to 
reconsider their decision. As Pepoli had told them, he and his peers found satisfaction 
either in a 'titulo honorevole' or in a 'provisione' generous enough to show the esteem 
in which a commander was held. Count Ugo expected from the Ten the title of 
Governatore Generale of all Florentine forces or a rich commission. In order to please 
the Republic, while the war and the 'spese straordinarie' lasted he was ready to 
renounce the cavalry retinue customarily granted to a generale, and even in peacetime 
he was prepared to have under his command a company of light cavalrymen rather than 
of heavy horsemen' 37 ; as we have seen, this was a considerable sacrifice for somebody 
who had been a commander of men-at-arms. After all, del Nero pointed out, between 
135 c et se il capitano Buria facea quel che era Pordine del conte, si dava loro una meza rotta, perchd lasci6 
aperta la grotta, che havea l'ordine di serrare, onde dovevon tomare tutti quelli che son scappati. Non s'ý 
facto in su questa guerra nd il magior, nd il piii bello conflicto, et ý stato pia presto stratagemma... ' Ibid. 
f. 17 r. 
136 On this fight, see Giovio, La Seconda Parte, book 26, pp. 86-87; Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book 
XIX, chapt. 111, pp. 1952-1953, Santoro, Dei successi, pp. 87-89. 
137 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 28 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. ff. 51 r. - 52 v. 
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his pay and what he was able to steal, a simple captain made more than one thousand 
scudi per year. Even the Ten's more vague assurances would have been better than a 
weak offer 
138 
. 
Both the commissario and the ambassador liked the Bolognese condottiere, since 
he was investing a good deal of his personal resources just in order to win the Ten's 
trust, and was planning a long career in Florentine service. However, the dramatic 
events of the second half of July made all the effort devoted to coming to an 
arrangement fruitless. 
Since the beginning of the siege, both the army of the League and the Imperialists 
had been afflicted with various epidemic diseases. The Florentines, who had strong 
commercial links with Naples, knew very well the danger represented by the seasonal 
fevers that racked the region and by the heat of the Italian summer, and for this reason 
had hoped for a quick conclusion to the siege. 'Questo aere' wrote Soderini already on 
4A )139 16 May e contrario alli oltramontani... . By June the army of the League was 
oppressed by 'caldi insuportabili et malattie infinite', and the danger of the 'peste' (the 
plague) loomed over the camp 140 .A clear 
distinction was made between the 'ordinarie' 
illnesses, mostly malarial fevers and dysentery, and the so-called plague, which in fact 
was epidemic typhus 141 and progressed slowly until mid-July. The sanitary measures 
138 , Et anchora quando e' si discorreva con Sua Signoria (count Ugo) come da noi circa e' titoli o 
provisioni che desidererebbe, et dicendo lui che li suoi pari si pregiavano in una delle due cose, o nel 
titulo honorevole o nella provvisione si gagliarda che supplisse a quello, et che quanto al gusto suo non si 
satisfarebbe di titulo di capitano generale di fanterie nd altro titulo minore che di governatore generale 
overo d'una grossa provisione che potesse dimostrare in che existimatione tenuto e' fussi. Niente di 
mancho che quando le Signorie Vostre lo ricercassino che sanza alchuno premio o titulo durante questa 
guerra e' comandasse queste lor genti, era per farlo volentieri, parendogli guadagnare assai s'eglj 
acquistasse la gratia delle Signorie Vostre. Et qualunche simil cose spesso si dichono pro forma, tuttavolta 
poich6 e'si truova entrato in questo governo io credo che nel modo sopradetto e' ci si manterrebbe con 
pi6 sua satisfattione o mancho discontento che se egli dichiarasse una provisione [di mille scudi]' Marco 
del Nero to the Ten, 16 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, ff. 248 v. - 249 v. 
139 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 16 May 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f. 337 
140 Giovarnbattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f3v. 
14 ' The Mantuan ambassador, who died of typhus himself, left a detailed description of the symptoms of 
the -peste': 'Nascono febre intestine et lente nel corpo de li homeni, che nel principio pare non doverse 
existimare, poi in un momento rinascono con tanto furore che di subito amazza, e queando Puomo 
289 
were grossly inadequate from the beginning, and, as the siege went on, the hygienic 
conditions of the camp of the League became plainly catastrophic. Moreover, following 
the advice of Neapolitan exiles, Lautrec had the aqueduct that supplied the city's 
fountains destroyed, and the river Sebeto flooded the fields, forming pools of stagnant 
water 142 . Under the pressure of the huge and 'licentiosa' army of the League, the 
delicate balance on which the 'paradise' of Poggioreale was based (see Plate 10) went to 
pieces, and it became a disease-ridden trap. The only consolation was that the situation 
was as bad in Naples at it was outside it. In particular, the 'febbre terzana', a form of 
malarial fever that causes febrile convulsions approximately once every three days, 
afflicted large numbers of the rank-and-file but also 'homini di qualitA' like Navarro, 
Vaudemont and Lautrec himself Most of the increasingly numerous daily casualties 
were due to the 'malattie ordinarie' and were private soldiers, exhausted, 
undernourished and with no one to care for them when they fell ill or were wounded. 
However, from April to the end of June, typhus had already killed sir Robert 
Jerningham., his lieutenant John Carew, the commander of the Mantuan cavalry, the 
Mantuan ambassador and the papal nuncio. On 30 June, proweditore Alvise Pisani died 
of 'febbre terzana doppia' 143 . Too sick to continue to serve, muster officer ser 
I Bernardino Politi took his leave at the beginning of June 144 , and in July (see Table 21) 
morto dimostra. alchune pentecchie negre per la schiena... ' Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, 
17 April 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f 223 r. 
142 Physic ian-turned-h istorian Paolo Giovio offered a 'scientific' explanation for the origin of the fevers: 
'Onde necessariamente tutta quella quantitA d'acqua raccolta da molti luoghi si veniva talmente ad 
allargare per quel piano, ch'a poco a poco ingorgando et poi fermandosi I'humore, il terreno di quei 
campi si veniva a marcire, et quindi nasceva una nebbia molto grossa, sollevata sempre, ma non per6 
domata dal sole; la quale perci6 generava le febbri et le divulgava per tutto il campo' La Seconda Parte, 
book 26, p. 90. 
"' On the last days and death of Alvise Pisani, see Sanuto, Diard, XL VIII, pp. 167,174,185,190,207, 
237. 
"' 'SarA aportatore di questa Bernardino di Arezzo, che ý stato rassegna per le signorie vostre lungo 
tempo et ha servito bene et fidelmente, ma per trovarse al presente impedito di grave malattia mi ý stato 
forza darli licentia. Prego vostre signorie I'habin per raccomandato et lo conoschino per lor bono 
servitore... '. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 7 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 14 
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captain lacomo, Filippo went back to Spoleto and was replaced by Angelo Bastardo W 
146 To quote commissario Soderini, 'e'pericoli della guerra sono, e' minori' . Since there 
was really nothing he could do and since the peste had already entered his casa, Marco 
del Nero 'secured' himself from the danger by trying not think too much about it and by 
trusting in divine assistance 147 . On the eve of the dramatic turning point of mid-July, the 
Florentine ambassador estimated that half of the army suffered from some illness 148 
while the Venetian provveditore alle galere, and future Doge, Pietro Lando was even 
more pessimistic in his report to the Senate: no one really knew the number of sick 
soldiers, the dead lay naked and unburied by the score, the miasmas emitted by the 
swamps that surrounded the camp covered the sun even at midday; 'Dio ne aiuti. Da 
ogni parte non si sente salvo ruina. e morte... ' 149 
By June, skirmishes, epidemics and desertion had considerably weakened both 
armies, but since it had to cover the wider front, these losses, coupled with the fact that 
Lautrec stuck to his choice of a close-range blockade, harmed the army of the League 
much more. When, on 18 June, the captain general ordered the drummers of the camp to 
sound a Varme in order to check the effective strength of his troops, the Ferrarese 
ambassador calculated that the army of the League amounted to twenty thousand 
footsoldiers 150 , eight 
hundred lances of heavy cavalry and one hundred and twenty-five 
light horsemen (see Table XX). However, these quite impressive numbers need to be 
put in the right perspective. We have to remember the dimensions of the Neapolitan 
scene of action and the fact that the army of the League was tactically unbalanced: its 
145 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 169 
146 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 22 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 7 r. 
147 ,... a noi in casa ce ne ý gid morti servitori in brevissimo tempo che per tutti e' segni [si giudica sia 
suta peste]. Ma non ci essendo modo da fare altre provvisioni di guardia, ce ne assicuriamo col pensarv, 
pocho et confidar nell'aiuto di Dio... ' [in code]. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 201 r. 
148 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 211 
149 Pietro Lando to the Venetian Senate, 19 July 1528. Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII, p. 293. 
150 In May, Alvise Pisani estimated that there were nine thousand footsoldiers in Naples; see Sanuto, 
Diarii, XL VII, p. 494. 
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superiority in men-at-arms could not make up for its limited powers of initiative caused 
by its shortage of light horsemen. From the beginning of June, the Imperialists virtually 
ceased their attacks on the League's fortified line and, taking advantage of the fact that 
their light cavalry had been in control of the roads since the beginning of the siege, 
directed their efforts against the League's backlines and smaller garrisons. All the cattle 
and wheat the Imperial raiding parties managed to bring into Naples was not enough to 
improve the city's critical logistical situation, but it was enough to give hope to the 
besieged and to force the commanders of the League to deploy large bodies of infantry 
outside the camp, an inadequate and costly replacement for the lack of a few companies 
of light cavalry 
151 
. 
There were, moreover, other discouraging signals. The excavation of the trench 
that, by way of the marshes of La Maddalena, was to seal off Naples from the east and 
to link the camp of the League to the sea, and to the fleet, was never completed. 
According to provveditore Pisani this was due to the marshy soil 152 , but both the 
commissario and the Florentine ambassador blamed rather the dangerous inertia and 
lack of perseverance of the French commanders 
153 
. 
By June it was generally thought that the League's army needed a substantial 
'rinfreschamento', that is an injection of 'fresh' units of infantry and light cavalry. 
However, Lautrec chose another, and far more ambitious, course of action: using the 
Germans captured by count Ugo at the grotta (25 June) the captain general resumed the 
15 1 Giovambattista. Soderini to the Ten, 24 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 15 v. The 
commissario strongly believed that the recruitment of four hundred light horsemen would have ensured 
the eventual victory of the League. 
152 'Come la trinzea si va trovando difficultA a compirla, perchd si trova il fango et paludo, che mal si pol 
far... ' Alvise Pisani to the Venetian Senate, 29 May 1528. Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII, p. 30 
153 'Ma in effetto la natura de'franzesi non porgie diligentia. Fanno spesso buon proposito et buoni ordini, 
et non gli hanno a pena cominciati a mettere in opera che se ne raff-reddano et ý intervenuto questo ancora 
nella trincera che e'volevono condurre fino alla marina et doveva essere fornita pia di fa. Ancora non ý 
arnezata. Chd quando per mancamento di guastatori et quando per essere le fanterie occupate in altre 
factioni, si dismette il lavorare, et pure sarebbe una grande utilitA si per tenergli strecti et si per impedirgli 
quando se ne volessino andare alla volta di Calavria. Bisogna pigliarsi da costoro quello che da loro la 
natura... '. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 25 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. f. 69 r. 
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pratica with the Imperial Landsknechts 154 , and started a new one with two companies of 
Albanian light cavalry which were in Naples 
155, 
promising them either safe passage 
home or employment in French service. The prince of Orange was running out of time. 
money and wine' 56 ; when the Venetian squadron arrived outside Naples (10 June 1528) 
with sixteen galleys, it seemed that the Emperor himself had eventually run out of luck. 
These reinforcements allowed the oared vessels of the League to adopt a more offensive 
approach: Filippino and his squadron (eleven galleys) went to Pozzuoli, between Ischia 
and Naples, six Venetian galleys went to support the expeditionary force of the prince 
of Melfi, who was now a partisan of the French, in its attack on Gaeta, and two 
patrolled the mouth of the Garigliano' 57 . To enforce the blockade of Naples, the 
Venetians relied on smaller ftegate, the same kind of ship used to run it158 . Navarro 
even planned to use the remaining available oarsmen to work on the half-finished trench 
at la Maddalena. At the same time, the Imperial relief army, whose imminent arrival 
had been announced to the Landsknechts on many occasions, was still in Lombardy, 
unable to repeat the miraculous 'leap' of 1527 159 . The morale of the German troops in 
Naples reached rock bottom. For a while, it seemed that in the city there was not enough 
wine to make them 'swallow' the umpteenth lie 160. The Spaniards' faith did not waver, 
but they could not hope to hold the city by themselves. 
154 Marco del Nero to the Ten, I July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. f. 194 r. /v. 
151 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 10 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f, 40 v. 
156 , 11 principe d'Oranges poi hiermattina adunando tutta la gente fece un parlamento publico, nel quale si 
risolv6 che tutto il vino s'accumunassi et si distribuissi per equale tanto al piccolo quanto al grande'. 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 10 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 39 v. The wine was 
instrumental in keeping the Landsknechts quiet, if not disciplined, and in making them accept difficult 
decisions. The importance of wine and beer in the diet of soldiers and in military history has been too 
frequently underestimated and overlooked as a rather embarrassing issue. 
157 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 28 June 1528, ASF, Died di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 51 r. 
151 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 4 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 205 v. 
159 On the campaign fought by Georg von Frundsberg Ounior) in Lombardy and on the disastrous attempt 
to storm the walls of Lodi (30 June), see Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, book XIX, chapt. 11. pp. 1941-1946 
'60 'Non lassar6 di scrivere a Vostra Excelentia qualmente questi capitanei cesarei hanno ditto a 
lanzhinechi, che queste galere sono venute per levar Monsignor Lautrech, come altre volte zA levorno il 
duca de Albania (in 1525), et questo per non havere monsignor luogo sicuro dove retirarse, Ný potendo 
aspettar che'l soccorso loro arrivi qua. lo credo, se li lanzchinechi havesser del vino, che forse crederiano 
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Refusing to set about the recruitment of much-needed reinforcements of infantry 
and light cavalry, Lautrec based his strategy for the prosecution of the siege on two 
assumptions: that the collapse of the backbone of the Imperial army was really 
imminent and that the French fleet would bring the money and fresh troops he needed. 
What the captain general did not realise was that he was walking on thin ice. Since the 
failure of the 'impresa di Sardegna' (see Chapter 2) the relationship between Andrea 
Doria and Francis I had worsened considerably. A series of personal 'faux pas' by the 
king, coupled with his decision to strip Genoa of some of its most important privileges, 
like the overlordship of the nearby harbour city of Savona, brought the old condottiere 
of the sea, whose contract was due to expire at the end of June, to reconsider his 
position in French service at a very critical moment 161 . Francis I had been responsible 
for excessive delays in the provision of the monthly payments for the services of 
Doria's galleys and had claimed for the French crown the prisoners taken during the 
battle of Capo d'Orso. Moreover, messer Andrea resented the fact that, after five years 
of faithful service, the title of admiral had been given to monsieur de Barbisieux and not 
to him. Eventually he decided that it was easier to forgive the sack of his native city by 
the Spaniards years before than Francis' manoeuvres against him and against Genoa's 
status and prestige. According to a fascinating (and probably false) legend, the marquis 
of Vasto, prisoner on Andrea's flagship, heard him complain while sleeping about the 
king's ingratitude, and the next day managed to persuade him into entering the 
162 
emperor s service . 
questa baia, ma il mancarli del vino non li lascia credere cosa alcuna... '. Gerardo da ca'di Mosto to the 
duke of Milan, II June 1528. Sanuto, Diard, XLVIII, p. 116. 
16 1 Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XIX, chapt. IV, pp. 1954-1957. On the dealings between Charles V 
and Andrea Doria, see also Guillmartin, Gunpowder, pp. 25-26. 
162 The mediation of Alfonso de Avalos was instrumental in defining the articles of Doria's agreement 
with Charles V, but by the time he slept on the same galley as messer Andrea, the latter had already 
decided to leave the French service: 'I] marchese dello Vasto accortosi della mala sodisfatione del Doria 
per mezzo di uno suo servitore che nello porto di Lerice lo haveva inteso in sonno parlare, lamentandosi 
delo re di Franza. Quale servitore pigliando lo marchese delo Vasto suo padrone per la mano, che stava 
nella stessa galera, se accostomo tutti due alla poppa, dove donneva il Doria, et celo fece sentire con le 
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By the end of June Lautrec started to receive alarming news from Rome' 63 about 
messer Andrea's manoeuvres,, while his infonnants reported a suspicious increase in the 
number of ships that were slipping into Naples through Filippino's blockade. Realising 
the danger, the captain general tried to appease the Genoese commander by giving him 
back the prisoners 'da taglia' taken at Capo d'Orso and by sending an envoy directly to 
Genoa. However Filippino had already been instructed by messer Andrea to abandon 
the siege of Naples as soon as possible. Seizing the opportunity provided by some grisly 
rumours about French attacks on Doriane galleys - rumours which had been spread by 
his own men - Filippino left the gulf of Naples 164 (3 July). The Genoese squadron could 
not go far without risking an encounter with the French fleet under the command of 
monsieur de Barbisieux 165 , which was heading southwards, and took shelter in the 
harbour of Gaeta, controlled by the Imperialists. Although del Nero dismissed 
Filippino's move as relatively unimportant, the fact that there was once again a 
potentially hostile squadron in the waters around Naples forced the remaining ships of 
the League to shift back to a defensive mode, and the 'mesh' became again too wide. 
proprie orecchie. Da lo che pigliato animo il marchese investi il Doria dopo che havevano mangiato 
insieme, et li persuase a volere lasciare Franza, et accostarsi allo imperatore' Rosso, Historia, p. 36. 
163 Assuming that the pope was once more lying, Marco del Nero appeased Lautrec's anger and dismissed 
as false the rumours about Andrea Doria's change of allegiances. '[... questa mattina andando a corte 
trovai Monsignor Illustrissimo mal contento, per lettere che aveva avute dal Papa con una lettera espressa 
che contenevano come Andrea Doria per mala contentezza si era licenziato dal Re... intendendo io questo 
opposi che non mi era verisimile... che se (Lautrec) non intendeva questo, stamani giA mandava al conte 
Philippino una ambasciata in collera dolendosi aspramente, la quale era apta - secondo la persona che gli 
& sensitiva -a fare solo per questo rottura tra loro. Et in quel cambio gli mand6 dolce parole et gli restitui 
Seron, il segretario dello Imperatore... il marchese del Guasto, che fmo a qui lo aveva Monsignor 
Illustrissimo ... ]' Marco 
del Nero to the Ten, 29 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 55 
Ov. 
164 el conte Philippino che hora si truova XI galere bene armate... hieri si lev6 di qua... Et ne incolpa e' 
padroni particulari delle galere che hanno voluto cosi fare, mossi da una nuova la quale dicono havere 
presentito esser qui in corte, che quella armata del re habbia preso dua delle galere di detto Doria et 
tagliato a pezo tutti gli huomini. La qual cosa ý vero che si ý detta, ma cercando la radice si truova che 
dalle medesime galere del conte Philippino ý uscita. Basta che gli ha trovata questa scusa et con effecto da 
quel poco di disfavore che e' reca questa sua partita in fuora. Quanto allo effecto ý di haverla cara, perchd 
a dire il vero e' dava a quelli di Napoli molte comoditA di condurre dentro rinfreschamenti di viveri in 
cambio di impedire quelli che ve ne portassino. Et monsignor illustrissimo per el fispetto che egli havea et 
per non lo far rompere lo dissimulava el pifi delle volte' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 4 July 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 205 r. /v. 
165Antoine de la Rochefoucauld, great seneschal of Guyenne, lieutenant general of the French Atlantic 
fleet. 
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Moreover, the powerful Sirocco would soon start to blow from the south, making 
sailing ships almost impossible to intercept 166 and, unknown to the besiegers, the French 
fleet was more distant that they thought. However, the outcome of the siege of Naples 
was eventually to be decided by a handful of days saved by one side and lost by the 
other. 
Lautrec was convinced that his negotiations with the Landsknechts in Naples 
would prove decisive. At the beginning of June the prince of Orange had made the 
Gennans swear that they would stay 'ad una vita et ad una morte' with the Spaniards, 
but in his turn he had promised them that the relief army would arrive soon. On I July 
the Landsknecht general assembly, the Ring 167 , gathered 
in a Neapolitan piazza for the 
first time. Many Germans grumbled that if the prince could not pay them, somebody 
else (Lautrec) would do it. Others argued that, since they had been left without wages 
and victuals for so long, they should no longer consider themselves bound by the oath 
of fidelity to the emperor, but should be ready to swear that they would not serve 
anybody else. Unable to express a common line of action, the consiglio met every day, 
and after every session the Landsknechts broke up into small groups of thirty or so, 
debating animatedly among themselves 168 . On 7 July (Tuesday), Lautrec assured Marco 
del Nero that by the end of that week the Gennans would leave Naples; even if they did 
not, the League would retain its advantage: the duke of Brunswick was still stuck in 
166 'El male 6 che el tempo ne scorre sempre verso la stagione che li venti pesono poi tanto che le galere 
non possono assediare il porto, che in uno Sciloccho forzato intreranno li navili di Cicilia con tutte le 
provvisioni che vorranno senza che s'elli possi fare resistenza'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 July 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 228 v. 
167 The Ring, also called Gemein, was not simply a demonstration by all the foot soldiers of a unit to 
protest against something, but a real assembly whose power, especially during the twenties of the 
sixteenth century, was respected and feared by the colonels. The Ring had an internal organization which 
was outside the control of the obrist (the colonel) and, in case of need, elected its own representatives, the 
Amissaten. See Baumann, I Lanzichenecchi, pp. 120-123. 
168 'Non volseno udirlo (the prince of Orange), vociferando molti di essi che e' non gli mancherebbe loro 
patrone bastante a pagarli. Et alchuni altri dicevono che sendo tenuti senza vettovaglie et senza danari non 
erono per giurare piii di servire allo imperadore, ma che giurerebbono bene di non servire ad altri. De poi 
referiscono questi dua che e' si sparsono per la terra et se ne vedeva dove XXV et dove 30 a mucchl 
parlando et disputando insieme... 'Marco del Nero to the Ten, I July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balla, 
Responsive, 13 1. f 194 r. /v. 
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Northern Italy, while the arrival of the fleet of monsieur de Barbisieux and of the much- 
needed money was considered to be imminent' 69 . However, the 'annata di Francia' - 
whose appearance could have caused quite a stir in the Landsknechts' council - was 
inexplicably late. In fact, on 15 July all the Venetian galleys, save those sent towards 
Gaeta, were forced to leave the gulf of Naples to take on supplies of biscuit in Calabria, 
and a stream of ships loaded with provisions for the besieged entered the harbour 170 . As 
we have seen, the logistical and financial situation of the Black Bands was bad, but the 
other units did not fare better. The soldiers of the League ventured outside their camp 
with alarming frequency, not to fight, but to find something to eat 171 , and the 
Gascons in 
particular were leaving the camp en masse to offer their services and earn some money 
during the harvest 
172 
. 
In Naples, the prince of Orange and the other Imperial commanders managed to 
persuade the Landsknecht council that the defection of Andrea Doria opened the way to 
a seaborne relief expedition from Sicily. The Germans accepted the scudo each they had 
previously refused and promised to remain faithful to the emperor until the end of the 
month 173 . It was not much, but 
it was what the prince needed. Philibert de Chalon was 
indeed desperate to gain time, but he had a plan. 
Lautrec believed that his plans had been simply delayed, and not thwarted, but the 
propitious occasion had past. On 13 July the captain general fell ill with 'febre terzana'. 
169 c Monsignor Illustrissimo tuttavia persevera gagliardamente nell' [opinione che innanzi che e' passi 
questa settimana li lanzi di Napoli debbino pigliare partito come Sua Excellentia mi dice riscontrare ogni 
giorno per quelli che vanno innanzi et in dietro.... ] ma pensando come prudente Sua Illustrissima 
Signoria che pur [ potrebbe questo suo disegno mancare desidera grandemente che] I'armata di Francia 
comparisca, che oltre a tutto gli ý molto necessario per conto de' danari de' quali si truova in grandissima 
necessitA. Et ne sta con dispiacere, dolendosi a cielo di questa tardanza' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 7 July 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 187 r. 
170 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 16 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f, 218 r. 
171 'Et hora son sforzati a viver di rapto et fare mille inconvenienti che si possono loro prohibire, et in 
ogni occorrentia che si havessino adoperare a combattere se ne troverebbe p41 fuori del campo a buscare 
che a rapresentarsi alle insegne, cos! interviene in tutte quest'altre bande... ' Ibid. 
172 Commissario Soderini resented that the Gascons not only had 'monopolised' the harvest by driving 
away all the other 'nationi', but had left the Black Bands to perform on their own all the duties expected 
of the light infantry. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 16 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive. 
13 1, f. 175 r. 
173 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 16 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. f. -118 r. /v. 
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and, thanks to his style of leadership, his absence risked paralysing the already 
weakened army of the League. Moreover, the worst suspicions of the collegati were 
confinned by the news that, while they were waiting for it on tenterhooks, the French 
fleet had been besieging Civitavecchia - the main harbour of the papal state, which had 
been occupied by the Imperialists after the Sack of Rome - at the request of Clement 
74 VII. This was another 'colpo di amico' from the pope, as Marco del Nero put it' . 
However, the eyes of the commanders of the League were not the only ones 
scanning the horizon diligently. Probably no less anxious than their enemy counterparts, 
Philibert de Chalon and his staff officers were gathering together the remaining Imperial 
forces, preparing them to deliver a blow that would irrevocably turn the tide of the 
campaign. 
174 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 12 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balla, Responsive, I _3 1, 
f 211 r. 
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3. The Defeat 
'Vedi Napoli, e poi muori'. 
Old Italian Saying 
The French fleet, which amounted to nineteen galleys, two fuste and four brigantini, 
eventually arrived in sight of the seashore of La Maddalena on 18 July, early in the 
monung. However, that day the rough sea prevented monsieur de Barbisieux from 
unloading his precious cargo - the money sent by the Cristianissimo - and from 
bringing ashore his illustrious guests, that is the young prince of Navarre 175 and his 
large retinue of French noblemen. 
To fully understand the dynamics of the situation, some more precise information 
is necessary. The landing place most commonly utilized by the galleys of the League 
was close to the bridge on the river Sebeto (see Map D), not far ftom the church of La 
Maddalena, which was outside Naples's walls, more or less two hundred passi from the 
Bastione del Carmine, and in sight of the Imperial lookout posts. Moreover, the trenches 
of Navarro had never reached the seashore, so that the landing place had not been 
secured and could be safely reached only under heavy escort. When, the following day 
(19 July), the French tenders started to unload the galleys' cargo, it was under the 
protection of the backbone, the 'nervo' 176 , of the troops of the League: the Florentine 
Black Bands, the Gascons under the command of monsieur de Candale' 77 , the 
"' Charles de Foix-Albret, brother of the king of Navarre. 
176 &**. la scorta che era andata alla marina... la quale si pu6 dire fussi el nervo di questo esercito..., 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 221 r. 
177 Charles de Foix-Candale, count of Astarac According to Blaise de Montluc, young Candale was the 
very promising protdgd of Pedro Navarro himself. 
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Landsknechts in Venetian service and a large band of French gendarmes led by 
monsieur de Laval 
178 
. 
Blaise de Monluc has left in his Commentaires an action-packed aCCOUntI79 of the 
engagement of 19 July 1528. At the time the future marechal de France was a captain 
of infantry (see Table XIX); his arquebusiers (more or less ninety men), three-four 
hundred shooters ftom Candale's colonnello, of which he was not a member (see Table 
XX), and three-four hundred from the Black Bands controlled the crossroads around the 
church of La Maddalena. These were advance troops; their respective main bodies were 
positioned behind the closest of Navarro's ramparts. According to his account, young 
Blaise was the first to sight the massive sortie of the Imperial troops, both infantry and 
cavalry, who were trying to reach the landing place of the League by using the walls 
behind the church to shield their advance and to sneak behind the covering troops of the 
League 180 . whose commanders, at that moment, were almost all at the 
landing place, 
intent on giving a very formal, and very long, welcome to the prince of Navarre, who 
decided to have dinner with them before he left his galley. Montluc, who went 
personally to warn his superiors 18 1, regarded the delay, almost three hours, caused by all 
these futile ceremonies as catastrophic, and rightly so. The arrival of the French fleet 
had not gone unnoticed. In Naples the prince of Orange and Ferrante Gonzaga, who led 
the sortie, had been just looking for an opening like this. The stretch of land between the 
half-finished trench of La Maddalena and the seashore was a very conspicuous gap in 
the League's fortified lines; to bring the much-needed money to their camp, Lautrec's 
178 Jean de Laval, seigneur de Chateaubriand, who had been captured at Pavia together with king Francis 
179 Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, mar&hal de France (Paris, 1864), 
Vol. 1, pp. 91- 100. 
180 ,** J'apperceuz quel la cavalerie sortoict a pied, tenant la bride en une main et la lance en I'aultre, se 
baissant tant q'ilz pouvoinct pour Westre descouvertz, comme faisoint aussi les gens de pied, qui 
marchoint en tapinois demier les murailles... ' ibid. p. 93. 
181 Quite caustically, Blaise the Montluc shouted to the crews of the tenders which shuttled between the 
seashore and the fleet those 'seigneurs and gentilhommes' who 'estoient encores dedans s'arnusant A fere 
des accolades' that the enemy was coming and that they should think about the combat, 'S'ilz vouloient'. 
Ibid. 
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troops were forced to leave their cover and to face an enemy attack close to Naples's 
walls for the first time in months. Even though the coffers full of tens of thousand of 
ecus d'or au soled that the fleet had brought were the main target, the Imperial 
commanders desperately needed some kind of victory to boost the morale of their 
troops, and to give their Landsknechts something to think, and to talk, about during their 
assemblies. 
The landing of the prince of Navarre took place in a far less dignified way than 
expected: as Candale, count Ugo and captain Artigaloub rushed to reach their units, the 
prince had to leave his luggage behind, and was given a horse to reach the camp of the 
League at a gallop, while the gentlemen of his retinue had to rely on their legs 182 . By 
that time the coffers had already been brought into the main alloggiamento. Located 
with his unit close to the shoreline, Montluc came under the fire of the League's galleys 
that mistook his men for the enemy, but managed to repel a first attack of a group of 
enemy shooters. However, further inland, things were going badly: Laval's gendarmes 
had been caught in the open by the Spanish arquebusiers and, as they started to 
withdraw at a steady trot, were charged by both the Imperial cavalry and infantry 'de cul 
and de teste'. The French men-at-arms' ordinanza broke up, and those who could 
galloped back towards the League's fortifications, but found on their way the colonnello 
of Venetian Landsknechts, which was arrayed on the road that led to the gate of the 
rampart. The Germans could not suddenly open their ranks to give way to the French, 
and the gendarmes were out of control; when the Imperial troops led by Ferrante 
Gonzaga fell upon them, neither the pikemen nor the men-at-arms, hopelessly 
entangled, could mount an adequate resistance. With their ordnung in disarray, 
182 Again, Blaise de Montluc pointed out how all those gentlemen 'n'eurent pas loeisir de s'arrester avec 
nous... '. Ibid. p. 94. 
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S. Marco's Landsknechts were quickly defeated, and their flag captured' 83 . In vain count 
Ugo dismounted and led his lancie spezzate and forty arquebusiers of the Black Bands 
into the fray; after offering a stiff resistance to the enemy, most of Pepoli's men were 
either killed or wounded, and the Bolognese condottiere himself was eventually 
captured 184 . The troops of the League outside the rampart found themselves cut off. 
Colonel Candale was badly wounded and taken prisoner 185 , as were many of the French 
gentilhommes who had just arrived with the prince of Navarre. Pursued by Imperial 
Landsknechts, Blaise de Monluc and his arquebusiers made for the gate, but to cross it 
they had to force a passage through the ranks of Gonzaga's light cavalry by opening fire 
on them 186 . The gate of the rampart was made of stone and, as Monluc says, it was a 
pre-existent structure - possibly some kind or arch, or the gate of a villa's park - that 
had been incorporated into the defensive system designed by Navarro. It had a vaulted 
roof and a dozen men could have crossed it walking side by side; but, even though it 
had hinges, there were no doors' 87 . Having reached the relative safety of the camp, 
Monluc and his men were forced to take cover in the trenches behind the rampart, as the 
Spanish arquebusiers arrived and started to open fire from their side of the gate, 
establishing through it a very localized, but effective, 'killing zone'. The Spaniards 
could not yet cross the gate but the troops of the League did not dare to approach it. 
The situation was desperate: if the enemies entered the defensive perimeter and 
established a bridgehead, everything was lost. After half an hour of finious shooting, the 
183 c ... [quella 
(the French cavalry) nel fuggire dette in uno colonnello de'Vinitiani el quale sbarattato et 
sopravvenendogli gli inimici perse la bandiera et fu rotto ... ]' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 July 1528, 
ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 221 r. /v. 
184 ,**. [il conte Ugo con circa 40 de'nostri archibugieri, che si era spinto innanzi con essi et il resto delle 
Bande per dare loro animo, et li smontassi et gagliardamente combattessimo alquanto, non poterono per6 
sostenere la piena, et cosi morti et feriti la maggior parte di loro, il conte rimase prigione]'. ibid. 
185 Young colonel Candale was also a nephew of Odet de Foix. Three days after his capture he was sent 
back to the camp 'in su la fede' to recover from his wounds, but there he died after a brief last agony. 
186 'Et pour gaigner le dit portal, il me fauzist combattre, r6solu de passer ou mour-ir. Je leur fiz fere ung 
salve d'arquebuzades... Sur ceste salve ilz me firent place' Monluc, Commentaires, p. 98. 
187 & ... y avoict ung grand portal 
de pierre, par le quel dix ou douze homess eussent peu passer de front; et 
croy qu'anciennement il y avoict eu porte, car tout I'arc y estoit faict en voute'. Ibid. p. 92. 
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marquis of Saluzzo crept into the shallow trenches of the League and told Artigaloub, 
now in command of the Gascons, to lead his men through the gate. The captain refused 
to comply, arguing that, by doing so, he would lose too many of them. Desperate, the 
marquis went to the trenches occupied by the Black Bands, and gave them the same 
orders. At once, the Italians left their trenches and marched towards the gate, where they 
were joined by the sheepish Gascons. After a ftnious assault, the troops of the League 
regained control of both ends of the 'portal', but the marquis, who wanted to cut the 
losses at the end of a disastrous day, stopped their advance 188 . Fully 
in control of the 
field for the first time since the beginning of the siege, the Imperialists withdrew to 
Naples. As Marco del Nero wrote to the Ten, 'la giornata e stata trista per noi' 189: five 
hundred soldiers of the League had been killed - one third of them were from the Black 
Bands - and as many had been captured' 
90. 
Monluc blamed Ugo de'Pepoli for this defeat, who, according to him, had 
stationed the German pikemen in the wrong place'91. The Florentine commissario and 
the ambassador, who resented the capture of their military governatore, openly accused 
the French cavalry of cowardice; they pointed out that the gendarmes' incompetence 
had utterly disheartened the footsoldiers, who, after so many blunders, knew that they, 
188 c (< Cappitaine Artigueloube, je vous en prie, levds-vous et donnds, car il fault passer le portal >>. Mais 
luy respondist qu'il ne pouvoict... Monsieur le Marquis, ne se contentant de ceste response, coreust aux 
bandes noires, leur commandant marcher vers le portal, lesquelles incontinent se levarent et marcharent 
ver le dict portal... je (Monluc) coureuz au cappitaine Artigueloube et luy diz: << Mon compagnon, vous 
recevds icy une escome pour jamais ; car voilA les bandes noires sur ma vie qui viennent au portal pour 
emporter I'honneur. >> Lequel incontinent se leva... donnant la teste baissde au portal... '. Ibid. pp. 99-100. 
189 'Et se la battaglia di Vostre Signorie, ritirandosi giA li Lanzichinech et li Guasconi, non havesse fatto 
testa gagliarda et combattendo ributtato li Spagnioli, sarebbero venuti fino a'nostfi ripari, con troppo 
danno di tutto lo exercito'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
13 1, f 222 r. Del Nero's report (one hundred dead and one hundred prisoners) was grim enough, but the 
figures given by Soderini (see next note), who lived among the soldiers, were far worse. 
" 'Pur si pu6 dire (the League) havere perso 500 homini o pi6, che vi sla el terzo delle nostre Bande. et 
e'prigioni son pi6 che altretanti'. Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 19 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 13 1, f 177 r. 
19' Even though this is not the place to shift the blame, it ought to be remembered that Ugo de'Pepoli was 
not in command of the Venetian troops. 
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2 
unlike their Imperial counterparts, could not count on the support of the cavalry'9 . 
Moreover, both the Imperial troops and their commanders had seen all the weaknesses 
and limitations of the army of the League, all things the Landsknechts would inevitably 
193 
remember in their future dealings with Lautrec 
Even worse, the Imperialists had not seen a substantial number of troops 
disembark. In the days that followed the engagement of 19 July, the situation of 
Lautrec's army emerged in all its seriousness. Everybody had assumed that, together 
with the prince of Navarre, the French fleet would bring enough money and troops to 
'refresh' the camp. However, besides the prince's household and the usual retinue of 
gentlemen-adventurers, only eight hundred footsoldiers had landed, and the money 
carried by the Cristianissimo's paymasters was insufficient to free Lautrec from the 
debts he had run up with his own officers while he was waiting for it. Years later, while 
writing his Commentaires, Blaise de Monluc gave vent to his resentment, but in 1528 
the young Gascon and his fellow captains could not help feeling abandoned by their 
king and disappointed by his ministers, knowing that the enemy was drawing the 
obvious conclusions from the arrival of such a weak force' 94 . By the end of July, the 
Imperial commanders probably knew that the French were no less isolated than they 
were, and that the final outcome of the conflict would be decided without the 
intervention of substantial reinforcements on either side. 
On 19 July the League had lost control of the field, and had not the means to 
regain it; the wind had changed, and it was not just the Sirocco that was starting to blow 
192 6... la ributtata che nel fare scorta alli danari et all'admiraglio quando smont6 con li altri gentilhomini 
di galera hebbono e'nostri per colpa delle gente d'arme franzese, che vilmente si messono in fuga... ' 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 228 r.; 'Basta che la 
giornata ý stata trista per noi, 11 che in maggior parte si attribuisce alla mala prova che hanno fatto questa 
cavalleria franzese come & intervenuto quasi sempre che ella si ha havuto ad operare in questi giorni. 
Cosa che toglie assai di coraggio alla fanteria, conoscendo non si potere fidare nel soccorso de 1 cavalli, 
come saria necessario. Et come fanno gli spagnioli, che gli hanno perfetti, et se ne servono assai... ' 
Marco del Nero to the Ten, 19 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 222 r. 
193 4 Certamente che tendendo al disegno di far risolvere i Lanzi di Napoli al passare di qua, non ý stato 
punto al proposito -- .' 
Ibid. 
194 Monluc, Commentaires, pp. 102-103. 
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from the south, swelling the sails of the ships full of provisions that were entering the 
harbour of Naples. Because of the victory, drinking the water they normally despised 
became a source of pride to the Landsknechts' 
95 
; in droves, they raised their right hands, 
96 
renewing their oath' . On 25 July, the Spanish community in Naples celebrated the day 
of the apostle St. James (Santiago Matamoros, St. James the Moor-slayer) with great 
pomp and ostentation; the good saint, in his turn, 'ended' the 'peste' (it was typhus) in 
the CitY197. 
Outside the city walls, after mid-July, the typhus epidemic, that up to that moment 
had been somewhat contained, literally exploded, spreading quickly among the troops 
of the League, including the Black Bands'98 . Every day the sick multiplied 'a 
maravigiia. ý 199 , and by 5 August, thanks to the report of count Ugo, who had been 
swapped for five Spanish captains the day before, del Nero believed that the number of 
soldiers fit for combat available in the League's camp was more or less equivalent to the 
whole of the Imperial forces in Naples, that is between six thousand five hundred and 
seven thousand men 200 . Pepoli himself was so ill that he had to leave the camp and to go 
to Capua, where he died three weeks later, shortly before the defeat of the League, 
without resuming his office of temporary governatore or signing a condotta with 
Florence. By the beginning of August, the company of Scipione da Imola was in such a 
bad state that it was disbanded, and the few remaining soldiers were divided among the 
'9' 'Quanto allo sperare che'Lanzi, per non volere bere acqua, o per non havere denari habbino a fare altro 
movimento... ý cosa vana, perchd gli hanno preso in gloria il sopportare ogni stento per vincere et sono 
pi6 ostinati che mai... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, 
ff. 228 v. /229 r. 
196 G iovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, p. 95. 
197 Rosso, Historia, p. 43. 
198 ,'*. in campo sotto Napoli ý intrato la peste in quelli de la Banda Negra... ' Pietro Lando to the 
Venetian Senate, 13 July 1528, Sanuto, Diarii, 48, p. 30 1. 
199 li tant] infenni ogni giomo si moltiplicano a maraviglia ... ] Marco del Nero to the Ten, 25 July 
1528, ASF, Dieci di Balla, Responsive, 13 1, f 
200 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 5 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 365 v. 
305 
other captains 201 , but this was not enough to make good the losses inflicted by militarY 
encounters and disease. Moreover, the soldiers recruited locally were 'mala gente' who, 
being close to home, tended to desert, so that the ambassador asked the Ten to send two 
thousand Tuscan footsoldiers, 'sciolti', that is not organised in companies, by sea, to fill 
A- - 202 the ranks of the Black Bands . Of the staff of the commissario, the treasurer 
Filippo 
Altoviti, the paymaster Marcello Strozzi and Francesco Ferrucci were so ill that by mid- 
August they could not leave their beds 203 ; of the sixteen members of thefamiglia of the 
ambassador, only his secretary messer Bruno and a groom were still alive 204 . Swept 
by 
typhus and by malarial fevers, the Florentine cavalry soon ceased to exist as an 
operational unit; from his sickbed, Jacopo Bichi asked the Ten to take care of his 
family, and announced that the Bands were, in practice, the only support left to the army 
of the League 205 . Every night 
Spanish mock attacks caused the camp's alarm to be 
sounded two or three times, and exhaustion and sleep deprivation were giving the coup 
de grace to the already 'rotti' soldiers 
206 
. 
In the rest of the camp, the situation was not different: as monsieur de Lautrec 
-,,, warTecovering, with difficulty, from his illness, he started eventually to take note of 
the real situation of his army, and, for the first time, Marco del Nero noticed the first 
'0' Giovambattista, Soderini to the Ten, 9 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 349 r. At 
the moment of its disbanding, the company was also without a commander. It seems that Scipione had left 
the camp in July; unfortunately, many of the letters written in July and August were intercepted, and the 
chancellors of the commissario and of the ambassador were so ill that they could not write many 
'duplicati'. 
202 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 5 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f, 365 v. 
203 Giovambattista, Soderini to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 347 
204 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 368 r. 
205 'Per esser quando io ero sano, continuo qua in le fattioni, so'stato negligente al scrivere alle Vostre 
Illustrissime Signorie. Hora per questa quanto piý posso le rengratio dello essersi degnate ordinare qui al 
Signor Commissario m'habbi messo fra Paltri servidor loro... non voglio mancare raccomandarli quella 
poca famiglia mi ý restata costA nelle terre loro, quale con me et dopo me ha sempre a vivere sotto 
Pombra delle vostre Illustrissime Signorie alle quale delle cose di qua non dir6 altro, se non che se prima 
le gente loro erano la reputatione di questo essercito, adesso sono si pu6 quasi dire el campo proprio, chd 
altro non c'ý - pia di sono - che lo sostenga che queste 
bande. N6 altro ci ý restato di formidabile appresso 
li nimici'. Iacopo Bichi to the Ten, 17 August 1528, ASF, Dieci 
di Balia, Responsive, 132, f. 106 r. 
206Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 347 v. 
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cracks in the mask of confidence of the captain general'07 - Besides killing or 
incapacitating the rank and file by the thousand, the epidemics had almost decapitated 
the army: by the end of July, only messer Ambrogio da Fiorenza was still active 4per 
conto del Consiglio', while, 'per conto della guerra', the marquis of Saluzzo, second in 
command to Lautrec, and Guido Rangoni were the only 'persone di recapito' still fit for 
service, and neither enjoyed Florence's trUSt208. Pedro Navarro, Paolo Camillo 
Trivulzio, the maestro di campo 
209 
and monsieur de Vaudemont 
210 
were either ill or still 
too weakened to take service, while the captain general of the ordnance was dead. The 
gendarmerie had in practice ceased to exist, as the men-at-arms, either ill or faking an 
illness, had left the disease-ridden camp of Poggioreale for the more wholesome ville 
around NapleS21 1. The footsoldiers, as usual, were stuck in their trenches. 'C'est grand 
peine d'aller a cheval, c'est la mort d'aller a pied. 
However, Renzo da. Ceri, who had arrived with the fleet, having no rank in 
Lautrec's anny and therefore no reason to be afraid of his disfavour, criticised openly 
the conduct of the captain general 212 and eventually persuaded him of the need to recruit 
fresh troops of infantry and light cavalry. Signor Renzo was hurriedly (27 July) 
dispatched to FAquila, with the task of enlisting up to four thousand Italian footsoldiers 
and all the light horsemen he could find between Rome and the Abruzzi. The French 
207 c*'. a me pare che a Monsignore Illustrissimo ne sia entrato qualche timore... et vorrebbe hora haver 
facto quello che mai fini qui se gli 6 ossuto persuadere... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 29 July 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 235 r. 
208 Ibid. 235 v. 
209 Guillaume de Rochefort, seigneur d'Ally, also called 'Pierrepont', that is Pierpont, as in Table XIX 
2 '0 Louis de Lorraine-Vaud6mont, count of Vaud6mont; his branch of the family of the dukes of Lorraine 
had inherited the rights of Charles I of Anjou over the crown of the Kingdom of Naples. He died a few 
weeks later. 
211 Ibid. f. 235 r. 
212 c- [ma pure (Renzo da Ceri) fa gran frutto in parlare al manco libero, et dire le cose egli le intende a 
Monsignor Illustrissimo sanza curarsi tanto del tarlo turbare, come fanno quasi tutti li altri che non 
ardiscono dirli quello che credono li habbia a displacere, intanto che molte cose gli sono tenute occulte, 
che saria bene le sapessi. Et in vero e' ne & causa da sd medesimo, per la mala cera che ci fa a chi gli dice 
quello gli dispiacej... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 25 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 
241 r. 
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treasurer of I'Aquila was to finance the whole operation, and the unlucky Renzo 213 
promised to be back within twenty days with the reinforcements - 'che se sia fra un 
1) 214 mese . wrote del Nero, 'non fard poca diligentia' 
The remaining forces of the League shifted to a purely defensive mode 215 1) 
guarding a defensive perimeter that, Soderini pointed out, had been too long when, at 
the beginning of the impresa, the besiegers had been 'one hundred thousand'. 
Nevertheless, until the end Lautrec refused to reduce the overextended front of his 
16 
army2 . Only a few days after their defeat of 19 July, the troops of the League found 
themselves besieged in their own camp. The Imperial raiding parties multiplied their 
efforts, patrolling the campagna and constantly probing the enemy defensive 
capabilities, making any activity immediately outside the trenches positively 
dangerous 217 . Some 
daring individuals, disguised, entered the camp itself Without 
cavalry, the forces of the League had lost any capacity of reaction. 
Frantically, a revived Lautrec multiplied his efforts to recruit new companies of 
light horsemen; he also recalled the Venetian stradiots from Apulia and ordered the 
many men-at-arms who were fit for service, but who were 'a rinfrescare' in the nearby 
villages, to go back to the camp of Poggioreale 'sotto pena della vita'. Given the 
excellent perfonnance of the Black Bands, the captain general asked Florence to send to 
213 Albeit a renowned condottiere and a protdgd of Francis 1, Renzo dell'Anguillara had the reputation of 
being very unlucky, and his fiasco at the defence of Rome had considerably worsened the situation. When 
they authorized him to recruit footsoldiers in Tuscany, the Ten pointed out quite caustically: 'El Signor 
Renzo & homo sforttmato; pure, di tante, una ne potrebbe colpire. Se ha a fare, facci presto. ' The Ten to 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 24 September 1527, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e Commissarie, 42, f. 
103 r. Even the Ferrarese ambassador in Naples wrote that on 19 July '... signor Renzo con la sua solita 
disgratia giunse... ' Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 31 August 1528. ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, 
ambasciatori, Italia, busta 9, the folios are not numbered. 
214 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 28 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f. 246 r. 
215 'Intanto noi ci staremo in su le difese... ' Ibid. 
216 '[Habbiarno un recinto di campo che era troppo quando eravamo centomila... e1 piii prudenti 
consigliano restregnere il campo per la sicurtA di esso, risparmio degli uomini. Non & parso al patrone 
(Lautrec). ]' Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 
347 v. 
217 'de' nostri saccomanni et bagagli ogni di ne ý presi fino su'ripari - et a me tocch6 una coppia di muli - 
et fino allo abbeveratoio sono venuti a torre e'cavalli... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 24 July 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. f 228 r. 
308 
Naples the two thousand Tuscan footsoldiers previously destined for Lombard y218. 
Lautrec had already asked the general Saint-p01219 , who was campaigning with another 
French army in northern Italy, to send him at least three thousand footsoldiers. 
However, Saint-Pol did not acknowledge the captain general of the League as his 
superior 220 . Apparently, Odet de Foix had been away from the French court for too long. 
The hope excited by Lautrec's new provisions was as short-lived as his recovery 
r__ - from the illness: there was neither the time nor the money to implement them. Without 
the arrival of substantial reinforcements, the slow breakdown of the army of the League 
could not be stopped. On I August Imperial troops from Naples sacked Somma, without 
the gendarmes and light horsemen stationed here offering any resistance, *cosa di gran. 
vergogna 221 , and one week later (8 August) the Spaniards captured Somma's 
garrison 222 . On 7 August two 
hundred Landsknechts of the Black Legion were attacked 
by the Imperialists while escorting a convoy of victuals and, after rushing to take shelter 
in two houses, surrendered 'molto vilmente', while twelve of captain Gian Moro's 
arquebusiers, barricaded in a nearby church, kept on fighting and managed to avoid 
capture 223 . By mid-August, the enemy 
light cavalry had forced the troops of the League 
to abandon the landing point to the mouth of the Sebeto, and the camp lost direct 
contaet with the galleys 224 . The searce provisions of 
bread, wine and meat ran out, the 
soldiers of the League started to starve, while the horses and the other animals of the 
camp could not be brought safely to the drinking troughs, which were just outside the 
218, 
... mi ha molto preghato che replichi alle 
Signorie Vostre di mandarli 2000 fanti ordinati per 
Lombardia, chd ha fede sieno buone genti, apresso a queste Bande Nere. li optimi portamenti delle quali li 
ta desiderare coteste... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 29 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1. 
ff. 235 v. - 236 r. 219 Franqois de Bourbon, count of Saint-Pol. 
220 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 2 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 376 v. 
221 'Et questa notte hanno cavalcato fmo a Somma, et scalato ]a terra 11hanno tutta saccheggiata. non 
avendo fatto alcuna resistentia una banda d'huomini d'arme et di cavalli 
leggieri che si trovavano dentro. 
cosa di gran vergogna' ibid. f 376 r. 
II vo Ii dettono un'altra spogliata, et presono ogni 222 'Hiersera tornorono gli Spagnoli a Somma, et di nuo I 
resto di cavalli vi si trovava di guarnigione... ' Marco del Nero to the 
Ten, 9 August 1528, ASF. Died d, 
Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 361 r. 
223 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 9 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 1-3) 1, 
f, 361 
224 Giovambattista Soderini to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Diecl di Balia, Responsive, 13 1, f 347 
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ramparts of Poggioreale 225 - As the 'humore adusto' and the terzana doppia that plagued 
him progressed, the letters of Marco del Nero became shorter, and he was forced to 
delegate a part of his duties to the commissario. The Ten had eventually granted him the 
leave he had been requesting, but he could not now abandon the camp: disease-ridden as 
26 it was, for him it was nonetheless the safest place to stay2 . 
In the night between 16 and 17 August, monsieur de Lautrec died 'di catarro', and 
was buried without pomp in his own quarters, in order to keep his demise secret for as 
long as possible. There are many versions of the circumstances of his death227 , but 
almost all agree on one point: the captain general died a desperate man, his spirit 
crushed by the consequences of the lies he had forced his soldiers to tell him. According 
to the Ferrarese ambassador in Naples, Lautrec died saying that he could not believe in a 
god who was giving the victory to the Spaniards 228 . 
Since monsieur de Vaudemont had also died, Lautrec's place was taken by the 
marquis of Saluzzo, but by that time all remaining hopes of either continuing the siege 
or withdrawing safely from Naples resided in the arrival of the reinforcements led by 
Renzo da Ceri, who on 22 August, owing to the pope's ban against the recruitment of 
229 230 troops on his lands , was still at 
I'Aquila, with only three thousand footsoldiers 
However, it was too late. In quick succession, Imperial troops reconquered Samo (19 
August), Nola (22 August) and Capua (28 August). In the same period, Andrea Doria 
225 '[Noi siamo assediati da ogni banda di pane, di vino, di came, di ogni altro reffigerio tale che e' fanti si 
muoiono di fame. Ultimamente li Spagnoli ci hanno tolto I'acqua di Poggioreale... e non si pu6 andare 
senza gran pericolo ... ]' Marco 
del Nero to the Ten, 15 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 13 1, f. 368 r. 
226 , da quattro di in qua oltre alla mala disposizione d'uno humore adusto che mi ha afflicto gid duo 
mesi, mi sono posto nel letto malato di terzana doppia, che non mi lascia netto... Et pure e' si debbe 
ringratiare Dio di tutto quello che e' manda... ' Marco del Nero to the Ten, 6 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di 
Balia, 13 1, f. 359 r. 
227 Giovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, pp. 98-99; Santoro, Dei successi, pp. 102-103; Rosso, Historie, p. 
45. The place of his burial, inside the 'masseria' of the duke of Montalto on Poggioreale, is still known 
today as 'Lotrecco'. After the defeat of the League, his body was stolen and taken as a 'hostage', but 
nobody paid the ransom; see Giovio, La seconda parte, pp. 109-110. 
228 Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 31 August 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, ambasciatori. 
Italia, busta 9, the folios are not numbered. 
229 Sanuto, Diarii. XLVIIL p. 490. 
230 The Ten to Bartolomeo Gualterotti, 29 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie. 
45, ff. 56 v. - 57 r. 
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arrived at Gaeta with his galleys, forcing the Venetian squadron to raise the blockade. 
To avoid being cut off from the main body, Giuliano and Bernardo Strozzi had to leave 
Pozzuoli, heading first to Aversa (23 August) and then to Capua (25 August), where 
they were forced to surrender to Fabrizio Mararnaldo231. 
The letters of 23 August were the last the Ten would receive from their 
representatives in the camp of the League. As the back lines of his army were 
collapsing, the marquis of Saluzzo decided, too late, to reduce the defensive perimeter 
of the encampment, and to concentrate all the remaining troops and the artillery in the 
main alloggiamento of Poggioreale. It was the beginning of the end. When the 
Imperialists SaW232 (27 August) that the ordnance was being withdrawn from theforte in 
front of the fortress of San Martino, and how the lack of horses and oxen was slowing 
down the operation, they attacked the fortified line between the Fort de France 233 and 
the campo grosso, overcoming resistance and cutting off from the main body eight 
hundred footsoldiers, Gascons, French and Italians of the White Bands. It was a 
devastating blow; after a first assault was repelled, the earthen bastions promptly built 
by the Imperialists dissuaded the League's commanders from attempting again to break 
the ring around the forte. In the evening of Friday 28 August, the three surrounded 
colonnelli surrendered 'a patti': disarmed, the soldiers reached the main camp, and only 
colonels and captains were allowed to keep their swords 
234 
. 
231 See Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII, p. 493. Once in Capua, the men of Fabrizio Maramaldo entered the church 
where the funeral of Ugo de'Pepoli, who had died there a few days before, was being held and stripped 
his corpse of the precious necklace of golden seashells, the symbol of the French Order of St. Michel 
given to him by Francis 1; Giovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, p. 106. 
232 'El giovedl che fti a Ii 27 calar del monte I'artegliaria, e la gente che vi allogiava. Li Imperiali si 
aveddero del trato, et di et notte stavano alla guardia, per dar loro una strecta. - .' Girolamo Naselli to the 
duke of Ferrara, 12 September 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, ambasciatori, Italia, busta 9, the folios 
are not numbered. 
233 Du Bellay, Mgmoires, pp. 112-113. 
234 'Et quantunque si conoscesse che'l campo grosso era tanto invilito che non era per soccorrerli, 
nondimeno si fecero tali bastioni tra. essi et quel campo grosso , che piCi non era dubio del soccorso, et 
heri sera li ditti tre coloneli con le zente si dettero a patti che fossero salve le persone senza anne, excetto 
li colonelli et li capitanei potesseno portar le spade, et potesseno andar salvi in lo campo loro' Girolamo 
Morone to Andrea Doria, 29 August 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e 
Sicilia, 8 10, f. 167 r. /v. 
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In the meantime, news of the fall of Capua had reached the camp, causing 
widespread discontent among the troops and forcing the commander to adopt a course 
of action that the loss of the forte had already made inevitable. There was no more time 
to wait for Renzo da Ceri; with Somma, Nola and Capua in enemy hands, the army of 
the League had to abandon the siege of Naples immediately before the only remaining 
road left open to its retreat, the road to Aversa, was blocked 
235 
. 
Those who left the camp of Poggioreale on Saturday 29 August at 3.00 a. m., 
under a violent thunderstonn, were the pale shadow of the belfissima gente which 
scarcely four months before had marched on Naples, eager to divide 'le spoglie del 
Regno'. Of an army that, in May, had probably numbered more than twenty thousand 
men. ) less than seven thousand soldiers were still able to walk, and even those were 
mostly broken men ('rotti'), half-starved, weakened by fevers, worn out by the fighting 
and deprived of sleep for days on end. Marching in silence, without the beat of the 
drums, they were leaving everything behind: their comrades who were too ill to march, 
all of the French ordnance but five light falconetti and five carts full of armnunitions, 
and all the luggage that could slow down or reveal their furtive retreat. fn the camp, 
amid the dead and the dying that lay in their huts and tents, the Imperial scouts found 
heaps of pikes, arquebuses, halberds and corselets. 
However, while organising his residual forces, the marquis of Saluzzo, following 
rigidly the French 'school ý236 , 
decided to array them according to the traditional 
tripartite division, that is vanguard-battle-rearguard. This choice was regarded by the 
Spaniards themselves as a catastrophic mistake: had the marquis arrayed his troops in a 
"' There are many versions of the disastrous retreat of the army of the League from the siege of Naples, 
the most detailed (and possibly the most unreliable) being the ones left by Paolo Giovio, La Seconda 
parte, book 26, pp. 103 -109, and by Leonardo Santoro, Dei Successi, pp. I 10- 12 1. However, I prefer to 
base my reconstruction of the events on the letters of Ferrante Gonzaga, who actually led the pursuing 
Imperial forces, of the Ferrarese ambassador in Naples, of other Imperial officers and, on the side of the 
League, on the reports of the survivors. 
230 Its persistent fidelity to the tripartite battle array was, according to the duke of Urbino, one of the main 
weaknesses of the French tactical school. See Rovere, Discorsi militari, pp. 31 v. - 32 r. 
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single 'squadrone', he would have probably reached Aversa suffering minimal losses. 
For the soldiers of the League were not alone in the night: the light cavalry of Ferrante 
Gonzaga, the Marte of the Imperial resistance, who with this victory laid the 
foundations of his successful career, had spent the night in the open. While the Imperial 
infantry and the men-at-arms were still readying themselves, the light horsemen were 
able to launch their attack immediately after the news of the retreat of the army of the 
League reached them. While Ferrante saw himself as personally responsible for the 
ViCtory237 , his claims, albeit excessive, were not groundless. Halfway from Aversa, the 
Imperial light cavalry caught up with the enemy rearguard, a force of approximately two 
thousand infantry, made up of Landsknechts of the Black Legion and Swiss pikemen. 
Even in such dire circumstances, the bitter rivalry between the two nationi prevented 
them from joining forces, and they were, therefore, beaten separately; in less than an 
hour, the repeated attacks of the light horsemen against their flanks broke first the 
German, then the Swiss ordinanza. 'Stracchi et desperati', and having not been paid for 
the last forty-five days, the pikemen did not mount much of a resistance; the Imperial 
light cavalry scattered them, took their flags and what was left of their luggage and let 
them be once they had dropped their weapons. Afterwards, the black-clad Landsknechts 
were even accused of betrayal: according to many witnesses, they had not tried to stop 
the enemy at all, and, at their arrival, had actually 'joined' the ranks of the Imperial 
LandsknechtS238. 
Ferrante Gonzaga. quickly resumed his pursuit and caught up with another 
squadrone, whose men, however, were not only marching 'piu' serrati et con miglior 
237 Ferrante described 'his' victory to his brother the marquis of Mantua in a letter that is highly 
informative, but reeks of self-satisfaction, written immediately after the fight. Ferrante Gonzaga to the 
marquis of Mantua, I September 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Napoli e 
Sicilia, 8 10, ff. 189 r. - 190 r. 
238 This is according to the report of Guido Rangoni, Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII, p. 529; however, it is far 
more probable that, as Venetian ambassador in Viterbo Gasparo Contarini wrote to the Senate, the Black 
Legion's Landsknechts were being 'protected' by their compatriots, and that if they joined the Imperial 
army, this happened after the defeat, ibid. p. 476. 
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ordine', but were also, as he admitted, 'miglior gente': it was the Florentine infantry, 
arrayed together with other Italian companies. In his Historie, Giovio wrote that the 
Black Bands and the White Bands (Italians in French service) had been overwhelmed 
by the onslaught of the Imperial cavalry. Ferrante Gonzaga, who was not a modest 
person, did not claim such a prestigious 'trophy'. Notwithstanding repeated charges, the 
Bands held their ground 239 until the Imperial commander, who had with him only one 
hundred and fifty light horsemen left, realized that he was getting too close to Aversa 
without 'spalle', that is without the support of the infantry, which had still to arrive. 
Ferrante contented himself with having defeated one third of the enemy army using only 
a few hundred light horsemen, and halted the pursuit. Slowly, the units of the League 
that had been able to hold out against the 'domino effect' caused by the attack of 
Gonzaga's cavalry reached the relative safety of Aversa's city walls. 
By midday, the prince of Orange, still convalescent from malarial fever, arrived 
with Juan de Urbina and the rest of the army. The Imperial captain general was 
determined to force what was left of the forces of the League to surrender 
unconditionally, and, after a first assault of the Spanish infantry had been repelled 
240, he 
ordered the pieces of ordnance that had been captured in the abandoned alloggiamento 
of the League to be brought up to the walls of Aversa, which, according to Santoro, 
were quite low, weak and 'old', that is without bastions, and could not withstand the 
cannonade which started at daybreak, on Sunday 30 August. 
Badly wounded in the knee by a shard at the beginning of the bombardment, the 
marquis of Saluzzo summoned a consulta, and all the captains told him that the 
239 On the retreat to Aversa. see the detailed letters written during the first half of September by the 
Ferrarese ambassador in Naples Girolamo Naselli, and in particular the one of 12 September, ASMo, 
Cancelleria Ducale, ambasciatori, Italia, busta 9, the folios are not numbered. 
240 Giovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, pp. 103-104; Santoro, Dei successi, pp. 113-114. 
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footsoldiers 'non volevano combattere a patto alcuno' 241 . Moreover, the citizens of 
Aversa wanted to surrender, there were no provisions and, in practice, no artillery. 
Eventually, the marquis agreed to send count Guido Rangoni to parley with the prince, 
in order to salvage whatever was possible 242 . The Modenese condottiere tried to save at 
least the face of the defeated army, but Philibert de Chalon rejected his conditions, and 
reaffirmed his request for an unconditional surrender. Count Guido rejected the draft of 
the accord, considering it shameful, and, even after the marquis had signed it, shrewdly 
kept on fighting for his comer until he was set free. 
According to the terms of the surrender, the marquis of Saluzzo, the prince of 
Navarre and Pedro Navarro were declared prisoners of Philibert de Chalon, and could 
not be freed without the approval of the Emperor. 'Item e concordato et convenuto che 
il capitanii et tutte le zente di guerra che sono in la ditta citta tanto da piedi come homini 
d'arme, arzieri, franchi arzieri, cavali lezieri tanto italiani come francesi, lanzinechi, 
sgulzari, et altn soldati di qual si voglia natione existente in ditta citta al servitio Regio, 
debbiano lassare et consignare in poter del prefato signor Principe tutte le bandiere, 
insegne et... anche tutte le anne, cavali et robe di qual si voglia sorte et quantitA 
siano... '. All the companies and the colonnelli were to be disbanded; the French, the 
Germans and the Swiss soldiers were free to go home, while the Italians first had to 
swear that, at least for the next six months, they would not serve against the Emperor. 
The captains and the lieutenants of the companies of infantry and cavalry, along with 
the men-at-arms, the 'archers' and the light horsemen, were allowed to keep one mount 
2" Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, ambasciatori, Italia, busta 9, the 
tolios are not numbered. 
242 , 
... che 
facesse quel che potesse... ' Ibid. 
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each, provided that it was either a mule, a 'cortaldo' 243 or a nag. The others would walk 
244 
until they had left the Kingdom of Naples 
Albeit tragic, the events of Aversa were a mere formality; the day before, at 8 
p. m., Girolamo Morone had already announced to the world the defeat of the army of 
the League in a famous letter to Andrea Doria that started with a cry of unrestrained joy: 
- 19245 'Vittoria, vittoria, vittona. 
My adherence to the rule that rhetorical flights of fancy have no place in a thesis 
has been sufficiently constant, I hope, to permit me a single, minor infraction of it. 
Maybe, on 31 August, at dawn, outside Aversa, a dozen ftayed, worn-out black flags 
were thrown to the ground, on a heap of other standards. Maybe, for a moment, they 
even seemed to cover the entire pile completely in black. Then, other flags were piled 
up on top of them, and black became just one colour among many others. 
The lance of Giovanni de'Medici had been broken. 
243 A horse whose ears and tail have been cut off. 
244 The marquis also agreed to return all the cities, fortresses and castles of the Kingdom of Naples still in 
the hands of the Cristianissimo's soldiers to the Emperor. A complete list of the articles is in Sanuto, 
Diarii, XLVIII, pp. 478 ff. 
245 c Vittoria, vittoria, vittoria! Li fi-anzesi sono et debellati et roti... et non li ý dubbio che hozi sarA finita 
questa guerra... ' Girolamo Morone to Andrea Doria, 29 August 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Napoli e Sicilia, 8 10, f, 167 r. /v. 
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Table XX 
The Army of the League at the Siege of Naples 
(18 June 1528) 
Mounted Troops 
Light Cavahymen: 
Florence 25 
Venice 100 
Tot. 125 
Men-at-Arms: 
Monsieur de Lautrec 100 
Monsieur de Vandemont 50 
Marquis of Saluzzo 100 
Count of Tenda 50 
Duke of Albany 90 
Duke of Lorraine 90 
Monsieur d'Obigny 90 
Montpezat 60 
Barbisieux 40 
La Val 30 
Bonaval 50 
Tournon 50 
Lignac: 30 
Pomperant 30 
La Fayette 60 
St. Andrd 50 
N6gre Pelice 50 
Robertet 40 
Duke of Ferrara 100 
Marquis of Mantua 80 
Renzo da. Ceri 50 
Paolo Cwnillo Orsini 80 
Ugo dei Pepoli 60 
Guido Rangoni 50 
Signor Bemab6 30 
Francesco Mons-(? ) 30 
Giovan Gerolamo Castiglione 20 
Tot. (in theory) 1560 
Tot. (in reality) 800 
Infantry 
Italian troops in French service, 'decte le Bande 
Bianche'. 
Commanders Number of 
French Aventuriers, under the command of 
Charles de Coucy, monsieur de Burie: 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Names unknown 7 
Tot. (in theory) 2100 
Tot. (in reality) 1200 
Landsknechts in French service (the Black 
Legion): 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Urglie 6 
Brandech 5 
Count Wolf 5 
Tot. (in theory) 4800 
Tot. (in reality) 4000 
Swiss in French service, under the command of 
the count of Tenda: 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Names unknown 14 
Tot. 4000 
The Florentine Black Bands under the command 
of count Ugo dei Pepoli: 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Names unknown (see 14 
Sheet ?) 
Tot. 3000 
Companies in Venetian service: 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Five Corsican 5 
commanders (names 
unknown) 
Tot. 2000 
Landsknechts under the 3 
command of count 
Avogadro 
Tot. 1000 
companies 
Gerolamo Castiglione 3 
Conte Cesare Scotti 2 
Marco Antonio Cusano 2 
Giovan Paolo Cossa 2 
Tot. (in theory) 2700 
Tot. (in reality) 2000 
Gascon troops under the c ommand of Pedro 
Navarro 
Commanders Number of 
companies 
Monsieur de Chandalle 5 
Baron of Bergne 2 
Artigaloub 3 
Three other captains, with 3 
one company each 
Tot. (in theory) 3900 
Tot. (in reality) 3000 
GRAND TOTAL: 
Men-at-Arms 800 
Archers 1200 
Light Horsemen 125 
Foot Soldiers 20,000 
Venetian Troops in Apulia: 
2000 foot soldiers 
200 light horsemen (stradiots) 
Galleys: 
Venice 16 
France 9 
(Genoa) 
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These data are taken from the estimates that the Ferrarese ambassador Cantelmi sent to 
his master the duke (ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio principi esteri, Napoli. busta 
9,18 June 1528; the folios are not numbered). Albeit less detailed and probably less 
accurate than the muster rolls prepared by the Venetians in December 1527 (see Sheet 
? ), Cantelmi's survey does however provide a better picture of the division of the 
various 'insegne' of infantry into bigger ensembles of companies - Cantelmi does not 
use the word 'colonnelli' - of different sizes. In the case of the Gascon, of the other 
French aventuriers, and of the Black Bands' Landsknechts, the Ferrarese ambassador 
assumed, probably to save time, that a typical company was made up of three hundred 
men. However, Cantelmi also pointed out all the major discrepancies between the 
theoretical and the real accounts. 
In order to understand the real situation of the camp of the League, a few more 
precise tactical details are needed: most of the men-at-arms and of the archers, for 
instance, were quite ineffectively garrisoned in nearby towns, and only the light cavalry 
resided permanently in the camp. Some units of infantry were also far from the camp - 
two companies of the Black Bands, for instance, were garrisoned at Pozzuoli - while 
others were busy trying to secure the roads and the flow of supplies. These factors, 
added to the already high number of soldiers periodically incapacitated by malarial 
fevers and dysentery, or killed by typhus, reduced considerably, possibly halving it, the 
effective number of soldiers that the army of the League could count on at any one time. 
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Table XXI 
The Florentine Troops after the Death of Orazio Baglioni: 
The Captains of the Black Bands: foot 
Lucantonio Cuppano from Montefalco. 400 
Badly wounded and out of combat since the 
end of April. 
Pasquino Co'rso 320 
Giovanni Turrini 310 
Giuliano Strozzi" 300 
Girolamo 'Rossino' de'Ciai. Killed in action. 250 
At least at first, his company was entrusted to 
his lieutenant - name unknown. 
Amico da Venafro 250 
Giacomo Filippo da Spoleto. Fell ill and left 250 
the camp in July. His company was given to 
captain Angelo Bastardo. 
Scipione da Imola. Fell ill and left the camp. 250 
Due to its reduced numbers, this company was 
disbanded at the beginning of August and the 
men assigned to other companies. 
Tommasino C6rso 220 
BeIriguardo da Castiglione 200 
Bernardo Strozzill 200 
Francesco Rustichello 200 
Gianmoro. Referred as captain of a company 
on August 1528. Probable 'heir' of Rossino de' 
Ciai. 
tot. *3300 
Troops previously under the command of 
Orazio Baglioni: 
Tommaso Gotti 750 
Braccio de'Pazzi 
Gianni di Restino 
Light horsemen under the command of Jacopo 84 
Bichi 
Light horsemen under the command of Angelo 15 
Bastardo - former lancie spezzate of Orazio 
Baglioni. 
A: These two companies were garrisoned in Pozzuoli after the battle of Capo d'Orso 
*: 3300 is also the number of the effectives of the Black Bands according to Marco del Nero. The 
company of Bino Signorelli (two hundred men) was presumably disbanded by Soderini. Gianmoro, 
referred to as a captain in August 1528, had been probably given the company of Rossino. 
It ought to be noticed that only seven of the thirteen captains who had fonned the first 
group of the Black Bands in May 1527 (see Table IX) appear on this list. 
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Map D: LEGENDA 
1. Harbour 
2. Baluardo del Carmine 
3. Porta del Mercato 
4. Porta Nolana 
5. Porta, Capuana 
6. Porta San Gennaro 
7. Porta Santa Maria 
8. Porta Reale 
9. Fortress of San Martino 
10. Castel Nuovo 
11. Castel dell'Uovo 
12. Area of La Maddalena and of river 
Sebeto 
13. Area of Poggioreale 
14. Area of the first 'forte' 
15. Area of the second 'forte' 
16. Road to Mergellina. (and to the tunnel) 
17. Road to Somma 
18. Mount Posillipo 
19. Landingpoint of the galleys of the 
League 
The Lafrery map (1556) depicts Naples as it was after the completion of the works 
started in 1535 by viceroy Pedro de Toledo. Apparently, there are no maps of the city 
walls as they were before or during the siege of 1528. It is therefore difficult to ascertain 
how much the new and formidable fortifications of Naples owed to the earth ramparts 
and bastions hurriedly built by the Imperialists to strengthen the old Aragonese walls 
against the threat of the famous French ordnance. 
The new city walls were built according to the geometries of the 'trace italienne', 
and were meant to integrate even more the three strongholds (San Martino, Castel 
Nuovo, Castel dell'Uovo) on which Naples' western defences were based. By 1537, the 
fortifications on San Martino/Sant'Elmo (the nearby chartreuse of San Martino gave its 
name to the hill, but the real name of the new fortress was Sant'Elmo) had been rebuilt 
and had become a formidable six-pointed star-shaped fortress, linked to Castel Nuovo 
by a line of fortifications. As can be easily seen, the steep slopes of mount Posillipo 
were accessible only from the east and from the north; for this reason the area of San 
Martino, placed at the eastern end of the mountain, was of vital importance for defence, 
while the tunnel of Piedigrotta was important for offensive reasons. 
Fortunately for us, even though by the mid-sixteenth century the city was in a 
period of growth and of population explosion, Habsburg Naples expanded westwards, 
and not eastwards as during the Aragonese period, so that the section of the city walls 
that faced the League's fortifications was not radically different from the one depicted 
here by Lafrery. 
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Map E: The Strategic Situation Around Naples 
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Following the wel I -established tactic of Consalvo de Cordova, after Troia the Imperial 
commanders concentrated their forces in the Kingdom's capital and in a few more 
strongholds, abandoning all the other cities of the Neapolitan area. In this case, Charles 
V's generals chose to maintain under their control the island of Ischia and the city of 
Gaeta, north of the river Garigliano. Gaeta was far enough away, and sufficiently well 
fortified, to force the commanders of the League to station a significant part of their host 
there for weeks if they wanted to take the city. Moreover, through Ischia, the 
Imperialists kept open a lifeline at the mouths of Naples' and Gaeta's roadsteads. The 
harbour facilities of the island were inadequate, but the cannons of Ischia's formidable 
fortress were big enough to force a squadron of galleys, which had a reduced operative 
range, to come to a dangerous standstill. At the end of the siege of Naples, thirty-five 
French and Venetian galleys, determined to make Andrea Doria pay dearly for his volte- 
face and for the disastrous conclusion of the whole campaign, did not dare to approach 
twelve Genoese galleys that were at anchor under the protective 'shadow' of the guns of 
the fortress of Ischia. Eventually forced to leave the waters around the Island and to 
separate from the Venetian squadron, which headed for Corffi, the French galleys found 
themselves pursued by Andrea Doria's squadron, which managed to capture a 
considerable part of the Cristianissimo's Mediterranean fleet'. 
It ought to be remembered that, in their attempt to maintain a tight blockade 
around Naples before the battle of Capo d'Orso (see Appendix 2), the fleets of the 
League used mainly the harbour facilities of Salemo and of its Gulf. 
' Giovio, La Seconda parte, pp. II 1- 112. During the siege of Naples Paolo Giovio was a welcome guest 
in the house of Vittoria Colonna, wife of Alfonso de Avaios marquis of Vasto. From Ischia, he heard the 
furious cannonade that opened the naval battle of Capo d'Orso and saw in person this last episode. 
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Map F 
The area of Pozzuoli 
(Map of Giuseppe Mormile - 1670) 
to Naples 
Red dotted line: the 'Grotta' through mount Posillipo 
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Plate 8 
Titian. Portait of Alfonso de Avalos, marquis of Vasto, addressing his troops. 
The marquis of Vasto (1492-1546), nephew of Ferdinando de Avalos marquis of 
Pescara, was a veteran of Bicocca and Pavia, and one of the most famous infantry 
commander of his times. His standing and popularity among the Spanish foot soldiers 
of the Imperial army were major factors in the long and difficult process of retaking 
control of the troops that had sacked Rome. During the campaign of Naples he did not 
play a major military role. Shortly after the retreat of the Imperial army into Naples, he 
had to flee the city and to take refuge in the island of Ischia after killing the son of the 
count of Potenza to settle a personal vendetta. Recalled and pardoned by viceroy Hugo 
de Moncada, he strongly supported the latter's decision to attack the fleet of the League. 
Captured by Filippino Doria - who refused to consign him to Lautrec - after the battle 
of Capo d'Orso. the marquis of Vasto played a major role in persuading Andrea Doria 
to change his allegiance from France to the Empire. 
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Naples' Defensive System I Viewed from East 
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When Alfonso of Aragon took the city, the defensive system of Angevin Naples was 
based on fourteen gates and four fortresses: three in the western part of the city, Castel 
S. Elmo, Castel Nuovo, Castel dell'Ovo and Castel Capuano on the eastern side. 
Between 1443 and 1458 Alfonso had Castel Nuovo rebuilt according to more modem 
principles, surrounding it with lower and thicker walls and with a system of ramparts 
and barbicans that were meant to shield the fortress from direct artillery fire. In the reign 
of Ferrante, who was frequently at odds with Genoa, the harbour's defences were 
strengthened and a naval dockyard was built. Castel dell'Ovo lost its role of last refuge, 
and by 1458 it had been renovated and played a more active role in the defence of the 
western part of the city. In 1463 the works for the construction of the new city walls 
started, and the Castel Capuano was incorporated into the city, becoming apalazzo. Its 
place was taken by the powerful Baluardo (Bulwark) del Carmine - here in the 
foreground. The Castel Sant'Elmo, here called S. Martino, as it was known by the 
League's soldiers in 1528, had been built in the thirteenth century by Charles I of Anjou 
to cover the slopes of the hill that dominated the Castel Nuovo. As we shall see, in 1528 
its inherently strong position was reinforced with heavy artillery and impressive 
earthworks. The defensive system of Aragonese Naples was therefore based on a sort of 
triangle, whose base was the line forined by Castel dell'Uovo, Castel Nuovo - which 
controlled both the outside and the inside of the city - and the Baluardo del Carmine, 
which with its guns also covered the entrance of the harbour, while Castel San 
Martino/S. Elmo was its apex. Aware of the danger represented by the French ordnance, 
after conquering the city (1503) Consalvo de Cordova enlarged the defensive perimeter 
of the Castel Nuovo by adding to it a new enceinte of bastions 2. 
' Giulio Ballino. De'disegni dellepih illustri cithý etjbrte,:, ze del niondo, parte I (Venezia, 1569) 
2 On the development and the architectural history of the city of Naples, see Giuseppe Russo, La cimi di 
Napoli dalle orikini al 1860 (Naples, 1960), first volume, pp. 230-24 1; Cesare de'Seta, Cartografia della 
ciati di Napoli (Naples, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 81-123. The third volume of de'Seta's work contains many 
maps and views of Naples drawn in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century. On Castel Nuovo, see also 
Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, Firearms and Fortifications (Chicago, 1986), pp. 20-2 1. 
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This model of a besieging camp is taken from the Discorsi Militari I of Francesco Maria 
della Rovere, duke of Urbino. The sequence alloggiamento-piazzaforte-trincea - from 
the top to the bottom of the picture - was the same as Navarro's fortified encampment 
around Naples, with a difference: the trenches of the duke of Urbino were a prelude to 
the storming of an enemy bastion (the lowest part of the picture), while Lautrec used 
them to (partially) surround Naples and to enforce a close-range blockade. 
1 Francesco Maria della Rovere. Discorsi Militari dell'Eccellentissimo Francesco Maria I della Rovere 
duca di Urbino (Ferrara, 1583), p. 22 r. 
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Conclusion. The Broken Lance 
The collapse of the forces of the League around Naples was so sudden and complete 
that for days no one, but the Imperialists, knew what had happened. As their 
representatives in the camp maintained an increasingly worrying silence, the Ten 
received various and contradictory versions of what had happened to the army of the 
League after its retreat from Naples; by 5 September, when the letter of Girolamo 
Morone was intercepted, they could only hope that the defeat was not as total as it 
seemed. However, on 12 September captain Giuliano Strozzi gave the Ten a complete 
report, confirming the most vaunting proclamations of the Imperial sources: 'la impresa 
del Regno e rovinata in tucto, 1'exercito e rotto, perdute le artiglierie, perdute le 
mumtioni et ogni altra cosa. ' I 
The marquis of SaIUZZ02' the prince of Navarre, Paolo Camillo Trivulzio, the 
secretary Ambrogio da, Fiorenza3 and monsieur de Pomperant4 died one after another 
after a brief imprisonment, overcome by their wounds, by epidemics and by exhaustion. 
Pedro Navarro, 'ammalato et vecchio', was locked up in Castel dell'Ovo, charged with 
treason and sentenced to death by the emperor, but died before the execution in 
1 The Ten to Giuliano Soderini, 12 September 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 45, ff. 
71 v. - 72 v. 2 The marquis of Vasto 'gli us6 ogni umanitA et cortesia. Ma egli poco da poi abbattuto dal dolore della 
ferita mortale et dal dispiacere dell'animo, quasi in prova, pass6 di questa vita' Giovio, La seconda parte, 
book 26, p. 108. 
3, 
'** mori in 
luogo ignobile et vituperoso quel messer Ambruogio da Fiorenza milanese, il quale crudele 
auttore di quel malvagio et veramente fatal consiglio, aveva tirato, come io dissi, Lotrecco a combattere 
Milano a Napoli, et perci6 pareva che mertamente egli portasse la pena della fattiosa malignitA sua... ' 
Ibid. p. 107. 
4 Monsieur de Pomperant had been one of the followers and advisors of the duke of Bourbon during his 
exile, but had been pardoned by Francis 1: 'stando tutto stupido con gli occhi fissi al cielo, pensando a 
quella sl grande sciagura, et abbattuto di gravissimo dolore subito casc6 morto, havendo tuttavia gli occhi 
fermi; nd fu possible per rimedio alcuno ritomarlo in vita, essendo subitamente morto di dolore... ' Ibid. 
328 
suspicious circurnstances5. Pugnacious Giovarnbattista Soderini, wounded in the head 
and having lost three fingers 6. died of illness in Naples while arguing over his own 
ransom, which he judged excessive 7. Marco del Nero, 'homo richissimo di contanti', 
was taken prisoner on his litter and died shortly after having agreed to pay a ransom of 
twelve thousand scudi8. 
On 31 August less than five thousand half-dead men, mostly French and Swiss 
soldiers - 'mai vidi le piu' sozze figure', wrote the Ferrarese ambassador - started a long 
march home; given their state of prostration 9 and the hostility of the 'villani', only a few 
of them would make itlo. Those who had been captured in the camp and outside Aversa 
were kept outside the Porta del Mercato, 'spogliati et svalisati" 1, and most of them died 
2 in the Royal Stables at La Maddalenal . According to Guido Rangoni's estimates, of the 
seemingly insatiable host of seventy thousand 'bocche' that had entered the Kingdom of 
Naples, only sixteen thousand remained. Renzo da Ceri had to withdraw his relief force 
I I... et v'hebbe di quegli che cedettero, ch'egli fosse stato strangolato quivi con avergli messo di molti 
panni in bocca, perciocch6 Hicardo (the Spanish castellan of Castel dell'Ovo) compassione avendo 
all'honore di quel fortissimo capitano.. volle levar dalle mani del boia quel valent'huomo... per tor via il 
carico che di si fatta morte poteva nascere all'Imperatore' Ibid. p. 108. 
6 Varchi, Storia Fiorentina (Firenze 1963), book 6, chapt. XXXVIII, p. 385. 
7 '11 Soderino scarso dell'oro, ma prodigo della vita, ostinatamente negava ch'egli non era per pagare la 
taglia, che gli era stata messa come troppo grave. ' Giovio, La Seconda parte, book 26, p. 109. 
8 Tu preso in Aversa Fambasciatore Fiorentino nomato messer Marco del Nero, homo richissimo di 
contanti. S'haveva posto taglia 12 mila scudi et ý morto qua in Napoli, ch'el era indisposto quando fu 
preso in lectica... ' Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 12 September 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria 
ducale, carteggio principi esteri, Napoli, 9, folios are not numbered. 
9, 
- ma se tiene che pochi di essi giungeranno 
in Lombardia, perchd sono meggio morti... che mai vidi 
le piii sozze figure... ' Gerolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 30 August 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria 
ducale, carteggio principi esteri, Napoli, 9, the folios are not numbered. 
'0 '... Nostro Signore mi mandava a Napoli, dove li gionsi a li 14, con gran fatica di traversar grandissime 
montagne, che da per tutto li vilani erano posti a le strade per spogliar francesi, de i quali di 5000 furono 
acompagnati da spagnoli, non se trova che 200 siano gionti a Roma... et che niuno li vol fa una caritA, 
sono morti per camino et da per tutto le strade ne sono piene di corpi morti, fin a Napoli, con un fetor 
intolerabile; et queli pochi son passati sono stA spogliati da vilani etiam de la camisa, et solo se copreno 
con le foglie, che mai ho visto tanta. crudeltA. El conte Guido Rangon referisse che de 70 milia boche 
erano reduti a 16 milia'. Sanuto, Diarii, XLLX, p. 15. 
11 Gerolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 30 August 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria ducale, carteggio principi 
esteri, Napoli, 9. 
12 , 
... non vi 
fti nd il piCi brutto nd il piCi infelice spettacolo, che quel della moltitudine minuta, i quali 
mezzo morti, et come ombre d'huomini, a guisa di bestie erano cacciati nelle stalle del Re, che sono alla 
Maddalena. Percioch6 questo ufficio di pietA fu fatto dal Senato di Napoli, comandando i capitani che 
fossero quivi pasciuti et medicati. Ma i corpi loro, i quali per cinque mesi continui havevano patito tutti i 
disagi dell'aere, delle vigilie, et delle fatiche della guerra, appigliandosi mal l'uno all'altro per essere cosi 
ristretti insieme, vennero talmente mancando che pochi ve ne riinasero... ' Giovio, La Seconda parte, 
book 26, v. 109. 
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at I'Aquila, while the Venetian and the French galleys were forced to lift the blockade 
(see Sheet ?) and to return to their bases. Two thousand Tuscan footsoldiers who were 
marching towards Naples were recalled to Florence. 
The surviving soldiers of the Black Bands were relatively lucky: they had lost 
their flags and had ceased to exist as a unit, but had not been captured during the retreat. 
Moreover, they were Italians, and the terms of the surrender only stated that they could 
not serve against Charles V. In order to avoid losing all their possessions, that is their 
weapons, many of them entered the Imperial service in the Italian colonnello of Fabrizio 
Maram o 13 , who was delighted to enlist all those experienced veterans in his new unit. 
Many of them would soon see Tuscany again as soldiers of the army that was to besiege 
Florence. Most of the soldiers of the German Black Bands took the same decision, and 
swelled the ranks of the 'loyalist' Landsknechts. Only a few days after their victory at 
Naples, the Imperial forces amounted to three thousand Italians, five thousand Germans 
14 
and - including those in Calabria, Gaeta and Sicily - eight thousand Spaniards . 
The Ten assembled all the captains of the Black Bands who came back from 
Naples 'svalisati', and gave them condotte a provisione 15; such was the case of 
Giovanni Turrini, Giuliano Strozzi, Amico da Venafro, Tommaso Gotti and Pasquino 
CO'rso, while Giovarnbattista da Messina was appointed sergeant major general of all 
Florentine forces. Other captains' 6 were either dead or had decided not to serve the 
republic for the time being. When Cosimo de'Medici seized power in Florence after the 
assassination of duke Alessandro in 1537, he could count immediately on a group of 
" Giovanni Borromei to the marquis of Mantua, 12 September 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Firenze, 1109, f. 546 v. 
14 Letter to the marquis of Mantua from Viterbo, Sanuto, Diarii, XLVIII, p. 490. 
'5 To see the details of these condotte, see ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, 
ff. 21 v. -27 v. 16 Bernardo Strozzi fought for the republic during the siege of 1529-1530, but his name is not mentioned 
among those of the captains of the Black Bands 'condotti a provvisione'. The fate of Angelo Bastardo, 
Tommasino C6rso, Belriguardo da Castiglione, Francesco Rustichello, Gian Moro and Gianni di Restino 
remains unknown. It ought to be remembered that towards the end of the siege many letters from the 
camp of the League were intercepted by the Imperialists, and we do not know how many of them were 
still alive or in Florentine service at the moment of the defeat. 
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experienced and determined veterans from his father's companies, first of all colonnello 
Lucantonio Cuppano. In the case of Giovanni Turrini, the power of the memory of the 
Great Devil did not go so far: in 1530 he allowed Maria Salviati and Cosimo to escape 
after the Ten had ordered him to bring them to Florence, but after the fall of the republic 
he served loyally under the exile Piero Strozzi and was among the defenders of the 
Sienese republic. 
Notwithstanding the Ten's efforts to salvage what it could, after Naples the Black 
Bands were, in fact, dead. What makes a regiment - or a proto-regiment, in this case - 
an elite unit is a very fragile balance between intangible elements like time, leadership, 
reputation, experience on one side, and very 'material' factors like the soldiers in the 
flesh on the other. The precious fund of experience accumulated during years of 
campaigning by the Black Bands, their high morale, their aggressiveness and the skill 
needed to make all these factors effective on the battlefield , were based on the 
continuity of internal hierarchies and 'customs' that coincided only partially with the 
commanders and their staffs. The Bands had sustained substantial losses since the 
beginning of the siege of Naples, and the defeat at Aversa separated the captains from 
the bulk of what they regarded as one of their most precious 'properties', that is their 
veterans , their 'homini 
da bene' and 'da guerra', soldiers they knew by name, thus 
dispersing an invaluable accumulation of technical and tactical knowledge. 
The dissolution of the anny of the League and the loss of the Black Bands were a 
tremendous blow for Florence. The republic had staked its best troops and its money on 
the policy of 'combattere Milano a Napoli', that is on the assumption that eventually 
Charles V would be forced to give Milan to Francis I in exchange for Naples, and that 
the liberation of the two French princes would be negotiated from a strong position. 
Albeit relatively small, the Florentine support and troops could have made the 
difference as long as the siege of Naples lasted. but, after the defeat of Aversa, Florence 
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soon ceased to be even a minor interlocutor and became subject to the decisions of the 
greater powers. In fact, now the republic had nothing to offer but its own freedom. 
The collapse of the pro-French party in Italy that followed the failure of the siege b 
of Naples hastened the reconciliation between pope and emperor. Clement VII wanted 
the power of his family restored in Florence, Charles V wanted to be crowned Holy 
Roman Emperor, Francis I wanted his sons back. When, on 21 June 1529, its last army 
was defeated at Landriano sull'Olona 17 , the League of Cognac was, figuratively 
speaking, an empty shell. On 29 June Clement VII signed the treaty of Barcelona with 
Charles V, and when, on 3 August, the so-called 'Peace of the Ladies' between Francis I 
and the emperor was signed in Cambrai, France's Italian allies found themselves 
deserted by the Cristianissimo. Owing to its refusal to restore the Medici, the growing 
political isolation of the Florentine republic became quickly an encircling, which was 
completed by the inclusion, on December 1529, of the duke of Ferrara - whose son 
Ercole had been appointed the new captain general of all Florentine forces - in the Lega 
Defensiva of all Italian states but Florence, a League promoted, this time, by the 
emperor 
18 
. 
Ercole d'Este signed the condotta, cashed his piatto, but he never went to 
Florence to take his place as capitano generale at the head of the one thousand 
footsoldiers he was supposed to recruit. The hopes the Ten had placed in this alliance 
19 
were quickly dashed when Ferrarese raison d'etat prevailed over its ruler's 'fede' . 
When, at the end of October 1529, the 'exercito del diavolo' arrived under the walls of 
Florence to commence a siege that would last almost twice as long as that of Naples, the 
republic would fight alone. 
17 Pleri, Il Rinascimento, pp. 583-584. 
18 Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, pp. 278-290; von Albertlnl, Firenze, pp. 112-113,119-12 1. 
19 1 
... anteponendo 
il padre (the duke of Ferrara) le considerazioni dello stato alla fede, (Ercole) ricus6 di 
, ndn,, nim-c-6rdini Storia d'Italia, book XIX, chapt. XII, p. 2014. 
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It would be wrong to see the relationship between Florence and the Black Bands 
in terms of a contrast between a state-of-the-art military unit and a state that, often 
wrongly, has been accused of chronic military backwardness and veiled hostility to the 
military world. Many of the tactical choices made by the Florentine republic, such as, 
for instance, its decision to enlist only companies of light horsemen and not of men-at- 
an-ns, were,, in fact, rather up-to-date 20 . In June 1528 the Ten appointed Babbone da 
Brisighella and Francesco dal Monte as 'governatori' and instructors of the revived 
Florentine 'ordinanza 21 , which was different from the one planned by Machiavelli. By 
the beginning of August 1528, the letters of the 'rettori' of the Florentine dominions and 
of the captains in command of the 'battaglioni' to the Ten were full of references to the 
various problems and issues raised by the re-organization of the 'ordinanza', but the 
overall picture was far from pessimistic 22 . Moreover, the importance of small firearms 
had been acknowledged, and forty percent of arquebusiers in a company were regarded 
as a basic requirement 23 . The Ten had no problem in selecting, among its new 
battaglioni, the two thousand veterans, all 'gente eletta', which were to be sent to 
Naples to swell the ranks of the Black BandS24. 
In fact, Florence resented being considered by its allies as not 'buona ad altro che 
a sborsar danari -)25 , that is only as a source of financial support. The republic was 
20 To see how the other great Italian republic approached the choice between heavy and light cavalry, see 
Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization, pp. 367-379. 
21 22 and 23 June 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 64, f. 16 v. ; for the 
structure of the new 'ordinanza', see ASF, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 108, ff. 75 r. - 76r. 22 1 August - 30 September 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 132, passim. The history of the 
reorganization of the Florentine 'ordinanza' would require more time, words and a separate analysis. 
23 'Li signori Nove (the Nove della Milizia) hanno solamente mandato 50 archibusi, che al mancho 
vorrebbono essere 80, et quando Vostre Magnifiche Signorie operassimo ne havessino sino a tal numero, 
non mancherebbe alla prefata compagnia cosa alcuna... '. Carlo Strozzi to the Ten, 2 August 1528, ASF, 
Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 132, f. 6 r. Carlo Strozzi was writing about the two hundred men of the 
'battaglione' of Montepulciano, under the command of Daniello da Castiglione. 
24 The Ten to Giovambattista Soderini and to Marco del Nero, 20 August 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Legazioni e commissarie, 45, f. 46 v. 
21 , ... et sanza 
dubio sarA molto pi6 utile tal concorso delle nostre genti alla impresa che de' danari... et 
quando 66 segua oltre al poco fructo che ne r1sulterA non passerA punto con dignitA della cittA, la quale 
non sarA riputata buona ad altro che a sborsar denari, cosa certo non solo poco honorevole, ma molto 
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determined to exploit the political respite granted by the military reputation of the Black 
Bands, which came 'in buona. parte' from the Florentine dominions, and to enjoy all the 
benefits that flowed from having its own troops in the first line 26 . It was not an empty 
gamble nor a matter of faithfulness to the military doctrine of Machiavelli and of the 
first republic: no other Italian state nor great military enterpriser had given birth to a 
body of infantry whose fame rivalled that of the 'fanti oltramontani'. However, the 
exceptional nature of the Black Bands should be put in an appropriate framework. 
In a very roundabout way, the Risorgimento biographers and eulogizers of 
Giovanni de'Medici were right to celebrate him as an unusual figure, and to say that his 
real name was the one that he had conquered with his valour, that is, Giovanni of the 
Black Bands. Their perspective should be, however, inverted: since the beginning, we 
should not consider Giovanni as a Medici. Like others with the same sumarne, he was 
bom a distant relative of the main branch, and had become an useful tool. To understand 
his 'greatness' we have first to perceive his 'normality': had he been something more 
than a soldier, he would not have been able, or obliged, to do what the other military 
enterprisers did, and do it better. 
In the same way, it could be said that the Black Bands indeed embodied Florence, 
but they were not its army, nor the last glimmers of a dying world, or the first signs of 
things to come. The Bands were not a direct manifestation of the Florentine state, but 
the spontaneous product of some of its components, whose role was simply being given 
extra emphasis by the growing importance of large bodies of tactical infantry on the 
battlefield, and by the quantity of the people and of the resources connected to their 
dannosa ... The Ten to 
Giuliano Soderini, 29 July 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 45. 
ff. 25 v. - 26 v. 26 c 
... ci rendiarno certi che 
Quella (the king of France) molto pi6 si satisfarA delle gent] che de'danari... 
sono le decte genti in grandissima expectatione et tutto nasce per li buoni effecti che si son veduti 
dall'altre genti ch'abiamo a Napoli le quali essendo in buona parte del paese nostro, si presume che le 
altre del medesirno paese sieno della medesima bontA, la qual cosa iustamente si pu6 credere... per questa, 
cagione insisterete di persuadere alla MaestA del Re che si contenti della contributione di questi 2000 fanti 
come cosa non soiamente pi6 honorevole per noi, ma etiam dio piý utile et necessaria all'impresa... ' The 
T, -n tn Ginfinno Soderini- 23 Aueust 1528. ASF, Dieci di Balia, Legazioni e commissarie, 45, f. 50 Ov. 
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organization and command. Florentine society was far from being 'demilitarized', nor 
was it falling behind in the process of adaptation that, by the second half of the sixteenth 
century, would allow the Italian military enterprisers to be an integral part of a 'system' 
that spread across westem Europe. 
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Appendix 1: 
The Incursion against Monterotondo 
(October 1527) 
Between 12 and 22 October 1527, after 
months of inactivity, the whole army of 
the League in Umbria moved southwards 
taking possession of what were to 
become its winter quarters and, at the 
same time, launching an incursion against 
the Imperial light cavalry, which was 
garrisoned in Monterotondo, a city 
dangerously near to Rome itself. The 
duke of Urbino used the information 
provided by the Orsini to devise a quite 
daring plan that, if successful, would 
have left the Spanish cavalry trapped in a 
cul-de-sac at the convergence of the river 
Teverone with the Tevere,, ready to be 
destroyed by the surprise attack of all the 
remaining cavalry forces of the League, 
gathered ad hoc for this incursion. 
Although this was to be mainly a 
(cavalcata', the support of infantry was 
needed, and Martelli had to furnish not 
only the Mantuan heavy cavalry under 
the command of Carlo Nuvolonil, but 
also one thousand men of the Black 
Bands 2. Between Foligno, the starting 
point of the incursion, and Monterotondo 
there lay a distance of approximately 65 
miles, which the duke expected to cover 
in three 'giornate'. This was the situation 
of the Black Bands at that moment: the 
companies of Lucantonio da Montefalco 
and Giannetto Albanese were besieging 
the castle of Le Presse 3; Pasquino, 
1 Carlo Nuvoloni to the marquis of Mantua, 22 
October 1527, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 875, ff. 367 r. - 368 
r. 
2 At the beginning Martelli refused to be involved 
in such an hazardous plan, but eventually he had 
to agree to it. Initially the commissario 'offered' 
500, then 800 of his precious troops, but he was 
eventually forced to commit himself to sending 
one thousand, though in fact, he wrote to the Ten, 
I manderonne 800'. Lorenzo Martelli to the Ten, 
12 October 1527. ASF, Dieci di Balia, 
Responsive, 125, f 235 r. 
Where Rodolfo da Varano and his wife had took 
refuge after having been expelled from Camerino 
bv the pro-Imperialist Sciarra Colonna. 
, 36 
Amico, Scipione, Morgante and Giovanni 
da Turino were sent to Monterotondo, 
and the remaining companies, together 
with the Venetians, marched towards 
Montefalco (green arrow) to take 
possession of their winter quarters. 
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Map G: The Incursion agains 
Monterotondo. 
The plan of the duke of Urbino was 
simple: the Imperialists could not know 
that the camp of the League had moved 
nearer to their positions, and were not 
expecting an attack on Monterotondo, 
where the main body of the light cavalry, 
one of their great assets, was quartered, 
and around which the surveillance was 
reduced. Leaving the 'bagaglie' behind, 
moving at the infantry's full speed, 
bringing food for three days only and, 
above all, cutting off any escape route 
behind the enemy by destroying the two 
bridges on the Tevere, the League's strike 
force could either take the elusive 
Imperial light cavalry by surprise or, at 
the very least, force a disastrous 
confrontation on it. It was probably the 
last chance the duke had to do this before 
the arrival of the winter. 
While Montefalco was being 
sacked (green line on the map) and the 
Swiss headed towards their quarters in 
Bevagna (blue line), the duke, the 
marquis and Federico da Bozzolo, with 
all the Mantuan, Venetian and French 
men-at-arms, the Venetian mounted 
crossbowmen and stradiots (see Table 
XVIII) and supported by one thousand 
Venetian foot', eleven hundred men of the 
Black Bands and from five to six hundred 
Swiss in French service were heading 
towards Rome with forced marches 4 (the 
red line on the map). 
Marcello Strozzi, the Florentine 
paymaster to whom Lorenzo Martelli had 
entrusted the five companies that were 
part of the strike force, never tired of 
praising the Black Bands and their 
captains: in two days the eleven hundred 
soldiers had covered 56 'Roman' miles, 
resting for 3-4 hours only, waded across a 
cold river and eaten only nine hundred 
and twenty loaves of bread. '... dicho a 
Vostre Signorie che Quelle hanno una 
tanteria eletta... Vostre Signorie hanno a 
chonosciere non hanno buttato via i loro, 
denari, et tutte le imprese o chamino pare 
4 Lorenzo Martelh to the Ten, 15 Octover 1527, 
ASE Dieci di Balia, Responsive. 125, f 197. 
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loro facile, et al comandarli io li trovo 
facilissimi et ubbidienti ... et a me anno 
questi satisfatto tanto quanto non lo 
potrei mai scrivere. ' 5. However, wrote 
Marcello, the attack on Monterotondo 
had been poorly coordinated. The French 
infantry, that is the Swiss, had not arrived 
on time at the assembly point, Cantalupo, 
and, lacking good reconnaissance 
services, which only experienced light 
cavalry, used to acting in support of foot 
soldiers, could provide, the troops of the 
League had marched 'a uso di zinghani', 
that is, like gypsies. 
During the last stage of its approach 
to Monterotondo, the main body of the 
League's army was preceded by a 
Venetian company of fifty mounted 
crossbowmen under the command of 
captain Farferello, who had been given 
the task of destroying the two bridges 
over the Teverone. Unfortunately the 
Venetians had only carried with them 
instruments apt for the dismantling of 
wooden bridges, and were unable to 
inflict serious damage on their supports, 
which were made of stone. At the same 
time, only one mile from Monterotondo, 
the advance of the troops of the League 
was discovered when a group of Imperial 
light horsemen, who were actually 
looking for the men of Napoleone Orsini 
(the 'abate di Farfa'), ran into a 
detachment of Mantuan cavalry. During 
the ensuing skirmish, the Imperialists 
captured two men-at-arms, discovered 
how grave their own situation was, and, 
having quickly loaded their carts, escaped 
from Monterotondo, heading for Rome 6. 
The noise of the trumpets of the 
Imperial light cavalrymen sounding their 
desperate alarm immediately after the 
first skirmish was a bad surprise both for 
the men garrisoning Monterotondo and 
Marcello Strozzi to the Ten, 21 October 1527, 
ASF, Died di Balia, Responsive. 124, ff. 91 
92 V. 
6 Carlo Nuvoloni to the marquis of Mantua, 22 
October 1527. ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 875, ff. 367 r. - 368 
r. 
for the advancing infantry of the League. 
'Restamo tutti spaventati', admitted 
Marcello Strozzi; had the imperialists had 
with them two hundred arquebusiers and 
as many light horsemen, he admitted, 
'faciavamo mala pruova, et forse 
dolorosa fine'. Marcello Strozzi,, who was 
walking ahead of the Black Bands to urge 
them on, found himself thrown into the 
action ('... li nimici mi furono a un 
passo... '), and was just glad that the 
'tanto animosP captains were always in 
the first rank with their flags, even after 
they had marched for two days, just like 
their men. Although in the past he had 
expressed a different judgement on the 
Black Bands, this experience forced him 
to reconsider it completely 7. 
In the meantime the Venetian light 
horsemen, who did not know that their 
comrades had been sighted, had been 
trying to damage the bridges with their 
inadequate tools, and found themselves 
separated from the main body of the 
force, caught between the retreating 
Imperialists and the reinforcements sent 
from Rome. The duke and the forces of 
the League went back to Umbria and to 
their new winter quarters, but captain 
Farferello was forced to surrender with 
all his men, with the exception of two 
who drowned in the Teverone trying to 
avoid capture. 
The planning and the execution of 
the failed attack against Monterotondo 
were criticised by Florence, which 
favoured a more defensive strategy. The 
incursion was a striking failure, which 
weakened the League's forces, but in fact 
the strike force had come exceedingly 
close to achieving a spectacular success. 
According to Sigismondo della Torre, 
Mantuan ambassador in Rome, only the 
fortuna & Cesare had saved the precious 
7 '... dicho a Vostre Signorie che Quelle hanno 
una fanteria eletta e chapitani in tanto animosi che 
n'& da fare conto, e se mai ne parlai altrimenti la 
experientia mi fa ridire, perchd vogliono 
combattere, che vi prometto Signori Miei fu 
mirabile chosa tutti li chapitani a piede havere 
chaminato dua giorni e di ghaloppo si pu6 dire... ' 
Imperial Ift cavalry from complete 
annihilation . 
Given the League's almost 
complete lack of good light horsemen, 
and the major role played by the Imperial 
mounted troops in the following 
campaign, that would have represented a 
major victory. In the following months, 
the military leaders of the League would 
frequently have cause to regret the failure 
of a daring plan that had so nearly 
succeeded. 
8, 
*** cosa memorabile. essendoci concorso 
solamente la pura et sola fortuna dello Imperatore, 
che veramente la cosa facillima da riuscire. et 
riuscendo era di estrema importanza a questo 
esercito... '. Sigismondo Fanzino della Torre to 
the maquis of Mantua, 23 October 1527, ASMn, 
Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 
875, ff. 2 10 r. -212 v. See also Sanuto, Diarii, 46, 
p. 294. 
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Appendix 2: 
The Battle of Capo d'Orso 
(28 April 1528) 
The routes followed by the two fleets - red for the Imperialist gallus, blue for the Leygue's. 
Dotted blue line: distance covered by Gilbert A Crocq's arquebusiers 
The naval battle of Capo d'Orso shows some very interesting characteristics that went 
beyond its immediate effects on the tactical situation around Naples, which in fact were 
negligible, and deserve a separate analysis. First of all, there was the nature of the two 
fleets involved: they were not 'national' fleets in any sense. In fact, the Spanish (two of 
them Catalan) and Italian galleys that composed the Imperial squadron were not, even 
formally, under a centralized control: their captains, military entrepreneurs of the sea, 
had willingly 'offered" their ships to viceroy Hugo de Moncada. On the other side, the 
galleys of the League were not Genoese: their crews were from Genoa, but the ships 
were the property of Andrea Doria, were placed under the command of his nephew 
Filippino and fought, at that moment, under French contract. From the administrative 
and from the strictly technical point of view there was not a great deal of difference 
between the two fleets; Capo d'Orso was not a classical confrontation between 
Christian and Muslim ships. 
However, even though there are plenty of detailed accounts 2 of the battle itself, 
the reasons that led to one of the most bloody naval confrontations in the Mediterranean 
1 Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, I May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza 
estera, Napoli e Roma, 876, f. 249 r. On the 'condottieri del mare', and especially on the Doria dinasty, 
see Guilmartin, Gunpowder, pp. 21-34. 
2 The most famous of all is Paolo Giovio's detailed letter to Clement VII - Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI, p. 664 
ff. later revised and included in his Historie. Seconda Parte, book XXV, pp. 75 - 82. Giovio was in 
Ischia during the siege, and was able to speak immediately after the battle with the winners (he was a 
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before Lepanto have never been investigated. All early modem sources offer different 
explanations, which are unfounded, or incomprehensible, but invariably insufficient. 
What could possibly have persuaded Hugo de Moncada, an experienced soldier and a 
veteran of the Spanish expeditions against Barbary, to risk all of his naval forces in a 
single, dangerous gamble? From a contemporary point of view, the need to destroy 
Doria's fleet before it could join the Venetian squadron might seem a good enough 
motivation, but it was probably not good enough in the sixteenth century. In fact, 
Mediterranean warfare did not call for the annihilation of the enemy fleet at any cost, 
but for the conquest, and the protection, of the harbours. To quote Guilmartin, 
Mediterranean warfare at sea was 'amphibious' in nature. The Neapolitan squadron 
could have been very useful even in front of a preponderant Venetian/Genoese fleet, 
both as a deterrent force and as support for the maritime relief expeditions 3. 
Moreover, the outcome of a confrontation of the size of Capo d'Orso - eight 
galleys against six supported by smaller ships - was usually easy to foresee, and the 
force that found itself in the more tactically disadvantageous position tended to avoid 
the confrontation at any cost. Once the battle had started, the galleys were inextricably 
engaged and there was no turning back, and the odds were usually easy to calculate. 
However, in the case of Capo d'Orso we have the unusual case of two relatively small 
forces that went into battle each trusting in its own superiority. 
As in the case of Lepanto, albeit on a much smaller scale, the reasons and the 
hoped for benefits that brought the Imperial fleet to the confrontation were political 
rather than military. In his attempt to prevail over the prince of Orange and his 
friend of Filippino) and the losers, since he was on a mission for marquis del Vasto's wife, his host in 
Ischia, who was worried about the fate of her husband. See Zimmermann, Paolo Giovio, pp. 102-105; 
Guicciardini, Storia d7talia, book XIX, chapt. 1, pp. 1930-1934; Rosso, Historia, pp. 28-29; Santoro, Dei 
successi, pp. 70-74. 
On naval warfare during this period, see the third section of the second chapter of this dissertation. 'The 
Living, the Dead, the Seafarers'. On the differences between Mediterranean and 'Oceanic' sea warfare, 
see Guilmartin, Gunpowder, pp. 16-4 1. 
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supporters, Hugo de Moncada insisted on transferring the struggle to the only area of 
conflict where his personal experience and reputation were unquestionably superior to 
those of the Burgundian Philibert de Chalon - the sea4. 
A hand-picked contingent of six-seven hundred Spanish soldiers and two hundred 
LandsknechtS5 (mainly arquebusiers) was embarked on the six galleys, two fuste, three 
brigantini and the other smaller vessels 6 that made up the Imperial fleet. Given the 
superior numbers and firepower of Filippino's squadron of eight galleys Moncada's 
plan was to 'grapple' with the Doriane ships as soon as possible and to board them in 
order to utilize his main asset, the dreaded Imperial infantry. 
The letters of the ambassadors in the camp of the League teStifY7 to the sense of 
bewilderment caused by the sight of the sortie of the Imperial galleys (27 April), 
crammed with arquebusiers and bent on destroying the League's fleet. In a great hurry 
three hundred arquebusiers under the command of the Gascon captain Gilbert du Crocq 
were sent to Salemo to reinforce the crews of Filippino Doria's galleys, but no one 
could really say if they would arrive on time. 
Fortunately for the League, the Imperialists first went to Pozzuoli, where they 
rested during the night. On the next day (28 April) Moncada moved his squadron to the 
island of Capri, where, before moving towards Salerno, he and his men found the time 
to listen to the sermon of a resident Spanish hermit, who encouraged them to fight 
bravely against the Genoese, those 'white Moors' who kept chained so many valiant 
4 Girolamo Naselli to the duke of Ferrara, 23 May 1528, ASMo, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio principi 
esteri, Napoli, 9, the folios are not numbered. On the rivalry between Moncada and the prince, see also 
Rosso, Historia, p. 27. 
5 In his letter to Clement, Giovio wrote generically of seven hundred Imperial soldiers. In his Historie, he 
maintained that the Spaniards were selected not only according to their personal valour, but also 
according to their past experiences in sea warfare and to their origins - Biscayan soldiers, for instance, 
were less likely to suffer from sea sickness. The two hundred Germans under the command of 
'Corradino' were not mixed with the Spaniards. 
6 These were the main sub-classes of oared vessels in order of decreasing size, number of oars, calibre of 
artillery and manpower: galea. =a, galera bastarda, galera, galeotta, fusta, brigantino. 
II... quando s'intese che questa armata de'nimici andava a assaltare la nostra si temeva forte che 'I 
danno avessi a toccar a noi'. Marco del Nero to the Ten, 29 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 
128, f. 268 r. . '. --& stato miraculo grande 
in favor di questi de la Legha... ' Ludovico Ceresara to the 
marquis of Mantua, I May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 249 r. 
341 
Spaniards to the oars. This delay was disastrous. At four p. m. du Crocq's arquebusiers 
arrived in Salerno, and half an hour after they had embarked, at five p. m., the Imperial 
fleet was sighted. 
Table XXII 
Capo d'Orso; 9.00 p. m. 
Probable order of Battle of the Imperial 
Fleet - approaching from East 
Probable order of Battle of the League's 
Fleet - approaching from West 
fusta 
fusta 
Gobba 8 
Sechanies 9 Pellegrina 
Villamarinalo Donzella 
Capitanal I Capitana 12 
Perpignana 13 Fortuna 
Calabresa 14 Sirena 
Galleys that feigned to escape steering 
southwards (open sea): 
Mora 15 
Patrona 
Signora 
Even though in his Historie Giovio reports the war cry bellowed by the Italian 
sailors after the speech made by Filippino, 16 , 
du Crocq confided to the Mantuan 
ambassador that before the battle the morale of the soldiers was - to quote an Italian 
saying - under the keel, and the Italians considered themselves as good as dead 
17 
. 
Surrounded by many smaller ships and adorned with an incredible number of flags, the 
' The Gobba was the galley of Fabrizio Giustiniani from Genoa, nicknamed 'Gobbo' (the Hunchback). 
Cesare Fieramosca was embarked on this ship. 
9 This was the only galley Giovio left without a proper 'name'. His captain was a Catalan called 
'Sechanies'. 
10 The galley of the Catalan don Bernardo Villamarin. 
11 The flagship of Hugo de Moncada 
12 The flagship of Filippino Doria. 
13 The Germans under the command of 'Corradino Glornio' were embarked on the Perpignana and on the 
Calabresa. 
14 The Calabresa was also called 'Calabresa Oria', since its captain Francesco de Loria was (or at least 
claimed to be) a descendant of the famous Ruggiero d'Auria, Italian commander of the Aragonese fleet. 
15The Mora, owned by the Moro family of Genoa, was under the command of Niccol6 Lomellini, who 
guided the diversionary manoeuvre of the three Doria galleys. 
" In the letter to Clement VII the speech of Filippino Doria was very short ('Qua non ý da fuggir. Poi che 
haverno li fanti, atendiamo a far talmente che la Gloria del signor missier Andrea Doria non si perda con 
la ruina nostra et infamia'). while the version of the Historie is quite long and elaborate. 
17 , 
... 
in vero se tenevano per morti sul principio e como disperati questi Italiani combattevano havendosi 
messi per persi.... Ludovico Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, I May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, 
corrispondenza estera, Roma, 876, f. 250 r. 
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Imperial galleys were an impressive sight and looked like the coat of arms of the duke 
of Sessal 8. However, Filippino and his Genoese comiti considered the situation with 
sangfroid: they knew that only the ships with crow's nests (the galleys) really counted19; 
the others were merely a show2o. Aware that his was a very narrow advantage, Filippino, 
unchained all his Moorish and Turkish oarsmen, and offered them freedom in exchange 
for their help against the common enemy. 
At 9 p. m., after the ships of the League had left their shelter of Capo d'Orso, the 
two fleets faced each other, and, with a furious cannonade, the battle began. Three of 
the Doria galleys, the Mora, the Patrona and the Signora, left the fon-nation and headed 
for the open sea, seemingly abandoning the battlefield. The remaining five galleys of 
the League faced a, now, superior Imperial force, which had also the wind in its favour 
and the sun behind. Overtaking the other ships, Moncada's Capitana faced the enemy 
flagship bow to bow, and was hit by what was probably one of the most famous cannon 
shots of the sixteenth century, fired by the centreline piece of Filippino's Capitana. The 
ball of the basilisco literally 'cleared' the gangway between the rowing benches, which 
was crammed with soldiers. Almost forty men died immediately, and among them the 
galley's captain and his staff'21. Unlike the Spaniards, the Genoese fired their arquebuses 
while staying crouched behind the broadsides, between the rowing benches. While the 
two flagships collided and started their deadly struggle, the Gobba, the Sicamas, the 
Villamarina and the smaller ships attacked the Pellegrina and the Donzella. The 
' 8Consalvo de Cordova, the Gran Capitan, was also duke of Sessa. His personal emblem was surrounded 
by sixty-four little flags, one for each of the cities he had conquered on behalf of his king. Sanuto, Diarii, 
XL VT p. 664. 
19 Ibid. On a galley, during the battles the 'gatti' were crammed (from ten to twenty men) with snipers and 
sailors with stones. 
20 According to Guicciardini, many fishing boats followed Moncada's galleys 'per spaventare gli inimici 
da lontano'. Storia d7talia, book XIX, chapt. I., p. 193 1. 
2' Among the 'Homini di qualitd' killed by the cannonade there was also Luis de Guzman, famous 
Spanish musician, who decided to join the expedition at the last moment 'per burla si come lo strascinava 
la sorte... '. Francesco Icardo had the flesh of his thigh up to the buttock wrenched away, but he survived 
'... con horribile, ma non per6 con mortal colpo, perciochd egli era molto grasso... '; Giovio, La Seconda 
Parle, P. 8 1. 
34) 
Spaniards boarded them and quickly overwhelmed the Genoese and Gascon resistance. 
The Perpignana and the Calabresa ran into the isolated Sirena, that had found herself 
too distanced from the Fortuna, and captured a third Dorian galley. Eventually, the 
Fortuna and Filippino's Capitana were practically surrounded, and the League's fleet 
faced a crushing defeat. 
The return of the three Genoese galleys that had left the formation at the 
beginning of the battle reversed the situation. Moncada's plan had worked, but now all 
of his galleys were committed, and could not manoeuvre in order to face the new threat; 
their stems and flanks, equipped with a few counter boarding guns, were totally 
exposed. Lined up in an echelon, the Dorian galleys opened fire against the Imperial 
Capitana 22; the cannonballs of the Mora destroyed the rudder, the Patrona's knocked 
down the maimnast, the Signora's shattered the spur. While the Mora ran into the flank 
of Moncada's flagship, the two other galleys relentlessly battered the Gobba from 
afar 23 . Filippino's Moors, almost naked and equipped with swords and bucklers, 
regained the Donzella. The Sechanies and the Villamarina were both sunk 24 . The fuste 
were captured and the other vessels were dispersed. When the captains of the 
Perpignana and of the Calabresa saw the Imperial standard fall from the Capitana's 
mainmast, they decided that the battle was lost, disengaged and went back to NapleS25. 
22 Hugo de Moncada died fighting, with a sword and a rotella in his hands. All the oarsmen and the one 
hundred and fifty arquebusiers embarked on the Capitana were killed. Even Giovangirolamo da Trani, 
captain general of the Imperial ordnance, was among the fallen. Alfonso de Avalos and Ascanio Colonna, 
both wounded and smeared with blood and 'cervella', surrendered to Niccol6 Lomellini. 
23 , *** le altre 
due refrustorno la Gobba con una grandine di archibusate et canonate... '. Cesare 
Fieramosca was killed, together with one hundred and three Spanish arquebusiers out of one hundred and 
eight that had made up captain Baredo's company. Seven standard bearers died one after another while 
holding the company's flag. Sanuto, Diarii, XL VI. 
24 'Sechanies valentemente et don Bernardo Vilamarino restomo nella zuffa et furno tagliati a pezzi et 
posto le loro galle a fondo; don Bernardo fu tutto brusato, Sechanies fu passato da uno archibuso nella 
Fola... '. Ibid. 
5 Back in Naples, the captains of the two remaining Imperial galleys were accused of cowardice, since 
many Imperial officers thought that they had abandoned the battlefield while it was still possible to turn 
the tide of the battle. Threatened with death, captain Francesco brought his Calabresa out of Naples' 
harbour, moored it on the shore near the besieging camp and entered negotiations with the League. 
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The battle had lasted from 9 P. M. to I a. m., 'ne mai piu fu si crudel et cosi 
horrenda baruffa'. Of the Imperial galleys two were captured (the Capitana and the 
Gobba), two escaped, two were sunk together with onefusta and one brigantino. More 
than one thousand Spaniards had died, but this number alone does not give the real 
, 26 measure of such a loss: they were 'lo fior del campo et delli veterani , the best 
arquebusiers of the Imperial armY27. Among the fallen there were many 'homini de 
qualitA', 'gentilhomini' and experienced officers; the whole staff of Hugo de Moncada 
and all of his partisans had been either killed or captured. About one thousand Spaniards 
were taken prisoner 28 . The losses of the League amounted to five hundred men between 
soldiers, sailors and oarsmen. 
The victory of Capo d'Orso was the result of Doria's tactical skill and of the 
superior numbers and coordination of his squadron. The dangerous decision to engage 
the Imperial fleet with an, initially, inferior number of vessels allowed Filippino to keep 
intact the only real asset of the League's squadron: its superior firepower. The initial 
gambit gave the three Dorian galleys the time to manoeuvre and to steer their bows - 
along with their cannons - towards the flanks and stems of the immobile Imperial 
vessels 29 . At that distance, there was nothing that the dreaded Spanish arquebusiers, the 
winners of Bicocca and Pavia, could do. Moreover, the Spanish and Gennan veteran 
foot soldiers, embarked for this specific occasion, soon found out that the agile Italian 
sailors and naval soldiers, besides being tough opponents, were playing at home, and 
26 
Sanuto, Diarii, XLVI. 
27 Marco del Nero to the Ten, 29 April 1528, ASF, Dieci di Balia, Responsive, 128, f 268 
28 , In questo ferrar de Spagnoli bisogna che io dica, testimonio del sacco di Roma, et passano mille... ' 
This phrase, with which Giovio gave vent to his anger as a witness of the Sack of Rome. cannot be found 
in the official and published versions of his letters, but only in Sanuto's version of Giovio's account. Only 
the wounds and the humiliations suffered by many of his closest friends restrained Paolo Giovio, 
technically a pro-Imperialist, from showing his satisfaction in seeing utterly defeated those who had 
'ruined the world' - his world. 
19 However. Filippino Doria complained about the fact that the three galleys under the command of 
Lomellini attacked the Imperialists arrayed 'ad organo' (like the pipes of an organ), and not 'di fronte', 
that is maintaining an even front formation. According to him, this fact reduced considerably the effects 
of their fire. 
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knew all the tricks of their trade 30 . Even the 
Gascon captain Du Crocq admitted that 
during the battle the Italians, initially disheartened, had performed incredible deeds 31 . 
The victory was a powerful boost for the morale of the League's troops, and was 
celebrated in the besiegers' camp with trumpets blasts and cannonades. However, in the 
short term and from the tactical point of view, the battle of Capo d'Orso did not produce 
the desired effects. The losses suffered by the Imperialists had been grievous, but not 
catastrophic, and, above all, the destruction of the squadron of Naples could not, and did 
not, reduce significantly the harbour's defensive potential. The League's galleys still 
could not approach and effectively cannonade it; its logistical and strategic 'shadow' 
still forced the enemy ships to operate from a distant base, rendering difficult the job of 
the galleys, hardly the best instrument to enforce a blockade. Pozzuoli surrendered to 
the League, but Ischia and Gaeta remained in Imperial hands. Moreover, Doria's galleys 
were now badly damaged. 
Elsewhere, at the same time, the relations between Andrea Doria and Francis I 
were deteriorating, and, as we shall see, the Genoese condottiere of the sea was having 
very bad dreams. 
ý'o , Da questa bataglia s'& ritratto da l'una et I'altra parte, per il iuditio di periti, che pi6 vale uno marinaro 
in bragessa con spada et rotella et sassi et partesane (short polearms) da lanciare de'soldati de terra 
quantunche electi, perchd lo mare non li comove, sono asuefati come caprioli et limpardi (leopards) a 
saltar per galea, conoscono li lochi pericolosi, et pigliano partito in uno momento. '. Paolo Giovio to 
Clement VII. Sanuto, Diarii, XL V1, p. 667. Other 'technical' military details pointed out by Paolo Giovio 
were the very big arquebuses utilised by the Genovese, whose balls could easily run through 'three or 
four men' and even through the pavesate, that is the wooden temporary bulwarks (buntings? ) erected 
before the battle, and also the pavesate utilised by the Italians themselves, thicker that those of the 
Imperialists. 
31 -Referisce (Du Crocq) questi Italiani hanno fatto cose incomprensibile quella giornata... '. Ludovico 
Ceresara to the marquis of Mantua, I May 1528, ASMn, Archivio Gonzaga, corrispondenza estera, 
Roma. 876, f. 250 r. 
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